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Chapter 1
Introduction
21st century housing markets have posited two major challenges to the developed
world. In the 2000s, increasing credit supply and housing speculation led to the build-
up of a large housing bubble, which eventually resulted in the global financial cri-
sis (Glaeser and Nathanson, 2014; Mian and Sufi, 2015). Following the crisis, central
banks injected large sums of money into the economy while also restricting mortgage
credit to prevent the next crisis.
Today, many believe we face a housing crisis of a very different kind: an affordabil-
ity crisis. Many households feel that proper housing is becoming increasingly out of
reach, with house prices and rents rapidly rising, in particular in cities. Home-owners
increasingly face competition in the housing market from investors (Nijskens et al.,
2019; Mills et al., 2019), who might view real estate as an attractive investment op-
portunity now interest rates are low. According to the United States Human Rights
Council, the recent crisis has caused a shift "from housing as a place to build a home,
to housing as an investment," highlighting the dual role of housing as a consumption
asset and a financial asset.
Societies have started to respond to these issues in different ways. Rent regula-
tion has experienced a revival, with the boldest move taken by the Berlin city council,
which recently decided to freeze housing rents entirely for five years. Beyond rent con-
trols, many governments have increased the stamp duty for investment purchases,
with Amsterdam even completely prohibiting buy-to-let investments for new con-
struction. In the arena of monetary policy, various central bankers have warned that
extended periods of low rates could cause exuberance in housing prices, and called
for action. In many places, housing advocates have called for a relaxation of zoning
constraints, often considered an important driver of expensive housing (Glaeser and
Gyourko, 2018).
At the same time, many of the current problems and their potential solutions are
not new. Housing booms and busts have occurred through history (Figure 1.1), and so
have tensions between property investors and their tenants. (Figure 1.2).
In 16th century Paris, the central court ruled to reduce rents on all existing con-
tracts to 25% of their original amounts, after a devastating siege had hit the city (Féli-
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Figure 1.1: Amsterdam House Prices, 1604-2019
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Notes: This plot shows the Amsterdam house price index in both real and nominal terms, using data and
methods from Chapters 4 to 6 of this dissertation.
bien, 1725). In 16th and 17th century Amsterdam, a continued influx of migrants forced
the municipal government to start a significant expansion of the city, in order to build
homes for all these new city dwellers (Abrahamse, 2010). After Amsterdam house
prices tumbled in the 1740s, home-owners rebelled to reduce property taxes because
"bringing back property prices to their old level will make the bourgeoisie flourish again."
In the novel ’Bleak House,’ Charles Dickens’ character Snagsby talks about London’s
high 19th century rents: "You find the rent high, do you, sir? Rents are high about here.
I don’t know how it is exactly, but the law seems to put things up in price."
The plethora of alleged causes of current and past problems on the housing mar-
ket point out that housing markets are complicated animals. We still lack a complete
understanding of the way housing markets function. Nearly all academic literature in
finance and economics has used modern settings and data to expand our knowledge
of housing markets. This dissertation instead exploits the long course of history to
create a better understanding of the dynamics in urban housing markets, both using
’historical experiments’ and with newly-collected data and statistics on the long-term
evolution of urban housing rents, prices and returns in the past 500 years.
The dual role of housing as a place to live in and as an asset to invest in implies that
housing markets can be analyzed from different points of view. In this dissertation,
the dominant approach is to analyze housing markets from a financial-economic per-
spective. The economic and financial literature studying historical housing markets
5
Figure 1.2: Rent Protests, Berlin, 2019
Figure 1.3: Rent Protests, Amsterdam, 1933
Notes: Rent protests today and in the past. In the 1930s, Amsterdam citizens revolted against high rents
and refused to pay them. In 2019, Berlin citizens protested for rent freezes and demanded the expropri-
ation of property from investors.
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is still in its infancy. Beyond a gradually expanding range of studies on the long-term
development of house prices and rents (e.g. Eichholtz, 1997; Clark, 2002; Knoll, 2017;
Knoll et al., 2017), a handful of studies have used historical settings or long-term data
to understand housing market developments (examples include Fishback et al., 2010;
Rajan and Ramcharan, 2015; White et al., 2014).
Despite this narrow starting point of view, this thesis aims to address housing mar-
ket issues that are of general importance. The remainder of this chapter discusses each
of these issues in more detail and introduces how the long-term studies in this disser-
tation can help to better understand housing markets. The next three chapters present
three studies that aim to measure and describe the long-term developments in urban
housing rents (Chapter 2), housing quality and affordability (Chapter 3), and the re-
turn and risk to real estate investments (Chapter 4). Chapters 5 to 7 use the lens of
history to provide a better understanding of the drivers of urban rents, house prices,
and returns. Chapter 5 studies the role of investor demand in property markets, and
Chapter 6 looks at the consequences of demographic structure and population aging
on urban house prices and rents. Chapter 7 exploits historical epidemics to study their
impact on property prices and rents. This dissertation ends with a summary of the re-
sults of these studies and a discussion of their societal implications.
1.1 Measurement in Property Markets
A house is an investment for its owner and a place to live for its tenants. For tenants,
the cost of living in a property equals its current rental price, and, for longer-term
tenants, the risky future levels of rental prices (Sinai and Souleles, 2005). For investors,
returns accumulate from these rental payments as well as potential capital gains.
Thus, the evolution of rental prices matters, both for long-term investors and for
tenants. However, accurate information on the development of rents is scarce, both
historically and contemporaneously. Most studies in economics and finance focus on
the evolution of house prices, and not rents. For house prices, Knoll et al. (2017) com-
pile data from 13 developed countries to document a ’hockey-stick’ pattern in house
prices since 1870, with home prices exploding in the past thirty years. In one of the
very few studies on housing rents, Knoll (2017) does not find this pattern, with hous-
ing rents climbing 1.4% per annum in real terms since 1870, relative to an annualized
real house price growth of over 2% per year. The recent explosion in house prices
drives nearly all of this diversion. Nevertheless, Jordà et al. (2019a) do find that most
of the return to housing investments derives from rental yields, and not from capital
gains.
However, a more fundamental problem in interpreting these findings is measure-
ment. To understand why, assume that the log rental price or log property price of any
property i in location j at time t can be written as the sum of a quality component αi ,
a market price component β j ,t , and an idiosyncratic price error εi , j ,t :
pi , j ,t =αi +β j ,t +εi , j ,t (1.1)
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Equation 1.1 states that the price of an individual property is a function of its qual-
ity attributes, such as the amount of floor space and the quality of the bathroom(s) and
kitchen(s), and a market price component that varies across locations and over time.
Aggregate house prices and rent prices change over time due to changes in housing
quality and changes in the value of locations.
This basic insight has three important implications for the way we understand the
evolution of prices, returns, and affordability over time. First, indices of rental prices
or property prices might be biased if they do not adequately separate changes in qual-
ity over time from changes in market prices. This issue is potentially severe: only a
few long-term indices of property prices or rents adequately control for quality. This
makes it difficult to understand if rent prices and property prices have risen because
quality has improved over time, or because housing has become fundamentally less
affordable. Making this distinction is crucial in debates about affordability. However,
without data on the evolution of housing quality and quality-controlled housing rents
over the long run, this has not been possible so far.
Second, house prices and rental prices vary across locations, and the past evolu-
tion of prices in a particular area might not necessarily be representative of its future
growth. One striking example is Los Angeles. In the 1850 US Census, the population of
Los Angeles County was a mere 3,500 people. Today, it is home to over 10 million peo-
ple, implying a population growth rate of around 5% per year. At the same time, Los
Angeles grew from a rural settlement to one of the most valuable places in the world.
It would be difficult to believe that Los Angeles will experience similar growth in the
next decades. However, most long-term evidence on the evolution of house prices and
rents is based on ’superstar cities’ like Los Angeles. So alike evidence from the finan-
cial sector (Brown et al., 1992), housing data from the developed world might have a
’survivorship bias:’ it focuses too heavily on areas that have been very successful in the
past.
Finally, these two issues become jointly even more significant when studying re-
turn and risk in property markets. So far, most literature has looked at housing re-
turns either by looking at rent-price ratios from existing indices (Gallin, 2008; Camp-
bell et al., 2009; Ambrose et al., 2013), or by augmenting implied yields from existing
rent and price indices with capital gains from a house price index (Brounen et al., 2014;
Jordà et al., 2019a). If these rents and sales prices do not cover the same properties in
the same locality, or inadequately control for quality, Equation 1.1 suggests these esti-
mates might be significantly off.
These three elements form the motivation for the first three studies in this disserta-
tion. In Chapter 2, which is co-authored with Piet Eichholtz and Thies Lindenthal, we
present the first long-term overview of developments in urban rents in Europe, going
back more than 500 years. Based on an enormous data collection effort of nearly half a
million housing rents, we construct quality-controlled annual rent price indices from
1500 to the present for seven European cities: Amsterdam, Antwerp, Bruges, Brussels,
Ghent, London, and Paris. Second, we combine these new nominal rent indices with
indices of consumer prices – both existing and newly constructed – to investigate de-
velopments in real housing rents.
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Importantly, the seven cities in our sample offer rich data on housing markets
against very diverse economic developments. For example, cities as London and Paris
started as ’superstar cities’ in 1500 and remained so for the entire sample. On the other
hand, Bruges was a very successful city in 1500, but reduced in importance over time
and was very poor in the 19th century, only recovering somewhat in the 20th and 21st
century.
In real terms, housing rents have grown barely over the long-run, with an aver-
age growth of 0.15% per annum in the cities we study (Figure 1.4). However, there
are essential cross-sectional differences that closely relate to the economic trajecto-
ries of these cities. For example, while persistent ’superstar cities’ such as London and
Paris experienced a growth rate of housing rents of 0.3% per year, ’fallen angels’ like
Ghent and Bruges experienced no real rental growth at all. These rental growth dif-
ferences closely correlate to the past population growth rates in these cities. Investors
who base their return estimates on past returns in high-growth cities, where most of
the currently available long-term data originate from, will thus fundamentally over-
estimate housing returns when moving forward. Because urban population growth is
predicted to slow down, this issue will likely grow in importance over time.
Figure 1.4: Average Real Rents and Real Wages, 1500-2018
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Notes: This figure reports the unweighted average of real rent and real wage indices in Amsterdam,
Antwerp, Bruges, Brussels, Ghent, London and Paris. These indices will be constructed and motivated in
Chapters 2 and 3.
In Chapter 3, which is co-authored with Piet Eichholtz and Thies Lindenthal, we
analyze the evolution of urban housing affordability, quality, and inequality since 1500.
Motivated by the recent debates about urban affordability, we aim to identify how
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urban housing affordability has developed over time. To do so, we complement the
rental data used in Chapter 2, with information about the development of wages,
housing quality and housing inequality.
This long-term perspective sketches a very different picture of the developments
in housing affordability. Before 1900, a period of unregulated markets, we find the
ratio of wages to quality-controlled prices was relatively stable. In growing cities, we
find that increases in rental prices were compensated by increasing wages. Instead,
the main negative consequence of long-term urban is an increase in housing inequal-
ity. Part of this increase is attributable to differences in rent price increases across
cheaper and more expensive segments. In cities that declined in population, we find
substantial affordability improvements, because housing supply could not adjust, re-
sulting in large rent price reductions (Glaeser and Gyourko, 2005). After 1900, we find
that aggregate housing affordability, in terms of the ratio of quality-controlled rents
to wages, improved drastically. For one hour of work, an average worker can now
purchase between three to eight times as many units of housing compared to 1900.
Although affordability has recently started worsening in some of the cities we study,
rental housing remains far more affordable than before (see Figure 3.2).
If housing affordability improved so much over time, why do urban households
spend large fractions of their income on housing? The answer is rising housing con-
sumption. We document that urban rental housing quality and housing consump-
tion per capita have both risen considerably, while housing inequality has reduced
substantially. Over time, housing space per capita increased, and homes increasingly
contained amenities like electricity, heating, or plumbing. Housing quality already
rose considerably from the 16th to the 18th century. Although temporarily halted by
the Industrial Revolution, the upward trend in housing quality accelerated in the 20th
century, helped by improvements in rental affordability. This time, these benefits ac-
crued more widely than before, as housing inequality reduced substantially.
For investors, the expansion of housing quality and populations implies that res-
idential housing has grown enormously as an asset class. Although buy-to-let invest-
ment reduced for most of the 20th century due to rising homeownership rates (Knoll,
2017), residential housing investment has made a comeback recently (Bracke, 2019;
Mills et al., 2019). In Chapter 4, which is co-authored with Piet Eichholtz, Thies Lin-
denthal, and Ronan Tallec, we aim to estimate the actual return and risk to real estate
investments for both Paris (1809–1942) and Amsterdam (1900–1979), and at the aggre-
gate and individual property level.
The unique contribution of this chapter is that it builds on actual observations
of rents and prices for the same properties over time, rather than implied measures
of returns. We hand-collected over 170,000 observations of rents, sales prices, and
property-level taxes and costs, covering a representative sample of about 40,000 dif-
ferent properties. The data allow both to construct quality-adjusted total returns in-
dices for rental housing and to estimate the risk and return to rental housing at the
individual property level.
In aggregate, we find a total nominal geometric return to rental housing of 6.3 per-
cent for Paris and 8.0 percent for Amsterdam, with index-level standard deviations of
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8.6 percent and 10.3 percent. We find that measuring returns at the house-level mat-
ters. Our results indicate lower risk-adjusted returns and low correlations relative to
the implied returns in Jordà et al. (2019a), even though these two studies aim to track
the same asset base. More importantly, we find that idiosyncratic risk matters. In
the short-term, almost all return variance is idiosyncratic and originating from cap-
ital gains risk, but the fraction of idiosyncratic risk reduces over time to about 50%
for holding periods of up to 20 years. In the long-term, yield covariance becomes the
most important determinant of idiosyncratic risk: properties bought at a higher-than-
market yield will continue to have high yields in the future.
1.2 Historical Housing Markets as Experiment
The red line through the first three studies in this dissertation is that they provide new
stylized facts on important parameters in the housing market, based on long-term his-
torical data. The second set of studies exploits historical settings and long-term data
to identify important relationships in property markets. There is an expanding trend
within economics to use history to provide (close to) causal evidence on relationships
that are of general interest (see Cantoni and Yuchtman, 2020). Examples in finance in-
clude Koudijs (2016), Koudijs and Voth (2016) and Xu (2018), and in urban economics
Nunn and Qian (2011), Bleakley and Lin (2012) and Ambrus et al. (2020). However,
the use of specific historical settings and data has been much more limited in housing
market research. Booms and busts in house prices or rents have occurred many times
in history (Glaeser, 2013), and there is much that can be learned from these historical
dynamics.
Chapter 5 exploits the historical setting of 17th-18th century Amsterdam to exam-
ine the impact of investor demand on housing markets. It investigates whether peri-
ods of low interest rates cause investors to switch towards buyer higher-yielding assets
like real estate, and what the price implications of these shifts are. In the past decade,
interest rates have fallen to historically low levels, while investor interest in real estate
has surged. Market commentators often describe this shift towards real estate as a
’reach for yield’ now interest rates are so low. This reach for yield is nonetheless hard
to identify in modern markets because interest rates are endogenous and portfolio
data scarce.
I exploit archival data from 164,067 housing transactions and 25,962 investor port-
folios to show that Amsterdam experienced large boom-bust cycles in housing prices,
but only minor changes in housing rents and bond yields. During these booms and
busts, the fraction of wealth invested in real estate rose significantly, in particular for
very wealthy rentiers who lived from capital income.
To identify whether these wealthy investors were reaching for yield, I exploit the
outbreak of expensive wars abroad. These wars were uncorrelated to the Amster-
dam economy, but exogenously increased the supply and yields of Holland govern-
ment bonds, which wealthy rentiers bought for a stable capital income. When the
war ended, and Holland stopped issuing bonds, wealthy rentiers could not reinvest
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their interest payments in new bond issues. Instead of buying bonds in the secondary
market, investors increasingly purchased real estate, inflating house prices. Wealthy
bondholders were reaching for yield: Facing declining bond yields, they invested in-
creasing shares of their wealth in real estate, and significantly drove up house prices.
Because regular home-owners with more limited wealth did not engage in such be-
havior, the very rich owned an increasing fraction of homes in Amsterdam, resulting
in a persistent increase in housing wealth inequality.
Chapter 5 highlights the role of buy-to-let investors in determining the distribu-
tion of housing wealth and the level of house prices, particularly in a low interest rate
environment. These investors are not the only actors in the housing market. Nowa-
days, owner-occupiers make most housing purchases. For home-owners, purchasing
a property is both a house to live in and a way to accumulate wealth. However, the
investment and consumption demand for housing is not stable over the life cycle. The
demand for housing consumption is age-dependent, rising fast in early adulthood and
flattening gradually for older ages (Mankiw and Weil, 1989). Similarly, life-cycle mod-
els predict investment demand for housing to be high for young adults, and to reduce
at older ages when individuals consume out of their wealth (e.g. Poterba, 2001; Abel,
2003).
The implication is that investment and consumption demand for housing varies
with the demographic structure of the population. These changes might be particu-
larly salient now populations are aging. However, it is unclear how such shifts affect
the prices of rental and owner-occupied housing because they are slow and typically
endogenous. Chapter 6, which is joint work with Marc Francke, combines Amster-
dam and Paris house price and rent data from previous chapters with annual data on
fertility and mortality. By looking at centuries of data, we can construct a sufficiently
large sample to examine the predictive effects of slow-moving demographic variables
on housing costs.
We test whether historical fertility can predict current changes in housing costs.
Our primary identifying assumption is that historical fertility predicts current housing
demand, but is unrelated to other economic variables that might correlate with cur-
rent housing demand, after controlling for aggregate changes in population, wages,
and consumer prices. We look both at changes in rent prices, which capture con-
sumption demand, and changes in house prices, that capture both investment and
consumption demand.
We show that changes in demographic structure have small effects on rent prices.
However, we find significant impacts of changes in the demographic structure on house
prices and rental yields. A one percentage point increase in fertility about 25 years ago
increases current rent prices by 5.4% and reduces rental yields by about 5%. We find
opposite effects for cohorts born around 60 years ago. A fertility increase 60 years ago
increases current rental yields and decreases house prices. In short, our results indi-
cate that the age-dependent investment demand for housing is an essential driver of
property prices.
Chapter 7, which is joint work with Marc Francke, derives its inspiration from a
very recent threat to the housing market: the outbreak of COVID-19. In this chapter,
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we exploit historical outbreaks of cholera in Paris and the plague in Amsterdam to
study their impacts on housing markets.
Based on much of the data presented in earlier papers, we document that major
epidemics cause significant but short-lived declines in house prices, and have only
small effects on rental prices. These effects are most substantial just after the out-
break of an epidemic, and in the worst-affected areas. We argue that epidemics tem-
porarily increase risk aversion, resulting in higher risk premia and lower house prices.
However, this price decline is only temporary, and barely visible in rent prices. For
both Paris and Amsterdam, the outbreaks did not stop a massive flow of migrants from
coming to the city, implying that house prices and rents quickly started growing again.
Our findings suggest that urban economies are highly resilient to massive economic
shocks, and that it is unlikely that the current pandemic will result in structural reduc-
tions in urban housing rents.
Chapter 2
500 Years of Housing Rents*
Housing is today the world’s largest asset class. It has not always been that way. In
1700, only 15 percent of total English and French wealth was invested in housing, with
most of the remainder invested in agricultural real estate. Three centuries later, this
number had risen to about 60 percent (Piketty and Zucman, 2014), while the capital
share of agricultural real estate fell almost to zero. The growth of housing over the past
centuries cannot be separated from the fact that population and income growth have
enormously expanded the demand for housing consumption. This increased demand
has not only resulted in more and larger residential properties, but also in rising real
house prices (Knoll et al., 2017). Because of urbanization, this has been particularly
the case in cities (Combes et al., 2019).
The rise of housing as an asset class has likely supported the beliefs of both home-
owners and investors that residential properties are a good investment for the long
term. However, this belief might be misguided. First, most long-run data on hous-
ing prices or rents contain a strong bias towards modern "superstar cities": modern
capitals or cities that have grown much faster than the general population (Gyourko
et al., 2013).2 However, the cities that have grown a lot in the past may not be the cities
that will grow a lot in the future. History is full of such examples, such as Alexandria,
Vijayanagara, and Rome, or the more recent case of Detroit. Similar to a ’survivorship
bias’ in studies of mutual fund returns (Brown et al., 1992), there might be a ’superstar
bias’ in studies of housing returns.
Second, urbanization is expected to slow down significantly, in particular in devel-
oped countries. In the 1950s, urban populations in developed countries expanded by
about 2.5 percent per year. Today, this number is about 0.5 percent, and this growth is
predicted to weaken further (United Nations, 2017).
Finally, interest rates have declined towards zero over the past few decades, so
that house prices have increased much more than rents. However, over the long term,
nearly all asset returns are driven by the cash flows they generate, both in stock mar-
*This chapter is co-authored with Piet Eichholtz (Maastricht University) and Thies Lindenthal (Uni-
versity of Cambridge)
2Examples include Eichholtz (1997); Eitrheim and Erlandsen (2004); Nicholas and Scherbina (2013);
Shiller (2005); Knoll et al. (2017); Knoll (2017).
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kets (Dimson et al., 2009; Le Bris et al., 2019) and housing markets (Jordà et al., 2019a;
Chambers et al., 2020; Eichholtz et al., 2020c). This implies that for long-term housing
investors it is rental growth that matters.
In this paper, we assess the long-term performance of housing investments by
studying urban rents in seven European cities since 1500. Based on about half a mil-
lion rental cash flows received by institutional investors, we estimate annual rent price
indices for Amsterdam, Antwerp, Bruges, Brussels, Ghent, London, and Paris. We show
that since 1500 real housing rents have grown by about 0.2 percent per year, but that
this growth is skewed towards current-day ’superstar cities. Cities that were ’super-
stars’ in 1500 but did not maintain that status, such as Ghent and Bruges, experienced
no long-term rental growth at all.
Our paper makes three important contributions. First, we provide for the very first
time a perspective on the long-term evolution of urban rental prices against very di-
verse economic developments. Studies regarding the long-term performance of urban
housing markets often focus on cities that are currently predominant, like New York
(Margo, 1996), London (Clark, 2002), Amsterdam (Eichholtz, 1997), Beijing (Raff et al.,
2013) or Paris (Duon, 1946). Studies that do include smaller cities, such as the study of
Eitrheim and Erlandsen (2004) for Norway, typically cover periods where the studied
cities grew much faster than the general population. This focus on high-growth areas
could give rise to an urban form of survivorship bias in which price appreciation and
rental growth could be systematically overestimated.
On the contrary, the seven European cities that make up our sample started as su-
perstar cities in the 16th century, and then experienced extremely diverse economic,
social, and political trajectories. Paris and London remained capital cities, of countries
that later became the centers of great empires and that are still among the most im-
portant nations on the planet. Amsterdam and Brussels also remained capital cities,
but of much smaller countries, and their subsequent urban development was in line
with the size of their countries. Antwerp and Ghent kept on prospering initially, but
slowed down and then shrunk later, only to regain some of their luster in the 19th and
20th centuries. Bruges was undoubtedly a European superstar city in 1500, but then
ceased to play a role of economic or political influence, getting very poor in the 19th,
and recovering somewhat in the 20th century, mostly as an interesting tourist destina-
tion. We find that these differences are strongly reflected in the level of rents.
Our second contribution lies in the creation of the new rent indices themselves:
these are annual-frequency indices, based on primary data, estimated using a state-of-
the-art methodology that accounts for quality differences, consistently applied across
cities. These indices – which are the longest in the literature – give important insights
into the long-term developments of the housing market rental price.
Our work is closely related to the studies of Knoll et al. (2017) for house prices
and Knoll (2017) for housing rents, which diligently splice together pre-existing house
price and rent indices to obtain annual indices covering 14 different advanced economies
from 1870 to 2015. However, contrary to this paper, they do not collect primary data
and combine indices that widely differ in quality and representativeness, and are mostly
not quality-controlled. To our knowledge, the only other attempt to compile rent in-
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dices across countries has been the work of Hoffman et al. (2002), as part of a broader
study on real inequality before 1800. That study does not differentiate between urban
and rural rents though, and more importantly, as in Knoll et al. (2017), it combines in-
dices constructed with different methods, some of which do (and many do not) con-
trol for housing quality. As the authors acknowledge, and we will show, this can have a
dramatic impact on the resulting rent indices and their comparability.
Beyond applying quality controls and covering a more diverse and representative
set of cities, our series also span a much longer period of time than existing work. We
provide the first consistent overview and comparison of housing rents across cities
and centuries, updated to current times. We collected more than 436,000 individual
rent observations from archival sources and earlier studies, such as Clark (2002) for
London, to estimate indices that go back from today until 1500. There are two impor-
tant reasons why it is useful to study the evolution of rents before the late 19th century.
First, most urban rental markets in Europe have been under some form of govern-
ment regulation since the early 20th century (Arnott, 1995), in particular around the
World Wars. We find that in these periods, real housing rents fluctuated substantially,
and it is unlikely that they are representative of the general long-term evolution in
rent prices. Our long-term study gives a perspective on housing rents for the 400-year
period before direct rent regulation and other market interventions were introduced,
when only demand and supply were setting rent prices.
Second, urban population growth has been exceptionally high over the past 150
years. This enormous increase in demand for urban locations has undoubtedly re-
sulted in increasing prices. However, urban population growth has slowed down sig-
nificantly, and the European Union projects that about 50 percent of European cities
will lose population in the next decades. In line with evidence from Glaeser and Gy-
ourko (2005) for US house prices, we show that urban growth has very different im-
plications for rental price growth than urban decline. In our very long-term dataset,
we observe episodes of urban growth followed by extended periods of decline, and
this likely provides a more representative picture of future rental growth than studying
only the past two centuries that were generally characterized by the triumph of the
city.
This brings us to the final contribution of this paper: a better understanding of the
long term financial performance of investment assets, and more specifically, housing.
Real estate investments have always been the largest asset class, and within the real es-
tate asset class, housing investments have become more important over time relative
to land (Piketty and Zucman, 2014). However, unlike the stock market (e.g. Dimson
et al., 2009; Siegel, 2014; Annaert et al., 2015; Golez and Koudijs, 2017; Le Bris et al.,
2019; Jordà et al., 2019a), there exist relatively few studies that trace the long-term re-
turns of real estate investments.
Recently, Jordà et al. (2019a) compiled total return estimates since 1870 by imput-
ing returns based on the rent indices from Knoll (2017) and the house price indices
from Knoll et al. (2017). Chambers et al. (2020) use actual return data to provide es-
timates for the UK from 1901 to 1970, and Eichholtz et al. (2020c) do so for Paris be-
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tween 1809 and 1942, and for Amsterdam from 1900 to 1979.3 The latter two studies
find substantially lower risk-adjusted returns than Jordà et al. (2019a), and show that
mismeasurement in rent prices plays an important role in understanding these devi-
ations. However, these studies still focus exclusively on estimating long-run returns in
an era of significant population growth, particularly in cities. This is not the case in
our study.
The total return to any housing investment is the sum of all received rents and
the realized capital gain, relative to the initial purchase price. In this paper, we ig-
nore the role of capital gains and focus only on the evolution of housing rents over
time. In a standard discounted cash flow model, capital gains can either arise through
(expected) real rental growth or through changes in the required return to housing in-
vestments. Because we only study rents, our approach does not capture any changes
in the latter.
We argue that this is of limited relevance for very long-term investors, such as pen-
sion funds, life insurance companies, and sovereign wealth funds. After purchasing or
constructing a property, all returns derive from rents, with changes in discount rate
playing barely any role. This is in line with existing evidence. Chambers et al. (2020)
and Eichholtz et al. (2020c) show that capital gains do not contribute at all to total
returns, and in Jordà et al. (2019a) their contribution is minor relative to rental yields.4
Fluctuations in discount rates and yields still have very significant implications for
the valuations and returns of properties over shorter horizons. In line with this, we
provide evidence that the institutional investors in our sample sold their properties at
very different yields. However, this paper aims to study the long-term cash flow returns
to housing, rather than looking at risk-return characteristics over the short-term.
If the absence of capital gains, which is found in existing studies, is driven by re-
ductions in housing rents, then changes in discount rates could still influence long-
term returns. For very long-term returns, however, changes in discount rates do not
matter. We find no time trend in the yields and corresponding required returns to
housing investments. This suggests that the long-term downward trend in interest
rates documented in Schmelzing (2020) does not generalize to housing, or at least not
for European economies after 1500. One potential reason for this finding is that the
fundamental risk to rental housing investments could be more stationary over time
than the risk to government debt. While the latter is currently associated with low
default risk, that was not at all the case in previous centuries.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2.1, we introduce and discuss the
data and data sources, after which Section 2.2 explains the methods to estimate the
indices of rent prices. Section 2.3 will present the rent indices in nominal and in real
terms. We also discuss the presence of trends in housing yields. Section 2.4 analyzes
the evolution of housing rents in periods of urban growth and decline. We end this
study with a short summary and some conclusions.
3The study of Eichholtz et al. (2020c) will be presented in Chapter 4.
4Eisfeldt and Demers (2018) find capital gains to be a more important component of total returns.
Most likely, this is driven by the enormous decline in interest rates and the resurgence in urban growth
since the 1980s, coinciding with their sample period.
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2.1 Data
Tracking rent prices for seven cities and for more than 500 years at annual frequency
implies major data collection challenges. We compile rental cash flow and contract
data from dozens of existing historical and contemporary studies, combined with hand-
collected primary data from archives. This effort resulted in the collection of about
300,000 observations of housing rents, most of which originate from the archives of
social institutions, such as churches, monasteries, orphanages, or hospitals. Beyond
these sources, we collected additional primary and secondary data on estimated rents
from tax registers. These registers provide information on the distribution of housing
values in a city, which we use to compute housing inequality and to assess the repre-
sentativeness of the institutional data. Including these, our database of primary rental
data contains over 436,000 observations, about 30 percent of which we hand-collected
from archival sources.
Table 2.1 presents an overview of all these different data sources and the num-
ber of observations that we used. We provide a very detailed discussion of all these
sources, and their representativeness in Appendix 2.A and 2.B. Appendix 2.B also pro-
vides plots, for each city, on the number of observations in our dataset in each year. We
converted rents for each country into a single local currency (Dutch Guilder, French
Franc, Belgian Franc, British Pound), and removed duplicate or non-representative
observations from the sample.
Rather surprisingly, it was more difficult to obtain primary data on housing rents
for the 20th and 21st century than for preceding centuries. There exist few commercial
databases that track housing rents, and due to privacy reasons it is not yet possible
to look for rental contract data in archives. Therefore, we had to rely on secondary
sources from the mid-20th century onward, ensuring to only select sources that (at-
tempt to) control for housing quality.5 In most cases, these series are based on the
rent component of the CPI, often at the urban level but sometimes using national fig-
ures. Although these indices do adjust for quality, there has been some debate about
whether they accurately represent market developments. First, the existence of a com-
plicated system of rent controls for a large part of the 20th century makes it by con-
struction difficult to construct a representative index. Second, quality controls might
be imperfect. For the United States, Gordon and VanGoethem (2005) argue that the
rent component in the CPI from the early 20th century until the 1980s is biased down-
ward, given that hedonic improvements in housing quality cannot make up for the
increase in mean housing rents relative to the quality-controlled CPI figure. One po-
tential reason for this bias is that renters are less likely to be included in the rental
survey when they move, even though rent increases typically occur after signing a new
contract. Ambrose et al. (2015) make a comparable point but find bias in a different
direction for the 2000s: their repeat-rent index, based only on newly signed contracts,
increases much less than the rent component of the CPI. To investigate whether these
issues might also affect our findings for the late-20th and 21st century, we will compare
5The only exception is Paris, where we rely on a secondary rent index already from 1867.
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Table 2.1: Overview of Rental Data Sources
Source City Type I Years Obs.
Primary sources, rents:
Henau (1991) Belgian cities Rent prices Y 1910-1940 11,711
Segers (1999) Belgian cities Rent prices Y 1800-1920 33,088
Verlinden (1972) Antwerp Rent prices Y 1500-1876 27,643
Verlinden (1972) Bruges Rent prices Y 1500-1800 22,157
Avondts (1971) Brussels Rent prices Y 1500-1800 19,150
Van den Eeckhout and Scholliers (1979) Brussels Rent prices Y 1800-1940 14,977
Van Ryssel (1967) Ghent Rent prices Y 1500-1796 41,492
Avondts and Scholliers (1977) Ghent Rent prices Y 1796-1932 13,585
Lesger (1986) Amsterdam Rent prices Y 1500-1869 48,860
ACA 367.A, no. 141-150 Amsterdam Contracts Y 1671-1805 7,537
ACA 367.C , no. 100, 1794, 1804-1805 Amsterdam Contracts Y 1833-1936 11,701
ACA 367.C, no 938, 947, 1498, 1798 Amsterdam Rent prices Y 1934-1940 348
ACA 201, no. 1973, 3596 Amsterdam Contracts Y 1849-1928 65
ACA 404, no. 156 Amsterdam Contracts Y 1843-1942 100
ACA 1120, no. 2087-2089, 2130 Amsterdam Rent prices Y 1845-1942 1,397
ACA 191, no. 979, 987, 991-992 Amsterdam Contracts Y 1840-1941 295
ACA 612, no. 432 Amsterdam Contracts Y 1853-1884 20
Clark (2002) London / UK Contracts Y 1225-1914 19,246
LMA, CLC/B/216/MS144 London Contracts N 1909-1959 15,274
Archives Nationales, 66 AJ 2029-2035 Paris Contracts Y 1400-1792 9,221
Archives de l’APHP, 782 FOSS 1 Paris Contracts Y 1733-1820 1,047
Monin and Lazard (1920) Paris Contracts Y 1766-1819 2,012
Archives de Paris, DQ18 Paris Contracts N 1803-1870 861
Primary sources, rental values:
ACA 5044, no. 254, 273, 281, 284 Amsterdam Rental value N 1647-1650 14,549
ACA 5044, no. 402-405 Amsterdam Rental value N 1733 25,328
ACA 5045, no. 269-323 Amsterdam Rent prices N 1805 33,210
ACA 5045, no. 269-323 Amsterdam Rental value N 1805 17,777
ACA 5210, no. 69 Amsterdam Rental value N 1815 1,619
Fryske Akademy (2018) Amsterdam Rental value N 1832 30,047
Felixarchief Antwerp, inv. 782 no 1-14 Antwerp Rental value N 1584 11,852
Secondary sources, rent indices:
Henau (unpublished) Belgian cities Urban N 1941-1961
Banque Nationale de Belgique (1980) Belgian cities National N 1975-1977
Statistics Belgium (2018b) Belgian cities National N 1977-2018
Gemeente Amsterdam (2018) Amsterdam City N 1940-1994
Statistics Netherlands (2018) Amsterdam National N 1994-2000
Dröes et al. (2017) Amsterdam City N 2000-2018
Samy (2015) London City N 1903-1909
ONS / National Archives RG 77/3 London National N 1959-1987
Office for National Statistics (2018) London National N 1987-2005
Office for National Statistics (2018) London City N 2005-2018
Marnata (1961) Paris City N 1867-1957
Friggit, by courtesy Paris City N 1957-2018
Notes: This table shows all different sources of data that we compiled for this paper, for each of the seven
cities. Details on each of the individual sources is provide in Appendix 2.A. The table uses the follow-
ing abbreviations: ACA = Amsterdam City Archives, LMA = London Metropolitan Archives. Column I
indicates with Yes / No whether the primary data were based on institutional sources.
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implied and observable improvements in housing quality for this period. Neverthe-
less, the fact that we have to splice indices constructed with different methods implies
that our series are likely less accurate in the 20th and 21st century.
Beyond housing data, we also compiled primary and secondary data on consumer
prices in order to assess real rents. For the Belgian cities, we create a new consumer
price index (1500-1830), while we rely on existing series for the other cities. The data
sources and methodology for our consumer price indices are discussed in Appendix
2.C.
Last, we searched existing sources for population estimates and interpolated pop-
ulation numbers using cubic splines. We employ these population numbers to create
population-weighted indices for the Belgian cities and in our later empirical analysis.
The population data sources are discussed in Appendix 2.D.
How Representative are Institutional Rents?
Except for Paris (1809-1860) and London (1909-1959), virtually all of our primary sources
originate from the archives of social institutions. Such institutions were very preva-
lent in most European cities and often had considerable housing portfolios, mostly
resulting from bequests or donations over time. They used the rental cash flows of
these homes to finance their activities. These institutions were the precursors of the
modern-day institutional investors (Gelderblom and Jonker, 2009), and kept extensive
archival records of their accounts, of which many have survived the test of time. Al-
though renting from private landlords was more common than renting from such in-
stitutions, small-scale landlords did not keep archives. This limitation implies that we
have to address two essential issues: did these institutions own a portfolio of housing
that was representative of the housing stock of the city, and were these homes leased
at market rates?
Compelling evidence shows that these institutions rented their homes at market
rates. First, many institutions relied heavily, and some even exclusively, on rental
streams to finance their core activities and could not afford to ask below-market rents
(Le Roy Ladurie and Couperie, 1970). Correspondingly, they cared significantly about
the returns they made on these properties (Gelderblom and Jonker, 2009). For rural
properties around Paris, owned by the Cathedral of the Notre-Dame de Paris, Hoff-
man et al. (2001) provides anecdotal evidence that points towards these charitable
organizations aiming to make profits from their property portfolios. Second, these in-
stitutions did not use their real estate portfolios to provide below-market rate housing
to the poor or other vulnerable groups, and in each city, there was considerable vari-
ety in the homes being leased, varying from sober tenements to urban mansions. In a
few cases, we found evidence that homes were rented at low or no cost, for example to
widows. Such cases were typically clearly indicated and organised separately, and we
excluded them from our sample.
To assess the representativeness of the institutional housing portfolio for the hous-
ing stock in each city, we compared the mean level of rent in our sample to the mean
level of rent obtained from historical fiscal sources or private rents. Plots of these es-
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timates are provided in Appendix 2.B. For the period before World War I, we could
obtain such an estimate in 49 cases, spread over various cities and centuries. On av-
erage, institutional rents are about 2 percent higher than those obtained from other
sources, indicating they are not systematically different from each other. However, in
some periods, most notably Amsterdam and Bruges in the 19th and early 20th century,
mean rent levels do not seem representative for the entire city. These differences are
typically due to small-sample issues since they coincide with periods with lower num-
bers of observations and institutional owners in the sample. Although observations
in these periods can still be used to estimate market rent prices, we should be more
careful in using them to infer housing quality. For a more detailed discussion of this
comparison and the sources used, we refer to Appendix 2.B.6
2.2 Methodology: Estimating Long-Term Indices
2.2.1 Rent Prices
The literature on the estimation of rent indices has relied on hedonic models and
repeated-measures models. We use the latter. The basic repeated measures method-
ology from Bailey et al. (1963) starts with the observation that the log price on any
asset, in this case the log rental price rt on a particular home i, can be represented as
the sum of three components:
ri t =αi +βt +εi t (2.1)
The first term, αi reflects the underlying value, and therefore quality, of the home:
the key assumption is that this does not change over time, at least at the level of an
individual home. The second term, βt is the value of the log rental price index, while
εit reflects price noise and is assumed to be distributed as N(0,σ2). Taking differences
for any time periods t = y and t = x, with y > x, the change in log rental price on any
home i can be written as follows:
ri ,t=y − ri ,t=x =
T∑
t=1
βt D t ,i + ε̃i t (2.2)
D refers to a set of dummy variables that take on the value of 1 if t = y and −1 if t = x,
and ε̃i t equals the difference in the two error terms. Equation (2) can be estimated us-
ing ordinary least squares (OLS), and subsequently converted to an index by exponen-
tiation. To satisfy the assumption of constant quality between rent reviews, homes in
our sample were treated as new observations if there was any indication that the home
had been rebuilt, renovated or significantly affected in some other way. Still, it is un-
likely that house quality does not change at all. First of all, we cannot account for the
6We could not formally assess the representativeness of the London sample. For the early 19th century,
Clark (2002) used estimates of rents from tax records, and found those to be closely correlated with the
average level of rents in his sample for England and Wales. However, our London sample is likely the least
representative due to the low number of observations. This is particularly the case before 1770, when our
sample contains only 2.5 observations per year.
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effect of aging on the properties as we do not know the years in which they were built.
Second, minor quality improvements to the property might not have been registered.
However, we believe the potential errors are small, as homes were well maintained
for, in many cases, hundreds of years.7 Since rental contracts were typically signed for
several years, we only include a rental observation in the index estimation in the year
a new contract had been signed. For the Belgian cities, and most observations from
Amsterdam, rent data did not specify new contracts. For these observations, we only
include observations where the rent changed, as it implies that a new contract had
been signed. The main disadvantage of this approach is that it misses observations
where the new contract is signed at the same price. In Paris, this was the case in about
30 percent of contracts. Additionally, as in Clark (2002), we excluded contracts lasting
more than 21 years as they likely represent ground leases rather than rents.
The use of repeated contracts implies that in some cities, in particular London and
Bruges, the remaining number of observations is low. In such cases, noise in the rent
prices can have a large impact on the resulting index. The literature has proposed sev-
eral adaptations of the original model to improve the signal-to-noise ratio. Probably
the most notable of these are the studies by Goetzmann (1992), proposing a Bayesian
ridge estimator, and Francke (2010), who develops a generalization of Goetzmann’s
method that allows for general model specifications that can be compared using like-
lihood criteria. We follow the model of Francke (2010), and specify the betas in equa-
tion (2) not as fixed unknown parameters to be estimated using OLS, but by using a
local level model:
βt+1 =βt +ζt , ζt ∼ N (0, qζσ2) (2.3)
The dependence between the betas is based on the signal-to-noise ratio qζ. If this
ratio is low, the variance of the error terms of the index is low, and the dependence
between the betas will be strong, resulting in a smoothening of the index compared to
the standard case. Francke (2010) proposes an empirical Bayes procedure to estimate
the index. Conditional on the variance parameters qζ and σ
2, estimates of the annual
coefficients can be obtained using generalized least squares. The variance parameters
are subsequently estimated by maximum likelihood. For more detail regarding the
estimation method, see Francke (2010).
Table 2.2 contains the output of the estimations of the repeat-rent index based on
the methodology of Francke (2010). Note that for Amsterdam, data was not available
for the early part of the 16th century, such that our index only starts in 1550. For Paris,
we estimated the index including observations from 1400 onward, since this signifi-
cantly increased the number of observations available to estimate the growth of the
index in the first part of the 16th century. For London, we estimated the indices sep-
arately for the periods 1500-1903 and 1909-1959, due to the absence of data between
1903 and 1909, and the difference in data densities between the two samples. To com-
pute a total Belgian city index, we used population-weighted averages. Consistent
7Some archival records also specify property-related expenses. For example, the Burgerweeshuis, the
most prominent institutional owner in Amsterdam, spent about 26 percent of its rental revenue on main-
tenance between 1682 and 1806 (ACA 367.A, no. 141).
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with the observations made earlier in the paper and in Appendix 2.B, the signal-noise
ratio for London, and to a lesser extent Bruges, is significantly lower compared to the
other cities. This indicates these indices have been smoothed significantly.
Table 2.2: Variance Parameters and Signal-to-Noise Ratios
City Years Obs. Prop. σ qζ Log likelihood
A’dam 1550-1940 19,299 1,228 0.06 0.72 18,475.73
Antwerp 1500-1940 6,133 473 0.15 0.54 430.16
Bruges 1500-1920 3,115 592 0.20 0.25 -449.50
Brussels 1500-1940 4,304 894 0.17 0.40 -142.62
Ghent 1500-1940 6,495 1,278 0.21 0.34 -1,167.45
London 1500-1903 1,624 660 0.25 0.20 -400.32
London 1903-1959 3,165 1,141 0.08 0.56 1,469.50
Paris 1400-1870 8,712 2,364 0.15 0.53 416.00
Notes: This tables provides summary statistics on the estimated rent price indices, following the method
of Francke (2010). qζ measures the signal-noise ratio, andσmeasures the standard deviation of the price
movements of the index. Signal-noise ratios are lower for cities for which few data is available to estimate
the index.
2.2.2 Robustness Checks
It is crucial that our rent indices accurately track long-term developments in rental
prices. Before proceeding to present and discuss our resulting indices, we therefor
perform two more additional checks to assess to what extent our repeat-rent indices
might be influenced by potential depreciation or unobserved quality improvements.
First, if we assume that homes are new when they enter our sample, either due
to new construction or significant renovation, we can test the assumption of con-
stant quality based on the framework of Harding et al. (2007). To estimate net-of-
maintenance depreciation, they suggest including the log difference in house age in
the standard repeat-sales regression introduced in the methodology section. The non-
linearity of the age effect avoids perfect collinearity with the length of the leases and
corresponding dummy variables. Using this technique, Harding et al. (2007) estimate
that US housing depreciates at an average rate of 2 percent per year.
Of course, the strength of this test is weakened when homes are not new when they
enter the sample. Although it is difficult to verify the extent to which this is the case,
there is strong evidence from Amsterdam that many of the homes were new or signifi-
cantly renovated when they enter our sample. First, we found construction or renova-
tion plans for many of these homes in the archives we consulted. Second, analysis of
data from Korevaar (2020) on housing transactions in Amsterdam between 1563-1811,
reveals that institutions were very inactive in purchasing property. For example, the
Burgerweeshuis, the most important real estate owner, was only involved in 41 real
estate purchases, while it was involved in 244 sales. However, some homes were cer-
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tainly not new when they were leased for the first time: we could link some of these
purchases to homes in our sample.
Taking note of this limitation, Table 2.3 contains the estimate of the ageing coeffi-
cient for each city, using the standard repeated-measures model. For both Paris and
London, we estimated the regression separately for the institutional sample and the
non-institutional sample, given that the upkeep of these properties might have been
different. The aging coefficient is highly insignificant in all but one case: London from
1909 to 1959. However, in this case it is positive, implying net appreciation over time
rather than depreciation, although the effect is small in magnitude. Hence, if any-
thing, our index might underestimate growth in this period. It is possible that part
of this effect is driven by rent controls that correlated with house age, as some rent
control measures in this period were directly determined by house age.
Table 2.3: Estimates of Log-Difference in House Age Coefficients
City Years Coefficient P-value
Amsterdam 1550-1940 -0.00023 0.89
Antwerp 1500-1940 0.00421 0.49
Bruges 1500-1920 -0.00665 0.86
Brussels 1500-1940 -0.0014 0.86
Ghent 1500-1940 0.00306 0.61
London 1500-1903 0.0185 0.12
London 1909-1959 0.046 0.00
Paris 1400-1800 0.0011 0.77
Paris 1800-1870 0.0168 0.20
Notes: This table reports the results from a standard repeated-measures regression (Bailey et al., 1963)
that additional controls for the difference in the log age of the property between repeated rental con-
tracts. The coefficients on the log-difference in house age are reported for each city. A negative and sig-
nificant coefficient indicates unobserved depreciation, a positive and significant coefficient unobserved
quality improvements.
A second way to assess the robustness of the assumption of constant-quality is
by comparing local housing rents to local land rents. Depreciation and quality im-
provements are aspects of the structures built on land, while the land itself does not
depreciate. Hence, if quality is adjusted for properly, land rents should evolve similarly
to housing rents over the longer run, at least in the period before 1800 when real wages
and construction costs did not move much over time. Hoffman (2000) created such a
land rent index for the Paris Basin, making use of land leases from the Cathedral of the
Notre-Dame in Paris, an institution very similar to the other institutions in our Paris
sample. He computed both a mean rent index per hectare, as well as hedonic index
that corrected for quality of the land (soil type, land use) and location.
Figure 2.1 compares his decennial indices to a decennial mean rent index based on
our data, which does not control for quality, and a decennial repeat-rent index, which
does control for quality. As can be seen, the various land rent indices closely track the
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repeat-rent index for Paris, while the mean rent index diverges from each of the indices
as housing quality gradually improves. There are some periods where the repeat-rent
index also diverges from the land rent index, most notably in the late 18th century,
but this does not seem to result in misestimating quality, as the difference between
the mean rent and repeat-rent index (the quality index) is not widening systematically
in these periods. A second reassuring notion is that quality-improvements seem to
matter much less for farm rents. Although leased lands could still contain significant
capital, for example in the form of land preparation, buildings or the plants and trees
on the land, the hedonic indices suggest these did not affect farmland rents as much
as housing rents.
Figure 2.1: Housing Rents and Land Rents, Paris area
1450 1500 1550 1600 1650 1700 1750
10
0
50
0
20
00
50
00
20
00
0
In
de
x 
(1
45
0−
14
59
=
10
0)
Housing Rent
Mean Housing Rent
Land Rent (qual. + area adj.)
Land Rent (per m2)
Notes: This figure reports the evolution of our repeat-rent index for Paris and a mean rent index for Paris,
relative to the land rent indices reported in Hoffman (2000). All indices are estimated for each decade.
We should note that these farmland rents are not perfectly comparable to housing
rents, as urban-rural rent differences might have changed over time, even though most
properties were very close to Paris. To complicate matters, land leases also contained
the right to levy the tithe, which effectively reduced the rent (Hoffman (2000) adjusted
for this). However, imperfections aside, both robustness checks supports our critical
assumption that the repeat-rent indices that we estimated indeed adequately control
for quality. We therefore now proceed to present and discuss the evolution of rents in
our long-term indices.
2.3 Housing Rents in the Long Run
Figure 2.2 (a–g) reports the rent indices for Amsterdam, Paris, London, and the four
Belgian cities, in nominal terms, with CPI plotted for reference. Figure 2.3 presents the
same indices in real terms together with population numbers. Population numbers
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are based on municipal boundaries and therefore underestimate the total population
due to suburbanization processes in the 20th century. In all cities, population numbers
for their respective metropolitan areas continued to grow.
We deflate nominal to real rent based on consumer price indices. Although real
rents can be compared in a meaningful way across cities, they exhibit excessive volatil-
ity due to the substantial short-term fluctuations in the consumer price indices, in
particular before the 20th century. In early modern times, household expenditures
have been dominated by the cost of food, especially bread. Prices of grain and other
agricultural produce were intrinsically volatile as they depended on the richness of
harvests and the conditions for trade.
The first and most striking conclusion from the long-term rent graphs is that rental
prices have shown very little growth in the long run. For Paris, the implied annual (ge-
ometric) growth rate of real rents is around 0.35 percent over the whole sample period,
while in London and Amsterdam, real rents have increased at a rate of 0.2 percent per
year. For the Belgian cities, real rent growth has been even less at 0.06 percent per
year. This result is in line with existing evidence for urban house prices. Eichholtz
(1997) finds little long-term price appreciation for the homes on the Herengracht, Am-
sterdam’s most expensive canal. The same holds for the price index of Shiller (2005)
for US homes since 1890. While house prices differ from rental prices in the short to
medium run, Ambrose et al. (2013) show, based on data from Amsterdam, that the
long-run developments in house prices and rents have been similar.
The second important conclusion is that in the long run, in particular since the
17th century, the seven urban rental markets studied here exhibit strong similarities in
terms of rent development. Since 1600, the correlation in 50-year growth rates across
cities varies between 0.9 and 0.95. This finding suggests that these cities have had close
economic connections in the last 400 years, and it would imply that benefits from ge-
ographic diversification, for example for very long-term rental housing investors like
sovereign wealth funds or pension funds, might be smaller than previously thought, at
least within Europe (Jordà et al., 2019a).
Beyond the general long-term conclusions, the short- to medium-term develop-
ments of the indices also offer interesting perspectives on the economic history of
these cities and their housing markets. Discussing 500 years of economic history and
rents for seven cities in detail is beyond the scope of this study, but we would like to
point out some of the most interesting trends over time and give a few examples of
how housing rents often closely reflect a city’s fortunes.
Of the more than five centuries that our indices cover, the 16th century was prob-
ably one of the most turbulent in terms of rent development. In the first part of the
century, real rents were steadily increasing in Paris, but gradually declining in London
and the Belgian cities.
In the second part of the 16th century, real rents started falling more quickly in
both the Belgian cities and Amsterdam, following the start of the Eighty Year’s War
in which the provinces of the Low Countries fought against the Spanish. Although
the Eighty Years’ War was full of twists and turns, it induced an economic shift of the
Southern Netherlands, containing Brussels, Antwerp, Ghent, and Bruges, to the North-
26 CHAPTER 2. 500 YEARS OF HOUSING RENTS
Figure 2.2: Nominal Rent and Consumer Price Indices, 1500-2018
1500 1600 1700 1800 1900 2000
10
20
50
20
0
50
0
20
00
(a) Amsterdam
In
de
x 
(1
90
0 
=
 1
00
, i
n 
lo
gs
)
Nominal Rent
Consumer Prices
1500 1600 1700 1800 1900 2000
10
20
50
10
0
50
0
(b) Antwerp
In
de
x 
(1
90
0 
=
 1
00
, i
n 
lo
gs
)
Nominal Rent
Consumer Prices
1500 1600 1700 1800 1900 2000
10
20
50
10
0
20
0
50
0
(c) Bruges
In
de
x 
(1
90
0 
=
 1
00
, i
n 
lo
gs
)
Nominal Rent
Consumer Prices
1500 1600 1700 1800 1900 2000
2
5
10
50
20
0
10
00
(d) Brussels
In
de
x 
(1
90
0 
=
 1
00
, i
n 
lo
gs
)
Nominal Rent
Consumer Prices
1500 1600 1700 1800 1900 2000
5
10
20
50
20
0
50
0
(e) Ghent
In
de
x 
(1
90
0 
=
 1
00
, i
n 
lo
gs
)
Nominal Rent
Consumer Prices
1500 1600 1700 1800 1900 2000
5
50
50
0
50
00
(f) London
In
de
x 
(1
90
0 
=
 1
00
, i
n 
lo
gs
)
Nominal Rent
Consumer Prices
1500 1600 1700 1800 1900 2000
1
10
0
10
00
0
(g) Paris
In
de
x 
(1
90
0 
=
 1
00
, i
n 
lo
gs
)
Nominal Rent
Consumer Prices
Notes: Scale of Y-axis in logs. The rent price indices estimated for 7 cities are compared to consumer
price indices. Year-to-year changes in rents are less volatile than changes in consumer prices. Political
and economic shocks, such as the fall of Antwerp to the Spanish in 1585, left a clear mark on the rent
indices.
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Figure 2.3: Real Rent and Population Indices, 1500-2018
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Notes: After correcting for inflation, rent prices (black lines) have been relatively steady for all cities. Pop-
ulation numbers (red lines) are based on municipal boundaries and underestimate total population due
to suburbanization processes in the 20th century. In all cities, population numbers for their respective
metropolitan areas continued to grow.
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ern Netherlands, most notably Amsterdam. Antwerp, the economic powerhouse in
the region for most of the 16th century, was captured by the Spanish in 1585, ensur-
ing Spanish control of the Southern Netherlands as Brussels, Bruges, and Ghent had
surrendered already. Many merchants left Antwerp, Bruges, and Ghent and moved to
Amsterdam. As is visible in the level of rents, Amsterdam entered its Golden Age, while
the Belgian cities experienced an economic depression.
Brussels was the only Belgian city in our sample that came out of the Eighty Year’s
War wars relatively unscathed. It did not experience population losses as significant as
Antwerp’s or the two Flemish cities and could sustain its economic status as the capital
of the Southern Netherlands. For the other cities, most notably Antwerp, trade oppor-
tunities had been severely restricted by the Dutch naval blockade of the river Scheldt,
cutting off Antwerp’s, Ghent’s, and Bruges’s access to the sea. For Antwerp, this situa-
tion lasted until the end of the 18th century–early 19th century, when the Scheldt was
gradually reopened. In that period, Antwerp’s housing rents recovered fast, as the city
developed once again into one of Europe’s leading port cities. The 19th century was
much less fortunate for Bruges, and its rental price growth was correspondingly much
lower. The city did not industrialize like Ghent, Brussels and Antwerp, and became
one of the poorest cities in Belgium.
Paris experienced trouble similar to the Belgian cities at the end of the 16th century.
During the Wars of Religion, possession of Paris was important for both the Catholic
and the Protestant side of the conflict. These struggles culminated in the Siege of Paris
of 1590. Around the Siege, nominal housing rents declined by as much as 75 percent,
following the starvation and migration of a large part of the Parisian population, and
it took almost 20 years for housing rents to recover fully. The situation was so excep-
tional that the Parlement de Paris, its most important court, twice ruled that tenants
only needed to pay a fraction of their contractual rent amount Félibien (1725). These
Parisian laws are among the very first recorded instances of explicit public interference
in rental markets.
After the turbulent 16th century, rents were at relatively stable levels throughout
the 17th and 18th centuries. However, by the end of the 18th century, real housing rents
started to decline substantially in most cities. This decline was most severe in Amster-
dam, where it lasted well into the 19th century. Amsterdam had remained one of the
most important European cities for most of the 18th century but ended in an intense
economic crisis following the start of the French period in the late 18th century. The
only city that did not experience a fall in real rents was London. This should not be
very surprising. First of all, London’s rent levels were at relatively low levels compared
to the other cities for most of the 17th and 18th centuries. Second of all, England initi-
ated the Industrial Revolution in the second half of the 18th century, and subsequently
dominated the European economy in the 19th century.
The Industrial Revolution did not only lead to the first sustained increases in real
wages, but it also led to an urbanization wave, and the first sustained increases in real
housing rents across cities. During the 19th century, real rent growth reached unprece-
dented levels: rents roughly tripled in each of the cities we study.
Although real rent prices also rose enormously throughout the second part of the
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20th century, particularly in Paris, total growth in this century was close to zero, or even
negative for the Belgian cities. Just like the rent swings at the end of the 16th century,
20th-century rent developments cannot be seen separately from the wars that ravaged
Europe at that time. At the start of the century, urban rent levels were already at high
levels and rose even further due to World War I housing shortages. To address afford-
ability concerns, all countries in the sample gradually started to adopt rent controls in
the 1910s. It is remarkable how similar the governments in the four countries studied
here have acted during this turbulent period. First of all, most rent regulation focused
on the nominal level of rents, rather than aiming to stabilize rents in real terms. With
nominal rents fixed, hyperinflation and deflation after World War I created unprece-
dented volatility in real rents. Second, it seems that governments realized approxi-
mately at the same time that the combination of frozen rents and high inflation left
little incentives for landlords to invest, harming the supply of rental housing. Thus,
in each country rents were slowly deregulated from the 1920s onwards (Willis, 1950).
Nevertheless, the higher inflation had been, the more difficult it was to restore equilib-
rium in the rental market. The same process happened during and after World War II:
real rents initially declined significantly due to nominal rent controls but could catch
up as soon as rent controls were abolished or gradually weakened. After this turbulent
period, most countries started to introduce more sophisticated rent control policies
(Arnott, 1995), which has likely had a dampening effect on real rent volatility.
Urban rental costs have started rising again in the last part of the 20th century and
the 21st century. Although rent growth was particularly limited in the Belgian cities,
where real rents are still much below their level from the 19th century, Paris and Lon-
don are characterized by large increases in housing rents. As we have seen, like in
the late 19th and early 20th century, this has led to increasing concerns about housing
standards and affordability.
2.3.1 Trends in Housing Yields
Changes in rental growth provide a good approximation to the long-term evolution
of housing returns when there are no significant trends over time in the required re-
turn to housing. For debt assets, Schmelzing (2020) documents a significant down-
ward trend of about 1 basis point per year between 1300 and 2018. If there also would
be such a persistent trend in housing yields, estimates of long-term housing returns
based on rental growth would be significantly off.
To see why consider a standard asset pricing model for housing that discounts net
rental cash flows with the safe interest rate and a risk premium. If safe rates have fallen
from approximately 5 percent in 1500 to about 0 today, which is what the numbers in
Schmelzing (2020) suggest, house prices must have appreciated substantially. For ex-
ample, if the housing risk premium is assumed to be constant at 2.5 percent, a fall in
rates from 5 percent to 0 percent over the past 500 years suggests an additional annu-
alized appreciation of house prices of about 0.2 percent per year. This appreciation is
equivalent to the real appreciation of rental prices that we find, and would result in a
doubling of capital gains.
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Figure 2.4: Yields on Transacted Institutional Properties, 1500-1900
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
● ●
●
●
● ●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
● ●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●● ●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
● ●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●●
●
●
●
●●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
● ●
●
●
●
●
●
●●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
1500 1600 1700 1800 1900
0.
00
0.
05
0.
10
0.
15
0.
20
0.
25
Y
ie
ld
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
Bruges
Ghent
Brussels
Antwerp
Paris
Amsterdam
London
Notes: This plot shows the yields on transacted institutional properties in the various cities that we study.
Each dot corresponds to a transaction. A yield of 0.10 corresponds to a yield of 10%.
It is unlikely such a trend exists in the yields to housing, at least in the cities that we
study after 1500. Figure 2.4 plots the gross housing yields based on 324 actual trans-
action prices and rents for properties within our sample that were sold or purchased
by the institutions, and for which we have data. In Table 2.4, we report a regression
of these yields on a linear time trend. As evident from both Figure 2.4 and Table 2.4,
there is no significant downward trend in the yields of these institutional properties.
In both models, the estimated time trend is insignificant and effectively zero. Based
on the model without city fixed effects, the 95% confidence interval ranges between a
decline of 0.07% per year to an increase of 0.04% per year. Hence, it does not seem
that the comparatively small number of observations is driving the absence of any
downward time trend in housing yields. Translating this to actual yields, this 95% con-
fidence interval would imply a change in yields between 1500 and 1900 ranging from
-0.4 basis points per year to +0.2 basispoints per year. This is significantly different
from the point estimates Schmelzing (2020) provides for interest rates, which he sug-
gests have fallen by 0.6 to 1.6 basispoints per year.
The lack of any decline in housing yields is also backed up by estimates from other
studies covering shorter time periods. For a more recent time period, Eichholtz et al.
(2020c) find no long-term downward trend in actual housing yields in Paris (1809–
1943) and Amsterdam (1900–1979) using a sample of ten thousands property gross
yields. Gross yields average 7% in Paris (net 4.2%) and 10% in Amsterdam (net 5.9%).
This pattern seems to extend to other countries as well: the implied yields in Jordà
et al. (2019a) that cover 14 countries in the 1870–2016 display no strong downward
trend either. Housing yield data is more scarce for earlier periods. Data from Korevaar
(2020) show a gross yield of about 10% for 17th-18th century Amsterdam, based on
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Table 2.4: Time Trends in Yields
Yield
Year −0.0001 0.0001
(0.0003) (0.0004)
Constant −2.663∗∗∗ −2.816∗∗∗
(0.508) (0.827)
City FE No Yes
Observations 324 324
R2 0.001 0.068
F Statistic 0.200 3.269
Notes: This table shows the results of a regression of log reported yields in each city on a constant and
a time trend. Column 1 does not include city fixed effects, Column 2 includes city fixed effects. ∗p<0.1;
∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01.
rent-price ratios benchmarked using 789 observations of actual yields. This is similar
to the 20th century Amsterdam yield.
In summary, there does not seem to be any long-term downward trend in the
yields on housing. This suggests the findings of Schmelzing (2020) do not generalize
to housing, and that using rental growth rates is a reasonable proxy to understanding
the evolution of long-term housing returns.
2.4 Urban Growth and Rent Price Growth
In the previous section, we have provided a descriptive overview of the long-term evo-
lution of housing rents and urban populations in each of the seven cities that we study.
The rental trajectories of these cities coincided with changes in their population levels
and economic prosperity. Given that there does not seem to be any trend in housing
yields over the long-run, and because urban population growth is expected to slow
down further, the currently available evidence on high-growth cities might sketch a
too optimistic picture of long-term housing rental growth.
In this section, we aim to use our long-term rent and population growth to esti-
mate more formally how housing returns evolve in periods of growth and urban de-
cline. To do so, we restrict our sample to the period from 1500 until 1913, when rental
prices were not distorted by government interference, and our sample is entirely based
on repeat-rent indices. We also report estimates for the entire sample period.
We separate periods of long-term population growth with periods of decline be-
cause these have very different implications on the housing market. When cities grow,
expansion of the housing stock can limit rental price growth. When cities decline
in population, housing supply does not adjust, and remaining residents will be dis-
tributed across existing properties. For this reason, house prices respond stronger to
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urban decline than urban growth (Glaeser and Gyourko, 2005). These existing works
have studied recent developments in urban US house prices. Our analysis instead
looks at rents over a much longer horizon.
We estimate a set of panel regressions of the following form, for each city i at time
t:
∆sr ri t =µi +β1∆+25popi t +β2∆−s popi t +γnr wi t +εi t (2.4)
We let s vary between 1 and 50 to show how the (correlational) real rent price elas-
ticity varies over time horizons. At short-time horizons, supply cannot adjust, but at
longer horizons, supply should be able to adjust fully. µi is a city fixed effect, and we
additional control for changes in real wages r wi t using real wage data presented in
Eichholtz et al. (2020a). We estimate the models using overlapping differences. To
account for the serial correlation introduced by the overlapping observations, and
the potential spatial auto-correlation across cities, we use standard errors based on
Driscoll and Kraay (1998).
Table 2.5 reports the entire regression output when using 25 year-changes, both
including and excluding a control for wages. In Figure 2.5, we plot the coefficients for
the regressions that relate changes in rental prices to urban growth and decline when
using varying time horizons, controlling for real wages.
Figure 2.5: Population Change and Rents at Varying Time Horizons
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Notes: This figure plots the point estimates for the coefficients on population growth (β1) and population
decline (β2) based on regressions of Equation 2.4 using varying time horizons (∆), together with 95%
confidence intervals. The coefficients on population growth and population decline are significantly
different from each other for all time horizons longer than 3 years, with the elasticity substantially higher
for periods of population decline. All regressions control for real wage changes and include city-fixed
effects, and are estimated over the entire 1500–2018 time period.
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Table 2.5: Regression Estimates: Rents and Population Growth
Dependent variable:
∆25r rt
(1) (2) (3) (4)
∆+25popt 0.394
∗∗∗ 0.229∗ 0.501∗∗∗ 0.327∗∗
(0.149) (0.121) (0.166) (0.131)
∆−25popt 1.096
∗∗∗ 1.132∗∗∗ 0.984∗∗∗ 1.071∗∗∗
(0.162) (0.100) (0.201) (0.125)
∆25w rt 0.772
∗∗∗ 0.659∗∗∗
(0.061) (0.099)
Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time Period Pre-1914 Pre-1914 Full Full
Observations 2,625 2,625 2,794 2,792
R2 0.211 0.592 0.160 0.461
Adjusted R2 0.209 0.591 0.157 0.459
F Statistic 350.386 1265.1 264.844 792.74
Notes: This table presents the estimates from a regression of Equation 2.4 using a time-horizon of 25
years. The dependent variable is the 25-year real change in housing rents. Columns 1 and 3 only include
time fixed effects, Columns 2 and 4 include a control for real wages. The first two columns look at the pre-
1914 period only, when rent controls were nonexistent, the last two columns include the entire sample.
Standard errors are based on Driscoll and Kraay (1998). ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01.
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For our sample of cities, we observe increasing rents when a city’s population
grows, and declining rents when cities shrink in population size. In line with the find-
ings of Glaeser and Gyourko (2005), we find housing rents to adjust stronger to popu-
lation declines than to population growth, at all time horizons. For decline, we find a
price elasticity around one, with little variation across time horizons. For growth, we
find the elasticity to decline slightly over longer time horizons, consistent with grad-
ual supply adjustment. At a 25-year horizon, a one percent increase in population
over a 25-year period leads to a 0.39 percent increase in real rents (Column 1), and
this even reduces to 0.23 percent when controlling for wages (Column 2). In line with
the increased importance of supply restrictions in the 20th and 21st centuries, we find
somewhat higher elasticities for urban growth when looking at the entire sample pe-
riod (Column 3 and 4).
Because population growth matters for long-term housing rental growth, it also is
a vital component of the total return to housing over time. The past 500 years of urban
rental growth in Europe indicate that cities that have grown the most have also expe-
rienced the most substantial increases in housing rents. This suggests that investors
who form return expectations based on past rental growth in ’superstar cities’, which
currently comprise the bulk of available data, might be too optimistic about the future.
Future urban population growth will likely be much smaller than it has been over the
past two centuries, and the return of urban decline in some cities might even result in
falling rents. Although our estimates are only correlational, these findings hold irre-
spective of whether we control for growth in real wages.
2.5 Conclusion
In this paper, we have presented a long-term view of urban rental markets in Western
Europe, relying on newly constructed indices of rents. For the first time, it is possible
to trace the rental trajectories for various European cities from 1500 to the present on a
continuous annual basis. Until the 19th century, growth in real urban market rents was
close to zero or even negative. Following sustained urban population growth, housing
rents rose substantially during the 19th century. Importantly, direct government inter-
ference in the rent level did not exist in the first four centuries we study, and the in-
terplay of market forces seems to have done its work in stabilizing long-term real rent
levels. In the 20th century, housing rents continued to rise in aggregate, but growth has
slowed down significantly.
We show that, absent trends in housing yields, trends in rental prices are the main
determinant of housing returns over the long run. Within our sample, we find that
rental growth is skewed towards modern ’superstar’ cities, which have grown much
more in population than the general population. Cities that were economically lead-
ing in 1500 but did not maintain that status, such as Ghent and Bruges, experienced
no long-term rental growth at all. This implies that investors who base their return
estimates from past data of current superstar cities, for which we had most evidence
prior to this paper, will likely substantially overestimate future returns. This finding
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is further strengthened by the fact that future urban population growth is expected to
slow done significantly in the developed world. Our results show it is crucial to adjust
for population growth, and even more so for population decline.
The data collected here provide a valuable source for economists and economic
historians. To our knowledge, the dataset presented in this study is the largest histori-
cal urban rental real estate dataset constructed to date, and by providing the data and
resulting indices to all interested researchers, we hope to have created a solid basis for
future research on the long-term history of housing markets.
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2.A Discussion of Rental Sources
This section provides an overview of all rental sources, organized per city. A summary
of all sources can be found in Table 2.1 in the main text.
2.A.1 Belgian Cities
Most Belgian historical rental studies follow a tradition that has been set up in the
early 1960s, most notably with the work of Etienne Scholliers on Antwerp rents, also
published in Verlinden (1972). The early works, done by Mason for Bruges (Verlinden,
1972), Van Ryssel (1967) for Ghent, Avondts (1971) for Brussels, and Scholliers (Ver-
linden, 1972) for Antwerp, focused on collecting housing rents for the largest possible
number of representative homes. In each of these studies, representativeness was as-
sessed in terms of location, ownership and fluctuations in rents. In each city, rental
observations stem from homes spread all over the city. Due to data availability, prac-
tically all rents stem from institutional accounts, as explained in the main body of our
paper. The main exception to this case is the study of Van Ryssel (1967) for Ghent,
where 25 percent of homes stem from private investors and another 12.5 percent from
city records. Homes that showed abnormal changes in the level of rents were excluded.
In each study homes were only included in the database if rental observations were
available for at least 7 years. If observations were available for less than 7 years, but
the rent was revised within this period, the home was included as well.
Most rents in these studies were paid annually: monthly, quarterly or half-yearly
payments were exceptional and seemed to occur only during very turbulent periods,
such as the start of the Spanish occupation. Although the starting dates of the con-
tracts are unknown, annual rents were mostly paid on various religious holidays, such
as Christmas, Candlemas or Maria Ascension, which were spread evenly throughout
the year. In the index estimation, it is therefore assumed that contracts start mid-year.
Works for the period after the Ancien Regime, from Avondts and Scholliers (1977),
Van den Eeckhout and Scholliers (1979), Henau (1991, unpublished) and Segers (1999),
vary slightly in methodology but rely on the same set of sources: social institutions. De
’Burelen van Weldadigheid’ (offices of kindness) and ’Burgerlijke Godshuizen’ (civil
alms-houses), were founded after the French revolution and operated like the insti-
tutions in place during the Ancien Regime. These institutions were merged in 1925
into a single organization that still exists nowadays in each Belgian municipality in the
form of a Public Centre for Social Welfare (OCMW). Their archives formed the source
for each of these studies. The work of Henau (1991) covers the period after the start
of the World War I until 1940, whereas the others span from 1796 to the first half of
the 20th century. Overlapping observations have been removed, as in some cases ob-
servations on the same address for the same year appeared in multiple studies. For
the study of Henau (1991) and Segers (1999), we also digitized data from the cities of
Leuven and Liége, but we did not include indices for these cities in this paper as no
data was available before 1800. Chain indices for these cities are presented in the cor-
responding papers; results for our repeat-rent indices are available upon request. The
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main methodological differences in these later studies are that they are able to exactly
estimate rents per calendar year, since the starting dates of the contracts are known. If
a contract for example changed mid-year, the annual rent would be based on both the
first six months of the old contract and the last six months of the new contract.
It is important to realize that the rental market was severely impacted by rent reg-
ulations introduced during World War I. In August 1914, a law was passed that gave
the Belgian state the power to adapt contracts during wartime, including rental con-
tracts. In 1919 and 1921 legislation was passed such that large groups of renters did
not have to pay rent arrears built up during World War I. In some cases, actual market
rents demanded might have therefore been higher than reported in our data, as we
only observe the actual rent paid.
Rents were frequently re-capped relative to the rent level on January 1, 1914, with
rent ceilings slowly increasing. There was significant variation in the imposition and
revision of rent ceilings across municipalities, with the general trend being a relaxation
of the regulations throughout the twenties and thirties. Following World War II, rent
restrictions were re-imposed until the early fifties to deal with the housing shortages
caused by the war.
We unfortunately do not possess underlying data for the unpublished study of
Henau, which we have used from 1940 to 1961. Methodologically, this study is sim-
ilar to Henau (1991), and covers the largest cities in Belgium. Between 1961 and 1975,
no rental indices are available at the city level or national level. In order to splice our
indices, we have used developments in house prices to proxy for rental prices from
Knoll et al. (2017). From 1975, we rely on the rent component of the CPI. The first
three years, we use a statistic published in Banque Nationale de Belgique (1980), while
from 1977 we rely on the nation-wide CPI published by Statistics Belgium (2018b). The
rent component of the Belgian CPI is based on the average rent reported in a monthly
survey of 1800 properties in the private sector. Properties remain in the sample for ex-
tended periods of time. Changes occur either when tenants do not want to participate
in the survey anymore or when old homes are being replaced by newer dwellings to
keep the sample representative.
2.A.2 Amsterdam
The work of Lesger (1986), our source for Amsterdam from 1550-1854, follows in the
tradition of the Belgian rent studies, albeit with one significant difference: the selec-
tion of homes based on quality. Whereas the homes in the samples of the Belgian cities
were well spread throughout the cities, there might have been a bias towards homes
of a particular quality bracket in particular years. Lesger therefore categorized on the
quality of the observed home, ensuring that in every year homes from each of the four
defined quality categories (from low to high) were in the sample. Each category was
defined based on a set of reference homes, for which quality characteristics were avail-
able such that a categorization could be made. Homes were subsequently classified
based on their rental price relative to the rental prices of the reference homes.
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Homes were only included in the sample if more than five years of rental data was
available. If data was missing for less than two years, most likely because the home was
not rented, the missing data would be filled with the rent that was paid after the gap.
This strategy is somewhat unfortunate for our repeat-sales index, since rent revisions
might occur one or two years earlier than they have occurred in reality. It was not
possible to trace these observations, but fortunately these gaps were relatively rare.
We complement the data of Lesger with our own archival data collection, using
data from various institutional archives kept in the Amsterdam City Archives. Our
main source is the archive of the Burgerweeshuis, the Amsterdam orphanage, which
has been discussed extensively in the work of McCants (1997). In addition we have col-
lected data from the archive of the Roman-Catholic boys’ orphanage, the Brants-Rus
Almshouse and various churches: the Walloon Reformed Church, the Remonstrants
and Mennonites. For the majority of data, we have attempted to collect data on rental
contracts, but for some cases it was only possible to rely on rent payments. For the
Burgerweeshuis, we collected but eventually excluded a significant set of contract data
prior to the 19th century: the homes in the Noordsche Bosch, an area in Amsterdam.
The homes in this neighborhood were initially rented out at below-market rates be-
cause they were used to attract textile workers. Correspondingly rent prices of these
homes increased much faster than anywhere else in the city.
From 1940 onwards, we do not have sufficient primary sources to allow for the
computation of a market rent index. However, this is not problematic since it coin-
cides with a period of strict rent freezes. The first rent controls had been introduced
in the Netherlands during World War I (despite Dutch neutrality in the war), follow-
ing housing shortages and a broader set of government policies to control prices for
basic needs during periods of large uncertainty. Initially, rents were fixed by the ’Hu-
urcommisiewet’ of 1917, but later rents could increase with the rate of inflation. In the
early 1920s governments grip on rents had reduced already, but only in 1927 this was
confirmed by law. The rent freeze after the start of World War II remained until 1950,
when gradually more sophisticated rent policy was introduced. The idea of the rent
policy was to slowly bring the prices of pre-war homes and expensive, but still subsi-
dized, post-war housing back to market level, while keeping rents affordable. While
in many municipalities rents were already liberated in the late 1960s, Amsterdam, and
most other big cities, remained under rent controls until the late 1970s.
For rent prices in this period until 1994, we rely on a rent price index of the Ams-
terdam Statistical Office, which we retrieved from its annual yearbook. The method-
ology used for this statistic followed standards of the Dutch Central Bureau of Statis-
tics. From 1994 until 2000, we rely on the rent component of the Dutch consumer
price index. Although the methodology has been updated multiple times, the core of
this study is formed by a rental survey currently sent out yearly to about 15,000 Dutch
households, whose rent changes are used to estimate the index. To control for unob-
served quality changes, the survey does ask whether renovations happened in the past
year. If that is the case, only price changes after the renovation are accounted for. A
small share of homes is added to and deleted from the sample every year to keep the
sample of homes representative. A drawback of this index is that households living
2.A. DISCUSSION OF RENTAL SOURCES 39
in private and social housing are surveyed. From 2000 onwards, we make use of an
index on average rent per square meter reported in Dröes et al. (2017). Note that this
measure only partially controls for quality, as it only takes account of changing space
over time, and not of the quality of a given space.
2.A.3 London
The main historical study used in our work on the English market is Clark (2002). Clark
(2002) assembled a large dataset of rents, consisting of 19,246 observations spanning
from 1225 until 1907.8 As in the other cases, most rental observations stem from in-
vestigations into the activities of charities. Clark’s sample consists of data from both
Wales and England, but about a quarter of observations originate from London. Not all
transactions in the sample of Clark correspond to actual rents. First of all, in about 10
percent of cases tenants had to pay fines or payment for repairs of the building. Since
these are generally considered to be part of rental expenses, Clark (2002) annualized
these fines and used these to adjust the rental values of the observations. Second, in
another 10 percent of cases Clark estimated the rental values of homes from house
prices, since no rental payments were mentioned.
Our index is only based on repeated observations on London, both within and
outside the City, with rent contracts of 21 years or less. There are 1,624 observations
left for the estimation of the index. Before 1770, there are very few observations and a
significant number of years have no observations at all. As a result, the signal-to-noise
ratio is very low, and hence the model smooths the index significantly.
From 1903 to 1909 we rely on the recent study of Samy (2015), who developed
a house and rent price index for London for the period from 1895 until 1939, based
on data from the London Auction Mart (1895-1922) and the mortgage registers of the
Co-operative Permanent Building Societies (1920-1939). Absent repeat sales, Samy
(2015) used the hedonic method to estimate the indices. Unfortunately, no structural
characteristics are available for the London Auction Mart data, and only very basic
ones (number of rooms, frontage size and property size) for the CPBS data. Hence,
his index likely overstates rental price growth. However, since we only use six years
of his data (with almost constant prices), this effect does not alter the London index
significantly.
From 1909 until 1959, we have collected data on more than 30,000 rent observa-
tions from the archives of Trafalgar House Developments Ltd. We have collected data
from seal books of two of its subsidiaries: Consolidated London Properties and City &
West End Properties. These companies managed several apartment buildings, shops
and offices spread out through London, and their seal books contain data on newly
registered leases and renewals on existing ones, listing date, new price and old price.
To identify repeat-sales, we first cleaned data on the unit identifiers per building. The
unit numbers for each lease were not written down in a consistent way in the seal
books, such that it was not always clear which unit exactly was let. After cleaning the
8Note that the number of observations does not match the number of observations reported in the
paper, since Clark added observations to the dataset after publication.
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unit numbers, we only matched rents as repeats in case the old rent matched the new
rent on the previous observation on that unit. In total fifty percent of data could be
matched. For the index, we only used residential rent observations. Devaney (2010)
has used the same sources to estimate an office rent index for the City of London.
From 1959 until 1987 we use the nation-wide rent component of the CPI, as pro-
duced by the Office of National Statistics. The methodology behind this index has
changed multiple times; from the early 1960s onwards the rent component also in-
cluded the implied cost for owner-occupied housing. After 1987 we rely again on the
rent component of the CPI, which is based on a representative sample of homes whose
rents are tracked over time. If no rental prices are available for a particular home, it is
substituted by a home of comparable quality. As homes in both the private sector
and the social sector (local authority rents) are in the sample, the index is not a pure
measure of changes in constant-quality market rents. After 2005 we use ONS’s experi-
mental index on private housing rents in London, which relies on the same sources as
the rent component of the CPI, but only includes homes rented in the private sector.
2.A.4 Paris
The landmark study on the history of the Paris rental market is Le Roy Ladurie and
Couperie (1970). In their paper, Le Roy Ladurie & Couperie publish a triennial index
from 1400 to 1789 based on about 11,000 leases. Rental data does mostly come from
actual lease contracts, stored in the archival records of 26 different social institutions;
either religious institutions or hospitals. Only in a minority of cases data originate
from accounting books for which the contract date is unknown. Since contracts were
most commonly signed for nine years, rent payments from accounting books are not
always representative of market rents. We therefore excluded these in the estimation
of the index. For the period 1400-1485, which we have not reported in the main body
of the paper, insufficient observations on rental contracts were available, such that
the index for this period (available on request) is built on both contractual and non-
contractual observations.
Le Roy Ladurie and Couperie (1970) made an impressive effort to construct a sam-
ple representative for Paris. As mentioned previously, they collected an additional
12,000 leases from private contracts for 23 benchmark years to underline the repre-
sentativity of the charity rents: no differences in average rental prices were found in
the private and charity samples. Additionally, they separated isolated and repeated
observations and ensured renovated homes were treated as new observations. Last,
properties are well spread around Paris: while each institutions typically only owned
real estate close the location of the institution, the large number of institutions cov-
ered ensures a sufficient locational spread.
Unfortunately, the authors of the study did not preserve the punch card lists which
contained the rents for every home. However, the authors organized transcriptions
of the contracts and records, which are stored in the French National Archives. We
collected and typed for each of these contracts the identifier and approximate location
of the home, the contract date, the date of the accounting year and the rental price. All
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prices were converted to livre tournois.
Following the French Revolution and the dramatic state of the French public fi-
nances, all possessions of the institutions were nationalized in 1792, and only priva-
tized again in 1811. Archival data is scarce for this period, and in order to continue our
series we have combined several archival and non-archival sources. First, the French
government registered the rent on each property and the contract date when all homes
were nationalized, and these lists are published in the Sommier des Biens Nationaux
de Paris Monin and Lazard (1920). Second, when the properties were returned in 1811,
references were made to the underlying notary contracts, which in many cases could
still be found in the Archives of the Assistance-Publique des Hopitaux de Paris, the
Paris hospital system. It is the latter archive from which we have collected additional
archival data in order to combine data from before and after the Revolution.
From 1809 until 1870, we add data from the first register of the Parisian ’sommier
foncier’. The sommier foncier is one of the registers that was part of the famous French
Enregistrement, and contains data on contracts relating to all Parisian homes, such as
inheritances, sales contracts, rental values or auctions. For the taxation of wealth, it
was important to keep track of the owners of homes, as well as the value and revenue
they generated with their real estate. In the first register, which lasted from 1809 to the
1860s, rent contract data was included as well. We have collected a small sample of
this rent data for various streets in central Paris, and since observations are organized
per house it allows for the identification of repeat rents. Note these rents are primarily
for entire properties, and might thus not account for the presence of subrenting
From 1867 until 1957 we rely on a rent index from Marnata (1961). Marnata col-
lected 11,800 different rents from lease management books from residential neighbor-
hoods in Paris and subsequently used these observations to compute a chained index.
Although his index is not a pure repeat sales index but rather a chain index, it con-
trols for quality as it follows the same residential units over long periods of time. The
main disadvantage of his study is that most of the residential units in the sample are
of relatively high quality, meant for the upper class of society. Since rental develop-
ments might have differed in lower class rental units, the index cannot be considered
completely representative for the city of Paris.
From 1960 onwards, we make use of various rent indices compiled in data kindly
provided by Jacques Friggit. Between 1960 and 1988, this index is based on the rent
component of the CPI for the Paris region. From 1989 to 2015, it is based on the median
rent per square meter in Paris from the Observatoire des Loyers de l’Agglomeration
Parisienne. The latter method likely overstates growth in quality controlled rents, since
it only controls for quality improvements due to increased space, but does not take
into the account that the quality of a given space has improved as well (e.g. due to
better insulation).
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2.B Representativeness of Institutional Sample
The quality indices developed in this paper rely strongly on the assumption that the
mean rent derived from our sample of institutional rents is representative for the gen-
eral housing stock in the city. In this appendix, we assess these claims in more detail
by comparing the rent estimates from our sample with other estimates of rent prices
in the city. We also pair these sources to population data to make estimates of housing
quality per capita.
For Amsterdam and the Belgian cities, our main sources for these secondary es-
timates derive from property tax records. Prior to the 20th century, property taxa-
tion was the most common form of taxation and many cities, in particular in the Low
Countries, had a developed system of property taxation already from the late medieval
period onwards. Taxes were typically levied on the estimated capital or rental value
of homes, sketching a fairly representative picture of the value of the housing stock
in a city. Correspondingly, historians have already used these registers to make as-
sessments of income inequality (e.g. Soltow and Van Zanden, 1998; Ryckbosch, 2016).
From the early 19th century onwards, these systems were replaced by taxes on cadas-
tral income.
These tax records also have several drawbacks. First of all, although the rental or
cadastral value is typically aimed to proxy for actual rents, it is difficult to assess how
precise these estimates are, particularly since they were rarely updated. If possible, we
therefore only collected data in years when such an update took place. If that was not
possible, we corrected the rental value for rent price changes that took place since the
last correction, often employing the market rent indices estimated in this paper. Sec-
ond, in various records it was not possible to separate non-residential property (most
notably basements and warehouses) from residential property. However, the resulting
error is likely small. For example, in 1805 non-residential property only constituted
about 11 percent of total rental value in Amsterdam.
In total, we obtained data from 22 tax registers. For most of these, we were able to
also collect data on the number of homes in the register, either by collecting all rents
in the archival registers or through existing statistics.
Beyond these tax-based rents, data on the level of actual private rents was also
available for Paris, Amsterdam and Brussels. For Amsterdam, we computed the aver-
age level of rents for seven years between 1909 and 1939 based on census data. For
Paris, Le Roy Ladurie and Couperie (1970) collected data on 12,000 (private) rent con-
tracts from the Paris notarial archives, covering 24 years between 1500 and 1788. For
Brussels, we computed the average level of private rents in 1865 based on data from
the Lokstat-PoppKad database. Overall, we obtained 53 points in time to compare
levels of institutional rents to private rents.
In the figures below, we plot for each city these points relative to developments in
mean rents in our sample. For reference, we also plotted the number of observations.
In each city, the level of mean housing rents is close to the level of housing rents ob-
tained from our sample. Major differences mainly appear in Amsterdam in the early
20th century and Bruges in the 19th century; these parts are not included in our quality
2.B. REPRESENTATIVENESS OF INSTITUTIONAL SAMPLE 43
indices.
In the shorter term, substantial revisions in the sample typically lead to signifi-
cant volatility in the sample. This is particularly visible in Bruges around 1800, and
to lesser extent in Antwerp and Brussels. In each of these cases, the sample changes
almost entirely. For London and Paris, developments in annual mean rent levels are
substantially more volatile, since these samples are entirely based on rent contracts
rather than rent payments. Due to the low number of observations, this issue is par-
ticularly severe for London. Correspondingly, no quality index has been constructed
for London.
Figure 2.6: Amsterdam Mean Rents
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Notes: This figure plots the evolution of the average rent in our Amsterdam sample over time, relative to
alternative estimates from sources reporting on rental values or rents in the entire city. The points for
the 20th century reflect actual rents rather than rental values. To convert rental values to rents, we used
data from the 1805 rent register listing both rental values and actual rents. The light-grey scatter reports
the number of observations in the sample. Sources alternative estimates: Soltow and Van Zanden (1998);
ACA 5044 no. 254, 273, 281 284, 402-405; ACA 5045 no. 269-323; ACA 5210 no. 69; Fryske Akademy (2018);
Laloli (2018).
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Figure 2.7: Antwerp Mean Rents
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Notes: This figure plots the evolution of the average rent in our Antwerp sample over time, relative to
alternative estimates from sources reporting on rental values or rents in the entire city. The light-grey
scatter reports the number of rent observations in the sample. Sources alternative estimates: Felixarchief
Antwerp 782 no. 1-14, Baetens (1976), De Belder (1977), LOKSTAT-POPPKAD.
Figure 2.8: Bruges Mean Rents
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Notes: This figure plots the evolution of the average rent in our Bruges sample, relative to alternative
estimates from sources reporting on rental values or rents in the entire city. The light-grey scatter reports
the number of rent observations in the sample. Sources alternative estimates: Database Heidi Deneweth,
LOKSTAT-POPPKAD, Quetelet Center.
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Figure 2.9: Brussels Mean Rents
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Notes: This figure plots the evolution of the average rent in our Brussels sample, relative to alternative
estimates from sources reporting on rental values or rents in the entire city. The light-grey scatter reports
the number of rent observations in the sample. Data from Vrielinck indicated the average ratio of cadas-
tral income to average actual rents in 1865. We used this ratio to transform average cadastral income to
actual rents for all other Belgian cities in 1865 and 1890. Sources alternative estimates: Database Sven
Vrielinck, LOKSTAT-POPPKAD, Quetelet Center.
Figure 2.10: Ghent Mean Rents
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Notes: This figure plots the evolution of the average rent in our Ghent sample, relative to alternative
estimates from sources reporting on rental values or rents in the entire city. The light-grey scatter re-
ports the number of rent observations in the sample. The rental value for 1834 is an estimate based on
rents from a decade earlier and, most likely, underestimated rents. We therefore correct the value by
25 percent. Sources alternative estimates: Dambruyne (2001), Vanhaute and Hannes (2007), LOKSTAT-
POPPKAD, Quetelet Center.
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Figure 2.11: London Mean Rents
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Notes: This figure plots the evolution of the average rent in our London sample. The light-grey scatter
reports the number of rent observations in the sample. Note that the number of observations in our
London sample is very low, implying average rents are very noisy at annual level. For this reason, the plot
provides a scatterplot of mean rents.
Figure 2.12: Paris Mean Rents
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Notes: This figure plots the evolution of the average rent in our Bruges sample, relative to alternative esti-
mates from sources reporting on rental values or rents in the entire city. The light-grey scatter reports the
number of rent observations in the sample. Source alternative estimates: Le Roy Ladurie and Couperie
(1970).
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2.C Consumer Prices
2.C.1 Data Sources
Our sources for consumer price data are reported in table 2.6. For most periods, we
rely on existing consumer price indices. For Belgium, from 1500-1830, we rely on in-
dices constructed from primary price data; the construction method is discussed in
section C2. Primary price data on individual consumption goods are either based on
actual purchase prices recorded by these social institutions, or on fixed prices set for
tax or exchange purposes. Governments levied small taxes on goods, which were ei-
ther based on actual market prices paid for the goods or on so-called ’spijker prices’,
fixed prices set by counties based on prevailing market conditions. Institutions with-
out tax-levying authority used similar practices to set prices for monetary contracts
that were settled in kind, providing an additional source of price information. These
fixed prices were not always accurate representations of average annual market prices.
Prices of goods could fluctuate considerably within a calendar year, as harvests could
significantly be affected by bad weather or political instability.
Table 2.6: Overview Consumer Price Sources
City/Country Study Years Coverage Type
Belgium Michotte (1937) 1830-1913 National Index
Scholliers (1978) 1914-1920 Urban Index
Statistics Belgium (2018b) 1913-2018 National Index
Bruges Verlinden (1972) 1500-1800 Urban Raw prices
Ghent Verlinden (1972) 1500-1800 Urban Raw prices
Antwerpen Van der Wee (1963) 1500-1600 Urban Raw prices
Verlinden (1972) 1500-1830 Urban Raw prices
Brussels Verlinden (1972) 1500-1800 Urban Raw prices
Amsterdam Van Zanden (2018) 1500-1800 Regional Index
Van Riel (2018) 1800-1900 National Index
Statistics Netherlands (2018) 1900-2018 National Index
Paris Ridolfi (2019) 1500-1840 City Index
Singer-Kérel (1961) 1840-1958 City Index
CGEDD (2018) 1958-1990 National Index
INSEE (2018) 1990-2018 National Index
London Allen (2001) 1500-1913 City Index
Thomas and Dimsdale (2017) 1913-1988 National Index
Office for National Statistics (2018) 1988-2018 National Index
Notes: The table reports for each city the different sources of consumer price data that we used. Most
data covers a strictly urban sample, although data is in some cases at national level. Except for Belgium,
we only use secondary time series.
For Antwerp, consumer price data is complemented with data from Van der Wee
(1963). Prices are based on the consumer price index constructed by Michotte (1937)
from 1830 until the World War I. For the period of World War I, we use an index for
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Brussels from Scholliers (1978). After World War I, a continuous consumer price index
(1921-2018) is available from Statistics Belgium (2018b), which uses 1914 as base year
and is therefore spliced to the index of Michotte (1937).
Amsterdam consumption prices are from Van Zanden (2018), who computes a
price index based on a representative basket of goods for Western Holland between
1500 and 1800. From 1800 to 1910, we use the price index constructed by Van Riel
(2018), which we deflate for rental expenses. Consumer prices after 1900 are based on
the Dutch national consumer price index from Statistics Netherlands (2018).
For consumer prices in Paris we employ the index developed by Ridolfi (2019) for
the period from 1500 to 1840. Annual figures for this index were kindly provided by
Leonardo Rudolfi This index is built on a wide array of primary and secondary sources,
improving existing estimates of Allen (2001). For the period from 1840 to 1950, we
use the price index for workers from Singer-Kérel (1961). After 1950, we rely on con-
sumer price indices reported in CGEDD (2018) and INSEE (2018). Indices for con-
sumer prices in London covering the 1500-1913 period are from Allen (2001). For
the 20th century, we use data from the the Bank of England dataset "a millennium of
macroeconomic data" (Thomas and Dimsdale, 2017), from which we used their pre-
ferred headline CPI measure. To extend to 2018, we use the standard CPI index of
Office for National Statistics (2018).
2.C.2 Index Construction
We estimate a new Belgian consumer price index from 1500 to 1830, based on 128
different price series collected from the Verlinden volumes and Van der Wee (1963).9
Even though Flanders and Brabant were separate states until 1795, with each having
their own currency, we do not estimate a separate index for these regions. We have
found no evidence that aggregate consumer prices within Flanders or Brabant were
more strongly tied together. This pattern was confirmed when looking at the individ-
ual price series.
We have also attempted to construct price indices for each city, as in the short run
prices for particular goods could vary across cities, but this turned out to be infeasi-
ble. First, the number of series available per city is limited, in particular for Ghent and
Brussels, causing their price indices to be unrealistically volatile relative to other cities.
Second, the available sources are of varying quality, ranging from monthly averages of
market prices to a single price fixed on the day before Christmas. Quality considera-
tions seem more important than differences across cities: high-quality series on the
same good across cities tend to be more correlated than high- and low-quality series
on the same good within a city.
9Allen (2001) has already estimated an annual consumer price index for Antwerp / Brabant from 1366-
1913, but his index does not rely on a representative adjustable basket of goods and is likely to understate
the true annual volatility in prices due to the strong reliance on interpolated data. As the majority of
prices is missing, interpolation results in unrealistically smooth indices, in particular during the 18th
century. This will make it much more difficult to identify to what extent nominal rents move with the
general price level.
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Due to the lack of continuous price series, we have developed a pragmatic method
to estimate the consumer price indices, making use of the available data as much as
possible. Note that due to the data-driven index estimation strategy, the index devel-
oped in this section cannot be classified in standard price index categories; such as
the well-known Laspeyres, Paasche or Fischer price indices. The method to construct
our indices consists of three steps.
In the first step, the 128 collected price series were stacked into 14 different groups:
wheat, rye, barley, peas, butter, egg, cheese, potatoes, buckwheat, beef, chicken, fish,
energy, and oils. The first nine groups contain only a single good, whereas the last
five groups contain multiple goods representative of the group under consideration.
To avoid sensitivity to size discounts or quality differences across cities, as each city
had its own measures, we index the individual price series. Base years are chosen to
be all years in which individual price series for a group overlap, which avoids strong
base-year sensitivity. In case a series has no overlap, it is indexed relative to one or
more high-quality series for the same good. Aggregate indices are constructed for
each product group by taking averages of the most-representative series. Represen-
tativeness is assessed based on the nature of the prices (fixed versus market prices)
and the frequency and timing of the observations within a year, with preference given
to high-frequency market prices matching the calendar year.
Table 2.7: Expenditure Patterns in an Antwerp Orphanage
Year Expenditure as % of total
Price Total exp. Food Nonfood
Grains Local curr. Grains Dairy Meat Rest Energy Clothes Repairs
1585 40% 9% 10% 15% 3% 18% 4%
1586 31.1 18,737 59% 13% 3% 12% 3% 7% 3%
1587 32.7 14,184 59% 6% 4% 21% 2% 6% 2%
1588 9.78 6,627 34% 16% 10% 5% 7% 15% 14%
1589 5.87 8,852
1590 10.2 10,389 25% 17% 24% 4% 21% 9%
1591 10.25 10,559 21% 20% 7% 24% 4% 22% 2%
1592 8.28 10,208 21% 16% 7% 22% 5% 18% 10%
1593 7.86 11,515 11% 20% 7% 26% 6% 23% 7%
1594 10.9 12,302 16% 18% 9% 24% 5% 21% 7%
1595 20.9 13,853 29% 18% 7% 20% 4% 17% 6%
1596 16.8 13,167 27% 17% 6% 20% 4% 16% 10%
1597 15.8 12,044 28% 18% 7% 21% 5% 13% 9%
1598 14.3 11,240 24% 19% 7% 24% 6% 13% 7%
1599 10.9 10,253 19% 17% 6% 21% 5% 19% 13%
1600 10.1 9,442 18% 15% 9% 18% 7% 24% 9%
Average 29% 16% 7% 20% 5% 17% 7%
Notes: The table reports expenses for the Maagdenhuis orphanage in Antwerp, based on data from Schol-
liers (1960). We use these to estimate budget shares in the CPI.
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In the second step the base weights of each good in the overall price index were de-
termined. Weights are based on scarce information on expenditure patterns of Ghent
households and Antwerp orphanages for a handful of years in the late 16th and 19th
century, published in Scholliers (1960) and Avondts and Scholliers (1977) (1977) and
reported in Table 2.7, for 1600 and 1840. Weights are fixed before 1600, and from 1600
to 1830 interpolated. Potatoes and buckwheat are only included after 1800 due to data
availability. It is important to realize that expenditure patterns vary significantly over
time and across sources. This becomes evident when looking at the expenditures of
the ’Maagdenhuis’ in Antwerp relative to the price of grains from 1585 to 1600, re-
ported in Table 2.7. The price of grain, which was the most important component of
the household budget until the early 19th century, increased significantly in 1586 due
to the uncertainty caused by the Fall of Antwerp to the Spanish in late 1585. Since ce-
reals were, even at very high prices, the cheapest source of calories, inhabitants did
not shift their consumption to other goods, but were forced to spend their money on
cereals to avoid starvation.
The main problem with the selected base weights is that for some product groups
no continuous price observations are available, in particular after 1800. In order to
make use of the available data as much as possible, without engaging in excessive
smoothing, we vary the weights across years depending on data availability (see Ta-
ble 2.8).10 In case prices for a product group are not available or of insufficient quality,
its weight is redistributed to a group (or groups) that is (are) most correlated with the
price index of the missing group. In the last step, the prices for each good are con-
verted to index prices and multiplied with the weights to produce the consumer price
index.
Table 2.8: Base Weights Price Index, Key Years
Year Wheat Rye Butter Cheese Beef Chicken Egg
1600 4.0% 40.0% 16.0% 7.0% 5.0% 5.0% 0.5%
1799 11.5% 23.4% 14.3% 6.2% 9.1% 8.3% 1.7%
1800 13.0% 19.0% 15.0% - 16.0% - -
1835 15.1% 15.5% 15.0% - 16.0% - -
Year Fish Peas Barley Energy Oils Potatoes Buckwheat
1600 3.0% 2.0% 6.5% 9.0% 2.0% - -
1799 3.0% 3.7% 5.3% 11.5% 2.0% - -
1800 - - 5.0% 14.0% 2.0% 12.0% 4.0%
1835 - - 5.0% 14.0% 2.0% 13.4% 4.0%
Notes: The table reports the base weights of each of the different food items in the aggregate CPI. Because
data on each food item is not available for each year, weights can shift over time.
10The weighting schemes for each city are available upon request.
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2.D Population Estimates
To construct estimates of population for our cities, which we use to make estimates
of housing quality per capita, we combined population estimates found in historical
studies, and interpolated these using cubic splines. It should be noted that the quality
of these estimates varies, in particular for the 16th century. In some cases, estimates
could differ significantly. For many early estimates, it was not always clear how they
were constructed, such that it was difficult to judge the accuracy of the numbers. From
1820 onwards, we used for all Belgian cities census estimates of population reported
in Segers (1999) and Statistics Belgium (2018b). For each city, we used the following
sources, which we deemed most accurate:
Antwerp: Quetelet (1846); Verbeemen (1956); Deprez (1957); Marnef (1996). Bruges:
Sentrie (2007); Deneweth (2010). Ghent: Dambruyne (2001); Van Werveke (1948); De-
prez (1957); Vermeulen (2002). Brussels: Cosemans (1966), Avondts (1971). Amster-
dam: Francke and Korevaar (2020). London: Harding (1990), Landers et al. (1993) and
Mayor of London (2017). Paris: Francke and Korevaar (2020).
2.E Unpublished Data Sources
Deneweth, H. Database Heidi Deneweth based on "Huizen en mensen. Wonen, ver-
bouwen, investeren en lenen in drie Brugse wijken van de late middeleeuwen tot de
negentiende eeuw”. Unpublished Ph.D. thesis, 2008. Courtesy of Heidi Deneweth
Henau, A. Rent index Belgian cities, 1940-1961. Courtesy of Katharina Knoll.
Historical Databases of Local and Cadastral Statistics (LOKSTAT-POPPKAD), Ghent
University, Quetelet Center
Friggit, J. Rent index Paris, various INSEE / OLAP statistics. Courtesy of Jacques Frig-
git.
Vrielinck. S. Database relation cadastral income and rental value for 19th century Bel-
gium. Courtesy of Sven Vrielinck.
2.F Archival Data Sources
Amsterdam City Archives, 191: Archief van het Rooms-Katholiek Jongensweeshuis,
no 979, 987, 991, 992
Amsterdam City Archives, 201: Archief van de Waalsch Hervormde Gemeente, no.
1973 and 3596
Amsterdam City Archives, 367.A: Archief van het Burgerweeshuis, oud archief, no 143,
143A, 144, 145, 146
Amsterdam City Archives, 367.C: Archief van het Burgerweeshuis, nieuw-archief, no.
938, 947, 1421, 1794, 1798, 1804-1805
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Amsterdam City Archives, 404: Brants-Rus Hofje en van Christoffel van Brants, no.
156
Amsterdam City Archives, 612: Archief van de Remonstrantse Gemeente, no. 432
Amsterdam City Archives, 1120 : Archief van Verenigde Doopsgezinde Gemeente van
Amsterdam en rechtsvoorgangers, no. 2087-2089, 2130
Amsterdam City Archives, 5044: Archief van de Thesaurieren Extraordinaris, no. 254,
273, 281, 284, 402-405
Amsterdam City Archives, 5045: Archief van de Honderdste en Tweehonderdste Pen-
ningkamer of Commissarissen tot de Ontvangst van de Honderdste en Andere Pen-
ningen: no 269-323
Amsterdam City Archives, 5210: Archief van de Commissaris van de Stedelijke Acci-
jnzen en Belastingen en rechtsvoorgangers, no. 69-75
Amsterdam City Archives, 30525: Collectie Kenniscentrum Amsterdam, no. 2036,
2391 and 3733
Archives de l’Assistance Publique des Hopitaux de Paris, 782 Foss 1 Propriétés ur-
baines vendues depuis 1807.
Archives de l’Assistance Publique des Hopitaux de Paris, 782 Foss 25, Loyers de maisons
1811
Archives de Paris, DQ18, Sommier Foncier
Archives Nationales, Pierrefitte-sur-Seine, EHESS Archives, cote 66 AJ 2029-2035
London Metropolitan Archives CLC/B/216, Trafalgar House Developments Limited,
MS144, 24-25, 28, 59
Felixarchief Antwerpen 781: Gilberte Degueldere, onderzoek over Antwerpse huizen,
bewoners en waarden, no 1-14
National Archives RG 77/3. Historic Retail Prices Index, 1947 to 2004 dataset. Re-
trieved June 18, 2018: http://discovery.nationalarchives.gov.uk/details/r/
C1152137
Chapter 3
Long Run Affordability and
(Ine)Quality*
There is no city in Europe, I believe, in which house-rent is dearer than in
London, and yet I know no capital in which a furnished apartment can be
hired as cheap. Lodging is not only much cheaper in London than in Paris;
it is much cheaper than in Edinburgh of the same degree of goodness. Adam
Smith (1776), The Wealth of Nations, Book 1, Chapter 10.
Urban housing is dear for many households and is perceived to have become too
expensive in cities all over the world, as a barrage of existing and recently introduced
affordability policies attests. For example, London’s mayor promised to start build-
ing 116,000 ’truly affordable’ homes by 2022 (Mayor of London, 2018), while Paris and
Berlin introduced new strict rent controls in 2019. In New York, over one million hous-
ing units are subject to rent regulations, and similar policies are being discussed or
have been implemented in various cities across the US, most notably in the San Fran-
cisco Bay Area (Diamond et al., 2019).
According to the Cambridge Dictionary (2018), affordable homes are "able to be
bought or rented by people who do not earn a lot of money." As appealing as this sym-
pathetically straight-forward definition might sound at first, it turns out to be very
unhelpful when analyzing affordability in detail. Housing affordability problems are
not merely a matter of rising housing costs meeting insufficient income: they stem
from the interplay between house prices, housing rents, income levels, income distri-
butions, and housing quality (Quigley and Raphael, 2005). However, despite the long
history of housing market interventions, with many countries already introducing rent
control and supply-side measures after World War I (Willis, 1950; Fischel, 2004), we do
not know how these variables have evolved, and how they respond to changes in the
demand for urban housing.
This paper aims to fill that gap: we present the first truly long-term overview of
urban rental housing quality, inequality, and affordability, going back more than 500
*This chapter is co-authored with Piet Eichholtz (Maastricht University) and Thies Lindenthal (Uni-
versity of Cambridge).
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years. This is based on the annual rent price indices developed by Eichholtz et al.
(2020b), for seven European cities: Amsterdam, Antwerp, Bruges, Brussels, Ghent,
London, and Paris. We combine these rent indices with indices of wages to investi-
gate developments in housing affordability, and we test whether rent control played a
role in this. We complement this rental information with additional data to construct
indices of housing quality that trace trends in housing standards and inequality since
1500, and we investigate the role of urban growth and decline in each of these devel-
opments.
We focus on rents rather than house prices, since renting has been, and still is,
the dominant tenancy form in most European cities. The seven cities in our sam-
ple offer rich data on housing markets in diverse economic conditions: each city has
been an important commerce hub at different periods in time – or still is. Some grew
quickly initially and slowed down later, such as Ghent, Bruges, Antwerp, and Amster-
dam, while others, notably London and Paris, have continued expanding and retained
their leading status in the 21st century. Such shifts possibly had an impact on fun-
damental equilibria of housing costs, affordability and quality, which are most visible
over the long run.
The 500-year perspective taken in this paper offers three contributions that jointly
provide a new outlook on the current housing affordability debate. First, the long-term
setting allows us to study how rent prices, housing quality and affordability respond
to changes in urban populations under a free market regime. With more recent data,
unregulated markets are hard to find. Most urban rental markets in Europe have been
subject to some form of government regulation since the early 20th century (Arnott,
1995). In both Europe and the United States, zoning regulations often limit the ex-
pansion of housing supply (Hilber and Vermeulen, 2016; Glaeser and Gyourko, 2018).
However, even in markets without such constraints, housing supply cannot adjust im-
mediately to changes in demand, such that it takes time for the market to reach equi-
librium. This implies that long time series are necessary to estimate the effect of urban
population changes on housing conditions and rents.2
We combine our panel of housing data with data on population changes to study
their long-term effects in the unregulated period from 1500 until 1913, expanding the
analysis in Eichholtz et al. (2020b). Using 25-year changes, we find that urban pop-
ulation growth leads to an insignificant but modest long-term worsening of housing
affordability, with an elasticity of -0.19. We define housing affordability as the evolu-
tion of quality-controlled prices relative to median wages.
These dynamics mask changes in the distribution of rental prices. We show that
when cities were growing, and housing supply expanded, average housing quality
grew as well. These higher quality homes were likely rented to wealthier citizens that
benefited from the growth of the city: wages for ordinary workers did not increase
faster than rents. At the same time, we find that rental prices of cheaper properties
2The recent work of Combes et al. (2019) uses a novel cross-sectional method to estimate the elasticity
of urban house prices with respect to population. Their preferred estimate corresponds to an elastic-
ity of 0.2. However, their estimate is conditional on current French zoning regulations that only allow
construction within existing city boundaries.
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increased at faster rates than expensive properties. Thus, in free markets, the main
long-term consequence of urban growth is not a worsening of aggregate rental afford-
ability, but increasing housing inequality.
Existing historical studies have documented the positive relationship between city
size and inequality before the 20th century (Soltow and Van Zanden, 1998; Ryckbosch,
2016), and such a pattern also exists in modern US cities (Baum-Snow and Pavan,
2013; Eeckhout et al., 2014). However, the implications of urban growth on housing
inequality have not yet been studied. This is particularly important since housing in-
equality also captures differences in the value of locations. Although we do not di-
rectly study the spatial dynamics of our data, our findings also relate to the literature
on segregation. Guerrieri et al. (2013) argue that during housing booms, more affluent
residents move into initially poorer neighborhoods, and bid up prices there, leading to
gentrification. This mechanism could explain why rental prices of cheaper properties
increase more when cities are growing. Such segregation has been directly linked to
rising inequality (Fogli and Guerrieri, 2019).
Dynamics in urban housing conditions are very different when cities are declining
in population. In line with Glaeser and Gyourko (2005) and Eichholtz et al. (2020b),
we find a much larger elasticity of affordability with respect to the population when
population declines, around one, since durable housing supply cannot adjust. Corre-
spondingly, after controlling for rent price changes, we find no evidence for changing
housing consumption when cities decline. Urban decline also does not seem to fully
revert increases in housing inequality that resulted from earlier urban growth: evi-
dence for such reversals is weak.
Our second main contribution is that we present new stylized facts regarding the
development of urban housing affordability in the regulated 20th century. In the early
20th century, the ratio of wages to housing rents fluctuated significantly, and we esti-
mate whether rent controls played a role in driving these changes in affordability. A
wide range of papers discusses the impact of rent control policies on housing costs.
The earliest paper warning that such measures can have negative consequences is
Friedman and Stigler (1946), and since then, different authors have pointed at lower
maintenance incentives (Downs, 1988), negative neighborhood effects (Sims, 2007;
Autor et al., 2014), and the misallocation of housing (Glaeser and Luttmer, 2003). A
recent paper of Diamond et al. (2019) exploits quasi-experimental variation in rent
control in San Francisco, and finds that housing supply decreases and city-wide rents
increase in response to rent control. Our paper exploits variation in inflation rates to
show that nominal price controls caused considerable improvements in affordability
over the short run. Our setting does not allow us to study their potentially harmful
long-term effects. However, we do show that aggregate housing affordability, in terms
of the ratio of quality-controlled rents to wages, improved drastically between the early
and late 20th century. Although affordability has recently started worsening in some
of the cities we study, rental housing remains far more affordable than in the centuries
before.
Third, we document that urban rental housing quality and housing consumption
per capita have both risen considerably, while housing inequality has reduced sub-
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stantially. The physical attributes and the size of homes in our sample improved over
time. In the early centuries covered in our study, the defining attribute of a typical
dwelling was space, and little of that. Gradually, housing space per capita increased,
and amenities like heating, running water, plumbing, access to sewers or electricity
became standard features of urban dwellings. The timing of these updates is remark-
able: housing quality already rose considerably from the 16th to the 18th century, sug-
gesting that urban living standards already improved prior to the Industrial Revolu-
tion, although primarily for the rich. This is both visible per capita and per home.
During the Industrial Revolution, housing quality stagnated, or sometimes even de-
clined, before rising again in the late 19th century. The upward trend continued in the
20th century, helped by improvements in rental affordability. This time, these benefits
accrued more widely than before, as housing inequality reduced substantially.
Better affordability seems to be at odds with households’ expenditure shares on
housing reaching new heights, but this paper shows that most increases in housing
expenses stem from improvements in housing quality and quantity rather than ris-
ing prices for a given set of housing attributes. This has also been hypothesized by
Quigley and Raphael (2004), who apply various measures to trace affordability in the
United States from 1960 until the early 2000s, and also include rental housing. They
find that the ratio of housing expenses to income has increased over time, in particular
for low-income renters, and that this may be due to improvements in housing quality.
However, we find that in some cities, housing quality improvements have halted re-
cently, while our data for Amsterdam show that housing inequality is rising again. The
latter pattern is also visible in the United States (Aladangady et al., 2017).
This paper proceeds as follows. The next section will present the original data we
have recovered for this paper, as well as sample statistics for all the data we employ,
both for the rent indices and for the new data. We will then discuss our measurement
methods for housing affordability, inequality, and quality. The section after that will
show our results, and we will end the paper with a short summary and some conclu-
sions.
3.1 Data
We track rent prices, housing quality and affordability for seven cities in four coun-
tries: Amsterdam, London, Paris, and the Belgian cities Antwerp, Bruges, Brussels,
and Ghent, and we do that for the period from 1500 until 2018.
The data on rent levels we use in this paper are based on the recently developed
urban rent indices from Eichholtz et al. (2020b). We also use their population and con-
sumer price estimates. Their rent indices are based on a database of rent observations
containing over 436,000 rent prices, covering most cities until the first half of the 20th
century. We will use this primary data also to make inferred estimates from housing
quality, and to assess housing inequality. For our assessment of housing inequality, we
complement the rental data in Eichholtz et al. (2020b) with rental value distributions
from other sources and time periods. We discuss these sources in Appendix 3.B.
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Besides rental data, we also compiled primary and secondary data on wages, in or-
der to assess rental housing affordability. An overview an detailed discussion of these
sources is presented in Appendix 3.A. For the Belgian cities, we created a new wage
index (1500-1830). We rely on existing series for the other cities, and the time period
after 1830. As much as possible, we have selected wage data that closely reflect the
marginal product of labor. This is important, because our affordability estimate is tar-
geted to measure the number of units of housing that can be purchased per unit of
work.
Until the 19th century, most of our wage indices are based upon day wages of work-
ers in the construction sector. An advantage of using these wages is that most of these
jobs are still existent nowadays, such that it is possible to make long-run comparisons.
A drawback is that wages in the construction sector varied significantly with season,
level of skill, the amount of beer money and the riskiness of the job at hand. This is not
always identified exactly in the records and, especially if data is scarce, is likely to cause
noise in our index compared to the ’true’ wage level. For later periods, our indices are
based on national or local indices of wages. Most of these indices track hourly wages,
some reflect weekly earnings. Note that in the 20th century, the introduction of taxes
and employer contributions makes it more difficult to have wage indices that consis-
tently reflect the marginal return to working, since only a very small fraction of such
taxes or costs directly benefit the worker proportional to the amount of his labor.
3.2 Methodology
3.2.1 Housing Affordability
The literature offers no single definition of ’housing affordability’ but explores a wide
range of approaches. On one side of the spectrum, for example in Glaeser and Gyourko
(2003), housing is considered unaffordable if housing costs exceed construction costs.
On the other end, housing affordability is viewed as an income issue. For example, in
the residual income approach, which is favored in the overview of Stone (2006), afford-
ability issues arise if insufficient income is left after paying housing costs. The main
problem with such an approach is that it relies on housing and income standards,
which vary over time.
In this paper, our main measure of affordability in city i at time t expresses afford-
ability as the ratio of wages to rent prices.
Affordabilityi t =
Wi t
Ri t
(3.1)
The affordability attempts to measure how many units of housing can be bought per
unit of labor: the rent price index measures the cost of one unit of housing of con-
stant quality, and the wage index measures the return to one unit of labor. In practice,
this measure is primarily based on day wages until the 19th century, and hourly wages
afterward. Such an approach is in line with earlier work of Gyourko and Linneman
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(1993) and Gyourko and Tracy (1999), who study developments in US housing afford-
ability but look at owner-occupied housing rather than rental housing, and do not
appropriately control for quality.
Because we have not collected construction cost data, we cannot identify exactly
how rent prices evolved relative to the costs of new construction, as in Glaeser and Gy-
ourko (2003).3 They find that house prices primarily deviate from construction costs
due to zoning constraints. Given that we study markets without such constraints over
the very long-term, such deviations are most likely absent in our setting, at least before
the 20th century. Instead, our interest is to determine how much long-term ’equilib-
rium’ rent prices and affordability change as cities grow and decline.
3.2.2 Housing Quality
The basic repeated measures methodology from Bailey et al. (1963) starts with the ob-
servation that the log price on any asset, in this case the log rental price rt on a partic-
ular home i, can be represented as the sum of three components:
ri t =αi +βt +εi t (3.2)
The first term, αi reflects the underlying value, and therefore quality, of the home:
the key assumption is that this does not change over time, at least at the level of an
individual home. The second term, βt is the value of the log rental price index, while
εit reflects price noise and is assumed to be distributed as N(0,σ2).
Since the repeat-rent index provides an estimate of the market price component,
we can simply rewrite equation (2) to obtain an estimate of implied housing quality
αi . Rewriting (2):
ri t −βt =αi +εi t (3.3)
Taking averages over all properties i at each time period t :
ᾱt = R̄t −βt (3.4)
Exponentiating (3.4), we can use the indexed ratio of the mean rent index to the
quality-controlled rent index as a measure of average quality. The quality index reflects
the monetary value of quality improvements over time, which have two dimensions:
improvements in the quantity of space consumed and changes in the quality of a given
space due to construction improvements, such as plumbing, better insulation, higher
ceilings or the installation of bathrooms or kitchens. Quality improvements external
to the property are not taken into account: these are included in market prices.
As changes in the composition of the sample sometimes lead to significant noise in
the developments of average rents in the short term, we only compute housing quality
3We should note though that until the 19th most wage data is based on day wages for construction
workers, so in this period our measure of affordability does at least partially account for changes in con-
struction costs
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indices for periods of 25 years between 1500 and 1900. For London, not enough data is
available to compute a quality index for any period. Instead, we report data from Clark
(2002) who has estimated an implied quality index for England and Wales, based on
a method very close to ours. Last, we compute a joint rent and quality index for the
Belgian cities, based on a population-weighted average. We do not extend our quality
indices to the 20th century, as from the 1910s no new homes are added to our samples.
Also, the introduction of social housing and rent control policies in the 20th century
implies that the rent paid cannot be used anymore to infer housing quality. For this
period, we will use census data to examine whether housing quality improved.
3.2.3 Housing Inequality
One issue with our aggregate measures of rental housing affordability and quality is
that they do not take into account variation in rental price appreciation and dwelling
quality across market segments. Affordability issues are particularly pressing for those
with lower incomes, and prices of their properties might appreciate faster than those
in other segments. For example, Glaeser et al. (2012) and Guerrieri et al. (2013) docu-
ment that properties in cheaper neighborhoods appreciated faster during house prices
booms than those in more expensive neighborhoods. This could reflect gentrification
processes, as in Guerrieri et al. (2013), but also changes in credit availability (Landvoigt
et al., 2015). Of course, only the former would apply to long-term rental prices.
To investigate this, we estimate rent price indices for above- and below median
properties using the data that was collected by Eichholtz et al. (2020b). For each rental
observation, we determine whether it is above or below the median price in the sam-
ple in that particular year. Next, we determine whether a pair of repeat-rents is con-
sistently above or below the median. We estimate an above- and below- median rent
price index using pairs consistently above or below the median price, based on a stan-
dard repeat-sales index, following the methodology outlined in Eichholtz et al. (2020b)
To further study the evolution of housing inequality over time, we compute the
Gini coefficient for the distribution of housing quality values at various points in time.
These inequalities reflect differences in both structure and location quality.
3.3 Urban Rental Housing in the Long Run
3.3.1 Rental Housing Affordability
Figure 3.1 reports the rent indices for Amsterdam, Paris, London, and the Belgian
cities, both in real terms, together with estimates of the real wage development. Given
that most developments in aggregate rent prices have already been discussed in Eich-
holtz et al. (2020b), we focus our discussion on their development relative to wage
levels.
The first and most striking conclusion from the figure is that rental prices have
shown little real growth in the long run. Unsurprisingly, wage growth has been partic-
ularly significant in the 20th century. Both our real rent and real wage indices adjust
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Figure 3.1: Real Rent Prices and Real Wages
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(b) Real Wage Indices, 1500–2018
Notes: The plots compare the developments in real rental prices (Figure 3.1a), using the indices from
Eichholtz et al. (2020b), to developments in real wages (Figure 3.1b). Rents and wages are deflated using
the CPI. Data is aggregated for the Belgian cities by using a population-weighted average of the individual
indices. From 1940, the Belgian index covers all urban areas.
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for consumer prices. However, this is not necessary when we are only interested in
their relative prices: our indices of housing affordability. Figure 3.2 plots the indices
of housing affordability that we have constructed for each of the studied cities. The
pattern emerging from the figure is rather surprising: housing has never been as af-
fordable as it has been over the past few decades and has improved tremendously in
the period between World War I and 1980, albeit with stark fluctuations. Housing af-
fordability did not improve at all before the 20th century: between 1500 and 1900, it
even worsened significantly in Paris and the Belgian cities, while staying roughly con-
stant in London and Amsterdam.
Figure 3.2: Housing Affordability Indices, 1500-2018
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Notes: This plot shows the developments in the housing affordability index, which is defined as the in-
dexed ratio between the wage index and the rental price index. High levels of the affordability index
imply affordable housing.
Beyond these long-term developments, there are substantial differences in afford-
ability both across cities and over shorter periods. Before 1800, most of these are due
to differences in rents. Correspondingly, the Belgian cities and London were relatively
more affordable compared to Amsterdam and Paris during the 17th and 18th century,
in line with the remarks of Adam Smith at the start of this paper. At the end of the 18th
century, this gradually changed, as rent growth outpaced growth in wages. In the 19th
century, part of the increase in rents was compensated by increasing wages, which also
had started rising gradually. However, it took until the early 20th century before wage
growth outpaced rental price growth. This was not an even process. Due to strict rent
controls, housing rents could not rise with inflation in the period around the World
Wars. Rent controls were particularly stringent in Paris, which explains the large peak
in affordability after World War II, when real rents had dropped dramatically.
The result of these unprecedented improvements in affordability in the 20th cen-
tury is that one unit of labor today buys approximately four to eight times as many
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units of rental housing as it could in 1900. To illustrate these affordability improve-
ments more clearly, we collected data on the share of rental expenses in the household
budget for all of our cities, both in the early 20th century and for very recent years. Sub-
sequently, we use our affordability indices to estimate the budget share needed nowa-
days to buy the same bundle of housing services as the early-20th century household
consumed while keeping the number of hours worked constant.
Table 3.1: Housing Budget Shares in the 20th and 21st Century
City Year Budget Share Implied Share in 2015 Coverage
Amsterdam 1911 16.25% 2.59% Renters
Amsterdam 2015 38.90% Renters
Amsterdam 2015 36.70% All
Belg. cities 1910 11.60% 1.46% Renters
Brussels 2016 33.80% All
Belgium 2016 30.40% All
Paris 1900 18.10% 4.60% Renters
Paris 2008 34.00% Renters
Paris 2011 19.10% All
London 1925 18.43% 5.41% Renters
London 2015 39.17% Renters
London 2015 28.86% All
Notes: This table compares expenditure shares on housing at the start of the 20th century to more recent
observations. Appendix 3.C reports the sources for these household budget shares. In all cities, expendi-
ture shares have increased over time.
Table 3.1, column 3, shows that the share of rental expenses in the household bud-
get has increased substantially in all cities. This also holds when including the ex-
penses of home-owners, who tend to be wealthier and spend a smaller part of their
income on housing. However, when we calculate the budget share that would have
been needed today to purchase the average early 20th century housing bundle, we see
that it is substantially lower than in the early years of the 20th century. This is most
striking in the Belgian cities and in Amsterdam, but it also holds true in London and
Paris: only 1.5 to 5.4 percent of the 2015 household budget would have been needed
to buy the housing bundle of a century earlier.
Evidently, the discrepancy between these budget shares implies that housing qual-
ity must have gone up substantially: households could only increase their budget
shares on housing if they consumed more housing. However, we should be careful to
use these data to infer by how much housing quality has gone up: working hours and
household sizes have changed substantially, our 20th century rent indices are based on
less accurate spliced indices, and housing expenses are nowadays strongly influenced
by housing policy. However, the magnitude of the changes we find suggests that the
real question is not whether housing quality improved, but when and by how much.
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3.3.2 Housing Quality and Inequality
Table 3.2 reports the index of housing quality in the studied cities between 1500 and
1900. For reference, we report the quality index of Clark (2002) for England and Wales.
Housing quality has improved substantially in each city, although at varying rates: it
increased most in Paris, and the least in Amsterdam and England. Part of this might
be because no data is available for England and Amsterdam in the 16th century, when
we already see marked improvement in the Belgian cities and in Paris. The timing of
these quality upgrades is similar across cities: improvements in housing quality took
place mostly prior to the Industrial Revolution. During the late 18th and most of the
19th century housing quality stagnated or even declined a bit, while increasing again
at the end of the 19th century.
Table 3.2: Housing Quality Index (1750-1774 = 100)
Time period Belgian cities Amsterdam Paris England (Clark, 2002)
1500-1524 51 33
1525-1549 62 35
1550-1574 68 59 40
1575-1599 76 55 43
1600-1624 76 87 50 64
1625-1649 90 91 56 67
1650-1674 99 119 64 72
1675-1699 101 110 67 61
1700-1724 104 104 69 75
1725-1749 105 102 79 86
1750-1774 100 100 100 100
1775-1799 91 100 109 93
1800-1824 91 112 126 90
1825-1849 96 97 149 85
1850-1874 100 85 150 88
1875-1899 142 88 101
Notes: This table shows the developments in the housing quality index for each of the cities we study.
The Belgian index is based on a population-weighted average of the quality index for the 4 Belgian cities.
Bruges is excluded for the 19th century because its sample is insufficiently representative.
The early cross-city improvement in housing quality may be surprising at first.
One explanation may be an increase in the available housing space per capita. For
Paris, where we report the largest improvements in housing quality, Hillairet (2004)
estimates that the population density of the city reduced from 640 people per hectare
in the late 14th century to just 180 people per hectare in 1789, suggesting that more
housing space became available per capita. In a more qualitative account, Pardailhé-
Galabrun (1991) describes how Parisian dwellings became much less crowded during
the early-modern period. For Amsterdam, the expansion of the city during its Golden
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Age led to the construction of its famous circular canals and the large mansions along
these.
Second, construction quality of homes gradually improved during the 16th and
17th century, as wooden and clay homes were gradually replaced by stone homes, and
roofs were constructed using tiles rather than thatch. Van Ryssel (1967) documented
that during the 17th century an increasing number of homes had a more fire-resistant
stone façade. The change from thatch to tiles already took place in the 15th and 16th
century. Baer (2014) also reports significant improvements in the construction quality
of homes in 17th century London, and concludes that housing quality improved con-
sistently and for all income groups.4 Beyond these changes on the outside of homes,
De Vries (2008) describes a shift in the organization of the interior of homes, with func-
tional spaces becoming much clearer defined: separate bed chambers appeared, as
well as drawing- and dining rooms, even in middle-class homes.5
A potential concern is that the quality indices discussed so far only measure the
increases in housing quality per home. In case families became larger, or more peo-
ple started sharing or sub-letting their homes, our quality indices are not an accurate
measure of housing quality per capita, which is most relevant when discussing the
evolution of the standard of living. Such concerns are relevant: Adam Smith explains
the relative affordability of London housing as the result of mass-scale sub-letting of
parts of dwelling homes (Smith, 1776). Smith’s observation suggests that the number
of people per house may have varied substantially across cities (and potentially over
time). To address these concerns, we need to look at housing space per capita.
For a limited set of years, the rental database of Eichholtz et al. (2020b) provides
information on the entire cross-section of rental values in Amsterdam and the four
Belgian cities. For Paris, statistics from Duon (1946) and Lyon-Caen (2018) provide
information on the total rental value of all properties. If we scale the total rental value
of all properties in a city by the number of inhabitants, we can estimate the mean rent
per inhabitant. Next, we can compute the quality index on the basis of mean rents per
capita, rather than mean rents per property. Appendix Table 3.6 reports the resulting
quality index per capita, and its findings are in line with the estimates in Table 3.2.
We cannot extend our housing quality index into the 20th century, due to lack of
primary data. To shed light on housing quality in the more recent era, however, we
have collected census data for all cities in the sample. Given the societal importance
4Note that the quality index of Clark does not report quality improvements in the 17th century but
in the 18th century. This might be because this development was specific to London, or due to the low
number of observations in Clark’s sample in the 17th century.
5 Our finding of improved average housing quality in the pre-industrial era might be indicative of an
improvement in the general standard of living, supporting the views of De Vries (2008) and Broadberry
et al. (2015). Absent increases in affordability and real day wages, one possibility is that citizens increased
their consumption by working more. Such an expansion is debated, but there is increasing evidence
that changes in day wages may underestimate developments in annual pre-industrial income. Another
possibility is that these quality improvements were primarily enjoyed by wealthier citizens that benefited
from urban growth, such as successful merchants. We have very limited information on the evolution of
their incomes, but existing evidence suggests that pre-industrial urban growth led to larger inequality in
housing consumption (Ryckbosch, 2016).
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of housing conditions, censuses have included variables on the number of persons
per house, as well as the number of rooms per person. Although the definition of what
constitutes a room varies across censuses, the number of rooms per capita should
give us a reasonable idea of the development of housing space per capita – a key qual-
ity attribute. Figure 3.3 reports the level of rooms per capita in each of the studied
cities, where we have used a population-weighted average of the Belgian cities. In all
cities, the number of rooms per capita has increased. If the size of the average room
increased as well, these data sources might even underestimate the change in hous-
ing space per capita. The only city for which we have the data to investigate this is
Amsterdam, and we find that the growth in the number of square meters of housing
space per capita, available since 1982, has been more than twice as high as the in-
crease in in the number of rooms per capita. However, even without controlling for
Figure 3.3: Space per Capita in the 19th–21st Century
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Notes: This figure shows the development in space per capita for each city, again aggregating the Bel-
gian cities. Sources: London: Mayor of London (2017), Paris: INSEE, Amsterdam: Statistics Netherlands
(2018); Gemeente Amsterdam (2018), Belgian cities: Census data provided by StatBEL.
room size, the increase in rooms per capita is notable. The growth is particularly large
in Belgium. Relative to 1846, the average person has almost five times more rooms
available nowadays. In Paris, the increase is smallest, but even there the number of
rooms per capita has increased by approximately fifty percent. The relative ranking of
the improvements in rooms per capita across cities is consistent with the affordability
indices: affordability improved most in Belgium, followed by Amsterdam and London,
with Paris reporting the smallest affordability improvements.
Beyond increases in the quantity of housing space, the quality of a given amount
of space increased also significantly over the 20th century. The sources of census data
used in Figure 3.3 also provide information on such quality improvements, although
primarily for the second part of the 20th century. Nevertheless, large quality increases
are visible even in this relatively short time period. For example, around fifty years ago
proper sanitary facilities were still not the norm. In 1944, only 16 percent of Parisian
households had a bathroom in their home, and about 46 percent had a proper toilet
66 CHAPTER 3. LONG RUN AFFORDABILITY AND (INE)QUALITY
(at end of the 19th century, this was just 25 percent). By 1999, toilets and bathrooms
were present in over 90 percent of homes. In the Netherlands, toilets were already
found in 86 percent of homes in 1956, although private bathrooms were only available
for a quarter of the population. By 2001, both figures had reached 100 percent. In
the Belgian cities, practically all homes contained a toilet and bathroom in 2001, but
toilets (60 percent) and bathrooms (50 percent) were not standard even as late as 1970,
the first year in which the census asked about these conditions.
Similar improvements can be reported for the prevalence of central heating. At the
end of World War I, central heating was only present in a quarter of Parisian homes,
and this increased towards 50 percent around 1970. Similar values were recorded for
urban homes in Belgium. The Netherlands lagged very much behind: by 1964, only
9 percent of homes were connected to a central heating system. Nowadays, that is
over 90 percent. Beyond central heating, toilets and bathrooms, the 20th century also
saw a rise in the number of homes with piped water and electricity, although these
facilities had already reached a large number of homes in the 19th century: in 1891,
85 percent of Parisian households already had private access to water. More recently,
better insulation of walls and windows has likely contributed to better housing qual-
ity by improving indoor climate and comfort. The improvements in space per capita
and in amenities suggest housing quality has indeed continued to expand significantly
during the 20th century, in line with improvements in affordability.
Housing has not only become more affordable and of higher quality, but the hous-
ing market has also become more equal over the last century. For Amsterdam, Antwerp,
Bruges and Ghent, we can estimate Gini coefficients on housing inequality for the
years for which the complete distribution of housing rental values is available – either
based on actual rents or on rental value estimates of owner-occupied homes. For three
Belgian cities, 4–5 full crossections shed light on the period from 1500 to 1890. The
Amsterdam data extends to the present (see the appendix of Eichholtz et al. (2020b)
for a discussion of the sources used). Figure 3.4 reports the trend in estimated Gini
coefficients.
Until the late 19th century housing provisions were very unequal - and persistently
so. Before 1900, we find Gini coefficients between 0.4 and 0.65, which are in line with
the higher levels in income and housing inequality found by Milanovic et al. (2010) and
Ryckbosch (2016). Apparently, relatively few households benefited from the improve-
ments in housing quality in this period. However, during the 20th century inequality
reduced, at least in Amsterdam, to much lower levels. The great compression in hous-
ing inequality we document for post-1900 Amsterdam is in line with the findings of
Piketty (2014) for the income distribution and the earlier found city-wide increases in
housing quality and affordability. Housing inequality has increased again since the
1980’s, which coincides with the halt in affordability improvements.
3.3.3 Urban Change in Unregulated Housing Markets
The tightening of affordability and the increasing inequality gap observed over the
most recent decades fuels worries about the future of cities, despite all the gains made
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Figure 3.4: Housing Inequality Estimates, 1500-2018
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Notes: This figure reports the estimate Gini coefficients on housing inequality for Amsterdam, Antwerp,
Bruges and Ghent. Data sources are provided in Appendix 3.B.
on these issues in the preceding century. Florida (2017), for instance, raises the alarm
about a "new urban crisis”, painting a bleak picture in which a city’s success depresses
housing affordability, increases inequality and ultimately erodes the economic basis
on which it depends. However, the recent worsening of affordability might also be par-
tially attributable to inappropriate housing policy, for example through zoning laws
(e.g. Glaeser and Gyourko, 2018).
Our exceptionally long affordability and housing quality time series, in combina-
tion with data on long-term population growth, allow us to test whether urban pros-
perity indeed causes these detrimental side effects over the long-term, in an environ-
ment devoid of government interference. To do so, we restrict our sample to the period
from 1500 until 1913, when rent control and other forms of government interference
in the housing markets took off. Thus, our estimates aim to identify the long-term im-
pact of population dynamics on housing affordability, housing quality and inequality,
in free markets.6
We separate periods of long-term population growth with periods of decline be-
cause these have very different implications on the housing market, as Glaeser and
Gyourko (2005) showed for US house prices, and Eichholtz et al. (2020b) also found
for rent prices in the cities we study. However, when cities grow, expansion of the
housing stock will change more than just prices: it might both change the distribu-
tion of rental prices and the distribution of housing quality. For the recent US house
price boom, Glaeser et al. (2012) and Guerrieri et al. (2013) document that prices in
cheaper neighborhoods appreciated faster than those in more expensive neighbor-
6This extends the analysis for housing rents in Eichholtz et al. (2020b), presented in the previous chap-
ter
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hoods. When cities decline in population, housing supply does not adjust, and re-
maining residents will be distributed across existing properties. For this reason, house
prices respond stronger to urban decline than urban growth (Glaeser and Gyourko,
2005).
The existing studies focus on recent developments in urban US house prices. Our
analysis instead looks at rental affordability over a much longer horizon, and also stud-
ies changes in the quality and inequality of housing. Analysing inequalities in rents
is arguably more relevant than inequalities in house prices, as renting is more com-
mon in most (European) cities than owning, especially among the poor. Additionally,
the economic history literature has widely employed urbanization as a proxy for eco-
nomic growth. In line with this, we aim to assess whether urban population growth
also translated into growing housing consumption, here defined as increasing quality
of the average dwelling.
We estimate a set of panel regressions of the following form, for each city i at time
t:
∆25 yi t =µi +β1∆+25popi t +β2∆−25popi t +γn xi t +εi t (3.5)
The 25-year changes in yi t correspond to the various dependent variables of inter-
est for each regression: housing affordability, housing quality, and housing inequality.
We study inequality in rental price growth across segments, and inequality in housing
consumption. The vector xi t contains controls, and µi is a city fixed effect. We use 25-
year changes for several reasons. First, a low frequency of observations reduces noise
and enables us to measure changes in population and housing quality sufficiently pre-
cise. Second, 25-year changes leave sufficient time for the housing stock, and corre-
sponding rental price, to adjust to increasing demand. Although we focus on 25-year
differences, we do not want to note that we obtain comparable results for all horizons
between 10 and 50 years.
We estimate the models using overlapping differences. For the regressions, we use
data from all time periods before 1913, given the limited intervention of government
in the housing market before 1913. To account for the serial correlation introduced by
the overlapping observations, and the potential spatial auto-correlation across cities,
we use standard errors based on Driscoll and Kraay (1998). For the regressions that
make use of data on inferred housing quality, we exclude periods where our sample
is likely not representative for the aggregate housing stock or where we have no data
(see Eichholtz et al. (2020b) for more detail). This implies that next to London, we have
excluded Amsterdam after 1800, Paris after 1790 and Bruges after 1795.
Table 3.3 reports the outputs of the regressions that relate changes in affordability,
quality and inequality to urban growth and decline. First, we find that housing afford-
ability barely worsens when populations grow (Column 1). The estimated coefficient
of −0.188 is small and statistically insignificant. Population decline, however, leads
to rents falling faster than wages: a one percent decline in population increases the
difference between wages and rents by 1.10. This result is in line with the estimates
reported in Eichholtz et al. (2020b) for rents only.
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Table 3.3: Housing Quality, Inequality and Urban Growth, 1500-1913
Dependent variable:
∆25(wt − rt ) ∆25qt ∆25(r ht − r lt ) ∆25(qht −q lt )
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
∆+25popt −0.188 0.359∗∗∗ 0.401∗∗∗ −0.214∗∗∗ 0.247∗∗
(0.150) (0.059) (0.065) (0.061) (0.101)
∆+25popt −1.108∗∗∗ −0.214∗∗ −0.042 0.092∗ −0.092
(0.162) (0.092) (0.082) (0.054) (0.123)
∆25w rt 0.149
∗∗ −0.076∗∗∗ 0.031
(0.072) (0.028) (0.071)
∆25r rt −0.155∗∗∗ −0.037
(0.058) (0.055)
∆25pt 0.051
(0.096)
Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2,632 1,931 1,931 1,931 1,931
R2 0.285 0.087 0.127 0.082 0.022
Adjusted R2 0.283 0.084 0.123 0.079 0.017
F Statistic 348.465 91.625 69.816 57.492 10.726
Notes: This table reports regression estimates of Equation 3.5, where we regress different dependent vari-
ables on 25-year changes in population, separating growth (∆+25popt ) and decline periods (∆
+
25popt ). In
Column 1, we use 25-year changes in affordability as dependent variable. Columns 2 and 3 use quality
changes as dependent variable, controlling for real wages and real rents (Column 2) or only for changes
in real wages (Column 3). In Column 4, we use the difference in rental price appreciation between above-
median and below-median housing as dependent variable. Column 5 uses the difference in quality for
high-quality and low-quality housing as dependent variable. This is defined as the change in the in-
terquartile range of house rental values in our samples, deflated for market prices. All regressions use
city fixed effects, and standard errors are based on Driscoll and Kraay (1998), with maximum lag length
of 30 years. ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Column 2 reports the impact of population growth and decline on housing quality.
Indeed, when urban populations grow and the housing stock expands, we observe that
the quality of the housing stock increases. For a one percent increase in population,
the quality of the rental housing stock goes up by 0.36 percent. Conversely, in times of
population decline, decreases in population actually correlate with increasing hous-
ing consumption. When urban populations fall, rental prices reduce substantially, as
the housing stock cannot adjust. This implies that the existing housing stock will be
distributed among fewer people, and that there will be more housing space per capita
available. In line with this, the positive effect of urban decline on housing consump-
tion disappears after we control for changes in real rent prices and wages, which we
do in Column 3. It is important to realize that our sample only covers properties that
are leased and maintained: vacant properties might of course gradually depreciate.
Average housing quality statistics do not reveal how quality gains are distributed
across neighborhoods and market segments. Columns 4 and 5 of Table 3.3 present
estimated coefficients for population dynamics on inequality. In Column 4, we esti-
mate whether rental prices of properties below and above the median appreciate at
different rates when cities grow or decline. The coefficient for ∆+25popt is negative
(−0.214) and statistically significant. This implies that rents for the less affluent are
rising faster than rents for the well-off when cities are growing, suggesting stratified
residential markets. One reason for this fact could be the presence of endogenous
gentrification when cities are growing (Guerrieri et al., 2013). There is limited evidence
for a reversal of this price inequality when cities are declining in population: the gap
shrinks slightly when population declines, but this effect is only significant at the 10
percent level. This might be due to limited statistical power, because most cities have
grown rather than declined over time.
Our cross-sectional estimates of housing inequality in the previous section did
not allow to account for changes in rent prices across segments. In Column 5, we
investigate whether differing rates of price appreciation across segments also lead to
increases in inequality in housing consumption. To construct our dependent vari-
able, we computed for each city 25-year changes in the log interquartile range of rent
prices, and substracted the price difference between above and below median proper-
ties (which we used in Column 3).7 Thus, our dependent variable measures the change
in the difference in housing quality between the 25th and 75th percentile. Indeed, col-
umn 5 shows that when cities grow, housing quality above the median grows faster
than housing quality below the median. This suggests that in free markets and over
the long term, housing inequality grows when cities expand in population.
3.3.4 Regulated Markets
Until about 1900, housing markets operated without much intervention from govern-
ments. This changed drastically in the 20th century, as governments became increas-
ingly concerned with housing quality, inequality and affordability. One major change
was the introduction of rent controls after the World Wars. Given that the two big
7We used 3-year moving averages for Paris
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jumps in affordability we observe in Figure 3.2 exactly coincide with the introduction
of rent control in the cities we investigate (during and after World War I and right after
World War II), it is tempting to infer the two were related. But establishing any causal
effect of these rent controls on affordability remains difficult. First, once introduced,
rent control did not change often if at all, providing for very few observations of policy
changes. Second, rent control measures tended to be accompanied by complemen-
tary policies to subsidize housing construction. Third, at their heyday, rent controls
were applied to all properties, providing no useful control group.
To measure their effects on affordability, we exploit that changes in inflation rates
across countries provides variation in the tightness of nominal rent controls that is
plausibly exogenous to local housing markets. Most early rent controls were stated
in nominal terms, either as outright rent freezes or as a fixed limit on the rate of rent
price increases (Arnott, 1995). In case of substantial inflation, rent prices would be
unable to adjust with inflation, while wages remained unrestricted. Thus, the higher
inflation, the tighter the nominal rent control, and the larger its potential benefit on
affordability.
The identification of such an effect relies on two crucial assumptions. First, in-
flation rates should only affect the tightness of the rent control, and have no other
effects on housing affordability, either directly or indirectly. This implies that inflation
rates should have no correlation with changes in affordability in the absence of rent
controls. Second, our measure of rent controls should only capture periods of strict
nominal controls, and not anything else. To identify these, we have studied rental
regulations in each of the four countries, and constructed a dummy variable for the
presence of strict nominal rent controls that applied to all rental contracts on existing
housing. Appendix3.D provides more information on the construction of this variable.
As a secondary measure, we use the regulation index of Kholodilin (2018), which con-
tains a measure for the presence of nominal rent controls. This measure is broader
than ours: it for example also covers periods when only subsets of properties are con-
trolled.
In our baseline model, we estimate the following panel regression, for each city i
at time period t.
∆(wi t − ri t ) =µi +β1RentContr oli t +β2RentContr oli t ×∆pi t
+β3∆pi t +γx xi t +εi t
(3.6)
We estimate this regression for Amsterdam, London, Paris and the combined Bel-
gian cities, including city fixed effects. ∆pi t refers to changes in inflation, and xi t are
control variables. RentContr oli t is a dummy variable that captures the existence of
nominal price controls. Standard errors are Driscoll-Kraay errors, with lag length se-
lected by the Bayesian Information Criterion.
The results reported in Table 3.4 show that the existence of nominal rent con-
trol itself is unrelated to improvements in affordability. However, the extent to which
these controls are binding matters: We expect that higher inflation rates will render
the nominal rent controls more binding, resulting in larger affordability gains. This is
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exactly what we find: inflation in the absence of rent control does not affect affordabil-
ity, but when we look at the interaction term of inflation and the nominal rent control
dummy, which measures inflation when nominal rent control is present, a one percent
increase in inflation increases rental housing affordability by 0.6 percent. This finding
is robust to the use of the measure of rent controls from Kholodilin (2018).
Table 3.4: Nominal Rent Control and Affordability
Dependent variable:
∆(wt − rt )
(1) (2) (3) (4)
RentContr oli t −0.001 −0.009 −0.005 −0.015
(0.014) (0.007) (0.014) (0.014)
∆pi t ∗RentContr oli t 0.609∗∗∗ 0.455∗∗∗ 0.618∗∗∗ 0.845∗
(0.080) (0.156) (0.078) (0.458)
∆pi t 0.033 0.041∗ 0.023 −0.050
(0.027) (0.023) (0.027) (0.434)
∆popi t −0.634∗∗∗ −0.416
(0.143) (0.550)
Constri t −0.002
(0.004)
Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2,010 2,010 1,959 382
R2 0.105 0.072 0.137 0.193
Adjusted R2 0.102 0.069 0.134 0.178
F Statistic 77.986 51.622 77.400 17.862
Notes: This table reports regression estimates of Equation 3.6, where we regress changes in rental housing
affordability, measured by the indexed ratio between wages and rents, on a rent control index interacted
by inflation. Columns 1, 3 and 4 use our measure of periods of strict nominal rent controls, Column 2
uses the measure of Kholodilin (2018) that also includes periods with second generation rent controls.
Column 3 additionally controls for population changes, Column 4 also controls for housing construction.
All regressions use city fixed effects, and standard errors are based on Driscoll and Kraay (1998). ∗p<0.1;
∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01.
We further control for changes in population. Note that our estimates of popu-
lation changes contain some measurement error until the 19th century, when most
population estimates are interpolated. Nevertheless, the estimate on population has
the predicted sign and significance. We do not estimate the coefficient separately for
urban growth and decline, because the possibility for supply adjustment is very small
at an annual level. For a small subset of data, we have also collected information on
construction rates (see Appendix 3.D.1). This variable follows the number of newly
built properties relative to total population. We normalized this variable for each city,
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to account for differences in the definition of construction. After controlling for new
construction, the interaction term is less significant due to the large reduction in the
number of observations, but the economic significance remains roughly the same.
To sum up, nominal rent control seems to have played some role in the rapid im-
provement in urban rental housing affordability we observe in the 20th century. How-
ever, it is important to note that the effect we find is of a short-term nature, as it in-
volves annual changes in inflation and the real economic value in the rent control. The
longer-term effect that rent control likely has on new supply is left out of our analysis:
we do not have detailed information on construction, and many governments heavily
subsidized construction during periods of rent controls.
3.4 Conclusion
This paper traces the trajectories of urban rental housing affordability, housing qual-
ity, and inequality in seven European cities from 1500 to the present. For the first
300 years, real rents did not grow significantly in most cities. However, the average
quality of housing units gradually improved in time. This increase in quality was not
uniformly distributed across all housing segments, and housing inequality increased
when cities expanded. During the 19th century, real rents started to increase signifi-
cantly, however not exceeding the growth rates of real wages. Initially, these increases
in housing costs seemed to hamper further increases in housing quality, but from the
late 19th century onward housing quality started improving again.
Importantly, governments did not interfere in rental markets for the first four cen-
turies studied here. The interplay of market forces stabilized long-term real rent levels
relative to wages: real rents increased when cities were growing, but improvements
in wages appear to have compensated for these. Instead, the main negative conse-
quence of urban growth over the long term is an increase in housing inequality. Part
of this increase is attributable to differences in rent price increases across cheaper and
more expensive segments. More research is needed to also investigate the spatial im-
plications of this.
When wages started to outpace growth in rents during the first 75 years of the 20th
century, possibly with the support of intervening governments, households could ex-
pand their housing consumption (and expenditure shares on housing) even further
to the high levels currently observed, while housing inequality fell. Rent control does
seem to have played a role in short-run affordability improvements. More empirical
work is still needed on the long-run effects, though. More recently, housing affordabil-
ity seems to have worsened slightly, particularly in London and Paris. Nevertheless, in
all cities we study rental housing has been much more affordable during the past few
decades than it has been at any time before.
This paper shows that in order to estimate housing affordability it is essential to
look at income, quality-controlled market rent indices and measures of housing qual-
ity and inequality simultaneously. Excluding any of these components can result in an
incomplete picture of housing affordability. However, even in the modern era quality-
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controlled rent indices are barely available (Ambrose et al., 2015), and data on de-
velopments in housing quality and inequality are even harder to find. We hope our
findings will stimulate researchers or statistical offices to also produce such estimates
for the 21st century.
The relevance of this study goes beyond housing affordability. For economic histo-
rians, we provide important new evidence on the way the household budget was spent
on housing, and our rent indices and estimates of housing quality shine new light on
the historical standards of living: housing quality seems to have improved very signif-
icantly prior to the 19th century.
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3.A Wages
3.A.1 Data Sources
An overview of all sources of wages data is presented in table 3.5.
Table 3.5: Overview Wage Sources
City/country Study Years Coverage Type
Belgium Peeters (1939) 1831-1913 National Index
Scholliers (1978) 1914-1919 City Index
Cassiers and Solar (1990) 1913-1959 National Index
FOD-WASO (2018) 1959-2018 National Index
Bruges Verlinden (1972) 1500-1628 City Raw wages
Ghent Verlinden (1972) 1500-1800 City Raw wages
Antwerp Van der Wee (1963) 1500-1605 City Raw wages
Verlinden (1972) 1606-1834 City Raw wages
Amsterdam De Vries and Van der Woude (1997) 1500-1815 Regional Index
Horlings and Smits (1996) 1816-1913 National Index
Schrage et al. (1989) 1913-1939 National Index
Statistics Netherlands (2018) 1939-2018 National Index
Paris Ridolfi (2019) 1500-1870 City Index
Singer-Kérel (1961) 1870-1946 City Index
Bayet (1997) 1913-1951 National Index
INSEE (2018) 1951-2018 National Index
London Allen (2001) 1500-1913 City Index
Thomas and Dimsdale (2017) 1914-2016 National Index
Office for National Statistics (2018) 2016-2018 National Index
Observations on daily wages of masons, carpenters, slaters and their helpers are
obtained for Bruges (1500-1628), Ghent (1500-1799) and Antwerpen (1500-1840) from
the Verlinden (1972) series. These are converted to a total index based on the method-
ology discussed in section D2. The study of Peeters (1939) provides us with an ag-
gregate index of hourly wages in various Belgian industries from 1831-1913. For later
periods we rely on a multitude of publications on industrial wages. Scholliers (1978)
provides estimates for Brussels wages during World War I. Cassiers and Solar (1990)
produce an index of gross hourly wages for the 1913-1959 period. From 1960 onward,
we use the average hourly wage increases for all employees (the Belgian government
makes a division between ’laborers’ and ’service workers’) from the official estimates
of FOD-WASO (2018), the Belgian ministry of labor.
For Amsterdam, we use day wages in the construction sector from 1500 to 1815,
which we have from De Vries and Van der Woude (1997). Wages from 1815 to 1913 are
based on nominal day wages reported in the study of Horlings and Smits (1996). Wage
data for the period from 1913-1939 from Schrage et al. (1989), and refer to average day
wages across sectors. From 1939 onward, we rely on the average wage increases from
collective labour agreements, which cover most of the Dutch labor force. Given that
this figure has not yet been updated to 2018, we use the Statistics Netherlands (2018)
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index on hourly cost of labour to extend to the present.
The wage index for Paris for the period 1500-1860 is based upon average day wages
of laborers and craftsmen, from the indices reported in Ridolfi (2019). Between 1860
and 1920, we use the weekly wage index for Parisian workers from Singer-Kérel (1961).
To correct for changes in the length of the working week, which were particularly
prevalent in the early 20th century, we used national figures on nominal hourly wages
reported in Bayet (1997) from 1914 to 1951. To fill the gaps in the war years, we still
made use of the index of Singer-Kérel (1961). From 1950, we use INSEE (2018) indices
on hourly pre-tax wage rates. Since these are not available for 2016-2018, we employ
an INSEE index on hourly cost of labor in the construction for the period 2015-2018.
For London between 1500 and 1913, we use the standard day wage index from
Allen (2001). From 1913 until 2016, we use a national index of weekly earnings derived
from Thomas and Dimsdale (2017) and Office for National Statistics (2018). Since this
does not control for changes in the number of hours worked per week, which likely
declined, London wages probably slightly underestimate wage growth. This is con-
firmed by the fact that the London index increases the least of all cities during the 20th
century.
3.A.2 Index Construction
Wage indices for the Belgian cities are created based on thousands of day wage obser-
vations from construction sector workers (1500-1830). No wage index is constructed
for Brussels, given the lack of wage data. The wage index for Bruges only spans the
period from 1500 to 1628; after 1628 Ghent wages are used for Bruges. An aggregate
wage index for Belgium is constructed as well, based on wage data from all cities. Note
that for Antwerp, our index is almost entirely the same as Allen (2001), who used the
same sources to construct his index.
Wage data come from wage lists published in the Verlinden series; one for every job
in every institution, containing the years in which workers were employed, the various
salaries that were paid and the number of days a certain salary was paid. In most
cases, wages of ’masters’ are separated from the wages of ’helpers’. We have excluded
observations that make note of special circumstances, such as risky jobs, the provision
of beer money or the aggregation of helpers’ and masters’ salaries. Other large outliers
have been removed as well, since these are likely the result of special provisions not
identified in the records.
Annual averages of wages are computed based on the remaining observations.
Contrary to the consumer price indices, we have interpolated average wages for years
where data is missing. This can be justified since the level of wages is extremely sta-
ble: contracts show that sometimes workers were paid the same wages for as much
as 60 years. Persistent increases in nominal wages occur in every city only in the sec-
ond half of the 16th century. After interpolating, wages are indexed for each job and
subsequently averaged across all jobs to construct the total wage index.
3.B. INEQUALITY DATA 77
3.B Inequality Data
To estimate the level of housing inequality within a city requires data on the distribu-
tion of housing rental values at the household level. The distribution of these values
reflects both differences in the value of the actual quality of the house, as well as dif-
ferences in its location. Such distributions also exist for the early parts of our sample
because property taxes were the most common form of taxation. To estimate taxes,
cities computed the rental value of properties based on actual rent prices or an esti-
mation of rental value when a home was owner-occupied. Existing studies have used
these measures as a proxy for income inequality (e.g Soltow and Van Zanden, 1998;
Milanovic et al., 2010; Ryckbosch, 2016).
Until the 19th century, we use the Gini-coefficient of housing inequality for Bruges,
Ghent and Antwerp from Ryckbosch (2016). For Amsterdam, we combine Gini-coefficients
from Soltow and Van Zanden (1998) with Ginis computed from our own database of
rental data. However, for 1647 and 1832 these measures are only available at the home
level rather than the household level. Because there often lived multiple households in
the same home, we have to transform these measures. To do so, we make the assump-
tion that the ratio of home to household inequality was constant between 1647 and
1732. In that manner, we can use the 1732 ratio, based on Van Zanden (2018) and our
archival data, to estimate the level in 1647. We apply the same procedure to estimate
inequality in 1832. In this year, we use the ratio based on data from 1805.
In the 20th and 21st century, we only compute housing inequality data for Amster-
dam, since this was the only city for which we are able to find data that would enable
us to extend our measure of inequality consistently until the 21st century. For the pe-
riod between 1909-1940, we use data on the rental prices or values of all properties in
Amsterdam, available from Laloli (2018). Contrary to the older tax registers, all these
measures are at the household level. One limitation is that owner-occupied housing
has not been valued in all periods, which likely was of higher rental value than the
average rental property. However, the impact of this on the rent distribution is small,
because owner-occupancy rates were only 3-4% in the first part of the 20th century.
For the second part of the 20th century, we use data on rent prices or rental values
from various publications of the Amsterdam Statistical Office, which we retrieved from
the Amsterdam City Archives.8 Such rental censuses were taken in 1956, 1974-1976
and 1985. One limitation is that the presence of housing policies made rental prices
and rental values an imperfect measure of housing quality. Thus, these measures are
primarily a measure of housing expense inequality, which might differ slightly from
actual housing inequality. We believe this limitation applies particularly to the distri-
bution of rents in 1956. Amsterdam was still under strict rent controls in these periods,
that likely had a compressing effect on the distribution of rental prices.
In the 21th century, we use the Gini coefficient on the taxed value of all properties
in Amsterdam (WOZ-waarde), which was directly provided to us by Statistics Amster-
dam, due to the confidentiality of the underlying microdata. For tax purposes, every
8ACA 30525, Collectie Kenniscentrum Amsterdam, nos. 2036, 2391 and 3733
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residential property in The Netherlands has been valued. The advantage of this mea-
sure is that it is computed in exactly the same way for owner-occupied housing, rental
housing and social housing, despite the different (implied) rentals for these properties.
Although such property taxes existed already in the 20th century, their valuation has
changed significantly over time. For this reason, Statistics Amsterdam only provided
data between 2000-2018, when there were few changes in the tax valuation of proper-
ties. One limitation of these measures is that they do not include rentals or sub-rentals
of rooms. However, less than 5% of households rent a room, and Statistics Amsterdam
estimated that they would have only a very small impact on inequality.
3.C Income Shares on Housing
To reconstruct expenditure shares on housing we searched both for historical data for
the early 20th as well as modern expenditure shares for the 21st century. For Amster-
dam, we used a study of Claeys (1921) on 23 households in Amsterdam that were sur-
veyed just after World War I. Contemporary data was retrieved from Statistics Nether-
lands (2018). Surprisingly, we found the most reliable estimates of expenditure shares
in urban Belgium in a publication of the Great Britain Board of Trade (1910), which re-
ported shares for middle-income households in industrial towns. Contemporary data
on expenditure shares, both for owner-occupiers and renters, was retrieved from the
housing survey of Statistics Belgium (2018b). For Paris, we used historical estimates
from Duon (1946), while contemporary data on Parisian rent shares was taken from
ADIL (2009) and from INSEE (2018) for both owner-occupiers and renters. For Lon-
don, the earliest estimates of expenditure shares we could find were published in Jones
(1928), for a sample of 50 London families. Today, the Mayor of London (2017) pub-
lishes expenditure shares. For all modern data, household budget shares accounted
for potential rent benefits.
3.D Rent Control Index
We use two different measures of rent controls for our analysis in the main part of
the paper. First, we use the measure of nominal rent controls from Kholodilin (2018),
which is one of the inputs in his total rent regulation index. This dummy takes the
value of 1 if any form of nominal rent control is present in a given year. If rent regula-
tion is only introduced or changed through the year, it uses the share of time the rent
control was present. One disadvantage of the index of Kholodilin (2018) is that it does
not allow to distinguish between first generation rent controls and more modern ones
that are more flexible (e.g Arnott, 1995). A second disadvantage is that it is a national
measure. For example, in The Netherlands rents were regulated at the local level rather
than at national level. Only recently this system has been nationalized. We therefore
also create a secondary rent control index that restricts the index of Kholodilin (2018)
to the most stringent nominal rent controls, and also accounts for differences in rent
controls across localities or housing classes. We motivate our index here.
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For The Netherlands, we use information from a report of the Dutch Rental Com-
mittee (Huurcommissie, 2017). Rent controls were introduced in 1917, and these freezed
the level of rents on smaller homes at the level of 1916. In 1918, rents on more expen-
sive properties were frozen as well. At the same time, municipalities could introduce
rental committees that would judge whether landlords were allowed to raise the rent if
maintenance costs for example increased. Rent controls were gradually relaxed from
1922 until they were fully liberalized on January 19, 1927. To account for this, our rent
control index linearly decreases from 1 to 0 in this period.
Rents were frozen again on December 27, 1940 following the outbreak of World
War II in 1940. Because rent laws were set at the national level, but differed across mu-
nicipalities, we use information from rent regulation published in the Dutch Staats-
blad, which published all applicable laws. Until January 1951, no changes on rents
were allowed. Between 1951 and 1967, rent increases were strictly set by the govern-
ment, and had to be adhered to. Rent increases were announced on average every two
years. In this period, our rent control index takes the value of 2/3. In some municipal-
ities, rents were already liberalized by the 1960s, as rents had caught back up to their
market level. Between 1968 and 1981, rent increases in Amsterdam were capped, but
could be set freely below that cap. In this period, the rent control index takes the value
of 1/3.
In Belgium, interwar rent control laws are discussed in Bettendorf and Buyst (1997).
They were introduced in 1919 following the housing shortages that had built up dur-
ing World War I. Homes were frozen relative to the level of 1914. Rents were gradually
decontrolled across housing classes between 1927 and 1929, so we linearly reduce the
rent control dummy. After 1929, only properties with very low rentals were controlled
by the market. To account for this, we keep the value of the rent control dummy at 0.1
until 1938, when also these properties were de-controlled. Rent control was reinstated
in 1940 following the outbreak of World War II. Rent controls were abolished in 1957
except for subsidized housing (which is not in our sample), when we change the rent
control index back to zero (Brown, 1970). There was some reimposition of rent con-
trols in the 1960s and 1970s, but we do not incorporate these as rental information is
missing from Belgium between 1961–1977.
In France, the rent control regime was most severe (see Bonneval, 2011). Rent
controls were initially only applied in 1914 for those drafted for war, but applied to
all properties from 1919. Rents were fixed by applying a coefficient relative to the
rent level of 1914. The exact regulations varied across properties and rent levels, but
the law remained firmly in place until 1948, when a new law was passed that ended
this regime. It replaced the old system of rent controls, and only applied to certain
dwellings. It deregulated rents on new dwellings, but also gave tenants the right to
stay in old dwellings for low regulated rents. The share of dwellings covered by this
law gradually declined from the 1948s onwards, although nowadays a very small set
of properties is still under the 1948 law. However, because the 1948 ended strict rent
controls on new contracts, we set our rent regulation index to zero after 1948.
In the United Kingdom, rent controls were introduced on December 23, 1915 to
combat housing shortages caused by World War II. Rents were frozen relative to the
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level of 1914. The law was extended in 1920, and rents remained in full control until
1923. Between 1923 and 1933, the UK government gradually lifted rent controls, and
our rent index therefore gradually and linearly declines in this period (Willis, 1950).
Rent controls remained in place for cheap properties if the tenant did not change, but
since our index only covers new contracts, rarely below this limit, we put the rent con-
trol index after 1933 at zero. Rents were frozen again in 1939, and strict nominal con-
trols remained in place until 1957, when more valuable properties were decontrolled.
Correspondingly, we set our index at 0.5. From 1965, strict controls were completely
removed and replaced by regulated tenancies. The idea of rent regulation rather than
rent controls was that rents would be set by the market, but that landlords and tenants
could appeal to the government in case of disagreement about the ’fair’ rental price
(Wilson, 2017).
3.D.1 Construction Estimates
To control for the effect of construction, we compiled data on construction levels for
our cities for the period of time where such controls played a likely important role. One
difficulty in creating such measures is that there exist few consistent measures of con-
struction both over time and across cities. To create a consistent measure across cities
and over time, we therefore normalized values per city. If the definition of construc-
tion changed within a city, we normalize per construction measure using standard
z-scores.
For Amsterdam, statistical yearbooks provide annual estimates on the number of
completed residential buildings from 1870-2018 (Gemeente Amsterdam, 2018). To
measure the rate of construction, we scale this number by the level of population in
the city.
For the Belgian cities, we use data on the number of complete buildings (at the na-
tional level) from the annual yearbook of Belgian Statistics (Statistics Belgium, 2018a)
from 1940 until 1961. We do not extend this measure after 1961, because our rent in-
dex is interpolated between 1961 and 1977. From 1920 to 1940, we use the number of
constructed buildings published in Buyst (1992). Again, we normalize both measures
after scaling them with the total level of Belgian population.
For Paris, we use data from Duon (1946) on the number of newly constructed hous-
ing units between 1870 and 1944. To estimate the number of housing units, we mul-
tiplied the number of homes constructed by the number of households per home.
Between 1944 and 1967 we use data on completed construction from Mairie de Paris
(1967a) for the Seine department, which contains the Greater Paris area. We scale both
measures by population, and normalize them.
For London, we use data from Mayor of London (2017) that compiles annual data
on completed construction between 1871 and 2017f. We scale this by population, and
normalize.
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Table 3.6: Housing Quality per Capita
Year Amsterdam Bruges Ghent Antwerp Brussels Paris
1527 26
1561 66
1571 45
1584 33 45
1632 50
1667 57 73 45
1695 61
1700 76
1713 56
1733 63
1755 62
1796 82
1787 69
1790 84
1805 79
1815 73
1819 107
1832 65
1834 67
1851 84
1865 63 84 70 61
1878 80
1889 89
1890 100 100 100 100
1900 94
1909 100
1911 100
Notes: This table shows the indexed developments in housing quality per capita, for years for which it
can be computed. For the Belgian cities, the index is normalized at 1890=100, for Amsterdam we use
1909=100. For all cities, the developments in housing quality per capita are in line with those reported
in Table 3.2 in the main paper. The main outlier in the table is Amsterdam in 1561, but it is likely that
this number is biased upward, due to a significant underestimate of the total Amsterdam population.
This estimate is based on Van Dillen (1929) estimated population by multiplying the number of homes
by five, but in all 17th century fiscal records, the estimated number of persons per home is well above 10,
suggesting the 1561 quality per capita figure should be halved.
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Chapter 4
The Total Return and Risk to Real
Estate*
Housing is the world’s largest asset class, but with some exceptions, it did not have
much institutional investor interest in the decades before the Great Recession. Since
then, however, housing markets all over the world have been booming, and so has
investor interest. Both private and institutional investors are putting capital into rental
housing (Bracke, 2019; Mills et al., 2019). No doubt, their interest has been spurred by
the recent performance of housing markets, with high levels of house price growth
observed across the globe in the past few decades (Knoll et al., 2017).
In a recent paper, Jordà et al. (2019a) aim to determine the total rate of return to
housing and to compare it to the performance of stocks and bonds all over the world.
Their results – based on secondary data sources – suggest that housing returns are
surprisingly high given their risk. Indeed, in a follow-up paper, Jordà et al. (2019b)
point out an unsolved risk premium puzzle for housing investments.
However, the housing returns data on which these papers are based suffers from
a number of measurement problems, which has resulted in a debate regarding the
question of whether the reported high returns to housing are real, or the result of mis-
measurement (Chambers et al., 2020; Eisfeldt and Demers, 2018; Dimson et al., 2018).
The main aim of our paper is to shed more light on this issue.
The crucial piece of information that is typically lacking in studies that aim to
compute long-term housing returns and risk, both at the aggregate and the individual
level, is an accurate assessment of the rental yield. Early papers aiming to assess the
total return to housing used an imputed rent (Flavin and Yamashita, 2002) or based it
on national accounts data (Piazzesi et al., 2007). More recently, the common approach
to deal with this issue is to estimate it on the basis of actual house price and rental
series, but these tend to pertain to different housing market segments (e.g. Brounen
et al., 2014; Eisfeldt and Demers, 2018; Giglio et al., 2018; Jordà et al., 2019a). This issue
goes beyond measuring housing returns themselves. Without data on actual yields,
*This chapter is co-authored with Piet Eichholtz (Maastricht University), Thies Lindenthal (University
of Cambridge) and Ronan Tallec (University Paris II, Pantheon-Assas)
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the use of implied rent-price ratios or rental returns has been standard in much of the
literature on housing markets (e.g. Himmelberg et al., 2005; Sinai and Souleles, 2005;
Campbell et al., 2009; Ambrose et al., 2013; Sommer et al., 2013; Favilukis et al., 2017).
Our paper overcomes this hiatus, and our first main contribution is to calculate total
returns and risks to residential real estate at aggregate and individual property level by
studying primary historic data on house prices and rents for the same homes, for two
important housing markets: Paris and Amsterdam. We then compare these to existing
measures based on implied returns from Jordà et al. (2019a), which cover these two
cities for a similar time period.
The second main contribution of our paper lies in a better understanding of the id-
iosyncratic risk to housing investments. The property-level data in this paper provide
a unique picture of the role of idiosyncratic risk - and of the role of the yield com-
ponent of the return therein - over different holding periods. The risk and market
return to housing investments are of limited relevance for investment performance,
as many residential property investors hold highly concentrated portfolios, due to the
indivisibility of assets, their capital intensity, and high transaction costs.2 For markets
in which full diversification is unattainable, both theory (see for instance Levy, 1978;
Merton, 1987) and empirical work (for example Fu, 2009; Eiling et al., 2019) suggest
that idiosyncratic risk and expected returns are linked in the cross-section. Existing
work has looked at idiosyncratic capital gains risk in residential properties (e.g. Mer-
ton, 1987; Peng and Thibodeau, 2017; Giacoletti, 2019; Eiling et al., 2019). However,
this ignores yield risk resulting from changes in the rental values of properties. To the
best of our knowledge, our paper is the first to study property-level changes in yields
and the contribution of property yield risk to total idiosyncratic risk, and to do that
over increasing investment horizons.
Given housing’s important role in the economy and investment portfolios, it is im-
portant to establish the annual total return and risk to residential real estate in a way
that avoids measurement problems as far as possible, using a dataset that is large and
representative enough for reliable inference. Our paper aims to measure total returns
to residential real estate as accurately as possible, and to assess the risk of that invest-
ment, distinguishing between idiosyncratic risk and systematic risk.
It is important to do that in the long run, for two reasons. First, holding periods
for rental housing are typically quite long: in our sample, median holding periods are
about 10 years, and we aim to study the relative role of idiosyncratic and systematic
risk for holding periods up to 20 years. Second, interest rates have been falling from
the early 1980s onward, pushing ex-post total returns up. So empirical studies of the
total return to rental housing that cover the last 40 years alone would likely be biased
upward. A long-term study avoids this problem.
Despite the enormous size of the housing market, data limitations regarding capi-
tal appreciation, gross rental yields, and taxes and costs have so far rendered it difficult
to make accurate estimates of the total return and risk on long-term residential real es-
2In the Netherlands, for example, 47% of the private rental stock is owned by individuals. Of these
buy-to-let investors, 80% own a single property and only 4% own more than five properties.
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tate investments.
Three recent studies have specifically attempted to construct total return and risk
estimates to real estate investments. Eisfeldt and Demers (2018) study total returns to
rental housing investments between 1986 and 2014 for a panel of cities in the United
States. Although they do not observe actual yields in this period, they construct im-
plied yields by extrapolating a city-specific hedonic pricing model for rental proper-
ties to owner-occupied properties. Both within and across cities, they find that rental
yields decline in price tiers. Cities with lower net yields experience higher price ap-
preciation, but have lower Sharpe ratios because capital gains are more volatile than
yields. However, within cities, this logic reverses, as low price tier areas experience
higher total returns due to both higher yields and higher capital gains.
Longer observation periods are important to establish the time-series properties
of aggregate housing risk and returns over different market conditions and economic
cycles. A recent influential paper by Jordà et al. (2019a) constructs total return indices
from a great number of existing house price and rent indices, based on construction
methods that vary over time and across countries. Given the ambition of their paper,
i.e. to assess housing investment returns and risks for a large cross-section of countries
between 1870 and today, this is understandable. Their data collection is momentous
as it is. However, their series may suffer from measurement error in all dimensions
of the total return, i.e. the capital appreciation, the gross rental yield, and in taxes
and costs. This might make inferences based on their findings unreliable, and a key
motivation for our paper is to investigate the extent to which such long-term implied
return series are affected by measurement errors.
Chambers et al. (2020) have made an impressive effort to construct estimates of
total real estate returns for England, using the archives of four prominent ‘Oxbridge’
colleges between 1901 and 1983. The archival ledgers allow to precisely track property-
level annual rental income and costs over time, and can be matched to transaction
prices when properties are purchased or sold. This enables them to measure returns
much more precisely, and they find that long-run real estate investment is less prof-
itable than suggested by Jordà et al. (2019a), with a real return to housing of 2.3%, and
5.4% for agricultural property. Given its aim and sample period, their paper is comple-
mentary to our study. Relative to our paper, their study also covers agricultural land
and commercial real estate and specifically investigates the role of costs in driving
asset-level returns and risk. However, because colleges infrequently transacted prop-
erty, they cannot directly measure aggregate capital gains and total returns. To derive
a total return statistic for the entire period, they use changes in the UK house price
index of Knoll et al. (2017) and adjust it to match the yields they do observe.
In this paper, we construct long-term annual total return indices and provide a
picture of the return and risk to rental housing investment at the aggregate and the
property level, and for different holding periods. To do so, we study two previously
unexplored primary datasets of house prices and rents on individual homes for Paris
(1809–1943) and Amsterdam (1900–1979). These datasets are large: in total, we hand-
collected approximately 171,740 observations of rents, sales prices, and property-level
taxes and costs, covering a representative sample of about 40,000 different properties.
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We have enough repeated price observations to estimate capital gains using repeat-
sales regressions to control for changes in housing quality.
The key innovation of our database is that it includes rents and prices for a large
representative set of properties. For Paris, we can link property-level sales prices to
rent prices retrieved from rental contracts or inheritance records, registered in the
years before or after the sale. For Amsterdam, we observe property-level rents and
prices concurrently, and in part of the data even repeatedly. In total, we have 63,575
observations of property-level gross yields. Most existing literature uses implied yields
from other series, and studies that do measure actual yields rely on small samples from
a limited set of investors (Bracke, 2015; Chambers et al., 2020).3
We also have property-level information on taxes and costs, but these data only
cover a subset of properties, so that we cannot study property-level costs with the
same level of detail as Chambers et al. (2020). To construct annual cost series, and
convert our gross yields to net yields, we combine our data with city-level data on
taxes, costs, and vacancies, similar to Eisfeldt and Demers (2018).
We find total net geometric returns to rental housing of 6.3% for Paris and 8.0% for
Amsterdam, with index-level standard deviations of 8.6% and 10.3%, respectively. In
real terms, geometric average returns amount to 4.0% per annum in Paris and 4.8% in
Amsterdam. These returns are significantly lower than reported in Jordà et al. (2019a)
and result in approximately 40 percent lower Sharpe ratios, closing most of the gap
with equities that Jordà et al. (2019a) document. This gap further reduces after ac-
counting for transaction costs and idiosyncratic risk. The long-term real return to
housing can entirely be attributed to the rental yield, with real capital gains around
zero. We find that our series of net rental yields are uncorrelated to the implied yield
series in Jordà et al. (2019a), showing that it is very difficult to accurately estimate long-
term yields from secondary data.
Our property-level return data for Amsterdam allow us to study idiosyncratic risk
in residential real estate investment, highlighting the role of yields as a risk compo-
nent to housing investments. We document significant persistence in property-level
yields over time, even up to 20-year holding periods, and even after accounting for
differences in yields across neighborhoods. This implies that properties purchased at
above-market yields will continue to earn above-market yields many years after the
purchase.
In aggregate, we find idiosyncratic risk to be substantial, contributing over half of
total return volatility for holding periods of 15 years and above. However, the composi-
tion and importance of idiosyncratic risks change over time. In the short term, nearly
all total return risk is idiosyncratic and comes from capital gains volatility. Because
yields are persistent, yield covariance becomes an increasingly important component
of total risk for longer holding periods. Idiosyncratic capital gains risk becomes less
important, given the flat structure of idiosyncratic capital gains risk across holding
periods (Giacoletti, 2019). Although we cannot account for property-level costs, our
3Bracke (2015) studies 1,922 yields from London for 2006–2012 and Chambers et al. (2020) use 1,359
distinct transactions to measure yields, of which 549 are for residential real estate.
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findings suggest that ignoring yield risk substantially underestimates the role of id-
iosyncratic risk for housing investments, especially over long holding periods.
In the remainder of the paper, we will first discuss the data and sources. The next
section will present measurements of capital returns, gross rental yields, taxes and
costs, and net rental yields. Section 4 provides our new residential total return in-
dices, and this is followed by a section discussing our return estimates in comparison
to those of other papers, most notably of Jordà et al. (2019a), and relative to equities.
That section will also provide a critical evaluation of our own indices, including ro-
bustness analyses. Section 6 will provide an analysis of property-level investment risk
- both systematic and idiosyncratic - associated with residential real estate investment
and the role of the holding period in risk and return. We will end the paper with some
conclusions.
4.1 Data and Historical Context
We employ two main archival data sources to construct indices of actual rental yields
and house prices, for Paris (1809–1943) and Amsterdam (1900–1979), which we com-
plement with data from other sources. Table 4.1 presents a brief overview of the data
sources and the number of observations employed in this paper. Importantly, all our
data contain observations on the level of rents and sales prices of an entire property.
In both Amsterdam and Paris, properties typically contain several housing units.
Table 4.1: Sources and Sample Sizes Property-Level Data
Data Type Period # Obs. Source
Paris
Sale Prices 1806–1943 38,168 Sommier Foncier
Rent Prices 1806–1943 44,379 Sommier Foncier
Matched Yields 1809–1943 27,722 Sommier Foncier
Taxes 1809–1926 4,474 Sommier Foncier, Tax Registers Sainte-Avoye
Asking Yields 1872–1940 10,052 Le Figaro
Realized Yields 1883–1939 1,060 Cote des terrains et immeubles, Le Temps
Amsterdam
Sale Prices 1840–1979 35,519 Brouwer & Zn., Eichholtz (1997), Verwey (1943)
Rent Prices 1900–1979 25,834 Brouwer & Zn.
Matched Yields 1900–1979 24,741 Brouwer & Zn.
Taxes 1917–1979 9,798 Brouwer & Zn.
Costs 1889–1967 2,454 Burgerweeshuis, Doopsgezinde Gemeente
Notes: Paris transaction prices are based on auction prices (34%) and regular sales (66%), while Amster-
dam data are auction prices (48%), regular sales (8%) and appraisals (44%). Amsterdam rental prices are
based on lease contracts (88%) and appraised rental values (12%).
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4.1.1 Paris
We extract the Paris housing data from the Paris land register called the Sommier
foncier, which covers the period from 1809 until 1943. This register is part of the
wider French administration responsible for collecting taxes on legal acts, the Enreg-
istrement. The Sommier foncier provides information on all property transfers in Paris
and served to check the veracity of the declarations of taxes paid on these transfers.
The first two series of the Sommier foncier, which cover the period until 1880, also
contain information about leases on these properties. For later periods, we obtain
data on rents both from donations during lifetime and inheritances after death (suc-
cessions).
Figure 4.1 presents two pages from the first registers of the Sommier. The left page
(top photo) lists all transfers of property, with information about the owners, the trans-
action price or assessed value, and the date of the transaction and registration. In the
first register, the Sommier also lists the paid property tax. The right page (bottom
photo) contains the neighborhood name and street address and lists the details of all
the leases on the property, including a description of the (part of) the property that
was let, the lease price, duration, and the names of the tenants.
The combination of rental prices and house prices for the same properties allows
one to compute property-level gross yields, for a period covering more than a century,
and for the entire city. To the best of our knowledge, this has hitherto been impossible,
even with modern data. Although historians have described this dataset (Daumard,
1958, 1965), the Sommier has not been the subject of extensive use so far, likely be-
cause of its enormous size and the complications arising with hand-written data.4
We collect data from a random sample of 327 registers, containing properties in
the entire city.5 In total, we digitize data for approximately 20,000 different residential
properties. For each property, we list the street address, the type of legal act, the regis-
tered price or value, and the date of registration and transfer. We remove observations
that are duplicates, not dated or outside our period, or do not have a price registered.
The reduced sample covers 82,547 registrations: regular property sales, auction sales,
leases for entire properties, inheritances and donations.
Information on 38,160 property prices originates from data on regular sales and
auctions sales, which are representative for all property sales in the city. Auctions sales
correspond to about 37% of the total number of sales, and were a regular way to sell
property. 13 percent of the total number of auction sales (5% of total sales) are ear-
marked as a judicial sale following a foreclosure or bankruptcy procedure. Notaries
directly sent information about transaction prices to the Enregistrement, ensuring the
accuracy of the data, and enabling the government to collect a stamp duty. The data
4A related register of the Enregistrement, containing the declarations of inheritances, has formed the
basis for the well-known work of Piketty et al. (2006) on French inequality, as well as subsequent studies.
5To draw a random sample of registers, we initially requested registers from the archive that, according
to the archival index, contain street names starting with the letter A or B. We stuck to this strategy as
much as possible, but due to restrictions in the number of registers we could request per day, we also
took pictures of registers that ended up not containing streets with these letters. We collected additional
data from the first set of registers to obtain more observations of actual rents.
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Figure 4.1: Example of Sommier Foncier Property Information
Notes: This is an extract of two pages from the Sommier foncier, in the first register for the house on the
Rue de Babylone, number 3. The first picture contains all ownership transfers; the second picture lists
the leases on this property.
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we collect cover all property sales for a given property in a given register. In some
cases, properties were sold partially, for example when individuals sold an inherited
part of a property, or when a property had multiple owners.6 These partial sales were
not always consistently indicated in the records, which implies there is some noise in
the house-level transaction prices.
Data on 44,379 rent prices between 1809–1943 come from rent contracts and from
succession and donation values. Before 1870, about 25% of rent prices originate from
lease prices on newly-signed rental contracts. The relatively low number of rental con-
tracts is driven by the fact that most properties were split into smaller units that were
let separately. The rent contracts in the Sommier provide a description of the prop-
erty that is being let, and we only include observations for which it is clear that the
rent corresponds to the entire property. After 1870, almost all rent prices are based on
successions and donations, since rent contracts were not registered anymore.
By law, the taxable value of properties in case of successions or donations equaled
twenty times the current price of the leases, or the rental value of the property in the
rare case the property was owner-occupied.7 The heirs declared these amounts and
proofs for them to the registration officers, who could verify and control declarations
subsequently. Clearly, heirs had a financial incentive to under-report the income from
their property. The French government was very well aware of this problem, and to
incentivize tax receivers to register the right amounts, they received a fraction of the
assessed value (Massaloux, 1989).8 We find that verification was very common: in over
20% of cases the tax receiver imposed extra taxes afterward (insuffisances). We adjust
our rent valuations for these insufficiencies.
Because of different registration practices, the succession and donation values in
the Sommier foncier were either entered in the books as the rental value or as the
capitalized rental value (20 times the rent). The latter was particularly common in
the period before 1860. We use data on actual rental contracts and sales prices to infer
which rental values are capitalized, and adjusted the data accordingly. In Appendix 4.A
we explain this procedure in more detail. In total, we can match 28,287 observations
of sales prices to rents on the same property.
After 1918, the legal system to determine succession values changed, and the law
stipulated that succession and donation values had to be based on the market value
of the properties.9 Because the registration officers had extensive experience with as-
sessing succession values based on rental leases, property values continued to be as-
sessed on the basis of rental values. However, the officers applied, depending on the
condition of the property, capitalization rates of 10 to 14, with an average rate of 12.10
6Until World War I, it was not possible to own a designated part of the property, such as a single apart-
ment.
7Loi du 22 frimaire an VII, article 27.
8The investigative power of the registration officers was enacted formally in law in 1851 (Arrêté du 3
mai 1851, article 2), but price adjustments were already frequent in the decades before that.
9Loi du 27 mai 1918, article 1er.
10See Le Temps Immobilier, 12 September 1933. Le Temps was a conservative newspaper close to
French financial circles. It was published between 1816 and 1942 and from 1932 offered a weekly bul-
letin devoted to the real estate market.
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After 1870, our rent data are almost entirely based on observations of successions
and donations, and one might worry that these are not accurately measuring rental
prices. This concern might be particularly severe after 1918 when the legal link be-
tween the succession values and rental prices disappears. To construct an alternative
series of yields, we, therefore, collect 10,052 announcements of property sales from
Le Figaro, a major conservative French newspaper, spanning the period from 1872 to
1940.11 These ads listed both the rental revenue of a property, the minimum starting
bid (mise à prix) in case the property was sold in an auction, or the asking price for a
regular sale. Advertisements for regular sales only started appearing after World War
I. One limitation of this database is that it is based on asking prices and self-reported
rents, which might deviate from actual rental prices and sales prices. Given that the
data do not report the actual addresses of the properties, it was not possible to match
these asking prices to the subsequent sales prices of the property. To estimate the
difference between minimum bids and realized prices, we collect 1,060 observations
from data in two real estate news bulletins, the Cote des terrains et immeubles for
1883-1884 and Le Temps Immobilier for 1932-1939, that list both the rental revenue,
minimum starting bid, and the realized price.
To obtain estimates of taxes, we collect data on paid property taxes for 2,094 ob-
servations in the first register of the Sommier. For each of these observations, we also
know the sale or rental price such that we can compute a property tax rate. To obtain
tax rates after 1860, we collect 1,704 property-level tax observations for a sample of
streets in Sainte-Avoye, a neighborhood in Paris.12 We match these to our data from
the Sommier. It is not necessary to diversify this tax sample since the law prescribed
the equivalence of property tax rates across the city.
4.1.2 Amsterdam
The city of Amsterdam had and still has a unique history of selling property for in-
vestment purposes in public auctions. Such auctions have been organized since the
1600s and still take place today. The format of these auctions has changed very little
over time: before the actual auction, the auction house and organizing realtors use
newspapers or other media to promote the properties for sale. During the auction,
participants bid on the properties using a unique auction format: the Anglo-Dutch
Premium Auction (Boerner et al., 2016). For auctioned properties, the buyer pays the
required transaction price and fees and subsequently registers the transfer of property
formally. Not every auctioned property would sell; after every non-foreclosure auction
the seller still reserved the right to reject a transaction (recht van gunnen).
The market for auctioned property in Amsterdam was large. For the period be-
tween 1900 and 1942, we gather statistics on the number of properties put up for sale
from the yearbooks of the Amsterdam statistical office (Gemeente Amsterdam, 2018),
11We collect about 150 observations per year. We excluded 1915-1916 since there were barely any prop-
erties advertised for sale due to World War I. The auction market was also at a standstill: 0 sales in 1915
and 1916, 7 in 1917, and 8 in 1918.
12Archives de Paris, D13P2/17, 67 à 69.
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which indicate that on average about 1000 properties per year were put up for auction.
We estimate this was about 2 percent of the housing stock.13 Most of these properties
were auctioned voluntarily (vrijwillige verkoop), but some properties were sold after
foreclosure or bankruptcy (executoriale verkoop). The data do not provide an indica-
tion of the number of properties that were sold involuntarily, but the large number of
properties put up for auction suggests this was only a minority of cases. Selling invest-
ment property in auctions was the norm, and foreclosed properties were sold in the
same auctions as regular properties.14
Before the advent of modern house price indices, auctions gave market partic-
ipants important information about market prices and yields. Because most prop-
erties were purchased for investment purposes, information on rents and taxes was
presented for nearly every property for sale. Properties were typically sold with ten-
ants at current rental prices. If a property was not rented out, the auctions typically
listed the assessed rental value of the property. The auctions were public, so individ-
uals could record and register this information. We exploit the archives of the Firma
Jan Brouwer & Zn., who developed a unique card system to store information on sales
prices, rents, and taxes of properties sold in these auctions.15 One unique aspect of
this database is that it appears to have been specifically designed to follow property
yields over time for a large sample of investment properties. This system covers the
period from 1900 to 1979 and contains information on 19,786 properties. These prop-
erties primarily cover residential units, although a significant fraction of properties
contains both housing units and office or retail space. In Amsterdam, offices or shops
often occupied the front part of the ground floor, with the upper floors or back of the
house used for residential rental units.
Beyond registering prices and rents for auctioned properties, the realtor also reg-
istered information on the appraisal value of these properties. These appraisals were
requested by banks and other mortgage providers. The appraisers assessed both the
market value of the property and the rental value because property developers and in-
vestors used rental cash flows to pay mortgage interest and amortization (Smid, 2019).
If the property was vacant or newly constructed, the appraisers estimated the rental
value of the property rather than using actual rent contracts. In a small number of
cases, the realtor also listed data on regular sales prices.
Figure 4.2 contains an example of a card for one property. We transcribe all 26,132
cards present in the archives. For each observation, we list the street and house num-
ber, as well as the date, the type of value observation (appraisal, auction sale, or regular
sale), and the price. In case the property was leased or its rental value was appraised,
we also transcribe this information. We only include information on rental prices if the
13In 1919, there were 45,000 properties in Amsterdam, containing about 140,000 housing units
(Gemeente Amsterdam, 2018).
14In the 17th-18th century, when properties were already auctioned using exactly the same procedures,
but when foreclosures can be identified, Francke and Korevaar (2020) find in a repeat-sales setting that
foreclosed properties realized 2% lower prices than non-foreclosed properties. They argue that this can
be caused by unobserved depreciation on foreclosed properties, or by actual discounts.
15Source: Amsterdam City Archives, Archive 901.
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entire property was rented out. Last, we include information on all mentioned taxes.
Next to regular property taxes and municipal taxes, many homes in Amsterdam were
subject to mandatory ground leases, which the municipality used for most property
developments after 1896 (Nelisse, 2008).
Figure 4.2: Example of an Amsterdam Auction Card
Notes: This figure provides an example of one Amsterdam auction card, for the property on the Prinsen-
gracht 723.
Excluding observations from outside of Amsterdam (4% of the data), this data col-
lection results in 25,834 observations of rents (88%) or appraised rental values (12%),
30,528 transaction prices (48%) or appraisals (52%), and 9,798 observations of taxes. In
24,741 cases, we have both a rental price and a price observation for the same home
in the same year. In 8,579 cases we can also adjust this yield for taxes. To complete
our database of prices, we augment it with 2,480 repeated transaction prices from Ver-
wey (1943) for property auctions between 1840 and 1940, and 2,826 transaction prices
from the Herengracht index database of Eichholtz (1997), covering the 1840–1972 pe-
riod. Removing duplicate observations across databases, the total number of prices is
35,519, and 93% of these price observations concern the 1900-1979 period.
To provide estimates of non-tax costs, we compile data on actual costs from the
archives of two institutional investors: the Amsterdam Orphanage (Het Burgerweeshuis)
and the Doopsgezinde Gemeente, an Amsterdam church. Since the 17th century,
the Burgerweeshuis has been among the largest institutional investors in the Amster-
dam residential real estate market. For social institutions like the Burgerweeshuis and
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the Doopsgezinde Gemeente, property investments provided the largest part of their
funding. Eichholtz et al. (2020b) use information on rental contracts from both insti-
tutions to construct multiple series of market rent prices, and we refer to their paper
for information on the investment activity of these investors. Chambers et al. (2020)
use similar data from Oxbridge colleges to obtain estimates of costs.
Although the Burgerweeshuis reduced its property portfolio over time because it
deemed investments in bonds and other financial assets more attractive (Gelderblom
and Jonker, 2009), the Burgerweeshuis still owned 60 properties until the mid-20th
century, containing over 100 rental units. Most of these properties had already been
acquired in the 16th and 17th centuries. From its archives, we collect property-level
information on rental income and expenses for these units, covering the period from
1937 to 1969. For the Doopsgezinde Gemeente, we obtain data on 30 different prop-
erties spanning the period from 1889 to 1924. Ledgers are incomplete before and after
these periods, but these properties likely stayed in their hands for decades or even
centuries. The mentioned costs include expenses on maintenance and renovation,
taxes, insurance and management costs (only at property level), lost rents due to rent-
arrears and vacancies, and water use (if not paid by the tenant). In short, this database
provides all asset-level costs. In total, this resulted in 2,454 property-level observations
of rental prices and corresponding costs.
4.2 The Components of Total Housing Returns
In this section, we estimate the components of the total returns of residential real es-
tate in Paris and Amsterdam. The return to rental housing investments for a property
(or a portfolio of properties) consists of both capital gains and net rental yields (Equa-
tion 4.1).
Retur ni ,t =
Pi ,t −Pi ,t−1
Pi ,t−1
+ Ri ,t (1− ci ,t −τi ,t )
Pi ,t−1
(4.1)
Pi ,t and Ri ,t equal the sale and rent price of the same property i at time t. To estimate
our total returns as precisely as possible, and to establish how measurement error
could contribute to wrongly specified returns, we split this equation into three parts.
First, we study the role of capital gains measurement in the assessment of the total
rate of return to housing. The main challenge here is to adequately control for hous-
ing quality, as well as to have sufficiently large and representative samples of housing
sales. Second, we look at gross rental yields: the current or estimated rent divided by
the sales price.16 We compare how these actual yields differ from implied yields de-
rived from secondary indices. Third, we study the implications of costs and taxes on
yields, with a particular focus on property-level taxes (τ). We proxy for non-tax costs
(c) using institutional cost data for Amsterdam and findings from other studies and
employ time series of vacancy rates to assess vacancy costs.
16Note that rental yields formally differ slightly from the rental returns defined in equation 4.1. The
latter expresses the rent price relative to the sale price in the previous period. Our rent observations
specify the annual rental price at the time of the transaction: we thus assume this is equal to the rental
price for the upcoming year.
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4.2.1 Capital Appreciation
The literature has employed a wide set of methods to estimate house price indices,
some aiming to control for changes in quality of the underlying housing stock, and
some not. Of the former, the two most commonly used are the repeat-sales method
(Bailey et al., 1963) and the hedonic method (Rosen, 1974). In a standard framework,
the log price of a transaction (pi ) at time t can be written as the sum of a ‘quality’
component (α) and a time-varying market value component (β) plus a transaction
error (ε).
pi ,t =αi +βt +εi ,t (4.2)
Crucial to both methods is that they attempt to separate improvements in the
quality of homes from increases in market prices. Because the quality of the housing
stock has increased throughout the 20th century, inadequate quality control will result
in indices with an upward bias (Eichholtz et al., 2020b). In the repeat-sales method,
which we employ for both cities in this paper, this is accomplished by focusing on re-
peated transactions of the same properties. Because we do not have observations on
actual housing quality for the properties in our sample, using the hedonic alternative
is not feasible.
For both Paris and Amsterdam, we estimate a standard repeat-sales index, control-
ling for the type of sale observed in the data. For the Parisian index, we use data from
1806 to 1943 to estimate the index but only report on its development from 1809 to
1943 when the number of repeat-sales is large. For Amsterdam, we include price ob-
servations for the entire period from 1840 to 1979 but only report on the index devel-
opment from 1900 to 1979, the period for which we have yield data besides transaction
prices.
To reduce the sensitivity of our index to extreme outliers, which may signal un-
observed changes in quality or cases where only part of a property was sold (but not
indicated), we exclude price pairs that have a log price difference exceeding 1.95 or be-
low -1.95 after correcting for log changes in the rent price index from Eichholtz et al.
(2020b) (> 600% or <−86%). For Paris, this removes 1,456 price pairs, leaving us with
17,770 price pairs to estimate the house price index. For Amsterdam, we use 15,125
transaction pairs to estimate the index, excluding 161 outliers.
Table 4.2 Panel A provides summary statistics of the new house price indices. We
find comparable figures for both cities. For Paris, we find a geometric average capital
gain of 2.4% (arithmetic: 2.8%), with a standard deviation of 8.7%. Adjusted for infla-
tion, the capital gain is 0.3% per year.17 For Amsterdam, we find a geometric average
annual log capital gain of 2.6% (arithmetic: 3.1%) and a standard deviation of 10.4%.
Adjusting for inflation, the real log capital gain averages -0.6% per year.
17We use the CPI indices assembled in Eichholtz et al. (2020b) for both Paris and Amsterdam. These
are city-specific CPI indices pooled from various sources.
96 CHAPTER 4. THE TOTAL RETURN AND RISK TO REAL ESTATE
Table 4.2: Capital Gains, Rental Yields, and Total Returns
Index Period Geometric Arithmetic Real Geom. Sharpe
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Panel A: Capital Gains
Paris 1809–1943 2.4% 8.7% 2.8% 8.9% 0.3% 10.3%
Amsterdam 1900–1979 2.6% 10.3% 3.1% 10.6% -0.6% 10.3%
Panel B: Gross Yields
Paris 1809–1943 6.9% 1.1% 7.2% 1.2%
Amsterdam 1900–1979 9.9% 2.0% 10.5% 2.3%
Panel C: Net Yields
Paris 1809–1943 3.9% 0.7% 4.0% 0.7%
Amsterdam 1900–1979 5.4% 1.2% 5.5% 1.2%
Panel D: Total Returns
Paris 1809–1943 6.3% 8.6% 6.8% 8.9% 4.0% 10.2% 0.25
Amsterdam 1900–1979 8.0% 10.3% 8.7% 10.6% 4.8% 10.3% 0.34
Notes: This table reports the headline estimates for capital gains, gross yields, net yields and total returns
for both Paris and Amsterdam in geometric terms, arithmetic terms and in real geometric terms. Sharpe
ratios for total returns are computed based on long-term bond rates for both cities.
4.2. THE COMPONENTS OF TOTAL HOUSING RETURNS 97
4.2.2 Yields
Gross Yields
To estimate the gross annual rental yield for the two cities, we divide the summed
rental prices of properties in the sample by their summed sales prices for each year.
For Amsterdam, all yields are based on the rental price in the year of the sale. For Paris,
we typically do not observe the value of the rent price (R) in the same year as the sales
price (P ), and we adjust for this using Equation 4.3. On average, we observe two rent
price observations and two house price observations for each property. To be able
to compute yields, we link each property sale to the nearest rent observation on the
property before the sale (at time t-x) and after the sale (at time t+z), with x and z lim-
ited to 30 years. We adjust these rent observations for changes in market rent prices,
which we estimated using a repeat-rent index (RPI ) based on observations of rental
contracts, successions, and donations, estimated using equation 4.2. To compute the
final yield, we apply linear interpolation, so that rent observations closest to the sales
price get the most weight, and divide these by the sales price at time t:
Y i eldi ,t = z
x + z ×
Ri ,t−x
Pi ,t
× RPIt
RPIt−x
+ x
x + z ×
Ri ,t+z
Pi ,t
× RPIt
RPIt+z
(4.3)
At the annual level, the estimates on portfolio yields can be sensitive to extreme
observations in the data. Most importantly, very large properties or properties with
extreme yields can distort the yields at the annual level. To combat this we remove
observations that have log yields deviating more than 1.39 from the median log yield in
the sample (more than 300% larger or -75% smaller). Second, we remove observations
with extremely high rent levels (> 800% of the median house rent). For Paris, there
remain 24,827 gross yields in the sample, and for Amsterdam 25,058 yields. Again, this
procedure removes a larger fraction of observations for Paris (10% of data, 2,895 yields)
relative to Amsterdam (3% of data, 683 yields), due to the larger amount of noise in the
Parisian data.
Table 4.2 Panel B shows a Parisian gross log portfolio yield for rental housing of
6.9%, with a standard deviation of only 1.1%. For Amsterdam, the average gross log
portfolio yield equals 9.9% with a larger standard deviation of 2.0%. We plot the se-
ries in Figure 4.3. For Paris, the gross yield moves in a rather limited range, roughly
between 5 and 10 percent, with relatively high yields in the Napoleonic Era, after the
Siege of Paris in 1870, and during the Great Depression. The picture is more volatile for
Amsterdam than for Paris. Amsterdam yields are quite stable until 1965, and then start
increasing substantially in the late 1960s, with the gross yield peaking at more than 20
percent in the 1970s. The evolution of yields in the overlapping period appears to be
similar, with yields declining at the end of World War I, but increasing in the 1920s
and 1930s. The correlation between the gross yields for Paris and Amsterdam in that
period is 0.75.
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Figure 4.3: Gross Housing Yields, Paris and Amsterdam
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Notes: This graph provides gross yields to rental housing for Paris (1809–1943) and Amsterdam (1900–
1979). For Paris, the gross yield moves in a rather limited range, roughly between 5% and 10% For Am-
sterdam, the average gross yield is 10%, with a peak of 20% in the 1970s. In the periods the Paris and
Amsterdam series overlap, they correlate closely (corr. = 0.75).
Costs
For Paris, we compute the average annual tax rate directly for a subset of 2,094 transac-
tion prices or rents between 1809 and 1854 for which we have information on the level
of the annual property tax, expressing it as a fraction of total rent. Between 1855 and
1917, we match tax payments on the properties in Sainte-Avoye to the rental prices
coming from successions, donations and rental contracts in the Sommier. To match
rental prices to tax payments, we use the same procedure that we employ to match
rental prices to sales prices, by finding the nearest rent price on the property and ad-
justing these for changes in the market price. We compute the average tax rate based
on these matched observations and interpolate it for years where data is missing. Be-
cause tax rates were very stable in this period, this likely does not introduce major
errors. After 1917, we use data from Duon (1946) who computed the fraction of prop-
erty taxes borne by the property owner annually, expressing it as a fraction of gross
rent.18
For Amsterdam, a third of the rental yield observations include the required property-
level taxes (9,798 observations). The most important of these were direct property
taxes, street taxes, and a fee for the use of water. For properties with leaseholds, we
also register land lease costs. From 1924 onward, there are sufficient observations
available to estimate the level of taxes as a fraction of total rents.19 To do so, we com-
pute the average tax rate in each year, controlling for differences in tax rates due to
18Appendix 4.B provides a more detailed discussion of the tax system and the sources we used.
19The rental tax rate can be estimated more precisely than the tax rate as a fraction of property value.
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the presence of land leases. To estimate the level of tax yields before 1924, we esti-
mate a repeated-tax index based on 635 annual observations of taxes for properties
of the Doopsgezinde Gemeente between 1900 and 1924. We use the 1924 tax rate to
splice these to the tax rate series from the yield database. For periods of missing data
(1915–1916) we interpolate the tax rate.
In Amsterdam, annual taxes account on average for 14.8% of property rental value,
with a volatility of 5.6%. In Paris, tax rates amount on average to 10.7% of the rental
value with a volatility of 4.3%. A plot and discussion of the series of tax rates and va-
cancy rates are provided in Appendix Figure 4.13.
To measure vacancy rates, we make use of city-level statistics. For Amsterdam,
we compute the annual vacancy rate in Amsterdam by dividing the number of vacant
housing units in the market by the total number of housing units in Amsterdam. For
most years, this is reported in the statistical yearbooks of the Municipality of Amster-
dam (Gemeente Amsterdam, 2018) or in the national housing census. In case data
was missing, we linearly interpolate vacancy rates (1900-1908, 1945-1946, 1948-1955,
1957-1965). Vacancy rates in Amsterdam were low, with an average of 2%, a low of
0.3% right after World War II, and a high of 5.5% in 1935. For Paris, we use estimated
vacancy rates based on the statistical yearbooks of Paris and data on the number of
vacant accommodations given by Faure and Lévy-Vroelant (2007) and Duon (1946).
Prior to 1869, there is no vacancy data available, and we use the 1869 number for this
period. We linearly interpolate data in periods with missing data, mostly in the 1870s
and 1880s. Vacancy rates average 3.1% of rental value in Paris.
One limitation of our sample is that we do not have asset-level information on
costs other than taxes, implying that we have to make estimates of these costs based on
other sources of data. The approach we take in this paper is to make a well-informed
estimate of the total amount of costs other than taxes and vacancies, using estimates
from our Amsterdam cost data and findings from other literature.
First, we estimate the average fraction of non-tax and non-vacancy costs in our
institutional cost sample from Amsterdam. Excluding vacancy costs and taxes, but in-
cluding maintenance costs, management costs, and insurance costs, the cost fraction
on residential properties averages 31.8% in our sample. This value reduces to about
26.5% when we control for location and the relative value of properties. Appendix 4.C
provides a more detailed discussion of our cost data and analysis.
In comparable studies, the fraction of non-tax costs typically amounts to approxi-
mately 30-35% of rental value. For the United States, Eisfeldt and Demers (2018) apply
a fixed fraction of about 35% of the total rental value as costs, and add time-varying
local property tax costs and vacancy costs to this estimate, as we do in this paper.20
Chambers et al. (2020) have full information about property-level costs and study a
comparable time period as we do. They find actual costs for residential real estate
of 32.7% of gross rental income (excluding taxes, but including vacancy costs). The
cost fractions they identify fluctuate substantially over time but only apply to a very
20They assume non-tax and non-vacancy costs are the sum of 2.13% of property value and 6.63% of
rental value, which equates to about 35% of the property value based on the gross yields in their sample.
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specific group of investors: Oxford and Cambridge colleges. For Paris, the tax authori-
ties assumed a 25% maintenance cost fraction since the French Revolution, excluding
management and insurance costs (Duon, 1946). Jordà et al. (2019a) also discuss the
evolution of maintenance costs historically, and find that maintenance, management
and insurance costs constitute about 30% of gross rent without strong time trends.
Based on our findings in Table 4.6 and other estimates in the literature, we apply a
fixed cost fraction to our gross yields of 30% of rental value for both Paris and Amster-
dam, excluding costs for vacancies and taxes.
Net Yields
The next step is to convert the gross rental yields reported in Table 4.2 Panel B to net
rental yields, using our estimates of costs, taxes and vacancy rates. These are reported
in Panel C of Table 4.2, and we observe a net yield for Paris of 3.9% for the full 1809–
1943 sample period, and a net yield of 5.4% for Amsterdam for the 1900–1979 period.
Given that there is some uncertainty surrounding the true level of maintenance
and management costs, and its evolution over time, these numbers might be different
if cost fractions differed from our estimates. For example, if the true cost fraction ex-
cluding taxes and vacancies was 25% or 35% of rental value, instead of 30%, net yields
would increase respectively decrease by 0.35% in Paris and 0.5% in Amsterdam.
4.3 The Total Return to Residential Real Estate
This section provides aggregate statistics on total returns for Paris and Amsterdam,
both in nominal and in real terms. To deflate nominal returns into real returns, we
use the CPI indices assembled in Eichholtz et al. (2020b) for both Paris and Amster-
dam. These are city-specific CPI indices pooled from various sources. We combine
the housing capital value index reported in Section 3.1 with the net yield development
in Section 3.2 by directly applying Equation 4.1 to get the total net return to rental
housing in Paris and Amsterdam. Table 4.2 Panel D provides statistics for these series.
First, the geometric average net return to rental housing is 6.3% for Paris (arith-
metic: 6.8%) and 8.0% for Amsterdam (arithmetic: 8.7%). In real terms, geometric
returns in both cities are more similar: 4.0% in Paris and 4.8% in Amsterdam. The lack
of any real capital gains on housing for both Paris and Amsterdam also implies that the
real total long-term returns on housing over time accumulate from rental cash flows
rather than capital gains. The standard deviations of the nominal total return are 8.6%
for Paris and 10.3% for Amsterdam, almost equalling the standard deviation of the
capital return for these cities.
In order to assess risk premiums and Sharpe measures, we use series of long-term
bonds returns that we can apply consistently over time, since bill rates are not avail-
able for all time periods. For France, we use the bond yield on French 5% annuities
before 1833, and the 3% annuity between 1833 and 1943. For the Netherlands, we
take the long-term Dutch government bond yield from 1900 to 1979, also reported in
Jordà et al. (2019a). Relative to long-term government bonds, housing earned a risk
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premium of about 2.1% in Paris and 3.5% in Amsterdam. Combining this with the
standard deviations of the geometric total returns gives a Sharpe ratio of 0.25 for Paris
and 0.34 for Amsterdam.
Figure 4.4 reports the evolution of real cumulative returns over time for both Paris
and Amsterdam. Real total returns dwarf capital gains but the disproportionate in-
fluence of capital gains on total return volatility is evident, especially for Paris after
1914. The consequences of World War I scarred the performance of real estate invest-
ments in Paris, as France experienced significant inflation and introduced nominal
rent controls. This was much less the case in Amsterdam, as the Netherlands was neu-
tral during World War I. In Amsterdam, real total returns accumulated steadily up to
the 1930s, then went into a 20-year hiatus following the Great Depression and World
War II, before picking up pace again in the 1950s.
Figure 4.4: Real Total Returns and Capital Gains
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Notes: These graphs depict inflation-adjusted cumulative total returns and capital gains for Paris and
Amsterdam. Real capital gains are dwarfed by total returns but the price volatility is very visible, espe-
cially for Paris after 1914. World War I scarred the real estate investment performance in Paris but did
not affect Amsterdam much. In Amsterdam, real total returns accumulated steadily up to the 1930s, then
went into a 20-year hiatus before picking up pace again in the 1950s.
4.4 Discussion
Having established our main estimates for housing returns and yield in both Paris and
Amsterdam, this section aims to discuss these estimates in more detail. First, we want
to address how our estimates compare to the results reported in Jordà et al. (2019a)
and in other related literature, and discuss the likely role of measurement error in the
differences between our estimates and previous series. This section also discusses
how our improved estimates for Paris and Amsterdam change our view regarding the
performance of housing as an asset class, particularly relative to equities. We will end
the section with a discussion of potential limitations and issues with our estimates,
and perform a series of robustness checks.
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4.4.1 Comparing Our Indices to Previous Work
Capital Gains
We start our comparison of total housing returns by looking at changes in house prices
for Paris and Amsterdam. Figure 4.5a and 4.5b depict our newly estimated repeat-sales
indices in nominal terms, and compare the nominal indices with other housing series,
most specifically those used by Knoll et al. (2017), on which the total return estimates
in Jordà et al. (2019a) are based. Table 4.3 provides numerical comparisons.
Table 4.3: Comparing Return Estimates
Index Period Geometric Arithmetic Real Geom. Corr.
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Panel A: Capital Gains
Paris 1840–1943 2.4% 8.6% 2.8% 8.9% -0.6% 10.3%
Paris (Duon, 1946) 1840–1943 2.7% 5.8% 3.0% 6.0% -0.2% 8.5% 0.39
Paris 1871–1943 2.4% 9.3% 2.9% 9.7% -1.5% 11.3%
Paris (Knoll et al., 2017) 1871–1943 3.2% 7.6% 3.5% 8.6% -0.7% 9.2% 0.31
Amsterdam 1900–1979 2.6% 10.3% 3.1% 10.6% -0.6% 10.3%
Amsterdam (Ambrose et al., 2013) 1900–1979 3.5% 26.0% 7.0% 27.3% 0.4% 25.6% 0.31
Amsterdam (Knoll et al., 2017) 1900–1979 3.9% 10.9% 4.6% 11.2% 0.8% 9.5% 0.40
Panel B: Net Yields
Paris 1871–1943 4.3% 0.6% 4.4% 0.6%
Paris (Jordà et al., 2019a) 1871–1943 4.9% 0.7% 5.0% 0.8% 0.11
Amsterdam 1900–1979 5.4% 1.2% 5.5% 1.2%
Amsterdam (Jordà et al., 2019a) 1900–1979 6.3% 2.1% 6.5% 2.3% -0.08
Panel C: Total Returns
Paris 1871–1943 6.7% 9.3% 7.3% 9.6% 2.8% 11.4%
Paris (Jordà et al., 2019a) 1871–1943 8.1% 7.8% 8.6% 8.8% 4.2% 9.6% 0.30
Amsterdam 1900–1979 8.0% 10.3% 8.7% 10.6% 4.8% 10.3%
Amsterdam (Jordà et al., 2019a) 1900–1979 10.2% 10.6% 11.1% 10.8% 7.1% 9.2% 0.39
Notes: This table compares our results on capital gains, net yields and total returns to previous studies.
The correlation coefficient is computed as the correlation in capital gains, yields, or log returns with
our baseline series. The house price indices from Knoll et al. (2017) are used to compute capital gains
and corresponding total returns in Jordà et al. (2019a). The price index of Duon (1946) for Paris was
smoothened using a moving average of unknown length. This explains the low volatility and correlation
of this series and that of Jordà et al. (2019a), who use Duon’s index until 1937. Until 1965, the Ambrose
et al. (2013) index for Amsterdam is based on a small number of transactions along the Herengracht,
Amsterdam’s most affluent canal, resulting in very high volatility and low correlation. Knoll et al. (2017)
use a smoothened version of this index.
For Paris, Knoll et al. (2017) used the index of Duon (1946) for the period between
1870 and 1935. This index is likely the world’s oldest repeat-sales index, although it
is unclear how this index was constructed exactly. Duon traced all previous sales for
the 4,389 homes sold in Paris between 1941 and 1944 and used this to estimate a house
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Figure 4.5: House Price Indices
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Notes: The plots compare our new repeat-sales indices for Paris and Amsterdam with earlier repeat-sales
indices that rely on smaller samples, and sometimes apply smoothing techniques. The indices from
Knoll et al. (2017) switch to national data from 1935 (Paris) and 1970 (Amsterdam) onward. The index of
Ambrose et al. (2013) uses national data from 1965.
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price index. Duon then smoothed his index using a moving average of unknown length
(Duon, 1943), to cope with the low number of transaction observations.
Given the overlap in methodology, it is not surprising this index displays a very
similar long-term development to ours, but due to the smoothing, it is less volatile
than our index, which is visible in the graph and in the numbers: the standard devia-
tion of annual capital gains is 5.8%, relative to 8.6% for our index in the same period,
as can be observed in Panel A of Table 4.3. This table also shows a correlation of 0.39
between house price changes according to the Duon index and our Paris house price
index.
Knoll et al. (2017) use this index until 1935, and then splice it to a national repeat-
sales house price index. However, house prices bottomed out in 1935, and because
the index of Duon (1946) is smoothed, the splicing takes place at an overly high index
level, resulting in an underestimation of the fall in house prices that took place in the
1930s. As a result, Knoll et al. (2017) find much higher average house price growth in
this period. So due to the smoothing of the index of Duon (1946), Knoll et al. (2017)
substantially underestimate volatility in the 1870–1935 period, and then overestimate
price growth afterward due to incorrect splicing. The correlation between the Knoll
et al. (2017) index and our Paris index is only 0.31.
For Amsterdam, we compare the capital return part of our index to the indices
in Ambrose et al. (2013) and Knoll et al. (2017). Both indices are primarily based on
the bi-annual Herengracht index of Eichholtz (1997), which employs repeated sales of
17th-18th century properties along Amsterdam’s best-known canal, ensuring constant
quality. Ambrose et al. (2013) estimated an annual version of the Herengracht index,
while Knoll et al. (2017) annualize the original index by applying the bi-annual obser-
vation only for the first of the two years. To interpolate the second year, which is now
missing, they take simple averages of the previous and next observation.
These differences in index construction and sample result in substantial differ-
ences between our indices and these alternative estimates. Without adjustment, the
low number of observations in the annual Herengracht index of Ambrose et al. (2013)
results in unrealistically high levels of volatility. The volatility in Knoll et al. (2017) is
more realistic and closer to ours, but this seems coincidental given the rather force-
ful smoothing technique they use. While smoothing can bring volatility down to levels
that are seemingly more realistic, it completely changes the process generating annual
capital gains, and will result in volatility estimates that are biased and inconsistent. By
estimating annual indices - both for Paris and Amsterdam - that are based on much
larger sets of repeat sales, our new indices strongly mitigate these estimation prob-
lems.
We find that capital gains in Amsterdam are substantially lower in our index rel-
ative to Ambrose et al. (2013) and Knoll et al. (2017). The Herengracht database, on
which their indices are based, has a very low number of observations from the mid-
1960s onward, resulting in very high but even more uncertain growth rates of house
prices. Knoll et al. (2017) switch to a national house price index from 1970 built on
median prices, whereas Ambrose et al. (2013) already do so from 1965. The difference
in capital gains is completely caused by this switch to an annual index that does not
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control for quality. Low index quality, as defined by the degree to which the index ad-
justs for the changing quality of the underlying housing stock, results in apparently
higher house price increases, as Gatzlaff and Ling (1994) and Eichholtz et al. (2020a)
show.
The issues discussed above result in relatively low correlations between the capital
gains in our new house price index for Amsterdam and those in Ambrose et al. (2013)
and Knoll et al. (2017): we find levels of 0.31 and 0.40, respectively. Because the volatil-
ity of capital gains is much higher than that of yields (Table 4.2), these differences in
index quality will also be the main cause of the low correlation in total returns between
our series and Jordà et al. (2019a).
We do not think these issues are unique to these series for Paris and Amsterdam
but apply to historical series of house prices and rent prices more generally. Given lim-
itations in data availability, long-term series of house prices and rents still frequently
build on relatively thin databases, and often splice together indices constructed with
different methods, from different localities, and based on different housing quality
segments. For example, for rent prices in the United Kingdom, Chambers et al. (2020)
suggest the estimates of Jordà et al. (2019a) diverge from those in their paper and in
Eichholtz et al. (2020b) due to inappropriate index splicing and insufficient control for
quality changes in the underlying housing stock. For house prices in the United States,
Fishback and Kollmann (2014) provide an extensive comparison with the well-known
index of Shiller (2005) for the years between 1920 and 1940, when the Shiller index re-
lies on self-reported repeat-house values rather than actual transaction prices. They
show that the resulting index substantially underestimates the magnitude of the boom
and the bust in this period relative to several alternative measures they develop.
Yields
Figure 4.6 plots the development in net rental yields at the portfolio level for both Paris
and Amsterdam relative to the yields in Jordà et al. (2019a). Comparing our net yields
to those of Jordà et al. (2019a) for the periods when both samples overlap, we find that
our annual net yields are about one percent lower. Correlations between our net yields
and those of Jordà et al. (2019a) are only 0.11 for Paris and -0.08 for Amsterdam.
The low correlations with Jordà et al. (2019a) are partly caused by the fact that we
adjust for taxes and vacancies, while they do not. However, when we look at corre-
lations between the gross yields (not reported in the table) we observe that they are
slightly higher but still low: 0.22 for Paris and 0.21 for Amsterdam.21
These low correlations show it is difficult if not impossible to accurately derive the
evolution of rental yields over time from series of house prices and rents that relate to
different sets of dwellings. The French yield series in Jordà et al. (2019a) are primar-
ily based on quality-controlled series of Parisian prices and rents but originate from
different sources and housing market segments, and use different methodologies. For
their Dutch yield estimates, Jordà et al. (2019a) combine quality-controlled series of
21For Paris we also find very low correlations with the Jordà et al. (2019a) yields using alternative mea-
sures of yields, with a value of 0.02 when we use the gross yield series based on Le Figaro data.
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Figure 4.6: Net Yields, Paris and Amsterdam
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Notes: Net yield estimates for both cities are compared to the implied yield underlying the Jordà et al.
(2019a) total return calculation. While the yield series from Le Figaro correlates closely with the estimates
from the Sommier, the yield series from Jordà et al. (2019a) show a very different evolution, in particular
for Amsterdam.
Amsterdam house prices with national rent price series that do not control for quality.
Brounen et al. (2014) use similar data sources and are therefore prone to the same er-
ror. These considerations also hold for papers that combine more recent house price
and rent data, such as Eisfeldt and Demers (2018) and Giglio et al. (2018).
Total Returns
Relative to Jordà et al. (2019a), we estimate lower total returns: The difference in an-
nual geometric returns is 1.4% for Paris, and 2.2% for Amsterdam. For both cities,
about 60% of the total real return difference between our returns and those of Jordà
et al. (2019a) is caused by lower capital gains, and the remaining 40% can be attributed
to lower yields. While the volatility estimates for Amsterdam are comparable to Jordà
et al. (2019a), we find higher estimates of volatility for Paris. For the periods where our
samples overlap, we find substantially lower Sharpe ratios. For Paris, we find a Sharpe
ratio of 0.31 instead of their 0.54, and 0.34 instead of 0.55 for Amsterdam (Sharpe ratios
not reported in the table).22
We find low correlation coefficients in annual log returns between our total return
series and those of Jordà et al. (2019a), even as both series attempt to track the same
asset base. For Paris and Amsterdam, the correlations are 0.30 and 0.39, respectively.
In the previous subsections, we have already provided a number of reasons why
the series used in Jordà et al. (2019a) result in distorted estimates of capital gains and
22Using bill rates instead of bond yields whenever they are available, our Paris Sharpe ratio is 0.42
against 0.69 in Jordà et al. (2019a), and for Amsterdam, these numbers are 0.44 and 0.64, respectively
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yields over the short term, and we will point at some limitations in our own series in
the robustness section. Some of these distortions, such as the use of smoothing in the
underlying capital gains series in Jordà et al. (2019a), will reduce correlations in short-
term return estimates, but vanish in importance at longer horizons. We thus might
expect higher correlations when computing returns at longer horizons.
To better understand how total returns developed and correlated over medium-
term horizons, Table 4.4 shows the level of average total log yields and returns for dif-
ferent horizons of up to 10 years, both in nominal and in real terms.
Table 4.4: Longer Horizons
Index Length New Index Jorda et al. Corr.
Mean SD Mean SD
Paris, 1871–1943
Log Yields 1 4.3% 0.6% 4.9% 0.7% 0.11
Log Yields 3 12.9% 1.6% 14.7% 2.1% 0.17
Log Yields 5 21.5% 2.4% 24.4% 3.3% 0.20
Log Yields 10 42.4% 4.0% 48.1% 5.7% 0.16
Nominal Log Returns 1 6.7% 9.3% 7.9% 7.5% 0.30
Nominal Log Returns 3 20.3% 17.4% 22.8% 14.5% 0.59
Nominal Log Returns 5 33.4% 22.5% 37.5% 17.5% 0.81
Nominal Log Returns 10 65.4% 28.2% 74.1% 22.5% 0.88
Real Log Returns 1 2.8% 11.4% 4.0% 9.4% 0.55
Real Log Returns 3 9.2% 21.8% 11.7% 22.2% 0.78
Real Log Returns 5 15.6% 29.6% 19.8% 31.9% 0.91
Real Log Returns 10 32.2% 41.1% 41.0% 44.7% 0.95
Amsterdam, 1900–1979
Log Yields 1 5.4% 1.2% 6.3% 2.1% -0.08
Log Yields 3 16.2% 3.4% 19.1% 6.1% -0.12
Log Yields 5 27.0% 5.5% 32.2% 9.7% -0.16
Log Yields 10 53.6% 9.7% 65.6% 17.4% -0.22
Nominal Log Returns 1 8.0% 10.4% 10.2% 10.7% 0.39
Nominal Log Returns 3 23.4% 19.6% 31.1% 24.3% 0.65
Nominal Log Returns 5 38.8% 27.1% 51.1% 33.1% 0.75
Nominal Log Returns 10 75.3% 37.8% 101.8% 51.3% 0.78
Real Log Returns 1 4.8% 10.4% 7.1% 9.2% 0.31
Real Log Returns 3 14.3% 17.9% 21.8% 18.4% 0.46
Real Log Returns 5 23.3% 23.9% 35.8% 21.7% 0.52
Real Log Returns 10 44.9% 33.9% 71.4% 30.3% 0.49
Notes: This table reports average total geometric returns across different horizons, comparing estimates
in Jordà et al. (2019a) to our new estimates. We compute these by summing log returns over the respective
horizons. Note that the sample periods used to compute annual and longer-term horizons do not fully
overlap, because we need more prior return observations to compute returns over longer horizons.
For both Paris and Amsterdam, we find that the low correlations between the yields
in our series and those in Jordà et al. (2019a) persist when we compute them based on
summed log yields across increasing medium-term horizons. This is concerning for
housing return estimates based on implied yields, since in the long run most of the
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real return to housing originates from yields rather than capital gains.
However, over medium-term horizons, the dominant component that is driving
total return volatility is still the volatility of capital gains. Comparing the volatility of
total yields in Table 4.4 to those of total returns shows that yield volatility remains
minor relative to total return volatility at all horizons. This is particularly so for Paris.
We find stronger correlations in nominal and real returns at longer horizons, par-
ticularly for Paris. This is consistent with the underlying data. For 93% of the overlap-
ping sample period, the French capital gains data in Jordà et al. (2019a) is based on a
representative but smaller set of Parisian repeat-sales. Given the limited importance
of yields in driving total return volatility, the French total return estimates in their pa-
per should correlate highly with our series over longer horizons, when the applied
smoothing techniques only have a limited impact on total returns.
For Amsterdam, the increase in correlation for lengthening time horizons is much
less pronounced, particularly in real terms. First, yield volatility in Amsterdam is much
higher compared to Paris, and therefore also contributes significantly to total return
estimates over longer horizons. This should decrease correlations with Jordà et al.
(2019a), since implied yield series do not correlate with actual yield series, also over
longer horizons. Second, the capital gains series in Jordà et al. (2019a) switch to a
national house price index that does not adjust for quality from 1970 onward, which
diverges substantially from the capital gains based on our quality-adjusted series for
Amsterdam. Finally, most of the increase in correlation in nominal terms appears to
be driven by high inflation rates that are reflected in both series, since the increase in
correlation between 3- and 10-year horizons is negligible in real terms.
Because small errors in rent or price series can lead to persistent under- or over-
estimation of yields, we find that implied return and yield series have low correlations
with more accurately constructed return series, both in the short and the long term.
So only when the underlying series very precisely track the evolution of rents and sale
prices and cover the same location and housing market segments, can return esti-
mates from implied returns be informative about the evolution of longer-term returns.
Unfortunately, long-term series having such properties are exceedingly rare.
Comparison with Equities
One important finding in Jordà et al. (2019a) is that rental housing earns substantially
higher risk-adjusted returns as compared to equities. Across all countries they study,
they find geometric returns to housing to be on average 2% higher than returns on
equities, but with only half the volatility. In a follow-up paper, Jordà et al. (2019b)
specifically point to a housing risk premium puzzle.
To make the comparison with equities for Paris rental housing investments, we can
employ two high-quality historic series on French equity returns. For the period be-
tween 1809 and 1854, we use the index constructed by Arbulu (1998), and for the years
from 1854 to 1943, we use the blue-chip stock market index created by Le Bris and
Hautcoeur (2010). Both compute total returns weighted by market capitalization.23
23The index of Le Bris and Hautcoeur (2010) is an improvement over Arbulu (1998), since the Arbulu
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Over the full sample period, the log returns on French stock investments equal 6.5%
per year, which is similar to the 6.3% we find on housing. Given the larger volatility of
stock returns of 12.8%, Sharpe ratios on housing (0.25) are still higher than those for
equities (0.17). We find similar differences when we restrict our sample to the 1870–
1943 period, when Jordà et al. (2019a) use the index of Le Bris and Hautcoeur (2010),
with a Sharpe ratio for housing of 0.31 relative to 0.19 for equities.
For the Netherlands, Jordà et al. (2019a) use the series of Eichholtz et al. (2000)
to estimate stock returns, with an average return of 6.3% and a volatility of 18.8% be-
tween 1900–1979. Using bond yields, this results in a low Sharpe ratio of 0.10 relative
to our estimates for Amsterdam rental housing of about 0.34. We should note that the
Dutch equity returns and Sharpe ratios - based on the data of Eichholtz et al. (2000) -
are low compared to those in other countries in this period (Jordà et al., 2019a). Given
data limitations, Eichholtz et al. (2000) estimate dividend yields in the first half of the
sample rather than actually measuring them. There is some evidence that this under-
estimates equity returns. For the 1901–1928 period, Derks (1933) reports total returns
to investments in companies with the largest market capitalizations across industries,
including all dividends, approximately equally-weighting sampled stocks, and includ-
ing firms that eventually went bankrupt. The average log total return for these stocks
in 1901–1928 is 6.4% relative to 4.3% in the data in Eichholtz et al. (2000). This is similar
to the return on housing for this period.
Although our improved estimates close about two-thirds of the gap in Sharpe ra-
tios between housing and equities that Jordà et al. (2019a) report for Paris, and about
half of the gap in Amsterdam, our findings still point to higher risk-adjusted returns for
housing relative to equities.24 Beyond potential limitations in data, we also see more
fundamental explanations for this finding.
First, there were substantial transfer taxes on Parisian housing during the period
that we study, while such taxes were absent or negligible for stocks. The transfer tax
rate in Paris varied between 4% and 15% during our sample period, averaging 6.8%.25
If we would compute yields on the basis of property prices plus transfer taxes (so
assuming an infinite holding period), property returns would fall by about 0.25% per-
cent per year, reducing the Sharpe ratio on Paris rental housing to 0.21. This is a lower
bound on the impact of transaction taxes on returns. If we compute taxes based on the
median holding period in our repeat-sales sample of 9.57 years, total returns would
fall by 0.7% per year. For our Parisian sample, this would bring the Sharpe ratio on
(1998) index weights returns by the market capitalization of each industry, but averages returns across
firms within an industry, which overestimates returns at the end of the sample period. Le Bris and Haut-
coeur (2010) instead uses weights at the firm level to compute total returns. Before 1854, the bias in
Arbulu (1998) is likely negligible given the low number of stocks per industry. Between 1854 and 1890,
returns on both indices are very similar.
24Note that Jordà et al. (2019a) use arithmetic returns to compute Sharpe ratios, whereas we report here
on geometric average returns. Using arithmetic average returns reduces the relative gap in Sharpe ratios,
given the higher volatility of equity returns relative to housing returns.
25From the Revolution to 1816 it was 4%, after which it rose to 5.5%, and remained unchanged until
1905, when it was raised to 7%, then to 10% in 1920 before rising to 15% in 1926. It fell to 12% in 1929
before rising again to 13.5% around 1935.
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housing down to 0.17, equal to the Sharpe ratio on equities.
For Amsterdam, transaction taxes were lower, amounting to 2.5% before 1970 and
6% after that. As a result, computing yields on the basis of sales prices plus transaction
taxes reduces yields only by 0.15%. Assuming median holding periods similar to Paris,
total returns would fall by 0.3% per year. This would reduce Sharpe ratios by a small
amount to 0.32.
A second key reason for this gap is that diversification is more costly for real estate
than for equities, and for nearly all investors it is impossible to own more than just a
few properties. As we noted when estimating capital gains, estimated return volatil-
ities increase once we base them on smaller samples, so reducing Sharpe ratios. We
will analyze the role of idiosyncratic risk in the next section, but we will first discuss the
limitations of our own index estimations, and do some analyses of their robustness.
4.4.2 Robustness
Although our indices offer a substantial improvement over existing ones, both due to
the much larger sample and the application of a consistent methodology, some limi-
tations apply to our series of capital gains and yields. We discuss these in this section
and perform robustness checks.
Capital Gains
The repeat-sales methodology alleviates most concerns regarding unobserved qual-
ity differences when estimating the capital gains component of our index, but that
still leaves a few measurement issues. First, we cannot observe changes in the quality
of a given property over time. Since our estimation method tracks the same parcels,
most of which still exist today, quality improvements are likely a more significant con-
cern than unobserved depreciation, given the improvements in housing quality in the
19th and 20th centuries. To gauge the magnitude of this, we turn to our Parisian tax
sample, which covers a small subset of streets in Paris. The first register of the Som-
mier (most data from before 1860) reports on the evolution of cadastral values on a
property over time. On paper, cadastral values would only change in case of signif-
icant quality changes to the property, implying we can use the change in cadastral
values between the 1810s and the 1850s to estimate the value of unobserved quality
improvements and the corresponding bias. We should note that the cadastral values
were highly debated, so political elements might have also played a role in their de-
termination (Bourillon, 2008). Additional information comes from the tax register for
Sainte-Avoye. For the period between 1855 and 1926 it reports the number of win-
dows on a property over time. Significant renovations or upgrades of properties often
resulted in changes in the number of windows, and we use the annual growth rate of
the number of windows on a property as an estimate for quality improvement. Adjust-
ing for outliers, as we also did in our own capital gains estimates, both samples point
to an unobserved quality improvement of about 0.4% per year. We should note that
between World War I and 1943 this number is likely smaller or even negative: due to
4.4. DISCUSSION 111
strict rent controls maintenance expenses fell and older properties started depreciat-
ing (Ellickson and Le Bris, 2019; Duon, 1946).
Second, because we do not observe the universe of transactions in a city, but rely
on sampling, our series possibly still overestimate the volatility in aggregate capital
gains. To estimate the elasticity of volatility with respect to the number of index pairs
for our samples, we make 1000 random draws of 99% of our sample of repeat-sales
pairs, and estimate the volatility of the resulting index. For Amsterdam, we find that
a 1% decrease in the number of observations increases index volatility by 0.11% (or
0.011 percentage point). For Paris, we find a larger elasticity of 0.26% (or 0.023 percent-
age point). Increasing the sample size will gradually reduce this elasticity. Combining
the first two points, our estimates thus likely slightly overestimate both the level and
volatility of capital gains.
A third possible concern relating to the capital component of the total return is
that our Amsterdam index not only relies on transaction prices but also on appraisals.
If these appraisals deviate from actual transaction prices in systematic ways, our re-
sults will be biased. In Figure 4.5b, we also display the house price index based on
transaction prices only, and we find a very comparable evolution over time. Table 4.5
Panel B reports summary statistics of both indices. We find a very comparable capital
gain (2.6% relative to 2.8%), but larger volatility (10.4% relative to 11.9%). The increase
in volatility is primarily driven by the 54% decrease in the number of observation pairs
in the transaction-only index. To illustrate this, we re-estimated the index 1000 times
by drawing random 46% samples from our set of repeat-sales pairs that include ap-
praisals. This results in a 1.4% average higher estimated volatility, which is very similar
to the increase in volatility when moving to observations from transaction prices only.
Yield Estimates
Several robustness checks assess the degree to which our gross yield series are prone
to estimation errors. We report the results of these checks also in Table 4.5.
For both cities, we first compare the average gross yields to annual median yields,
which are less sensitive to outliers in the data. We find that these median gross yield
levels are similar to the average yields for Paris, where we are most concerned about
noise and outliers, and slightly higher for Amsterdam. In Amsterdam, this difference
results from the fact that larger and more expensive properties have lower yields, which
is not taken into account when looking at median yields.
For Amsterdam, all sales and rent price data are matched in the same year, but
some sales observations originate from appraisals. To assess whether our inclusion of
appraisal data for Amsterdam results in biased estimates of gross yields we compare
gross yields based on auction prices only (11,658 gross yields) to our baseline series
that include data from appraisals (24,058 gross yields). We find that the two series
result in nearly identical yields and have a correlation very close to one.
For Paris, our gross yields estimates are based on rent observations that are typ-
ically not from the same year as the price observation to which we match it. We do
adjust the rent observations for changes in the market rent between the year of the
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Table 4.5: Robustness of the Return Estimates
Index Period Geometric Arithmetic Corr.
Mean SD Mean SD
Paris
Panel A: Gross Yields
All observations 1809–1943 6.9% 1.1% 7.1% 1.2%
All observations, rent within 10y 1809–1943 6.8% 1.1% 7.0% 1.2% 0.92
Median Yield 1809–1943 6.9% 0.9% 7.1% 1.0% 0.91
All observations 1809–1854 6.1% 0.7% 6.3% 0.7%
Rent contracts only 1809–1854 6.3% 0.9% 6.5% 0.9% 0.77
All observations 1872–1940 7.4% 1.1% 7.7% 1.2%
Le Figaro 1872–1940 7.3% 1.0% 7.6% 1.1% 0.81
All observations 1883-1884/1932-1939 8.8% 1.3% 9.2% 1.5%
Le Figaro 1883-1884/1932-1939 8.9% 1.5% 9.3% 1.7% 0.81
Realized Auction Yields 1883-1884/1932-1939 9.3% 1.7% 9.8% 1.8% 0.74
Amsterdam
Panel B: Capital Gains
All observations 1900–1979 2.6% 10.4% 3.1% 10.7%
Excluding Appraisals 1900–1979 2.8% 11.9% 3.5% 12.8% 0.86
Panel C: Gross Yields
All observations 1900–1979 9.9% 2.0% 10.5% 2.3%
Excluding Appraisals 1900–1979 10.1% 2.2% 10.6% 2.5% 0.98
Median Yield 1900–1979 10.5% 2.6% 11.1% 2.9% 0.98
Panel D: Net Yields
All observations 1900–1979 5.4% 1.2% 5.6% 1.3%
Excluding Appraisals 1900–1979 5.5% 1.3% 5.6% 1.3% 0.98
Panel E: Total Returns
All observations 1900–1979 8.0% 10.3% 8.7% 10.6%
Excluding Appraisals 1900–1979 8.2% 11.9% 9.2% 12.7% 0.86
Notes: This table compares, for both Amsterdam and Paris, and for various subperiods the baseline esti-
mates on capital gains and portfolio yields in the main body of the paper to alternative specifications and
data. We also report correlations with our baseline estimates. For Amsterdam, we compare estimating
the index with appraisals (benchmark) or without appraisals. For Paris, we compare benchmark yields
to yields from actual rent contracts only, and from asking yields in the newspaper Le Figaro. We also
compute a series of yields that only includes rental observations within 10 years of the sale price. Finally,
we compute for both cities net yields based on a high- and low-cost scenario.
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rent observation and the price observation, but this may still bias our gross yield es-
timates. We test whether our yield estimates are sensitive to changing the maximum
permissible time difference between a rent observation and a transaction price obser-
vation on the same property. If we reduce this difference from 30 years (baseline) to
10 years, estimates do not change significantly.
A potentially more severe concern for the Paris data is that most yields are based
on observations of successions or donations, which are based on self-reported val-
ues of rental leases, only verified ex-post by registrars. After 1918, legal changes also
imply that the link between actual rental prices and succession and donation values
becomes much less clear-cut. To assess whether our estimates deviate in fundamental
ways from actual rents, we first compare our Parisian yield series to gross yields based
on the subset of rent data coming from actual rental contracts, for the period 1809 to
1854. For other periods, there are too few data points on rental contracts to make such
a comparison. We find that these approaches result in identical estimates of yields,
except that the series based on rental contracts seems more noisier due to the lower
number of observations.
To test the validity of the succession and donation data in the final part of the 19th
century and during the 20th century, we construct an alternative series of gross yields
from the ads in Le Figaro. To construct the series, we separate the advertisements
for the 1872–1914 period and the 1917–1940 period, given that ads for regular prop-
erty sales were not common before World War I. Before World War I, when the data
list rental revenues and minimum prices, we estimate gross yields by regressing all in-
dividual log yields on year-fixed effects and a set of five-year dummies that take the
value of one in case the auction ad did not explicitly specify that the rental revenue
was a gross revenue. To arrive at our series of yields, we take the exponentiated co-
efficients on the year fixed effects, subtracting the median log yield difference (-0.33)
between minimum prices and realized prices from the Cote des terrains et immeubles
in 1883–1884. From 1917 onward, we combine data from advertisements of auction
announcements (with minimum prices and rental revenues) with advertisements for
regular sales (with asking prices and gross revenues), and regress log gross yields on
year fixed effects. To control for price differences between minimum bid prices and
asking prices, we add five-year dummies for advertisements that list minimum bid
prices, and again a set of five-year dummies to control for advertisements of minimum
bid prices that do not explicitly specify that the rental revenue was a gross revenue. We
use the exponentiated coefficients on the year-fixed effects to create the final series.
In Table 4.5 we compare our estimates of succession-based gross yields to the
gross yield series from Le Figaro. Figure 4.6 plots the developments in net yields for
both series. The resulting estimates are almost identical and correlate strongly. The
yield series based on Le Figaro advertisements appears somewhat smoother than our
succession-based estimates. This could be caused both by the fact that realized yields
move more quickly than asking yields in newspapers, but also by noise in our esti-
mates of succession-based yields. The latter is likely a more important concern after
1918 when we cannot identify the exact capitalization rate used in the succession data,
and yields are visibly noisier.
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The gross yields used in this alternative estimate still rely on asking yields rather
than realized market yields. To investigate the importance of this, we compare the
yields that are based on succession prices with those from realized yields in auctions
reported in the Cote des terrains et immeubles (1883-1884, 208 observations) and Le
Temps Immobilier (1932-1939, 611 observations). An additional advantage of this data
and the Figaro data is that we observe the rents at the same time as the sale price, and
that the rents are reported by the seller. If there existed any incentive to under-report
rental values in the successions data, then sellers had an incentive to over-report when
advertising their properties. We find the realized yields only result in slightly higher
average yields compared to the data in Le Figaro and the data from the Sommier. Al-
though the number of observations is low, the realized yields also correlate closely
with succession-based yields (correlation = 0.74) and with asking yields from Le Fi-
garo (correlation = 0.92).
In summary, there is no evidence that our baseline estimates of gross yields result
in significantly biased estimates of yields. There is some evidence that our yields con-
tain a bit of short-term noise, particularly after 1918, but this does not significantly
impact our total return estimates, as the volatility of yields is small relative to the cap-
ital gains volatility.
4.4.3 Representativeness
We discuss the representativeness of our total return indices here, focusing first on the
question of whether the 19th and 20th century period we investigate is representative
of present times, and subsequently discussing how our returns compare to those for
other regions and cities.
It would seem intuitive that papers investigating housing returns using more re-
cent data than ours would be more representative of current expected returns than
the historic study we do, but this is not necessarily the case.
More recent studies (Eisfeldt and Demers, 2018; Favilukis et al., 2017) typically
use housing samples starting in the late 1970s or in the 1980s, and interest rates have
mostly been on a downward trajectory since then, likely biasing total housing returns
upward relative to their long-term average. Given the fact that interest rates do not
have room to fall much further, it is unlikely that these favorable conditions for total
housing returns will continue. A longer time frame, in which interest rates have been
stationary, may yield results that are more representative of the future trajectory of
housing returns.
This concern is illustrated by the lack of any real capital gains on housing for both
Paris and Amsterdam in our sample. Finding low long-run capital gains is in line with
the broader estimates in Jordà et al. (2019a) and Chambers et al. (2020), while Eisfeldt
and Demers (2018) find that capital gains and net rental yields contribute evenly to
the total return. However, this seems to result from the specific period they study, and
the fact they exclusively focus on nominal returns. In nominal terms, capital gains
contribute about a third to our total returns.
Another concern regarding the validity of our indices for present times may lie
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in changing housing market institutions. It is important to note that the institutions
of the markets we study were not that different from residential housing investment
markets in present times. Both Paris and Amsterdam were characterized by a mixture
of institutional and private investors, as well as owner-occupiers, much like they are
in present times. These markets have also been very similar in terms of property rights
and the rule of law regarding housing ownership. The registrations behind the Parisian
Sommier foncier continued after World War II, although in a slightly different form.
The Amsterdam auctions that we study continue to be held to this day and are still
frequently used to buy and sell investment properties.
We now turn to the final, more complicated question as to how the returns we
have estimated for Paris and Amsterdam compare to estimates for other regions. If
we contrast our estimates to the numbers Jordà et al. (2019a) report for other coun-
tries, we find that our real return index for Paris ranks lowest among all countries for
which Jordà et al. (2019a) provide return numbers in the 1870–1943 period.26 For all
countries that Jordà et al. (2019a) consistently report on in the 1900–1979 period, 8
countries have higher returns and 3 countries have lower returns than Amsterdam,
with real returns on average 1.1% per year higher in other countries.
Without a proper counterfactual, it is difficult to identify whether these differences
are driven by measurement error or by actual differences in returns across regions.
However, the comparatively low return estimates for Paris and Amsterdam, capital
cities that grew substantially over time, do suggest that measurement errors might
also impact their return series for other countries. For the United Kingdom, Chambers
et al. (2020) also find that the housing returns in Jordà et al. (2019a) are substantially
higher than their estimates.
We should note that our return estimates for Paris and Amsterdam are higher than
the estimates for residential real estate in Chambers et al. (2020). They report a real
total return of 2.3% for residential real estate and a return of 5.4% for agricultural real
estate. We again want to highlight that it is difficult to establish exactly what is driv-
ing these differences. Beyond studying a different country with a slightly different
methodology, their data do not consistently come from the same regions, and com-
bine rural and urban data.
In that regard, a more representative comparison might be to look at a consistent
urban sample. Although precise return numbers are not available for other cities, im-
plied discount rates of urban housing cash flows could be informative of long-term
housing returns. Bracke et al. (2018) use leasehold data to measure housing discount
rates in London for different horizons. They find discount rates of housing cash flows
in the short-term in the range of 5–6%. For medium to long horizons of 10 to 75 years,
discount rates hover around 4–5%, similar to the real return and net yields we docu-
ment in this study. For very long horizons of over 100 years Bracke et al. (2018) find
lower discount rates of 2–3%. This number is in line with Giglio et al. (2015), who esti-
mate very long-run discount rates based on modern leasehold and freehold data from
26Their sample only includes four countries in 1870, increasing to 11 countries by 1900. Average returns
in all these 11 countries are higher in the 1870–1943 period than our estimates for Paris. Nearly all of this
data is for urban areas.
116 CHAPTER 4. THE TOTAL RETURN AND RISK TO REAL ESTATE
London and Singapore.
4.5 Idiosyncratic Risks
The indivisibility of assets, high transaction costs, and the capital intensity of real es-
tate investments hamper the construction of well-diversified direct property portfo-
lios.27For markets in which investors cannot fully diversify, theoretical studies (for in-
stance Levy, 1978; Merton, 1987) and empirical evidence (e.g. Fu, 2009; Eiling et al.,
2019) suggest a link between idiosyncratic risk and expected returns in the cross-section.
How relevant is idiosyncratic risk at the property level? Giacoletti (2019) shows that
idiosyncratic risk accounts for the majority of housing risk in California and that the
idiosyncratic variance is constant across holding periods. Sagi (2020) models the price
process for US commercial real estate and also finds a dominant role of idiosyncratic
risk. Due to data limitations, these and other papers (e.g. Peng and Thibodeau, 2017;
Eisfeldt and Demers, 2018) ignore the contribution of income to total return and risk
and concentrate on the capital return only.28 The novelty of our study is to investigate
asset-level systematic and idiosyncratic risk based on total gross returns for different
investment horizons of up to 20 years and to highlight the role of yield risk in total
return risk. Also, we broaden the geographic and temporal scope of this discourse by
using European data and by covering large parts of the 19th and 20th centuries.
Ignoring costs, the total gross log return r for a portfolio of properties of any size i
with the holding period n going from year t = 0 to year t = n is defined as follows, with
yi ,t denoting log (Y i eld +1) at time t , and gi ,tn the log capital gain until period tn :29
ri ,tn =
n−1∑
j=0
yi ,t= j + gi ,tn (4.4)
Correspondingly, the variance of any individual gross property return can be written
as follows:
V ar (ri ,tn ) =
n−1∑
j=0
V ar (yi ,t= j )+2×
∑
0≤ j<k≤n−1
Cov(yi ,t= j , yi ,t=k )
+2×
n−1∑
j=0
Cov(yi ,t= j , gi ,tn )+V ar (gi ,tn )
(4.5)
Equation 4.5 shows that the variance of a gross housing return is a function of the
variance of the yield and the capital gain, as well as the covariance in yields over time,
27In 1832, half of Amsterdam’s property investors owned one building only. About 90 percent of in-
vestors owned fewer than five properties (Fryske Akademy, 2018).
28For commercial real estate, Peng (2016) combines capital returns and Net Operating Income (NOI)
figures to arrive at asset-level total return estimates but does not analyze idiosyncratic risk.
29Note that we assume that properties transact at the start of each year, and that annual rents are paid
directly afterward, so that yields are earned from t = 0 until t = n −1.
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and the covariance of the yield with the capital gain. In the remainder of this section,
we aim to assess each of these quantities both at the property level as well as across
space, with a focus on the first three terms of equation 4.5. This analysis will mostly
focus on Amsterdam, since the Amsterdam sample contains precise repeated data on
yields and capital gains at the property level, with yields and capital gains observed at
the same time. Because we do not have dwelling-level observations on costs, we only
look at gross returns. We both look at the variance of total property-level risk and the
variance of property-level idiosyncratic risk. We obtain the latter by deflating yields
and capital gains with their average market values.
4.5.1 The Dispersion of Yields
Starting with the first term of Equation 4.5, we look at dispersion in yields across dif-
ferent properties. For Paris and Amsterdam, the standard deviations of all log gross
property yields are 4.2% and 4.8%, respectively. Only a minor part of these variations
in yields is due to changes in aggregate housing yields: the volatility of residual yields
after controlling for changes in market yields is 4.0% for Paris and 4.1% for Amsterdam.
Still, city-wide yield estimates might not capture all systematic variation in local
yields and total returns. For instance, Giacoletti (2019) studies idiosyncratic capital
gains risk at the zip-code level and finds pronounced differences across low- and high-
income areas. While the historic cores of Paris and Amsterdam are very compact and
at least one order of magnitude smaller than today’s cities, yields and returns might
differ even at more granular geographic levels.
Figure 4.7 displays the spatial dispersion of gross yields at different periods for
neighborhoods in both cities. In both cities, we find higher yields in poor areas, in line
with evidence for modern cities from smaller databases (Bracke, 2015; Desmond and
Wilmers, 2019).
Investigating the degree of spatial structure in yields more formally, we estimate
Moran’s I statistics (Moran, 1950) to tests for correlations in yields among nearby houses.
For Amsterdam, gross yields in excess of the market without neighborhood controls
are found to be strongly correlated.30 and the null hypothesis of yields being ran-
domly distributed across Amsterdam can be rejected firmly (p-value: < 0.001). This
implies that local factors introduce non-random deviations from the city-wide trends
for Amsterdam and that investors cannot expect, on average, the same level of yields
across the city.
When calculating excess returns at the neighborhood level, the Moran’s I test statis-
tics cease to be significant (p-value: 0.29). This implies that the time-invariant neigh-
borhood fixed effects capture most of the spatial heterogeneity in yields and more de-
tailed demarcation of sub-markets or more granular neighborhood-level indices will
not improve the empirical fit.
For Paris, the Moran’s I statistic is positive but not statistically different from 0 (p-
value: 0.20) even before accounting for neighborhood differences. When calculating
30We find Moran’s I, which measures spatial autocorrelation, to be 0.010, with an expectation of -
0.00006 and a variance of 0.0000016.
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Figure 4.7: Median Excess Gross Yields, per Neighborhood
(a) Yields, Amsterdam, 1919–39 (b) Yields, Amsterdam, 1950–70
(c) Yields, Paris, 1820–40 (d) Yields, Paris, 1870–1900
Notes:
Excess yields are calculated as the difference of property-level gross yields and city-wide median of yields
for a given year. Excess yields are not homogeneously distributed in space as clusters of low yields are
found next to high yield areas. For Amsterdam, the deviations from the city-wide averages are large to
begin with, getting more pronounced in time but tend to keep the relative ranking: The upmarket canal
belt and museum areas, for instance, persistently deliver the lowest yields right next to the high-yield,
working class Jordaan. Differences in yields are only partially offset by higher subsequent capital gains.
Correlation of asset-level yields at time of purchase and the subsequent capital gains are estimated to
be only 0.22 for Amsterdam. In Paris, yields are more densely distributed in space but again mostly
persistent in time: Only the northwest experienced a distinct yield shift.
Boundaries are based on Vasserot arrondissementsa for Paris and contemporary neighborhoods for Am-
sterdam.
ahttps://maps.princeton.edu/catalog/stanford-cj936rq6257
systematic risk, we, therefore, assume persistent differences in yield levels but similar
time trends across neighborhoods.
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4.5.2 The Covariance of Yields and Capital Gains
We now present some stylized facts regarding the second and third terms of Equation
4.5, the covariance of yields over time, and the covariance of yields with capital gains.
To do so, we use a subset of 5,852 transaction pairs from Amsterdam where we observe
both the yield at purchase, the yield at the time of sale, and the capital gain.
Aggregating across all holding periods, we find that gross yields at purchase have a
low but statistically significant correlation of 0.13 with subsequent capital gains, while
gross yields at sale have a negative correlation of -0.21 with realized capital gains. If
we compute these correlations on the basis of residual yields, controlling both for yield
differences across neighborhoods and market yields, we find stronger correlations of
0.20 and -0.46 respectively. Thus, investors purchasing a high-yield or selling a low-
yield property typically realize higher capital gains, irrespective of the holding period.
This result is partially mechanical when transaction prices are distributed around
fundamental asset values. However, the positive correlations between initial yields
and subsequent capital gains are not strong enough to flatten out spatial differences
in yields that persist in time: Figure 4.7 illustrates the persistence of yield differences
at the neighborhood level.31
The question is to what extent this yield persistence also applies to individual
properties, which brings us to the second term in Equation 4.5, the covariance in yields
over time. If yields are very persistent over time, the yield at purchase will have a last-
ing consequence on returns over the entire holding period.
Figure 4.8 plots the correlation in yields across holding periods of up to 20 years,
based on the same set of repeated yields. Because we aggregate data by holding pe-
riod, we only have a limited number of observations for each point in the plots, start-
ing at 587 repeated yields for one-year holding periods and dropping to below 100
repeated yields for holding periods longer than 15 years. This implies that the indi-
vidual data points are relatively noisy, particularly when considering that data points
within a given holding period can come from the entire 1900–1979 period. Second,
we also report the residual correlation after controlling for market and neighborhood
yields, by subtracting the median yield per year and neighborhood across the sample
at the time of each transaction from the property-level yields.
Importantly, the correlation across yields over time is substantial, and only grad-
ually decays over time. Thus, properties with higher or lower gross yields will con-
tinue to earn above- or below-market gross yields for decades after purchase. Since
the variation in median gross yields over time is small relative to the total variation
in yields, we do not find large differences in this pattern when controlling for market
prices. However, given persistent differences in yields across neighborhoods, we find
a stronger decrease in correlations across holding periods after controlling for neigh-
borhood differences.
31At the market level, Ambrose et al. (2013) show that while rents and prices are cointegrated, it often
takes decades for deviations from long-run rent-price ratios to correct. Price adjustments account for
most of the eventual reversion to the mean, which is in line with the positive correlations between yields
and capital gains found in this study.
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Figure 4.8: Correlation Repeated Yields
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Notes: Based on 4,371 pairs of repeat sales in Amsterdam with holding periods of 20 years or less, the cor-
relation of yields at purchase and sale is estimated for various holding periods (in years). In general, both
yields are positively correlated. The effect fades away for longer holding periods. The residual correla-
tions are estimated after subtracting the median yield for the entire market at the time of each transaction
from the respective yields. Correlations of neighborhood-level yield residuals fall more quickly in time
than correlations for market-wide residuals.
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4.5.3 Total Return Risk and its Components
We now proceed to estimate the contribution of each component of Equation 4.5 to
the variance of total returns to housing investments for different holding periods. We
can compute these numbers both based on total returns and on residuals returns, the
latter adjusted for average neighborhood yields and changes in market prices. To esti-
mate these, we pool all 5,582 transaction pairs by holding period and estimate each of
the individual variance terms.
We can estimate the variance of yields and capital gains for each holding period
directly, but we need to make two assumptions to estimate the covariance terms, since
these contain terms that we do not observe in our data. First, we assume that the
covariance in yields on a property during a holding period is independent of the length
of that holding period, so that we can use the observed covariance between the yield at
purchase and the yield at sale to estimate covariances in yields during holding periods.
Formally, this implies that for all observations where k− j = m−l , Cov(yi ,t= j , yi ,t=k ) =
Cov(yi ,t=l , yi ,t=m).
Second, we assume that the covariance between yields during the holding pe-
riod and the total capital gain is a weighted average of the covariance between the
yield at purchase and the capital gain, and the covariance of the yield at sale and
the capital gain. This implies that the third term of equation 4.5 can be rewritten as:
2×∑n−1j=0 Cov(yi ,t= j , gi ,tn ) = n×Cov(yi ,t=0, gi ,tn )+n×Cov(yi ,t=n , gi ,tn ). The main draw-
back of this assumption is that it magnifies any noise in our estimated covariances be-
tween yields and capital gains by a factor n. We noted already that we have relatively
few repeated-transactions per holding period, implying that we cannot estimate the
covariance between yields and capital gains very precisely for each holding period.
This noise increases for longer holding periods when the number of observations per
holding period drops.
Figure 4.9 plots for each holding period between 1 and 20 years the estimated vari-
ance of the total return and its components. Figure 4.9a differentiates between id-
iosyncratic and systematic risk, Figure 4.9b shows the composition of total property-
level risk.
A clear pattern emerges. For investments with short holding periods, nearly all risk
is idiosyncratic and unsystematic risk hardly seems to play a role. But the importance
of idiosyncratic risk gradually reduces once we consider longer holding periods.
Importantly, the contribution of each component of total return volatility, depicted
in figure 4.9b, changes over time. Unsurprisingly, most variance in the short term
comes from capital gains risk, because the variance of yields is small relative to the
variance of capital gains. However, the importance of capital gains variance decays
over time, and yield covariance becomes an increasingly important component of to-
tal return risk.32 Because the correlation between yields and capital gains is positive
for the yield at purchase, but negative for the yield at sale, we do not find large aggre-
gate impacts of the covariance between yields and capital gains. Because the negative
32This pattern also persists when looking at residual yields, adjusting for neighborhood yields and mar-
ket price changes, which we plot in Appendix D Figure 4.14.
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Figure 4.9: Decomposition of Total Risk
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Notes: This plot compares total systematic and idiosyncratic risk based on their variances, and the com-
ponents of total property-level risk. Residual variance is calculated in excess of city-wide yield and price
trends. Most variance in the short term can be attributed to capital gains risk because the variance of
yields is small relative to the variance of capital gains. However, the importance of capital gains variance
decays over time.
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correlation outweighs the positive correlation, this covariance is negative on average
but moves over time due to estimation noise.
4.5.4 Implications
Taken together, these results have two important implications for our understand-
ing of the risk and return of individual properties. First, nearly all short-term invest-
ment risk at the property level is idiosyncratic, but the fraction of idiosyncratic risk
decreases with the holding period, as changes in market-wide trends of capital gains
and yields become more important in the long term. For the average holding period
of 10 years, we find volatility of market returns of 32%, and volatility of total returns of
50%, which includes idiosyncratic risk.33 This implies that for 10-year holding periods
Sharpe ratios would drop by about one third when including idiosyncratic risk.
If idiosyncratic risk followed a random walk – an assumption soundly rejected by
Sagi (2020) and Giacoletti (2019) for the idiosyncratic risk of capital gains – the idiosyn-
cratic variance of total returns would scale exactly by the holding period (and volatility
by the square root). Our series suggests that the assumption of a random walk should
also be rejected for the idiosyncratic risk of total gross returns, although we still doc-
ument stronger increases in total idiosyncratic risk than Giacoletti (2019), who only
looks at capital gains. For example, the five-year idiosyncratic variance is about 0.1
(volatility of around 30%), whilst this increases to about 0.25 for twenty-year periods
(volatility around 50%). As a result, the inclusion of idiosyncratic risks has a larger rela-
tive impact on total return risk for short holding periods than for long holding periods.
Second, and most importantly, we document that persistence in property-level
yields is a crucial risk component for investors, especially in the long run. The increas-
ing importance of yield covariance in total idiosyncratic risk for longer holding peri-
ods partially offsets the fact that idiosyncratic capital gains risk barely increases in the
holding period (Giacoletti, 2019). This implies that for a long-term investor the initial
yield is a much more important source of risk than for a short-term investor, who pri-
marily bets on capital gains. Basically, rents are sticky and will not quickly revert back
to their economic fundamentals in case of deviations at purchase. A small part of this
persistence can be explained by differences in yields across neighborhoods. Another
factor that could be causing these yield differences are structural differences in non-
tax costs across properties. However, representative long-term data on these costs
are difficult to obtain. With short-term data from Milwaukee, Desmond and Wilmers
(2019) shows that gross yields are higher in poor areas and that less expensive rental
units face higher costs, in line with our evidence for Amsterdam. However, they find
that landlords still earn higher net rental returns in poor areas.
Our main results do not change substantially when excluding appraisals from the
sample, or when splitting the sample in the pre- and post-World War II period. If
many more observations were available, one could estimate capital gains indices at
33Note that the number of 32% differs slightly from the 37.8% reported in Table 4.4. This is because the
figure of 37.8% is based on all data covering the entire 1900-1979 period, whereas the 32% is only based
on the small set of repeated observations with a 10-year holding period.
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the neighborhood level and fully separate market-wide risk, neighborhood risk, and
idiosyncratic risk. Some of the variation in capital gains that we still account for as
idiosyncratic risk would then likely be captured by a neighborhood risk factor.
4.6 Conclusion
This paper creates new indices describing the net total returns of rental housing for
extended periods and compares these to returns reported in recent work (i.e. Jordà
et al. (2019a) and Chambers et al. (2020)). We create total return indices for Paris and
Amsterdam, for the periods 1809–1943 and 1900–1979, respectively. These indices are
based on previously unexplored archival data that we hand-collected and digitized
for this study. Our unique contribution lies in the fact that we observe rental yields
and values for the same properties, and that we have enough observations to use a
repeated measures approach to reliably control for changes in asset quality. In all, we
have 44,379 rent and 38,168 price observations for Paris, and 25,834 rent and 35,519
price observations for Amsterdam.
The first main finding is that the geometric average net total return to rental hous-
ing is 6.3% in Paris and 8.0% in Amsterdam. These returns come with considerable
volatility of 8.6% and 10.3%, respectively. We show that using actual rental yields and
capital gains for the same set of properties is essential to obtain reliable estimates of
housing return and risk. Relative to Jordà et al. (2019a), who use secondary series, we
find substantially lower risk-adjusted returns to housing for both cities and a low cor-
relation with their total return series. This confirms the conclusion by Chambers et al.
(2020).
We show that most of the real long-term total return to rental housing stems from
the net yield, and that capital returns are small and even negative in real terms for Am-
sterdam. This is in contrast to Eisfeldt and Demers (2018), who find a more important
role for the capital return.
Besides these findings at the index level, our study also makes important contri-
butions regarding property-level investment performance. Our findings regarding the
geographic dispersion of rental housing performance and the importance of the hold-
ing period show that the yield at purchase is a key determinant of the holding pe-
riod return at the individual asset level. We find that higher-yielding properties sub-
sequently have higher capital gains, irrespective of the holding period, and that high
initial yields are persistent, even over holding periods as long as 20 years.
Regarding the composition of total return risk, we find that the idiosyncratic risk is
the dominant part of total risk in the short term, but that the importance of market risk
increases over the holding period. Moreover, we show that variation in the capital gain
is the dominant factor in total asset risk only in the short term. For holding periods
going up to 20 years, yield covariance becomes as important.
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4.A Identifying and Adjusting Capitalized Rents
To determine whether a Parisian rent observation from succession and donation val-
ues before 1918 is capitalized, we apply a multi-stage procedure. Our intuition is that
if we match succession and donation values to transaction prices and actual rent con-
tracts on the same property, we can infer with near certainty whether an observation
is capitalized. If a rent is capitalized, dividing the rent by sales prices on the same
property should results in yields on average 20 times larger than market yields. Sim-
ilarly, the capitalized rent price should be on average 20 times larger than the actual
rent contracts on the property.
However, because we typically do not observe other sales prices or actual rental
contracts in the same time period as the succession or donation, our estimates will be
biased if we do not correct for changes in market yields and rent prices.
To estimate a rent price index that we can use to deflate succession values, we use
repeated observations of rental contracts, successions, and donations to compute a
repeat-rent index, in a similar way as we construct the house price indices. To deal
with outliers and capitalized rents, we first deflate all observations with the existing
rent index from Eichholtz et al. (2020b), which serves as a prior. We update the index
of Eichholtz et al. (2020b) because our aim is not to track rents on new contracts as
their index, but current rent payments, which permits us to use a much larger set of
observations on successions and donations. To deal with capitalized observations, we
exclude pairs that have an absolute index-corrected log rent difference of more than
1. We estimate the index based on all remaining pairs, using their original prices.
Next, we use the scaled rent index divided by the price index to establish a series
of prior gross yields. Because both our rent indices and price indices are based on rent
prices and sales prices from the same properties, and estimated using exactly the same
index technique, this prior yield index should track actual yields relatively closely. To
benchmark this index, we set its value so that the period between 1883-1884 has an
average yield of 7.1%. For 1883-1884, the data from the Cote des terrains et immeubles
provide information on 208 sales prices and rental revenues of properties in Paris.
For each donation or succession S at time t, we look up all actual rent contracts
(Ri ) and sales prices (Pi ) on that property that happen within 30 years. For any sales
price j on property i taking place at time s, with −30 < t − s < 30, we compute the
deviation of the estimated yield at time t from the prior yield at time t:
εi , j ,t = log (
Si ,t
Pi , j ,s
× HPIt
HPIs
)− l og (Y i eld pr i ort ) (4.6)
For any rental contract j on property i taking place at time s, we compute the
deviation of the index-corrected level of rents at time t with the donation or succession
value S at time t .
ui , j ,t = l og (Si ,t )− l og (Ri , j ,s × RPIt
RPIs
) (4.7)
With n denoting the summed number of matched sales prices and m the number
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of matched actual rent contracts, we compute per succession or donation observation
i at time t a score:
Scor ei ,t =
∑n
j=0 εi , j ,t +
∑m
j=0 ui , j ,t
m +n (4.8)
We exclude observations of successions or donations that cannot be matched to
a rental price or a sales price. The resulting score measures the average deviation of
the succession or donation observation from our prior yield and rent observations.
The resulting distribution of scores should peak at zero for observations that are not
capitalized, and at three (ln 20 ≈ 3) for observations that are capitalized.
To identify the frequency and distribution of capitalized observations, we analyze
the resulting distributions of scores at five-year frequencies. Figure 4.10 plots one ex-
ample for the period of 1834 - 1839. The distribution is clearly bimodal, with peaks
around 3 for capitalized observations and peaks at 0 for non-capitalized observations.
There is also a limited overlap among the distributions.
Figure 4.10: Example Distribution of Scores, Paris, 1835-1839
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Notes: Distribution of scores for succession and donation observations, by comparing these observations
to actual rent contracts on the same properties and on sales prices of the same properties. A score of 0
implies that the succession or donation value matches the actual rent prices and prior yields observed in
the data. Capitalized observations center around 3, non-capitalized observations at 0.
Depending on the fraction of capitalized observations, we adjust the capitalized
rent prices. Before 1830, the large majority of succession and donation prices is capi-
talized. We divide all observations with a score between 1.25 and 4.75 by 20. Succes-
sion and donations with a score between -1 and 1 are not adjusted, observations below
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-1, between 1 and 1.25 and larger than 4.75 are removed. Between 1830 and 1917, most
observations are not capitalized. In this period, we do not adjust observations with a
score between -1.75 and 1.75, and we divide succession or donations with a score be-
tween 2 and 4 by 20. We remove observations with a score below -1.75, larger than 4
or between 1.75 and 2. The removed rent prices are either extreme outliers, or obser-
vations for which there is significant overlap between the distribution of capitalized
rents and non-capitalized rents. We remove these observations to reduce uncertainty
in our measures, but our results are robust to limiting or extending the number of re-
moved observations. In total, we remove 2% of the observations on successions and
donations (801 observations).
We subsequently use the adjusted data on successions and donations together
with the observations on rents to match sales prices to rent prices, following the pro-
cedure outlined in the main text. The resulting distribution of log yields (prior to re-
moving outliers), which we plot in Figure 4.11, is smooth without showing evidence
of a peak at very high yields, confirming that our analysis has effectively adjusted the
capitalized rent observations.
Figure 4.11: Distribution of log Yields, Paris, 1806-1943
log Yield
F
re
qu
en
cy
−5 −4 −3 −2 −1 0
0
50
0
15
00
25
00
Notes: Distribution of Parisian yields, after accounting for various ways of recording values and rents in
the archival records, but before exluding outliers.
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4.B Tax Data and Analysis for Paris
Fluctuations in property-level tax rates impact the return to residential real estate. We
adjust the gross yield by using a direct tax index levied annually on the inhabitants of
Paris. We describe here the nature and the evolution of the taxes that were in effect
until 1940.
The French Revolution defined the fundamental principles of taxation that re-
mained in place until World War I. The best description of this tax system is due to
legal practitioner Lemercier de Jauvelle (1906). Three main taxes directly affected real
estate: a land tax in proportion to a property’s cadastral income (contribution fon-
cière), a personal wealth tax based on the rental value of citizens’ dwellings (contribu-
tion personelle-mobilière), and a tax on doors and windows (contribution des portes et
fenêtres), a proxy for the luxury of dwellings as manifested by the number of openings
to illuminate them. These taxes were annually assessed by the government.34
These three taxes were levied according to the presumed value of dwellings. A
standard deduction was applied taking into account the owner’s costs (25 percent tax
allowance) to calculate the net cadastral income over which the tax was distributed.
The rate for each of these three taxes was set annually and was uniform within a city.
All taxes had to be pre-paid by the owners, but the owner could subsequently charge
the contribution personelle-mobilière directly to the tenants. The income tax intro-
duced in 1914 radically changed these old taxes. Specifically, its adoption led to the
abolition of the tax on doors and windows in 1926. For the post-1914 period, we use
data on taxes from Duon (1943), who reports on all taxes that had to be paid by the
owner of the property. Until the 1950s, the income tax affected less than a quarter of
French tax households (Piketty, 2001).
At the individual asset level, we use the annual amount of taxes imposed on the
net cadastral income for almost 4,500 properties between 1807 and 1926. We then
compare these to the income generated by the assets to assess the average tax burden.
For the period between 1805 and 1860, we used the tax information noted in the first
series of the Sommier foncier which is the most complete available. They give for
each house the amount of rental income received, the net cadastral income and the
effectively levied taxes. After 1860, we used the statistical data compiled in the land
registers of the city of Paris which provide the real rental values of the houses for the
years 1862, 1878, 1889, 1901 and 1911 (Département de la Seine, 1890, 1901, 1911).
Unpublished tax data relating to the Sainte-Avoye district were used to supplement
these statements.
4.C Costs for Institutional Property in Amsterdam
We use 2,454 cost observations for the 90 properties of the Amsterdam Burgerweeshuis
(an orphanage) and the Doopsgezinde Gemeente (a protestant church) to estimate the
fraction of costs over time.
34We use data on the latter tax to estimate unobserved quality improvements.
4.C. COSTS FOR INSTITUTIONAL PROPERTY IN AMSTERDAM 129
Figure 4.12 plots the development in the annual cost fraction, aggregating across
all properties in the sample in each year. Between 1925 and 1937, data are interpo-
lated. Annual spending on non-tax costs for these institutional investors varied sub-
stantially over time and across properties, since not every property needed mainte-
nance or major renovation at the same time. Because the institutions often pooled
major renovations together, and only owned property in a small subset of neighbor-
hoods, we cannot treat our annual measures as representative for the entire city. In-
stead, we use the average cost figure of both institutions to estimate the expected non-
tax costs for the average property.
Figure 4.12: Composition of Costs, Institutional Properties, Amsterdam
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Notes: Figure 4.12 reports the average cost fraction observed among all properties in the sample in each
year, compiling data from both the Burgerweeshuis and the Doopsgezinde Gemeente. Data is missing
between 1925–1937 and therefore interpolated. The large jumps in the data primarily reflect changes in
the maintenance and renovation costs, as properties are typically renovated jointly, causing very high
cost fractions in some years.
For each property and in each year, we compute the fraction of rental value that
is being spent on costs excluding vacancy costs and taxes. To estimate the average
cost fraction in the entire portfolio, we first regress the fraction of costs on the type of
property (commercial or residential). This is reported in Columns 1 and 4 of Table 4.6,
for non-tax costs and all costs respectively.
Since the cost fraction might change across the distribution of properties and yields,
we aim to estimate the fraction of costs for the median property in Amsterdam. To do
so, we take the median rental value in the return sample in 1924, when our sample
contains over 600 rent observations, and track the market rent price of the 1924 me-
dian property using the Amsterdam rent price index of Eichholtz et al. (2020b). We
use this median to scale each rental observation (Ri ,t ) in the database of costs, and
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Table 4.6: Expense Fraction, Rental Property Institutional Investors
Dependent variable:
Non-Tax Costs All Costs
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Commercial −0.238∗∗∗ −0.046 0.004 −0.265∗∗∗ −0.048 0.020
(0.043) (0.053) (0.061) (0.044) (0.053) (0.061)
log(R) - log(MedR) −0.136∗∗∗ −0.118∗∗∗ −0.154∗∗∗ −0.130∗∗∗
(0.021) (0.023) (0.022) (0.024)
Jordaan 0.214 0.162
(0.147) (0.149)
Noordsche Bosch 0.027 0.039
(0.039) (0.039)
Old Center −0.072 −0.098∗
(0.054) (0.054)
Zuid 0.005 −0.029
(0.189) (0.192)
Constant 0.318∗∗∗ 0.265∗∗∗ 0.263∗∗∗ 0.434∗∗∗ 0.374∗∗∗ 0.373∗∗∗
(0.017) (0.019) (0.030) (0.017) (0.019) (0.030)
Observations 2,453 2,453 2,453 2,453 2,453 2,453
R2 0.012 0.028 0.031 0.015 0.035 0.037
Adjusted R2 0.012 0.027 0.028 0.015 0.034 0.035
Residual Std. Error 0.788 0.782 0.782 0.788 0.780 0.780
F Statistic 30.375 35.309 12.851 37.533 44.185 15.717
Notes: The constant in the regressions in Table 4.6 shows the estimated fraction of rents spent on ex-
penses such as taxes, maintenance costs, and renovations, either excluding taxes (Columns 1–3) or in-
cluding taxes (Columns 4–6). In Columns 1 and 3, we control for commercial properties, in Column 2 and
5 we also control for the value of the property relative to the median, as more expensive rental properties
have a lower cost fraction. In Columns 3 and 6 we control for neighborhood-level differences, with the
properties along the canal used as baseline neighborhood.
∗p < 0.1;∗∗ p < 0.05;∗∗∗ p < 0.01
.
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estimate the following regression:
ci ,t =α+β
[
l og (Ri ,t )− l og (Rmedi an,t )
]+T y pei +εi ,t (4.9)
With ci ,t denoting the fraction of non-tax costs and non-vacancy costs spent on
a property i at time t , and α equalling the cost fraction for the median property. We
again control for property type. The results of this regression are reported in Columns
2 and 4 in Table 4.6. To control for differences in location, Columns 3 and 6 add neigh-
borhood fixed effects, with properties in the Canal District (Grachtengordel) used as
baseline. The findings in Table 4.6 suggest a non-tax non-vacancy cost fraction of ap-
proximately 30 percent, and a total cost fraction of approximately 40 percent.
We find higher but imprecisely estimated costs in the poor Jordaan area, but this is
only based on two properties (30 property-year observations). Among the three neigh-
borhoods for which we have most observations, the Noordsche Bosch, the Canal Dis-
trict and the area around the Kalverstraat, we only find an (insignificantly) lower cost
fraction in the properties around the Kalverstraat. This is not surprising due to the
high location value of the Kalverstraat. Until today, the area around the Kalverstraat is
the area with the highest commercial rents per square meter in the Netherlands.
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4.D Supplementary Figures
Figure 4.13: Tax and Vacancy Rates, Paris and Amsterdam
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Notes: Figure 4.13 reports the annual tax rate for both Paris and Amsterdam, as a fraction of rents. We
also plot the series of vacancy rates for Paris and Amsterdam that we introduced in the data section.
Relative to prices, taxes averaged 15 percent of rental value per year in Amsterdam and 11 percent of
rental value in Paris. In both cities, the fraction of rental income lost in taxes varies substantially over
time, however. In Paris, large changes in taxes coincided with political and economic instability: taxes
were very high after the Napoleonic Wars in the 1810s and after the 1848 revolution. In both Paris and
Amsterdam, taxes increased substantially after World War I and during the crisis years in the 1930s.
In terms of vacancies, we find high levels of vacancies in Paris following the crisis and Siege of Paris in
1870, and extremely low levels during the period with strict rent controls after World War I. In Amsterdam,
vacancy rates peak during the Great Depression.
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Figure 4.14: Decomposition of Residual Variance
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Notes: Most residual variance in the short term stems from capital gains risk as the variance of yields is
small relative to the variance of capital gains. However, the dominance of capital gains variance decays as
holding periods increase. After period 15, the data become significantly noisier, but the pattern persists.
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Chapter 5
Reach for Yield and Real Estate
Over the past decade, interest rates have fallen to historically low levels in many ad-
vanced economies. In standard financial theory, such a decline in interest rates should
not impact the allocation of wealth among risky and safe assets, because this is only
governed by risk preferences and corresponding risk premia (e.g. Campbell, 2017).
However, there is increasing concern that investors might be inclined to shift their
portfolios towards higher-yielding, riskier assets in order to offset low returns. For ex-
ample, when the ECB lowered interest rates in September 2019, various central bankers
publicly warned this might trigger further asset price increases through reach for yield
behavior.1 This behavior could be particularly prevalent in housing markets. Investors
are increasingly buying real estate (Mills et al., 2019; Bracke, 2019), and policymakers
fear this increases house prices and prices out first-time homebuyers.2
Although reach for yield behavior has not yet been documented in real estate mar-
kets, existing literature has identified reaching for yield in the investment fund indus-
try (Chodorow-Reich, 2014; Hau and Lai, 2016; Andonov et al., 2017; Di Maggio and
Kacperczyk, 2017) and in the US corporate bond market (Ammer et al., 2019). How-
ever, it is still unclear how this behavior influences asset prices and the mechanisms
driving a reach for yield are not yet understood. Most existing work has focused on in-
stitutional frictions in the financial sector (Rajan, 2006; Martinez-Miera and Repullo,
2017; La Spada, 2018), but studies have also found evidence for reach for yield be-
havior in experiments with individuals (Lian et al., 2018) and, theoretically, in models
imposing a sustainable spending constraint (Campbell and Sigalov, 2020).
This paper studies whether individual investors reach for yield, and what the im-
plications of this behavior are for aggregate asset prices and the distribution of wealth,
with a specific focus on the housing market. Due to the scarcity of portfolio data and
the endogenous nature of interest rates makes, it is still difficult to empirically link low
interest rates to changes in aggregate asset prices and shifts in investment portfolios.
Identification is particularly challenging in housing markets, where low interest rates
1See "ECB hawks rally against Draghis farewell stimulus," Reuters, September 13, 2019, and "Former
central bankers attack ECB’s monetary policy," Financial Times, October 4, 2019.
2In Amsterdam, where house prices have risen by 60% in the last five years, the government has re-
cently proposed to ban buy-to-let (The Guardian, March 19, 2019).
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directly increase the housing demand of owner-occupiers through changes in mort-
gage credit conditions.
In the ideal experiment, we would like to observe how investment portfolios, yields,
and house prices respond to exogenous shocks in the demand or supply of safe bonds,
and corresponding interest rates. These shocks should have no other effects on the
economy or housing market. The historical setting in this paper comes close to this
ideal experiment. Exploiting the unique characteristics and data of the 17th-18th cen-
tury Amsterdam asset markets, this paper shows that individuals reach for yield when
interest rates are low, but that this behavior is almost entirely driven by wealthy indi-
viduals for whom capital is the main source of income. In Amsterdam, reaching for
yield caused large booms and busts in house prices and resulted in growing housing
wealth inequality.
The identification in this paper uses periods of war as an instrument for investor
demand for real estate. Importantly, wars were uncorrelated to the Amsterdam econ-
omy. They were fought outside of Holland and caused by political discontent about
the successions of deceased foreign kings. However, wars had enormous implications
for investors, as they forced Holland to issue large amounts of bonds. Rentiers bought
these bonds as a safe source of income, but saw bond returns and their correspond-
ing capital income exogenously fall in periods of peace. Alternating periods of peace
and war caused large booms and busts in house prices, even though bond yields only
changed by small amounts. Consistent with the model of Campbell and Sigalov (2020),
I show these booms were driven by wealthy rentiers that aimed to offset capital income
losses by reaching for yield. During periods of peace, rentiers actively purchased more
real estate, and housing risk premia declined substantially. Because individuals with
more limited wealth sold their properties or were unable to buy real estate at these
inflated prices, reach for yield behavior led to a persistent increase in housing wealth
inequality.
Amsterdam has several other aspects that make it an ideal setting to study the im-
pact of investor demand on house prices. The motivation to reach for yield is strongest
when interest rates are low, and during the main period of study in this paper, from
1688 to 1780, yields on perpetual government debt averaged 2.67%. Such persistently
low nominal rates are exceptional in history (Homer and Sylla, 1996). These low rates
were likely related to a shortage of investment opportunities (De Vries and Van der
Woude, 1997). Absent alternatives, 60% of the total amount of wealth was invested in
just two assets: Amsterdam real estate and Holland bonds. Because bond holdings
were much more concentrated than real estate holdings, low bond yields primarily re-
duced the income of wealthy investors. Reaching for yield enabled investors to offset
these losses, and real estate was the main asset to do so. This combination of fac-
tors makes it possible to identify portfolio shifts and price effects precisely. Later in
the 18th century, the combination of low rates and limited asset supply spurred finan-
cial development, transforming Amsterdam into the first international capital market.
This paper provides, for the first time, a detailed overview of the emergence of these
investments.
Despite the enormous amounts of government lending on Amsterdam’s capital
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market, its market for private credit was small. Correspondingly, mortgage credit fi-
nanced only very few property purchases. This rules out that the housing booms and
busts were driven by changes in credit conditions, as various papers have suggested
for modern housing cycles (e.g. Mian and Sufi, 2009, 2011; Favara and Imbs, 2015;
Favilukis et al., 2017). Beyond credit, there were no significant changes in standard
housing fundamentals during the main period of study: population, wages, construc-
tion, and GDP per capita were stagnant. Expectations about future housing demand
thus were unlikely drivers of the observed housing cycles (see Glaeser and Nathanson,
2014), and rent prices changed little over time.
This paper uses archival data on 164,067 real estate transactions in Amsterdam,
covering nearly all transactions during the 17th and 18th century. To my knowledge,
this is the first dataset that provides full coverage of transactions in a large real estate
market for such a long time period. I additionally hand-collected data from 25,962 es-
tate tax records that contain the investment portfolios of 32% of the Amsterdam popu-
lation that died with any wealth between 1688 and 1780. This data makes it possible to
link individuals’ portfolios to their housing transactions and the level of bond yields.
Due to privacy restrictions and data limitations, this has not yet been possible with
recent data.
The paper starts by providing new stylized facts of the housing market and aggre-
gate investment in Amsterdam. Matching buyer and seller names to identify repeat-
sales, I construct a new house price index (1604-1811) that reveals Amsterdam experi-
enced three large booms and busts in house prices. During booms, house prices ap-
proximately doubled before reverting to initial values. Two of these boom-bust cycles
are well-explained by a standard discounted cash flow model. However, this model
fails to account for the large fluctuations in house prices in the first part of the 18th cen-
tury. In this period, the boom-bust cycle correlated with significant shifts in investor
portfolios. During the boom, the share of wealth invested in real estate increased sub-
stantially for very wealthy citizens, at the expense of investments in domestic govern-
ment bonds.
These portfolio shifts correlated with changes in bond yields. For the top 1% of
society, who owned about 57% of the total wealth, a 1% decline in yields coincided
with a 12% increase in the share of wealth in real estate, relative to an average invest-
ment share of 21%. For investors with limited wealth, these effects were negligible or
even opposite. The composition of assets influenced portfolio shifts. Investors with
sizeable domestic bond holdings invested a more substantial fraction of wealth in real
estate when rates were low.
Of course, these portfolio shifts do not provide any specific information about
their underlying causes and the impact of these shifts on house prices. To do so, I
exploit outbreaks of war in Europe. During the 17th and 18th century, the Dutch Re-
public was often drawn into warfare. War engagement was costly and thus forced the
Republic to issue large amounts of bonds. Bond issuance coincided with substantial
changes in house prices, as house prices were stable or falling during periods of war,
but increased during periods of peace. Because rents and interest rates were relatively
stable, housing risk premia fluctuated substantially.
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Crucially, periods of war were exogenous to the state of the Amsterdam economy.
The Dutch Republic did not initiate these wars, but they resulted from international
concerns about the successions of deceased foreign emperors, which could alter the
balance of power in Europe. Because the wars were fought abroad with privatized
armies (Brandon, 2015), most war spending did not end up in Holland. Accordingly,
wars did not correlate significantly with any change in standard economic variables.
However, changes in public debt had significant impacts on wealthy investors, who in-
vested most of their wealth in these bonds and saw yields decline when bond issuance
halted.
In the empirical analysis, I instrument changes in public debt with a dummy vari-
able for periods the Dutch Republic was at war, and relate these to changes in house
prices. A one percent increase in bond supply reduced annual house price growth by
about 1.4%, and these effects are robust to the inclusion of a set of relevant economic
control variables. Periods of war involving foreign governments that Amsterdam in-
vestors were lending to also reduced house prices. These bond supply shocks had a
much more significant impact on house prices and corresponding rental yields than
on bond yields. Correspondingly, a one percent increase in bond supply increased
housing risk premia by 0.7%.
To provide micro-level evidence that these substantial changes in home prices
were driven by wealthy investors reaching for yield, I develop a matching method that
links unique individuals in the estate tax records to their housing transactions. Using
a difference-in-difference approach, I find that wealthy investors became relatively
more likely to purchase real estate during periods of peace relative to periods of war.
This effect is even more significant for individuals with large bond holdings. Con-
trolling for wealth, large bondholders became twice as likely to purchase real estate
during peace compared to periods of war, relative to investors with no or only lim-
ited bond investments. For Holland bondholders, this effect disappears later in the
sample period, when investors also had the opportunity to invest in higher-yielding
foreign government bonds.
The final part of this paper analyzes the broader implications of reach for yield
behavior and its potential mechanisms. First, reductions in bond yields correlated
strongly with increasing investment in new financial assets across all wealth groups,
although the effect is again most significant for the very wealthy. This finding suggests
that the development of international capital markets was related to investors’ search
for higher-yielding investment opportunities, which has long been asserted by finan-
cial historians (Riley, 1980; Neal, 1993; De Vries and Van der Woude, 1997), and has
also been suggested for modern times (Rajan, 2006). Second, reaching for yield led to
a persistent increase in housing wealth inequality, as investors purchased properties
from less wealthy home-owners, and price increases kept new home-owners off the
market. During the 18th century housing boom, the share of Amsterdam real estate
owned by the wealthiest 5% in the portfolio data increased from 20% to 34% and did
not reduce afterward.
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5.1 Related Literature
This paper relates and contributes to two different kinds of literature. First of all, this
paper relates to an emerging set of studies studying whether investors reach for yield,
and what the implications of this behavior are. Most of this literature has focused on
the behavior of investment funds. In response to lower interest rates, funds increase
their exposure to riskier assets (Hau and Lai, 2016; Di Maggio and Kacperczyk, 2017).
Such behavior can help to attract investment flows (Choi and Kronlund, 2017), and
might also increase asset prices (Hau and Lai, 2016). In the corporate bond market,
Becker and Ivashina (2015) find that insurance companies reach for yield by select-
ing higher-yielding bonds within the same rating class, although they do not study the
link with low interest rates. Ammer et al. (2019) use actual foreign investments in US
corporate bonds to show that foreign investors increase their exposure to risky cor-
porate bonds when rates are low. In an experimental setting, Lian et al. (2018) show
that individual participants also increase their allocations to risky assets when rates
are low. However, reaching for yield is often argued to originate from the financial sec-
tor, as suggested by Rajan (2006) and theorized by Martinez-Miera and Repullo (2017).
La Spada (2018) highlights that reaching for yield can arise due to competitive pres-
sures within the finance industry.
This paper provides evidence that individual investors actively reach for yield when
interest rates decline, and that this behavior amplifies asset booms and busts. This be-
havior is most pronounced among the very wealthy, who use their capital returns to
finance consumption expenditures. This empirical finding aligns with the recent the-
oretical work of Campbell and Sigalov (2020), who highlight that spending constraints
can be one mechanism that generates reach for yield behavior. In line with Camp-
bell and Sigalov (2020), the findings in this paper for wealthy individuals might thus
also extend to pension funds, sovereign wealth funds and endowments, who also use
capital returns to finance a relatively constrained set of expenditure.
In this paper, bond yield reductions originate from exogenous changes to the sup-
ply of bonds. Such shocks are also central to the modern debate about reaching for
yield. Various papers hypothesize that bond-buying programs by central banks might
have increased risk-taking by financial institutions (Goldstein et al., 2018; Albertazzi
et al., 2018), but portfolio-level evidence for this is limited (Koijen et al., 2018). Some of
these shifts might have gone towards real estate: Frame and Steiner (2018) find effects
of the FED’s quantitative easing program on the prices of REITs. However, the impact
of reaching for yield has not yet been studied for residential real estate markets. Hous-
ing differs from other financial assets in essential ways, because it is purchased both
for consumption and for investment, with both owner-occupiers and buy-to-let in-
vestors active in the market. Because wealthy investors are particularly prone to reach
for yield, this paper shows that reaching for yield also has significant implications for
the distribution of housing wealth.
Finally, this paper relates to the literature studying the impact of investor demand
on house prices. Both institutional investors (Allen et al., 2018; Mills et al., 2019), and
private investors (Nijskens et al., 2019; Bracke, 2019) are increasingly purchasing real
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estate. Haughwout et al. (2011), Chinco and Mayer (2015) and Garcia (2019) show that
demand from second-home buyers contributed to the dynamics in the US housing
bubble in the 2000s. Demand from foreign investors has also been linked to hous-
ing price increases (Sá, 2016; Favilukis et al., 2017; Badarinza and Ramadorai, 2018;
Cvijanovic and Spaenjers, 2018). This seems particularly prevalent in globally impor-
tant cities, because real estate in these cities is considered a safe-haven investment
(Badarinza and Ramadorai, 2018). These studies support the view that increasing in-
vestor demand contributes to house price growth. However, they do not allow us to
identify whether investor demand can cause entire housing cycles and whether this is
related to reaching for yield.
5.2 Data
This paper combines various archival data sources, of which a major part has been
newly collected and digitized. Table 5.1 provides an overview of these sources. This
section discusses the two most important sources: registrations of estate taxes and real
estate transactions. Appendix 5.A provides additional documentation and historical
context. Next to these two main sources, I collected additional primary and secondary
data to support the empirical analysis. Appendix 5.D presents a complete overview of
these sources.
Table 5.1: Primary Datasets
Description Observations Period
Real Estate Transactions 164,067 1563-1811
Estate Tax Registrations 25,962 1688-1780
Rental Value New Buildings 8,780 1633-1782
Non-Mortgage Loans 37,811 1683-1807
Private Annuities (mortgages) 8,887 1630-1810
Gross Rental Yields 782 1738-1805
Burial Records 890,169 1563-1811
Marriage Records 255,689 1563-1811
Real Estate Transactions (Den Bosch) 11,458 1662-1838
Notes: For a detailed overview of the composition of these datasets, see Appendix 5.B and 5.D.
5.2.1 Real Estate Registrations
This paper uses data from individual real estate transactions to measure activity in the
housing market. From the 16th century until 1810, any individual buying or selling real
estate in Amsterdam had to register each transfer at the municipal law court (schep-
enbank). In Amsterdam, the oldest surviving register of real estate transactions dates
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from 1563, while the last transactions were registered in February 1811 because the
French changed the system. Although there were five different legal ways to transfer
real estate (see Appendix 5.A), almost all transactions were registered as ordinaris kwi-
jtschelding (regular sale, 85%), or as a executie kwijtschelding (foreclosure sale, 10%).
Figure 1 contains an example of a single real estate transfer for the purchase of prop-
erty by the painter Rembrandt. Appendix 5.A.1 provides a full English transcription of
this act.
Figure 5.1: Property Transfer Act, Rembrandt
Notes: Figure 5.1 shows a registration of a property transfer. A full transcription of this registration is
provided in Appendix 5.A.1. This particular act originates from ACA 5062, Register 45, Page 196, and
describes the transfer of property from the heirs of Pieter Beltens to Rembrandt Hermansz, also known
as the painter Rembrandt van Rijn. The names of the buyers and sellers are underscored, and written
in the top half of the document. The price of 13,000 guilders is mentioned at the top-left, while the
registration date (8 January 1653) is written at the bottom of the act. The sold property still exists today
and now hosts the Rembrandt Museum.
Nearly all of these registrations have survived in the Amsterdam City Archives. In
the past years, the archive and its volunteers have transcribed data on all 164,702 real
estate transactions in the registers, involving over 450,000 individuals. This study is
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the first to be able to use this newly-digitized data.3 Although a handful of registers
did not survive the test of time, the database is fully complete after 1700. Before 1637,
there were no prices recorded in the registers for regular sales.
For each transaction, volunteers transcribed information on several variables. First,
they recorded the type of transaction, the registration date, and the transaction price.
Next, they listed the names of buyer(s) and seller(s), and, whenever available, their job.
Most registrations also list whether an individual was widowed or the heir of the orig-
inal owner. Last, they recorded information on the property. For every transaction,
the data contain information on the street name as well as a brief description of the
property (’home’, ’land’, ’warehouse’, etcetera). Many records provide a more detailed
description of the location of the property. Absent street names and street numbers,
this often involved the distance of the house relative to a nearby point of interest. This
information could not be coded systematically, because most of these reference points
could not be traced back.
5.2.2 Estate Tax Records
I use registrations of estate taxes to reconstitute the investment portfolios of citizens
of Amsterdam. In the Dutch Republic, estate taxes were levied on inheritances outside
of the direct descending line: to heirs that were not children or grandchildren. These
taxes were introduced in the 17th century, and although the applicable laws and tax
rates modified slightly over time, they were levied consistently until 1810. For each
registration, the aldermen made a list of all assets owned by the heiress and their value.
Figure 5.2 shows an example of one registration.
Real estate assets were valued by appraisers. If the heiress owned real estate out-
side of Amsterdam, it would be appraised locally, and the valuation report would be
sent to the Amsterdam aldermen. Domestic debt was valued based on its capital sum,
except if the debt had been partially repaid or if the debtor had missed debt payments.
In the latter case, the debt was valued based on its market value. Equity and assets
denominated in foreign currency were valued based on current list prices, and con-
verted to guilders if necessary. Taxes were only levied on the net asset position so that
any outstanding loans would be deducted from the total amount.
Together with research assistants, I hand-collected and transcribed data on all reg-
istrations between 1688 and 1780, totaling 25,962 observations containing approxi-
mately 150,000 different assets. For each registration, I transcribed the name of the
deceased individual, the year of registration, and, if available, the death date. For each
person, I aggregated the value of its assets both by location (foreign and domestic) and
type (government and corporate bonds, equity, real estate, private debt, etc.). A full
description of these asset classes is provided in Appendix 5.A.2. Only in a tiny num-
ber of cases clerical errors, unclear identification of assets, or bad handwriting made
it difficult to transcribe records correctly.
3I want to acknowledge the support of the Amsterdam City Archives gratefully. Note that the registra-
tions have been indexed and can be found online at https://archief.amsterdam/indexen. Data on house
prices, occupations, and various other variables are only available from the full database.
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Figure 5.2: Estate Tax Record, Willem van Collen
Notes: Figure 5.2 shows one example of an estate tax record, originating from ACA 5046, Register 26, Page
8. Appendix 5.A.2 provides a full transcription of this act. The record starts with the name of the deceased
individual (Willem van Collen) and the date of death (October 22, 1740), followed by the list of assets left
by the heiress. Every record describes each asset and its value. The value of an asset is reported on the
right-hand side of each record. Records were signed by the heir, and followed by a formal statement that
confirms the payment of the estate tax. The very bottom of the document mentions the registration date.
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To the best of my knowledge, this paper is the first to provide a systematic overview
of investment in 18th century Amsterdam, despite its importance as a global financial
market (Neal, 1993). Various historical studies have drawn small samples from these
tax records for smaller cities (De Jong, 1985; Kooijmans, 1985; Prak, 1985), arguing they
draw a representative picture of investment portfolios. I discuss this assumption in
more detail in Appendix 5.A, and use secondary wealth estimates to show the distri-
bution of wealth in the estate tax records is similar to the distribution of wealth for all
deceased persons in the city. The main drawback of using estate taxes is that wealth
portfolios at death might be slightly different from those of younger cohorts. Histori-
cally, this is less of a concern because many people passed away at a young age.
5.2.3 Linking Housing Transactions
To provide a link between investment portfolios and real estate transactions, I match
individuals in the estate tax records to their housing transactions. Similarly, I match
purchases and sales of the same properties to identify aggregate house price move-
ments. Three factors complicate this matching. First, most people did not have unique
names. Second, clerks did not always write the names of individuals in the same way,
due to the presence of other names and clerical errors. Finally, difficulties in transcrip-
tion can contribute to errors as well. To properly match transactions and individuals,
I combine algorithmic matching with manual data classification. These techniques
are comparable to the fully automated matching approach Abramitzky et al. (2019)
suggested for US census data.
I start by identifying the gender of each individual by matching the first names of
brides and grooms in marriage records to those in the other datasets. I classify the
gender of individuals whose first name cannot be matched by hand. Next, I use the
890,000 names present in the Amsterdam burial records to identify a uniqueness score
for each individual in the sample of transactions. Young children and individuals that
died before 1688 are excluded because these could not have bought or owned property
in the sample period. I split the sample of transactions and burial records into k =
1, . . . ,K blocks, that are each defined by a unique combination of gender, and the first
letter of the first and last name. This assumes that the first letter of first and last names
are transcribed correctly.4 With each block containing nk individuals, the uniqueness
score is defined as the weighted sum of all transformed Jaro-Winkler distances (jw)
between individual i in the database of property transactions and all j individuals in
the burial records sharing the same gender and first letters:
ui =
nk∑
j=1
2×
√
mi n( j w f i r stnamei j +1.5× j w l astnamei j ,0.25) (5.1)
Jaro-Winkler distances are the most common measure to match names in differ-
ent databases with potential transcription errors (see Winkler, 1999; Abramitzky et al.,
4This reduces computation significantly, as it shrinks the number of Jaro-Winkler distances to com-
pute from about 1 trillion to a few billion.
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2019). A distance of 0 indicates perfect equality of character strings and a distance 1 of
perfect inequality. I compute these distances both for first (p = 0.05) and last names
(p = 0), with 50% additional weight given to last names. I determined the functional
form of Equation 5.1 and the value of the penalty factor p by experimenting with dif-
ferent set-ups, and manually classifying the correctness of the matches. In the end, I
used the values that resulted in the largest set of correct matches. Note that Equation
5.1 implies that names with Jaro-Winkler distances equal or larger than 0.25 are never
matched.
To match individuals in the transaction records to the estate tax records, I split the
sample of estate tax records in the same blocks as the transaction and burial records.
Next, each individual in each transaction is matched to the entry in the estate tax
records that minimizes the Jaro-Winkler distance defined in the previous paragraph.
Of course, the likelihood this is a right match depends both on the uniqueness score
ui and the minimum Jaro-Winkler distance, which I discuss later in this paper.
To match housing purchases to sales, I restrict the set of housing purchases to
transactions involving homes, adding two additional blocking variables: the street
name and the number of sold properties.5 This ensures the same properties are being
matched. I split the sample into purchases and sales, and compute for each individual
i in the sample of purchases the Jaro-Winkler distances with all sellers and all buyers
within the same block. A housing purchase is matched to the sale that has the lowest
Jaro-Winkler distance if that match satisfies four conditions:
1. The Jaro-Winkler (JW) distance with the nearest seller (minimum) is less than
0.1
2. The JW-distance with the nearest other buyer (minimum) is at least 0.15
3. The second nearest-seller has a JW-distance at least 0.15 higher than the first
4. The purchase happens before the sale
In total, this procedure resulted in 39,123 transaction pairs. Again, these param-
eters are chosen to strike a good balance between the number of matches and their
accuracy. This strategy can only result in mismatches in case of severe misspellings, or
if an individual owned multiple properties on the same street, but bought exactly one
property and sold exactly on other property during the period covered by the data.
Both cases are unlikely. Although there does not exist a ’ground truth’ to assess the
quality of these matches, high-quality matching should result in precise price indices.
Following the standard repeat-sales framework in Bailey et al. (1963), I assume the log
price on a property x can be written as pxt = αx +βt + εxt , with αx representing a
constant quality component, βt the market price component and εxt the transaction
price error.6 Thus, for each matched price pair purchased in year s and sold in year t:
pxt −pxs =βt −βs +εxt −εxs , s < t , ε∼ N (0,σ2) (5.2)
5Historically, it was common to own part of a house, either due to inheritance or because full home-
ownership was not affordable.
6Note that the constant-quality is less relevant for the analysis in this paper, because I study changes
in prices, and there was limited quality growth in this period. In line with this, median house prices only
rise marginally more than the constant-quality price index. See Eichholtz et al. (2020b) for more detail
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This equation can be estimated for all transaction pairs using ordinary least-squares,
with 1810 used as the baseyear. For the annual index, I only include observations after
1625, because too few price observations are available beforehand. Between 1604-
1625, I estimate an index at a three-year frequency. To control for heteroskedasticity
that might arise due to differences in the holding periods, I apply the Case and Shiller
(1987) correction. The resulting annual index is precise: the median standard error of
each index coefficient is 2.5%.7 I apply the same method to estimate an annual house
price index for Den Bosch (1692-1838). Given the lower number of observations, this
index is less precise.
5.3 Motivational Evidence
To motivate my empirical analysis and identification, this section aims to explain the
economic motivation for Amsterdam investors to reach for yield, and subsequently
provides novel stylized facts of investment portfolios in Amsterdam and the develop-
ments of its housing market. In Appendix 5.B, I provide a more detailed overview of
the housing market.
5.3.1 Why Would Investors Reach for Yield?
In Amsterdam, only a small fraction of the total population possessed significant wealth.
Based on figures from Hart (1973), approximately 15 to 20% of the Amsterdam popu-
lation possessed wealth in the 18th century. This group of wealthy individuals roughly
consisted of two different groups: Rentiers, who purely lived from their capital income,
and working individuals that also possessed wealth. Although the estate tax records do
not report on the profession of individuals, data from a one-time income tax in 1742,
the Personeele Quotisatie, provides a unique picture into the social structure of this
group (Oldewelt, 1945). The 1742 income tax was a one-time tax levied on individ-
uals earning more than 650 guilders per year, consisting of the 25% highest-income
households in Amsterdam.
About 12.5% of these households, corresponding to about 3% of the entire Am-
sterdam population, reported being a rentier. These rentiers had a median income
of 1000 guilders per year (mean 2,200 guilders). Although it is not exactly clear how
this income was estimated, an average net return of 3.33% on total assets (in between
the net yield on government bonds and the estimated net yield on real estate) would
imply the median rentier possessed assets worth about 30,000 guilders. These indi-
viduals lived from their capital income and transferred their assets to their heirs upon
death. Because these individuals used capital to fund their consumption, fluctuations
in interest rates directly reduced their income.
This contrasts with the group of wealthy individuals who also worked and earned
regular wages. During the 18th century, wages were extremely stable. The wedde-
7For reference, this value is 33% when estimating market prices using average prices. This index is
also a substantial improvement over the index of Eichholtz (1997) for the Herengracht, Amsterdam’s most
famous canal, which relies on average on eight observations per year in this period.
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boeken of the government of Amsterdam, which report the salaries of all civil servants,
show that wages were constant over time.8 Evidence from day wages of masons of
carpenters shows a similar pattern for workers in the construction sector (Nusteling,
1985). For these households, fluctuations in interest rates were much less of a concern,
because most of their income was earned through labor.
Of course, the distinction between these two groups was not absolute: some ren-
tiers also worked, and some workers also earned substantial capital income. However,
it is clear that the propensity to be a rentier increased with wealth. In 1742, the me-
dian rentier with 30,000 guilders of financial wealth would rank in the 92nd percentile
of the wealth distribution based on the estate tax records. Given that 86% of individ-
uals in the 1741–1745 period died without any wealth (Hart, 1973), this would be the
98th to 99th percentile of the wealth distribution for the entire population. As 12.5%
of the individuals in the 1742 income tax records reported being a rentier, so about 3%
of the entire population, rentiers likely comprised the large majority of individuals in
the upper right tail of the wealth distribution.
The motives of these two different groups to reach for yield are best understood
through the recent theoretical work of Campbell and Sigalov (2020). Campbell and
Sigalov (2020) develop a model that shows that investors with a sustainable spend-
ing constraint increase their allocation to risky assets when interest rates decrease.
These investors consume their financial returns, rather than accumulating wealth or
running it down. Such a spending constraint is representative for large endowments
and sovereign wealth funds, but Campbell and Sigalov (2020) argue it could also be
representative for rentiers with a bequest motive, as is the case in this paper. This
negative correlation between interest rates and risky asset shares is driven by the fact
that rentiers prefer to maintain their consumption levels when interest rates decrease,
and thus increase their exposure to riskier and higher-yielding assets at the expense
of more risky future consumption. Campbell and Sigalov (2020) show this behavior is
particularly significant when interest rates are low, as was the case in historical Ams-
terdam and again is the case today.
This finding contrasts with the standard Merton (1969) finding that risk-taking is
independent of interest rates and only governed by risk-aversion. This standard model
is more representative for investors who do not have a significant spending constraint:
individuals whose consumption stream is not fully dependent on capital. This implies
that reaching for yield is not pervasive across all investors. Although there exists no
formal model that computes equilibrium portfolio shares and asset prices in a world
where there exist both investors with a sustainable spending constraint (as in Camp-
bell and Sigalov, 2020) and investors without such a constraint (as in the traditional
Merton model), we can derive intuitive hypothesis for this case.
First, wealthy investors with a sustainable spending constraint, such as rentiers,
will be prone to increase their allocation to risky assets when interest rates decrease,
and will thus be willing to accept higher prices and lower expected returns for risky
assets. Second, investors that are less reliant on capital income for their consumption
8Amsterdam City Archives 5039: Archief van de Thesaurieren Ordinaris, no. 768 – 773
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and possess more limited financial wealth do not have such a preference, and will find
it profitable to sell their assets to these rentiers. As a result, decreasing interest rates
will lead to higher equilibrium asset prices than in the standard model with constant
risk premia, and rentiers will increase the fraction of risky assets they possess rela-
tive to non-rentiers. Finally, housing wealth inequality will increase as reach for yield
purchase will increase the fraction of homes owned by wealthy rentiers.
5.3.2 Investment Porfolios in Amsterdam
Time-varying portfolio shares of risky assets across different wealth groups are a nec-
essary but not sufficient condition for reach-for-yield behavior to be economically sig-
nificant. Although the portfolio data collected for this paper do not report on labor in-
come, the fraction of capital income in total income likely correlated very closely with
total wealth.
Figure 5.3 reports the evolution of the investment portfolios of Amsterdam citizens
from 1688 to 1780, split into three groups: the bottom 50% of estates (< 3100 guilders),
the top 50-95% (3100-65000 guilders) and the top 5% (> 65000 guilders), which almost
entirely consisted of rentiers. To avoid extremely large estates distorting the wealth
distribution, I removed extreme outliers (17 observations, over 1 million guilders) and
aggregated data per three years for the first two groups, and per five years for the much
smaller top 5% group. Most wealth concentrated in the top 1% of society (the top 5%
in the estate tax records), who owned approximately 57% of total wealth. Piketty et al.
(2006) find similar levels of wealth concentration in 19th century Paris.
All three groups invested the majority of their wealth in real estate and domes-
tic government bonds. Nearly all investments in real estate were within Amsterdam
(89%), and most domestic government bonds were Holland bonds (83%). Similar to
today, smaller portfolios primarily consisted of an individual his own house and con-
tained few other assets beyond real estate. The home-ownership rate in Amsterdam
was approximately 14%, so buy-to-let investors owned most homes. Investments in
equity, corporate bonds, and foreign assets were concentrated among the wealthiest
members of society. Importantly, the data show that the market for private credit was
small. Absent banks, most loans were peer-to-peer loans (Hoffman, 2000; Gelderblom
et al., 2017), but in Amsterdam, these only amounted to a few percents of total as-
sets. Within this group, the share of mortgage loans was relatively constant at approxi-
mately 0.5-1% of total assets. In line with this, I show in Appendix 5.B.4 that the volume
of new long-term mortgage loans was negligible relative to the total volume in the real
estate market.
While the portfolios of the bottom 50% of estates were relatively constant over
time, there were significant fluctuations in the estates of the top 50%. From the start
of the sample until 1713, the share of wealth invested in government bonds increased
drastically at the expense of real estate investments. Because house prices were stable
in this period, nearly all new investments must have been in government bonds. After
1713, this pattern reversed, and the share of wealth invested in real estate increased at
the expense of the share invested in government bonds. As we shall see, this change
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Figure 5.3: Investment Portfolios, 1688-1780
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Notes: The plots report on the composition of household portfolios over time for the wealthy population
of Amsterdam, separating the bottom 50%, the top 5% and the group in between. For a detailed list of
assets, see Appendix 5.A.2.
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happened exactly when house prices started booming as well. The share of wealth
in real estate gradually stabilized in the late 1720s and started declining from about
1740 until 1760. Due to the gradual development of international financial markets
(Neal, 1993), investors increasingly purchased foreign assets from the second quarter
of the 18th century onward. These were primarily English securities (81%). Following
the continued development of financial markets, there were also changes in portfolio
composition in the second part of the 18th century, but these occurred primarily in
other asset classes than real estate.
To test whether shifts in the share of wealth invested in real estate correlated to the
level of the Holland bond yield, I link the share of real estate in each portfolio to the
demeaned level of the bond yield (it − ī ) for six different wealth groups (g ), using the
following regression:
%RealE st atei ,t =
6∑
g=1
[
αg +βg (it − ī )g
]
+εi ,t (5.3)
The first three wealth groups contain individual portfolios from the first three quar-
tiles of the distribution of portfolio values. Group 4 contains portfolios between the
75th and 90th percentile. The top two groups, which contain the bulk of total wealth,
contain the 90th to 95th percentile and the remaining top 5%. All wealth groups are
identified by dummies. I estimate this equation with and without weighting for port-
folio size, and both using the registered value of domestic bonds (the capital value) and
the market value of these bonds. Contrary to other assets, domestic bonds were val-
ued at par as long as the loan had not been in default or partially repaid. I convert their
value to market prices based on current bond prices and yields from Gelderblom and
Jonker (2011). This bond yield is based on transaction prices of redeemable annuities,
bonds similar to British consols. In the 18th century, Holland bond yields were the
lowest in the world, and they were the main safe asset for Dutch investors (Gelderblom
and Jonker, 2011).
Figure 5.4 plots the results for each model and each wealth group, using White
standard errors. In parenthesis, I report for each wealth class the average share of total
wealth that was invested in real estate, based on weighted OLS and using the market-
value of domestic bonds. For the top group, which owned the majority of total wealth,
a one percentage point reduction in the bond yield increased the share of investment
in real estate by about 12 percentage points, relative to an average share of 21 per-
centage points. The absolute size of this effect is similar for the other two groups in
the top quartile of wealth, but the relative effect size for these groups is smaller, given
that they generally invested a higher fraction of their wealth in real estate. The effect
changes substantially for the bottom three quartiles, who invested nearly all of their
wealth in real estate. For the third quartile, the estimated effect is much smaller, in
particular relative to their average real estate holdings. The effect turns insignificant
for the second quartile, and reverses for the bottom 25%.
Reductions in bond yields had the most significant impacts on individuals that
invested most of their wealth in bonds. These investors might have responded more
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Figure 5.4: Bond Yields and Portfolio Composition
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Notes: The dots report the coefficients (dots) and 95% confidence intervals (lines) measuring the impact
of a change in the bond yield on the fraction of wealth in real estate. I computed these coefficients for
each wealth group, sorting by total wealth, ranging from the bottom 25% to the top 5%. Average real estate
portfolio shares are reported in parenthesis for each wealth group. There are three models estimated. In
the top model, I use the unadjusted investment in domestic bonds. In the bottom two models, I adjust
the value of domestic bonds using market prices. In the last model, I also weigh each observation by
portfolio size.
152 CHAPTER 5. REACH FOR YIELD AND REAL ESTATE
strongly to changes in bond yields than other investors, in particular given that ren-
tiers had a preferences for bond investments (De Vries and Van der Woude, 1997). To
investigate this, I estimate equation 5.3 for groups that are sorted based on their total
holdings of domestic government bonds. Because 55% of portfolios do not contain
any investment in domestic government bonds, I pool these into a single category.
Relative to Figure 5.4, I estimate one additional model that also controls for the log of
total wealth in each portfolio.
Figure 5.5 plots the estimated coefficients for each wealth group. Investors that
owned no or limited amounts of domestic bonds invested relatively more of their
wealth in real estate when yields were high. This effect was particularly large rela-
tive to their weighted mean exposure to real estate investments, which was only 6%
for the group without domestic bond investments and 15% for the group with small
bond investments. For individuals with larger bond holdings, the effect reduces and
turns negative for the top quartile of bondholders. For the top group, a 1% reduction
in bond yields increased the share of wealth invested in real estate by 11%, after con-
trolling for total wealth. This effect does not change significantly in the other models.
In short, this suggests that portfolio changes in response to lower interest rates were
the largest among investors with very substantial bond holdings.
5.3.3 House Prices in Amsterdam
These portfolio shifts did not only coincide with fluctuations in interest rates, they also
coincided with fluctuations in house prices. Importantly, house prices in this period
fluctuated by more than would be predicted in a conventional standard discounted
rent model, with Rt the rent index, τt the annual tax rate on rental value, it the net
long-term yield on domestic government bonds, and πt the risk premium:9
Pt = Rt (1−τt )
it +πt
(5.4)
Figure 5.6 plots the level of house prices relative to the level of discounted rents
and the Holland bond yield, which is used to discount the rents. For this benchmark
model, I assume risk premia are fixed over time at 2%, which corresponds to the esti-
mated average difference between bond yields and net rental yields in the 18th cen-
tury. This model is close to some early writings on asset pricing in this period. For
example, Zillesen (1800) writes that the ’fundamental law’ to value real estate is that
"one computes the net revenue of it, and estimates the value of this real estate based
on an interest as the course of a more or lesser money provides." In his examples, he
capitalizes net-of-tax rents with the presumed required return on housing, and explic-
itly recognizes that prices increase if "the course of interest declines."
Large booms and busts in Amsterdam were common, both in the 17th century and
18th century. In the early period, most of these changes can be explained by changes
in discounted rents, although we should note that bond markets and interest rates
were still developing in the 17th century (Gelderblom and Jonker, 2011). Also in the
9The construction of the long-term yield and rent price series is discussed in Appendix 5.D.
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Figure 5.5: Portfolio Composition and Bond Investment
●
●
●
●
●
95−100% (avg. 41%)
90−95% (avg. 41%)
75−90% (avg. 42%)
55−75% (avg. 6%)
0−55% (avg. 15%)
−10 0 10 20 30
Coefficient
Model
● Unweighted, BV
Unweighted, MV
Weighted, MV
Weighted, MV, +Wealth
Notes: The dots report the coefficients (dots) and 95% confidence intervals (lines) measuring the impact
of a change in the bond yield on the fraction of wealth in real estate. Contrary to Figure 5.4, the differ-
ent wealth groups are now sorted by their total bond holdings, ranging from the bottom 55% (no bond
wealth) to the top 5% (most bond wealth). Average real estate portfolio shares are reported in parenthe-
sis for each bond wealth group. There are four models estimated. In the top model, I use the unadjusted
investment in domestic bonds. In the bottom three models, I adjust the value of domestic bonds using
market prices. In the last two models, I weigh each observation by portfolio size. In the bottom model, I
additionally control for the log of total wealth in each portfolio.
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Figure 5.6: House Prices, Bond Yields and Discounted Rents
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Notes: Figure 5.6 plots the annual index of house prices relative to the level of discounted rents, estimated
based on Equation 5.4. The orange line plots the Holland bond yield, which is used to discount the rents.
final part of the sample, the discounted rent model explains most volatility in prop-
erty prices. However, discounted rents fail to fully capture the large cycle in property
prices that is happening between the 1710s and the 1740s. The presence of such ex-
cess volatility relative to rent prices and interest rates is a necessary condition if reach
for yield behavior impacted house prices.
Bond yields were exceptionally low and stable during this period. Between the end
of the 17th century and the 1780s, Holland issued its perpetual bonds at an interest
rate of around 2.5%. To the best of my knowledge, no other economy in the world has
ever maintained such low interest rates for a comparable time period (see Homer and
Sylla, 1996). This fact becomes even more striking if one realizes Holland sustained
this debt with a debt-to-GDP ratio of up to 200%. On the one hand, Holland managed
to build a reputation for being a very safe creditor. On the other hand, there was an
enormous pool of Dutch savers eagerly looking for a stable source of capital income
(Gelderblom and Jonker, 2011). These extended periods of low rates make Amsterdam
a useful setting to test for reach for yield behavior.
The remainder of this paper focuses exclusively on the period from 1688 to 1780,
covering the century around the boom-bust cycles between 1713 and 1750. It is during
this period that we observe that the housing boom coincides with increasing portfolio
shares on housing for the very wealthy.
Several other reasons make this period particularly suitable to study the impact of
investor demand - potentially driven by a reach for yield - on house prices. Most im-
portantly, this period is characterized as a period of economic stagnation (De Vries and
Van der Woude, 1997), implying that changes in regular economic fundamentals can-
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not explain the booms and busts in asset prices. The data also confirm this. Between
the end of the 17th century and the late 18thcentury, the housing supply and popula-
tion in Amsterdam did not change much (see Appendix 5.B). Most housing construc-
tion that did happen, improved existing homes rather than constructing new ones.
Wages and GDP were also stagnant, and the long stagnation of the Amsterdam econ-
omy makes future demand growth an unlikely driver of housing dynamics. This was
not the case for the other two cycles. During the 17th century, Amsterdam expanded
enormously, and the bust in the 1670s correlates closely with the end of this ’Golden
Age’ of the Amsterdam economy. On the other end, the fall in house prices in the late
18th century coincides with the lost Fourth Anglo-Dutch War and the demise of the
Dutch Republic in 1795. Both events are widely considered to have caused significant
economic disruption.
5.4 Investor Demand and Housing Cycles
The analysis in the previous section shows that wealthy investors, in particular those
with significant bond investments, increased their exposure to real estate and other
risky assets when interest rates were low, consistent with reach for yield behavior.
However, the portfolio data only measure the stock of investments, and thus do not
allow to identify why interest rates changed, and how this impacted the behavior of
investors on the housing market and the prices they paid. In this section, I exploit ex-
ogenous changes in the supply of government bonds to identify the causal impact of
investor demand on house prices and housing market activity. To support the identi-
fication, I describe the factors driving the supply of bonds, and subsequently estimate
their effect on prices and purchase behavior.
5.4.1 Wars, Bond Supply and House Prices
Changes in the supply of Holland bonds had important implications for the invest-
ment opportunities of large bond investors. If Holland was issuing bonds, investors
could (re)invest their capital returns in new issues, and generally did so (Gelderblom
and Jonker, 2011). When Holland did not issue bonds, investors had to purchase
bonds on the secondary market or had to invest in other assets.
Figure 5.7 plots the level of Holland public debt relative to Amsterdam house prices.
Developments in Den Bosch house prices are plotted as well and will be discussed
later in this section. The revenues from bond issuance were almost exclusively used
to finance warfare, and increases in bond supply therefore correlate almost perfectly
with periods of warfare, which are shaded in grey. Figure 5.8 plots the estimated net
rental yield relative to the net bond yield, both using average taxes and current taxes,
with periods of war again shaded in grey. The level of the net rental yield is based
on actual observations of net-of-tax yields, and assumes costs were 30% of the gross
yield.10
10See Appendix 5.D for construction of this series
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Figure 5.7: House Prices and Bond Supply, 1687-1780
1700 1720 1740 1760 1780
0
50
10
0
15
0
20
0
In
de
x 
(1
70
0=
10
0)
House Prices Amsterdam
House Prices Den Bosch
Public Debt Holland (Index)
Figure 5.8: Bond Yields and Rental Yields, 1687-1780
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Notes: Figure 5.7 reports the relation between total public debt and house prices in Den Bosch and Am-
sterdam. Figure 5.8 displays net rental yields and bond yields. The dashed line Figure 5.8 reports the net
yield based on current taxes, as taxes varied during periods of war relative to their standard values. Note
that the level of net rental yields depends on the assumed maintenance costs (40%). If actual mainte-
nance costs were different, the rental yield might be shifted up- or downwards. In both figures, periods
of major warfare are shaded in grey; the Seven Years’ War (1756-1763) is dashed because it did not involve
the Dutch Republic.
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The three main wars in this period that involved the Dutch are the Nine-Years’
War (1688-1697), the Spanish Succession War (1702-1713), and the Austrian Succes-
sion War (1740-1748). Importantly, these wars were not initiated by the Dutch Repub-
lic, but did force the Republic to issue large amounts of bonds. The Nine-Years’ War
was caused by increasing worry of the Grand Alliance (composed of Britain, the Holy
Roman Empire, the Dutch Republic, Savoy, and Spain) about the expansion of France.
They worried that France might become too powerful, in particular when the French
house would inherit the Spanish throne when its king would die, who had been ill for
a long time. It was his actual death that caused the Spanish Succession War. The same
issue repeated itself in the Austrian Succession War when the Austrian emperor died.
The Spanish Succession War had the most substantial impact for investors be-
cause it forced Holland to issue a record amount of bonds, while bond supply grad-
ually declined in the decades after the war (Figure 5.7). The influence of the Dutch
in the outcome of the war was nonetheless small. In 1713, when the Peace of Utrecht
was concluded, French diplomat Polignac said "nous traiterons chez vous – de vous - et
sans vous" ("We negotiate in your place – about you – and without you," Van Bunge,
2018).
When the Spanish Succession War ended, house prices started booming, while
they had been stable during the war and the earlier Nine Year’s War. Until the outbreak
of another war in 1740, house prices boomed, and rental yields declined substantially,
while there were only small declines in bond yields. Prices peaked in 1740 when Hol-
land resumed issuing bonds, and prices and yields started reverting.11
The relation is also apparent for the second boom, although to a much smaller
extent. In this period, investors had access to a broader set of investment opportuni-
ties outside of real estate (see Figure 5.3). Dutch investors purchased significant sums
of foreign government debt during the Austrian Succession War and the later Seven-
Years War (1756-1763), which did not involve the Dutch Republic. Beyond foreign in-
vestments, securitized loans to plantation owners in the colonies, invented in 1751,
provided new opportunities for investment in the corporate bond market (Van der
Voort, 1973).
Following the correlational evidence presented in Figure 5.7 and Figure 5.8, I aim
to identify the causal effect of bond supply on house prices. Log-differencing house
prices (∆pt ) and Holland public debt (∆log (Debt )t ) to ensure stationarity, I write
house prices as a function of changes in bond supply and a set of control variables:
∆pt =α+β∆l og (Debt )t +Γ′X t +εt (5.5)
The identification of β is challenged for three reasons. First, bonds were supplied
to fund warfare, and warfare might have directly impacted the Amsterdam economy.
Second, changes in bond supply affected taxation, which could have an impact on
house prices. Third, Holland’s bond issuing policy might have been influenced by the
11During the war, bonds purchased in the primary market earned substantially higher returns. In order
to attract investors, newly issued bonds were promised to be tax-free for the period of the war, and thus
paid a coupon of 4%. This likely explains the large and stable risk premium on housing during the first
two wars. Taxation of these bonds started several years after the Spanish Succession War ended.
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aggregate demand for financial assets, and thus be correlated to both interest rates
and house prices.
Correlation with Economic Outcomes
If the housing cycle would be the result of changes in economic conditions caused by
the war, estimates of equation 5.5 will be biased upwards. However, both contempo-
raries and economic historians have stressed that the main impact of the war was fis-
cal. In the memoirs of his travels to Amsterdam, the French philosopher Montesquieu
(1729) claims that "the commerce of Amsterdam is more flourishing during war than
peace", likely referring back to the fact that the Dutch Golden Age primarily happened
in periods of war. He also writes that the "finances of Holland are completely lost"
because the Spanish Succession War had been so expensive. Council of State member
Cornelis van Slingelandt had proclaimed the same in 1715: "This country is burdened
to sinking" (De Vries and Van der Woude, 1997). Existing historical studies also argue
that the main impact of the war on the economy was fiscal and that the direct con-
sequences of the war itself were small (e.g Dormans, 1991; Liesker and Fritschy, 2004;
Fritschy, 2017). Most of the war was fought outside of the Dutch Republic, and only
minimal fighting occurred at the border. Complemented with the fact that warfare
in the Republic was highly privatized and a significant part of the troops hired from
abroad (Brandon, 2015), this implied that few of the war spending ended up in the
Amsterdam economy, nor disturbing it significantly. The war also resulted in minimal
territorial changes.12
The data also support the hypothesis that these wars had no direct impact on the
economy. In the top part of Table 5.2, I present descriptive statistics on various eco-
nomic variables related to the state of the economy of Holland and Amsterdam, for
periods of war and periods of peace. In the last column, I report p-values of standard
difference-in-means tests. None of these differences is statistically significant, while
there are large and significant changes in Amsterdam house prices and bond supply
(middle part of Table 5.2)
To provide further support for this hypothesis, I compare house prices in Amster-
dam to those in Den Bosch (1692-1838), a small city in the south of the Dutch Repub-
lic, close to the border. Because some of the battles took place near the border, the
city hosted military troops during several wars, most notably the Spanish Succession
War. As a result, Den Bosch was more directly exposed to the wars than Amsterdam,
and subject to similar taxes. However, investors in Den Bosch were not exposed to
the market for Holland bonds. Bond markets in the Dutch Republic were local, with
each province issuing its bonds in local offices (Feenstra, 2018). Den Bosch was part
of the States of Brabant, a "Common Land" under federal rule instead of provincial
rule, and therefore did not have a provincial bond office. Investors had to travel to the
12During the Nine-Years’ War and the Spanish Succession War, the main ’gain’ of the Dutch was its
ability to station troops outside of the Dutch Republic in ’barrier cities’ in the Southern Netherlands
(current Belgium). These were supposed to provide extra protection against the French, but turned out
to be useless in the War of the Austrian Succession.
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Table 5.2: Descriptive Statistics, War and Non-War Periods, 1688-1780
Peace War
Statistic N Mean S.D. N Mean S.D. P-val.
∆ log(CPI) 60 −0.002 0.068 33 0.009 0.087 0.515
∆ log(GDP) 60 −0.007 0.080 33 0.022 0.104 0.166
∆ log(Wages) 60 0.0004 0.003 33 −0.0001 0.003 0.389
∆ log(Population) 60 −0.0004 0.005 33 0.002 0.005 0.069
∆ log(Rents) 60 0.005 0.019 33 0.0004 0.025 0.395
∆ log(ConstrCPI) 60 −0.002 0.062 33 0.006 0.101 0.689
∆ log(HPI, Amsterdam) 60 0.020 0.037 33 −0.018 0.048 0.000
∆ log(HPI, Den Bosch) 60 0.005 0.140 28 −0.017 0.259 0.675
∆ log(PublicDebt) 60 −0.0005 0.011 33 0.022 0.017 0.000
log(IntPayments) 60 16.032 0.195 33 15.937 0.201 0.031
∆ log(Yield) 60 -0.005 0.017 33 0.011 0.023 0.008
% Bond Tax 60 0.015 0.001 33 0.017 0.003 0.000
% Property Tax 60 0.164 0.025 33 0.199 0.036 0.000
% Wealth Tax 60 0.0002 0.001 33 0.002 0.006 0.196
log(ConsumptionTax) 29 15.828 0.031 31 15.850 0.070 0.110
Notes: Table 5.2 shows descriptive statistics for various annual time series used in the empirical analysis,
both for periods of peace (left) and periods of war (right). The column on the far right reports the p-value
for a t-test of equality of means.
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office that issued the bond, implying significant travel costs for out-of-town investors
(Van Bochove, 2013). Similarly, Amsterdam investors did not invest in Den Bosch’s real
estate.
Thus, if wars and taxes were causing the housing booms and busts, we should see
similar patterns in Den Bosch and Amsterdam. However, both Figure 5.7 and Table
5.2 show this is not the case. There is significant volatility in Den Bosch house prices
during the Spanish Succession War, but there are no major trends in prices during and
after the war.
Correlation with Taxation
The bottom part of Table 5.2 supports the view that the main impact of the war was
fiscal: war correlates with significant increases in public debt, higher bond yields, and
higher wealth taxes. Consumption taxes did not change. Most of these taxes had al-
ready been introduced before 1688, and could not be raised anymore (see Fritschy,
2017).
To fund the increasing debt, the government introduced extra annual taxes on real
estate and bonds during the Nine Year’s War and the Spanish Succession War. Real
estate had been taxed already since 1600, although at lower rates. During the war, the
total annual tax ranged from 1% to 2% of capital value, and this tax was similar for
bonds and real estate. In order to attract investors to the primary market, new bond
issues were tax-free for the duration of the war, which likely explains the willingness
of investors to buy bonds in this period (Gelderblom and Jonker, 2011). The taxes
remained in place after the war and were levied for the entire 18th century. Investors
viewed them as a permanent reduction in returns. All historical sources quote the 18th
century Holland coupon rate as 2.5% instead of the pre-tax 4%.
Although I will control for these taxes directly, they are an unlikely driver of the
housing cycle. Tax rates were comparable for bonds and real estate, and most of the
changes in the level of these taxes happened between 1687 and 1713 when house
prices were stable. Taxes were unchanged after 1713 until the late 1780s, except for
a brief spell in the 1740s, when rates were increased temporarily, and the government
started levying hefty one-time wealth taxes. House prices were falling when substan-
tial additional taxes were imposed in 1747-1748, but most of the decrease in house
prices had already happened in periods with more limited changes in taxes.13
Correlation with Asset Demand
Discussing the Nine-Years’ War, the British mercantilist thinker Davenet wrote that
"the act of war is reduced money," as tax capacity and access to investors had become
crucial for war engagement (Brandon, 2018). If bond issuance depended on changes
in investor demand for assets, which likely correlated with house prices, estimates
13The additional taxes in 1748 caused a significant rebellion. One of the most prominent movements,
the Doelisten, proposed to sell the public Amsterdam post offices in order to reduce taxes on real estate.
This would help to "bring real estate back to its old value, and to make the bourgeoisie flourish again."
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of Equation 5.5 would be downward biased. To circumvent this issue, I instrument
changes in public debt with a dummy for periods the Dutch Republic was engaged
in war. The exclusion restriction states that periods of war should be unrelated to
investor asset demand. Because the Dutch Republic did not initiate these wars and
played no leading role in them, this restriction is most likely satisfied.
The Dutch Republic did not participate in the Seven-Years’ War (1756-1763), but
this was unrelated to investor demand. Both during the Austrian Succession War and
the Seven Years’ War, Dutch investors were lending significant amounts to foreign gov-
ernments, primarily to England. Similar to the domestic case, these wars caused ex-
ogenous increases in the investment opportunities of Dutch investors. To estimate
their effect on house prices, I will include a dummy variable for these war periods. It is
not possible to use actual levels of foreign bond issuance, because there is no detailed
data on how new debt issues were transmitted to Dutch investors (Riley, 1980).
5.4.2 Empirical Results
In Table 5.3, I report results for both IV and OLS regressions that estimate the effect of
changes in bond supply on house prices, both in a model with and without controls.14
I only report significant control variables. Insignificant controls include tax variables
(changes in bond taxes, real estate taxes, and levels of one-time wealth taxes) and eco-
nomic variables (log changes in GDP, day wages, consumer prices, population, and
construction cost). The two significant control variables are changes in rental prices
and the annual log of interest payments to Holland bondholders. The latter was logi-
cally a vital determinant of investor demand: the more interest payments bondholders
received, the more money they could reinvest.
I find large effects of bond supply on house prices. Based on the two IV-models,
a one percent increase in bond supply reduced annual house price growth by about
1.4-1.6%. Periods of increased lending to foreign governments also led to approxi-
mately 3% lower house price growth. In line with the discussion in the previous sub-
section, the IV-estimates on the effect of changes in bond supply are higher than the
OLS-estimates. Comparing estimates across models, effects are not significantly dif-
ferent in the model with all control variables. Both significant control variables have
the predicted effects: a 1% increase in rent prices increased house prices by about
0.7%, whereas a one standard deviation (20%) increase in interest payments to bond-
holders increased annual house price growth by 1.2%. In Appendix 5.C I present an
additional robustness check that endogenizes house prices and turnover in a VAR-
model, in order to account for the presence of potential (speculative) dynamics among
house prices and turnover that cannot be captured in a standard model, as suggested
in DeFusco et al. (2017). Although I find weak evidence for such dynamics, this does
not alter any of the results presented here.
14For the IV-estimate, the first-stage F-statistic is 60.16, suggesting the instrument is strong. This can
also be derived from Table 5.2 and Figure 5.7. For both models, I use regular standard errors, as standard
tests indicated there was no evidence for autocorrelation or heteroskedasticity in the errors.
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Table 5.3: The Effect of Bond Supply on House Prices
Dependent variable:
∆pt
IV OLS IV OLS
∆log (Debt )t −1.576∗∗∗ −0.826∗∗∗ −1.420∗∗∗ −0.704∗∗∗
(0.404) (0.253) (0.389) (0.250)
For ei g nW ar Lendi ng t −0.038∗∗∗ −0.034∗∗∗ −0.027∗∗ −0.022∗∗
(0.011) (0.010) (0.011) (0.010)
∆rt 0.653∗∗∗ 0.718∗∗∗
(0.214) (0.202)
l og (IntPayment s)t 0.065∗∗∗ 0.058∗∗∗
(0.022) (0.021)
Constant 0.028∗∗∗ 0.021∗∗∗ −1.014∗∗∗ −0.911∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.005) (0.355) (0.335)
Tax Controls No No Yes Yes
Economics Controls No No Yes Yes
Observations 93 93 93 93
R2 0.096 0.177 0.316 0.379
Adjusted R2 0.076 0.159 0.213 0.286
Residual Std. Error 0.043 0.041 0.040 0.038
F Statistic 9.669 4.076
Notes: Table 5.3 reports regression estimates of Equation 5.5. Column 1 reports estimates without con-
trol variables, based on an IV regression where changes in public debt are instrumented with a dummy
variable for periods the Dutch Republic was engaged in war. Column 2 reports results for the same re-
gression when estimated using OLS. Column 3-4 reports the results of both regressions when adding
control variables. Insignificant controls (log changes in GDP, wages, population, consumer prices and
construction, percentage changes in bond and real estate taxes, and levels of one-time wealth taxes) are
omitted for brevity. Standard errors are not adjusted as diagnostic tests detected no heteroskedasticity or
autocorrelation in the residuals. ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01.
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To test more specifically whether these bond supply shocks had significant im-
pacts on yields and housing risk premia, I re-estimate equation 5.5 replacing the de-
pendent variable with changes in rental yields (∆rt −∆pt ) and changes in housing risk
premia (∆rt −∆pt - ∆it ). All models control for changes in taxes since these might
directly impact the yield. If homes are priced according to Equation 5.4, we should
expect no significant impact of changes in bond supply on housing risk premia, which
Equation 5.4 assumes to be constant.
Results for these regressions are presented in Table 5.4.15 Based on the IV-models,
a one percent increase in the supply of bonds increases rental yields by 1.3% and hous-
ing risk premia by 0.73%.16 In the OLS models, the effect is smaller, with 0.7% and
0.51% respectively. Most importantly, comparing the IV-estimates and OLS-estimates
of changes in rental yields (Column 1 and 2) with those for changes in housing risk
premia (Column 3 and 4) suggests the majority of the effect comes from a change in
housing risk premia, as the impact of bond supply shocks on risk premia is only about
40% smaller than the effect on rental yields.
5.4.3 Reach for Yield and Housing Market Behavior
To provide more specific evidence on the role of investors in the boom-bust cycle, I
use linked portfolio and transaction data to identify which investors became active in
the housing market during periods of war and peace. If reach for yield behavior was
an important factor driving down housing risk premia, we should expect increased
activity of very wealthy investors during periods of peace, in particular for investors
with significant bond investments.
I focus on purchases instead of sales because purchases were in almost all cases
concluded by the person mentioned as the buyer. Sales were often executed by heirs or
widows of the original owner, and could also be foreclosures or unidentified fire sales.
To identify all purchases for each individual, I only include transactions of individuals
with a uniqueness score ui below 1.5, which can also be matched to an individual in
the estate tax records with a Jaro-Winkler distance less than 0.175. A uniqueness score
of less than 1.5 implies that the expected number of individuals having a similar name
is less than 0.5 so that in expectation, the individual is unique. In total, the matched
sample contains 3257 individuals involved in 5,880 purchases. This is a substantial
reduction relative to the 25,967 purchases in the estate tax records. Only about 20%
of individuals had a name that could be classified as unique, and about 60% of them
purchased any real estate during their life. For all matched individuals that ever pur-
chased real estate, I compute the annual number of transactions in each year until the
year of death.
To identify the role of wealthy investors in driving housing market activity, I esti-
mate a difference-in-difference model that compares the annual number of purchases
of investors (Pur chasesi ,t ) with different levels of wealth (W ) or bond wealth over
time. Treatment periods are periods where the Dutch Republic is at war (W art ), with
15Estimation results without control variables are presented in Table 5.9
16Note these are percentage increases, not percentage points.
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Table 5.4: The Impact of Bond Supply on Yields and Risk Premia
Dependent variable:
∆(rt −pt ) ∆(rt −pt − it )
IV OLS IV OLS
∆log (Debt )t 1.311∗∗∗ 0.700∗∗∗ 0.730∗∗ 0.506∗∗
(0.357) (0.237) (0.359) (0.247)
For ei g nW ar Lendi ng t 0.024∗∗ 0.019∗∗ 0.017∗ 0.015
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
log (IntPayment s)t −0.059∗∗∗ −0.054∗∗∗ −0.038∗ −0.037∗
(0.021) (0.020) (0.021) (0.021)
Constant 0.921∗∗∗ 0.852∗∗ 0.601∗ 0.576∗
(0.340) (0.327) (0.342) (0.339)
Tax Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 93 93 93 93
R2 0.146 0.208 0.102 0.110
Adjusted R2 0.087 0.152 0.039 0.048
Residual Std. Error 0.039 0.037 0.039 0.039
F Statistic 3.754 1.778
Notes: Table 5.3 reports regression results similar to Table 5.3, with the main dependent variable the log
change in the rental yield (Column 1 - 2) and the log change in the housing risk premium (Column 3 - 4).
Column 1 and Column 3 are based on an IV regression where changes in public debt are instrumented
with a dummy variable for periods the Dutch Republic was engaged in war. Column 2 and 4 reports
results for the same regression when estimated using OLS. All regressions control for changes in taxes
and interest payments to bondholders. Standard errors are OLS errors as standard tests detected no
heteroskedasticity or autocorrelation in the residuals. ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01.
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the addition of the Seven-Year’s War, when Dutch investors were lending significant
sums to foreign entities. During these periods, bond supply increased significantly,
and bond yields rose. With observations for each investor i alive at time t, I estimate
the following regression:
Pur chasesi ,t =α0 +α1 W art +γ l og (W )i +β l og (W )i ×W art +µi ,t +εi ,t (5.6)
The main parameter of interest in this regression is β. I estimate this model with three
different measures of wealth. First, I use the log of total wealth, as indicated in equa-
tion 5.6. Second, I use a dummy variable that indicates whether the individual has
large holdings of Holland bonds while adding a control for total wealth. Large hold-
ings are defined as more than 4000 guilders, which is the level at which the effect of
bond yields on real estate investment becomes negative (see Figure 5.5). Third, I es-
timate a double difference-in-difference model that uses both the log of total wealth
and the indicator variable whether the individual has large holdings of Holland bonds.
Finally, I included fixed effects for the number of years until death, computed for each
investor, but estimated jointly. This fixed effect controls for the fact that I cannot ob-
serve the birth year of investors, such that in some cases, the data will contain periods
before investors were alive or financially mature.
In the 1720s, foreign investments became much more accessible to Dutch investors,
and investors increasingly started purchasing foreign assets (Figure 5.3). This implied
that investors also had other investment options next to real estate during periods of
peace and declining bond yields. English bonds were the most important of these. The
returns on English bonds were in between the returns on Holland bonds and Amster-
dam real estate. To account for these new opportunities, I estimate the model both
using the full sample period (1688-1780) and the period of limited outside investment
opportunities (1688-1725).
Table 5.5 reports the results of these regressions. Across all estimated models, I
find that wealthier individuals became more likely to buy real estate during periods
of peace. This effect was much more substantial in the early part of the sample when
other investment opportunities were limited (Column 4-6). On average, a doubling of
wealth led to a 0.004 increase in the number of annual real estate purchases. This is
an 18% increase relative to the base rate of 0.022 purchases per individual per year (1
purchase per 45 years).17 Of course, the effect captures both ’reach for yield’ purchases
and the fact that wealthier investors could still afford to purchase real estate when
prices were high.
After controlling for wealth, there are no effects of large Holland bond holdings
in the aggregate sample. However, when restricting the sample to periods with lim-
ited other investment opportunities, I find that large bondholders were substantially
more likely to buy real estate during periods of peace. During such periods, the ex-
pected number of purchases per year increased by about 0.01 relative to periods of
war (Column 5 and 6). This is approximately a 50% increase relative to the base rate of
17The base rate underestimates the actual number of purchases per year because I cannot observe
when individuals were born, and when they were legally able to buy real estate.
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Table 5.5: Purchase Frequency, Difference-in-Difference Regressions
Dependent variable:
Purchasei ,t : 1688-1779 Purchasei ,t : 1688-1725
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Wart 0.010∗ −0.005∗∗∗ 0.009 −0.002∗ −0.002∗ 0.009
(0.005) (0.001) (0.006) (0.001) (0.001) (0.007)
log(Wealth)i 0.004∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.001) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.001)
log(Wealth)i×Wart −0.002∗∗∗ −0.002∗∗ −0.003∗∗∗ −0.001∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
LargeBHi −0.00004 −0.002 0.009∗∗∗ 0.009∗∗∗ 0.007∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
LargeBHi×Wart −0.005∗ −0.0004 −0.012∗∗∗ −0.009∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004)
Constant −0.002 0.003 −0.004 0.001 0.014 0.008
(0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010)
Years-to-Death FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 217,450 217,450 217,450 125,007 125,007 125,007
R2 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.013 0.013 0.013
Adjusted R2 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.012 0.012 0.012
Residual Std. Error 0.235 0.235 0.235 0.190 0.190 0.190
F Statistic 21.344 21.005 20.795 21.983 21.743 21.491
Notes: Table 5.5 reports estimates from the difference-in-difference regression that measures the effect of
wealth and / or large bondholdings on the number of purchases. The dependent variable is the number
of purchases per individual per year. Column 1 reports estimates of the base-line regression reported in
Equation 5.6, which measures the effect of wealth on the annual number of purchases during periods of
war and peace. Column 2 compares individuals with large bondholdings (over 4000 guilders) to individu-
als with no or limited bondholdings, both during periods of war and peace. I control for the log of wealth
in this regression. Column 3 reports results for a regression that combines the specifications in Column
1-2, comparing individuals with different wealth levels and different bond investments, both during pe-
riods with and without war. Columns 4-6 report the same regression as Columns 1-3, but restrict the
sample period to 1688-1725, when international investment was minor. All regressions contains fixed
effects for the years until death ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01.
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purchases for large bondholders. This finding supports the earlier portfolio evidence
and shows that investors actively started purchasing higher-yielding real estate assets
when Holland stopped issuing bonds, and yields declined.
To provide insight into the dynamic timing of these effects and to check for un-
observed time trends, I re-estimate the regression reported in Column 2 of Table 5.5
for 5-year periods, instead of only distinguishing periods of war and peace. Figure 5.9
plots for each period the estimated coefficient that measures the effect of large bond
holdings on the number of purchases per year, controlling for the log of total wealth.
As a baseline, I take the period of the Nine-Years’ War between 1688-1697.18 Bond-
holders became increasingly more likely to purchase real estate both after the end of
the Nine Years’ War and after the Spanish Succession War. This effect diminished over
time and disappeared by the mid-1730s, consistent with the increase in alternative
investment opportunities in this period.
Figure 5.9: Difference-in-Difference Estimates, per 5-years
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Notes: Figure 5.4 plots the estimated difference-in-difference coefficients that compare for each five-year
period the annual number of purchases of large bondholders to those of investors with no or limited
bond investments, while controlling for the log of total wealth. For example, in the period from 1718-
1722 large bondholders purchase 0.015 more properties per year than non-bondholders. The average
number of purchases in the sample is 0.022 per year.
5.5 Implications
In the main body of this paper, I have shown that the cycles in Amsterdam house prices
between 1688-1780 were caused by changes in investor demand for real estate and that
18I aggregate these periods, because the number of matched transactions in this period is small due to
missing data.
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reach for yield behavior played a crucial role in these demand changes. In this section,
I analyze the broader implications of these findings and link them to modern debates.
I look at implications for the development of financial markets, the distribution of
housing wealth, and the role of credit in housing booms and busts.
5.5.1 Private Credit
The booms and busts in Amsterdam were not caused by changes in mortgage credit,
as the size of the mortgage market was negligible in this period (see also Appendix
5.B.4). This finding contrasts with the recent US housing boom and bust, which was
accompanied by massive changes in mortgage credit. Policymakers have suggested
this credit boom was related to increased demand from foreign investors for US as-
sets, who viewed mortgages as a safe alternative for Treasuries (Bernanke et al., 2005,
2011). In Amsterdam, increased investor demand translated directly into real estate
investment, rather than increased mortgage supply. However, changes in investor de-
mand for real estate were accompanied by booms and busts in non-mortgage credit.
Figure 5.10 plots the volume of newly registered non-mortgage loans relative to
house prices.19 The two series are very closely correlated, although the market for
non-mortgage credit was much smaller in size, both in terms of flow and stock. An-
nual registered loan volume was about 30% of total real estate transaction volume, and
the stock of total investment in these loans averaged only 6% of total real estate invest-
ment because most loans had short maturities relative to the average holding periods
of real estate.
Why were there similar changes in investment in real estate and non-mortgage
loans, even though mortgage loans themselves were small? Most likely, the same fac-
tors that drove the increase in real estate investments also increased the supply of
non-mortgage loans. When bond supply halted, and bond yields declined, wealthy
investors sought alternative higher-yielding investments. Interest rates on nominal
private debt were about 4%, and supplying private non-mortgage loans was thus an-
other way for investors to increase their expected returns.20
What do these findings imply for modern debates? First, a credit boom is not a
necessary condition for a housing boom, as nearly all housing investment was paid di-
rectly rather than financed using loans. Second, increased investor demand can cause
developments in housing markets and credit markets to be correlated, without induc-
ing a causal relationship between housing and credit. Because investors were looking
for alternative investment opportunities next to government bonds, they started pur-
chasing real estate, but also provided more private loans.
19These series are constructed based on archival registrations of mandatory taxes on registered private
debt contracts (see Appendix 5.D). They exclude beleningen, repo-type short-term loans secured on fi-
nancial assets. No such registrations exist for mortgages, because mortgages were free of taxes, as real
estate purchases were already taxed.
20The number of investment portfolios with non-mortgage loans is too small to estimate directly
whether changes in the share of investment in these loans were related to changes in bond yields.
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Figure 5.10: House Prices and Private Non-Mortgage Credit
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Notes: Figure 5.10 plots the total value of newly issued non-mortgage loans in each year (right axis) and
the nominal house prices index (left axis).
5.5.2 Financial Market Development
In the early part of the 18th century, investors only had a handful of investment op-
portunities, and international investment was negligible. However, international in-
vestment increased to around 25% of total wealth by the 1770s. Although many dif-
ferent explanations have been put forward, economic historians have, among others,
attributed the development of international financial markets in this period to the lim-
ited availability of attractive investment opportunities within the Dutch Republic (Ri-
ley, 1980; De Vries and Van der Woude, 1997). Put differently, low returns in Holland
caused investors to search for yield abroad. However, without data on bond yields and
investor portfolios, it is difficult to test this proposition.
To identify whether the investment in ’new’ financial assets was related to low
yields, I re-estimate Equation 5.3 with the share of wealth invested in foreign assets
and plantation loans as the dependent variable. Investments in these assets were im-
possible or difficult at the start of the sample but developed during the 18th century.
Although the returns on these assets differed markedly from each other, all had higher
yields than Holland bonds. I estimate this model both using value-weighted and un-
weighted observations. I also estimate a third model that adds a dummy for periods
of warfare, which exogenously increased the supply of these new assets.
Figure 5.11 shows the results of these regressions. In brackets, I report the mean
weighted exposure per wealth group to investments in foreign assets and plantation
loans. Investments in these assets were negligible for the bottom three quartiles but
substantial for the wealthiest investors. In line with the findings for real estate, I find
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significant increases in the share of wealth invested in these ’new’ assets when rates
were low. For the 5% largest estates, a 1% reduction in bond yields increased the share
of wealth in these assets by more than 20%, relative to a mean exposure of 19%. The
enormous effect size suggests that reaching for yield was an important motivation to
start investing abroad, and might have fueled the development of international capital
markets and new financial instruments.
Figure 5.11: Bond Yields and New Assets
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Notes: Figure 5.11 plots the coefficients from a regression that relates the share of wealth in new assets
(foreign assets and plantation loans) to the level of the bond yield, for each of the six wealth classes, with
95% confidence intervals. This coefficient measures the effect of a 1% change in bond yields on the share
of wealth invested in foreign assets and plantation loans. In parenthesis, I report the share of wealth that
each group, on average, invested in these assets. All models use the market value of domestic bonds.
In the bottom two models, I weigh observations by portfolio size. In the third model, I add a dummy
variable for the Austrian Succession War and the Seven-Years’ War.
There could be drawbacks to these developments. For example, newly-developed
plantation loans, securitized mortgages on plantations in the Caribbean, dramatically
went bust following the 1773 financial crisis (Van der Voort, 1973). In the housing
market, reaching for yield magnified housing booms and busts. Thus, while reaching
for yield might contribute to financial market development, it can also increase asset
price volatility. Policymakers have expressed similar concerns in recent discussions
about reaching for yield, and the historical case of Amsterdam suggests they might
very well have a point. Before the financial crisis, Rajan (2006) raised similar issues.
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5.5.3 Housing Wealth Inequality
In the early parts of the 18th century most reaching for yield investments were made
in real estate. Because the Amsterdam housing stock was fixed in this period (see Ap-
pendix 5.B), investors bought these properties from less wealthy home-owners. Many
investors used buy-and-hold strategies (De Vries and Van der Woude, 1997), implying
that much of this real estate wealth remained in their hands. Thus, investor demand
for real estate might have redistributive effects. This is a major reason why policymak-
ers are currently concerned about buy-to-let investments.
To estimate if investor purchases resulted in shifts in the distribution of housing
wealth, I estimate for every ten years the distribution of housing wealth within each
wealth group in the estate tax records. Figure 5.12 reports these distributions. Con-
ditional on owning any wealth, the distribution of housing wealth was relatively sta-
ble over time, except for one major change. In the ten years between 1715-1724, the
heyday of reaching for yield by wealthy investors, the share of Amsterdam real estate
wealth owned by the largest 5% of estates jumped from 20% to 34%. After 1725, there
were no significant changes in housing wealth inequality anymore.
Figure 5.12: Housing Inequality
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Notes: Figure 5.12 plots for each 10-year period the cumulative distribution of real estate wealth in the
sample of estate records, distinguishing five different groups of wealth.
Although Amsterdam society was already highly inegalitarian, the real estate pur-
chases of investors in this period further increased the inequality in housing wealth.
Importantly, this increase was persistent. Housing wealth inequality did not reduce
when the boom went bust, as investors held on to their properties. This result may still
underestimate the actual increase in housing wealth inequality. If wealthy investors
purchased the property of people that did not have any other wealth beyond their own
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house, these individuals would not show up in the estate tax records anymore because
they had sold all their assets.
5.6 Conclusion
This paper shows that investor demand for real estate played a crucial role in gen-
erating large booms and busts in house prices in historical Amsterdam. When wars
ended, and Holland stopped issuing bonds, wealthy rentiers could not reinvest their
interest payments in new bond issues. Instead of buying bonds in the secondary mar-
ket, investors increasingly purchased real estate, inflating house prices. Wealthy bond-
holders were reaching for yield: Facing declining bond yields, they invested increasing
shares of their wealth in real estate. As a result, housing wealth inequality increased,
and house price volatility exacerbated.
The historical case of Amsterdam has valuable lessons for today. Although the
modern world does not entirely resemble Amsterdam’s rentier society, investors still
face similar trade-offs. When rates are low, investors either have to accept lower lev-
els of return and adjust their saving and consumption, or they can switch to assets
with higher expected returns and risk. Now interest rates are at historically low lev-
els, there is a lively debate about the existence and implications of reach for yield be-
havior. The recent surge in current Amsterdam house prices, as well as other cities,
has been linked to such increased investor demand (e.g. Nijskens et al., 2019). How-
ever, contrary to the 18th century, it is much more challenging to identify the impact
of investor demand on prices, and whether these investors are reaching for yield. The
historical Amsterdam case shows that individual investors actively decide to reach for
yield when interest rates are low and that such episodes can trigger substantial and
prolonged increases in asset prices, which might go bust when interest rates increase
again.
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5.A Additional Context Data
5.A.1 Real Estate Registrations
There existed a comprehensive and mandatory system of real estate registrations in
Holland since the 16th century (see Van Bochove et al., 2015). This system likely evolved
from medieval practices in the Southern Netherlands, where such registrations took
place already in the medieval period. The central authority in the registrations of
real estate were local law courts (schepenbanken), where aldermen (schepenen) rati-
fied and registered each real estate transaction. Although central laws were governing
the registration of mortgages and real estate in the Dutch republic, exact customs and
practices varied slightly from place to place.21 For Amsterdam, much of the practical-
ities and customs regarding the real estate and mortgage markets can be found in the
books of Rooseboom (1656) and Van Wassenaer (1737). These two documents formed
a vital source for the remainder of this section.
In Amsterdam, the oldest surviving register of real estate sales dates from 1563,
while the last transactions were registered in February 1811. In total, there were five
different legal ways to transfer real estate. The first, and by far the most common, were
regular property sales. To ratify these sales, buyers and sellers had to appear in front of
aldermen, who created an act of ordinaris kwijtschelding (ordinary remission). Buyers
had to bring two guarantors for the transfer. Buyers and sellers that were legally not
allowed to transact property, such as women or children, had to be represented by
guardians. The acts followed a standard format, and a full English transcription of one
such act is given below, for the purchase of property by the painter Rembrandt. The
acts contained the most relevant information regarding sales. First, they contained the
date and the names of the buyer(s) and the seller(s) of the property, and sometimes
also their profession. Representatives were often listed as well. Importantly, the acts
always mentioned the names of the original and future owners of the property. For
example, if the owner was deceased, the seller(s) would be referred to as the ’heir(s)
of’ the original owner. The same applied for buyers and sellers not legally allowed
to transact property, such as women and children. Properties could have multiple
sellers, while multiple buyers occurred less frequently. Second, the act contained a
short description of the property and its location. Most transactions are classified as
’house and land’, but sometimes the acts provide more detail. It was also possible to
own a property partially, and a few percents of the acts mention that parts of properties
were sold.
Homes had no house numbers in this period. Acts identified the location of prop-
erties based on street names, a near point of interest, or the names of owners of sur-
rounding properties. Unfortunately, the latter has not been collected in the database
used for this study. Last, and most importantly, the aldermen included the transac-
tion price for each transfer. Unfortunately, this practice only started in 1637 for regular
sales.
21Many of the applicable rules can be found in the placaatboeken, published in Cau et al. (1658), which
contained ordonnances of the Dutch Republic
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In case a homeowner defaulted on a loan or fell behind tax payments, his property
could be transferred per executie kwijtschelding. In this case, the property would be
sold in a foreclosure auction organized by the City of Amsterdam, and the transfer reg-
istered with the aldermen. Before such an auction, creditors had to seize the debtors’
assets via the bailiff of Amsterdam. This would give the debtor the possibility to repay.
If he did not, the aldermen provided creditors a letter that would allow them to auction
the property. Creditors were not allowed to participate in the auction but had the right
to buy the asset from the winner of the auction in case the proceedings of the auction
were not sufficient to repay the debt fully. The earliest registrations of these executie
kwijtscheldingen date from 1604 and already include transaction prices.
Because there was a (limited) market for private credit, and real estate the most
important collateral for credit, it was possible that creditors still possessed claims on
properties that the debtor had already sold. Usually, creditors retained this claim until
one year after the purchase. However, to shorten this period, buyer and seller could
agree to sell via a procedure of willig decreet at the Court of Holland (see Van Iterson,
1939). The sale would be announced publicly three times with intervals of 14 days,
which would give creditors the time to announce themselves, and settle the debt. Af-
terward, the sale would be registered and creditors would lose their claim on the asset,
and could only be paid directly by the debtor. Such a procedure also existed for fore-
closures sales, when the sale would be registered as onwillig decreet. Although not a
foreclosure sale in itself, willige decreten were used frequently when there was signifi-
cant concern that debt would not be repaid: the number of decreten correlates closely
with the number of foreclosure sales.
The last way to transfer property was via the weeskamer (orphan chamber), a local
authority in charge of the asset management of orphans’ possessions. They had the le-
gal authority to registers property transactions involving the property of orphans and
recorded those in their books of weesmeesterverkopingen. They were not registered
with the aldermen.
Transcription Figure 5.1
This subsection contains the transcription of the real estate transaction in Figure 5.1.
In bold are the elements that have been transcribed.
In margin: sold for fl. 13000
We, Cornelis van Vlooswijck and Gerrit van Hellemont, alderman in Amsterdam, write
and acknowledge that for us have appeared Christoffel Thys and Jan Beltens as heirs of
Pieter Beltens de Jonge, and have sold and remitted to Rembrandt Hermansz a house
and yard standing on the Breestraat, over the Sint Anthonis sluice, on the west-side,
with a free exit or pass-through to the house of Claes Elias, as has been explained in the
acts of remittance about those, and this being the house and yard that is or was next
to that of Claes Elias, with the entire wall on the north west side and that of Salvador
Rodrigues on the south east side, and reaches from the street until the house and yard
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that belongs to Bastiaen Jacobsz Kistemaecker. And those that have appeared have
already committed to the terms, and the principal has brought Isaac van Beecq and
Dirck Dircks Grijp (jointly appeared) as joint guarantors, and each has promised with
all their movable property that this house and yard has and will be remitted year and
day, as one has promised to do, and to remove older acts. This is what the sellers have
each promised, and the principal has also promised to keep the guarantors free from
losses under the agreements written above. Entered January 8, 1653.
5.A.2 Estate Tax Records
To reconstitute the investment portfolios of Amsterdam citizens, I use data from archival
records of estate taxes, the so-called collaterale successie. Inheritances from parents
towards children were free of taxes, but inheritances in collateral lines were taxed with
a 5% inheritance tax. In 1745, these taxes were increased to be either 5%, 6.66%, or
10%, depending on the distance between the heir and heiress. Registrations of these
inheritances have survived in the archives from 1663, although registrations in the
early 17th century do not always seem complete.
Every record contains a full list of assets owned by the deceased individual. Most
assets were valued based on their market price on the day of registration. However,
domestic government bonds were valued at par as long as there had been no formal
write-offs on the debt. To value properties, the city of Amsterdam employed several
assessors that would appraise the properties owned by the deceased individual. Sec-
tion 5.A.2 provides a transcription of one of these records.
I have collected and transcribed 25,672 of these registrations, covering all registra-
tions between 1688 and 1780. I classify each asset in each registration in six different
aggregate asset classes, which are reported below in section 5.A.2. If a deceased indi-
vidual had borrowed money, these loans would be subtracted from the total value of
its assets. I exclude these liabilities from my analysis: these loans already appear on
the asset side (since every borrower has a lender).
There are three potential problems with these sources. First, they only give infor-
mation on wealth at death, and only for those that do not inherit in the direct line.
Wealth at death might not be entirely representative of aggregate wealth in society.
This might be particularly pronounced for individuals without children, who make
up the majority of registrations. Second, tax evasion might lead to a bias in the esti-
mated portfolios and valuations. The incentive to evade taxes is most significant for
the wealthiest, who generally have different investment portfolios compared to indi-
viduals with less wealth. Carter (1953), who used these records to estimate foreign
Dutch investment between 1740 and 1790, also discusses this issue.22 She concludes
that this concern is not of major importance. Similarly, the dissertations of Prak (1985);
Kooijmans (1985); De Jong (1985), conclude these sources sketch a representative pic-
ture of total investment.
22Unfortunately, she only separated domestic and foreign investments, such that her data could not be
used for this study
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To test in more detail whether these sources are representative of the total distri-
bution of wealth, I use summary statistics on taxes on burials and marriages from Hart
(1973). Amsterdam introduced these taxes during the Seven Years’ War to finance the
growing debt service. These taxes were progressive, and based on total wealth level.
There was no tax (pro deo) for individuals without any wealth, and the taxed increased
based on total wealth.
Table 5.6 shows the percentage of the population in each tax bracket conditional
on owning any wealth for both burial records, marriage records, and the estate tax
records. In general, the two distributions overlap each other very well. The main dif-
ference between the estate tax records and the burial tax records originates from the
under-registration of small estates. However, Hart (1973) reports that his figures might
significantly overstate the share of the population in the fourth investment class be-
cause many individuals without any wealth might have decided still to pay the small
tax in the first wealth class (3 guilders). Hart (1973) argues some did so in order to
avoid being classified as ’unwealthy’. If a few percent of the population without any
wealth did so, the measures from the estate tax records would match up with those
from Hart (1973).
Table 5.6: Representativity Collaterale Successie
% of Population with Wealth
Marriage tax Burial tax Estate tax
First class (> 12000) 0.197 0.225 0.218
Second class (6000−12000) 0.093 0.096 0.127
Third class (2000-6000) 0.201 0.209 0.259
Fourth class (< 2000) 0.509 0.47 0.396
% Pro Deo 0.852 0.797
Notes: Table 5.6 shows the fraction of wealthy citizens within each wealth class based on three different
sources: estate taxes, marriage taxes and burial taxes. For the latter two categories, I also report the share
of individuals without any wealth. The records from the burial taxes and marriage taxes might slightly
overstate the number of people in the fourth class, as people sometimes reported to possess wealth in
order not to be classfied as poor.
The data in Hart (1973) also allow us to estimate what fraction of individuals is
covered by the estate tax records. Any individual that died with real wealth paid burial
tax, but only those without inheritance in the direct descending line paid estate tax.
Excluding estates under 2000 guilders, the number of estate tax records with an as-
set value larger than 2000 guilders is 32% of the total number of burials with wealth
above 2000 guilders. The estate tax records thus cover about a third of individuals in
Amsterdam that owned any wealth.
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List of Assets and Examples
For each estate tax record, I distinguish sixteen asset classes, which I aggregate in
seven major asset classes:
1. Real Estate
• Amsterdam real estate (any real estate within Amsterdam)
• Non-Amsterdam real estate: (real estate outside of Amsterdam, mostly land)
• Other real estate (leaseholds, usufruct, life rentals etc.)
2. Domestic Government Bonds
• Holland bonds (various types: bills, life annuities, perpetuals, lottery bonds)
• Other government bonds: municipal bonds, other provincial bonds, Gen-
erality debt (federal debt), admiralities)
3. Corporate Bonds
• Corporate bonds (Dutch East India Company, Dutch West East India Com-
pany and other colonial enterprises)
• Plantation loans (securitized mortgages to plantations in the Caribbean)
4. Equity
• Stock (Dutch East India Company, Dutch West East India Company and
other colonial enterprises)
• Investment funds (mutual funds, tontines)
5. Repo
• Belening: (short-term) loans with financial assets as collateral
6. Private debt
• Non-mortgage debt (schepenkennissen, losrenten, notarial obligations)
• Mortgage-debt (kustingsbrieven)
7. Foreign investments
• English debt (annuities, obligations in Bank of England, South Sea Com-
pany, East and West India Company, Million Bank, Exchequer debt etc.)
• English stock (stocks in traded companies)
• Other foreign debt (primarily government bonds in German cities and Aus-
tria, later also in France, USA, Russia, Sweden, Denmark and Norway)
• Other foreign equities
178 CHAPTER 5. REACH FOR YIELD AND REAL ESTATE
Transcription Figure 5.2
This subsection contains the transcription of the estate tax record in Figure 5.2. In bold
are the elements that I transcribed. Iadded the asset class in parenthesis. The num-
ber of assets varies highly across records: wealthy individuals could own hundreds of
different assets.
Transcription:
Left with Willem van Collen, deceased 22 October 1740.
1500 British pounds capital stock in the Royal Bank of England, valued at 141 per-
cent with a 34 percent exchange rate and 4.25% bank agio. 22985 guilders and 15
stuivers (English stock: foreign investments)
A life annuity from the Province of Friesland, dated the 3rd of April 1695, to the
body of Maria Amstenraad, 61 years old, at 45 guilders per year. 180 guilders (Holland
bonds: domestic government bonds)
A 32-year interest letter from the Generality Office in The Hague, on the name of
Emerentia Kerkrink, widow of Jacob Bak, dated 20 February 1711, capital sum 100
guilders where 3/32 part remains. 93 guilders and 15 stuivers (Other government
bonds: domestic government bonds)
1/47 part in 25000 guilders capital obligations from the Roman Emperor on the
Quicksilver, by contract of survival (tontine) number 5, dated 10th January 1736, folio
19. 531 guilders and 18 stuivers (Investment fund: equity)
1/47 part in the same contract, folio 20. 531 guilders and 18 stuivers (Investment
fund: equity)
We, Mayors and Rulers of the City of Amsterdam, declare that for us has appeared
Zacharias Zijlmans, as executor of the will of Willem van Collen, and has by this means,
adhered to the Law Passed by the Highly Esteemed Lords of the States of Holland and
West Friesland, on the means of the 20th penny, enacted the 11th of March 1623, and
testified and confirmed that the registration of the estate of Willem van Collen, as far
as it is due the 20th penny, is true and right, without any evasion or withholding. May
God Almighty Help Him. Dated 11th of January 1741.
5.B Additional Historical Context
5.B.1 House Price Developments and Turnover
Figure 5.13 plots developments in nominal prices, where the CPI (from Van Zanden,
2018) is used as deflator, together with estimates of turnover. I discuss the estimation
of turnover in the subsection below.
In the long-run, house prices have not changed much, while (unreported) real
prices declined slightly.23 The average level of turnover is about 3%, which makes mar-
23The long-term developments in prices are similar to the Herengracht index from Eichholtz (1997).
However, the Herengracht index from does not reveal the very strong boom-bust cycles of the index in
figure 5.13. The correlation of the log growth rates between the updated annual Herengracht index (Am-
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Figure 5.13: House Prices and Turnover, 1585-1810
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Notes: Figure 5.13 reports the developments in nominal house prices and turnover. The level of turnover
is interpolated and dashed in some years in the 17th century, when transaction data is missing.
ket activity similar to what is reported for various European countries today (Dröes
and Francke, 2017). The general decline in house prices does not seem very surprising
in the historical context: the index starts during the Dutch Golden Age, while ending in
the French period, which is widely considered as a period of major crisis in the Dutch
economy (De Vries and Van der Woude, 1997).
Of course, the most interesting developments in house prices and turnover are
over the shorter-term: there are very strong cycles in both house prices and turnover.
During the Golden Age, the population of Amsterdam expanded rapidly, increasing
from about 30,000 in 1580 to over 200,000 in the 1660s. To accommodate these in-
creasing population numbers, the City of Amsterdam was expanded based on large
planned extension, that, among others, led to the construction of its famous canal ring
(see Abrahamse, 2010). From the late 17th century, population numbers and housing
supply did not change anymore.
The first and second extensions of the city happened in the 1580s and 1590s, and
these extensions led to considerable activity in the real estate market: there are two
large cycles in turnover in this period. Plans for the third extension of the city were
made in 1609 when the 12-year truce in the Eighty Years’ War with the Spanish started.
At the same time, activity in the real estate market spiked again, most notably for
properties outside of the city walls, which were the subject of the planned extensions.
brose et al., 2013) and my index is also very low: 0.068. As indicated previously, this seems the result
of the low number observations in the Herengracht index, rather than differences in house prices at the
street level: an unreported index of all three major Amsterdam canals (Herengracht, Keizersgracht, Prin-
sengracht) almost entirely mimics Figure 5.13.
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Prices increased during the 12-year truce but started falling substantially between
1625 and 1629 when nominal prices declined by 25% and real prices even by 45%.
The subsequent recovery was strong, and likely constituted one of the most massive
booms in Amsterdam housing history: between 1629 and 1645 nominal and real house
prices increased respectively by 133% and 180%, while turnover increased significantly
as well. Although there was a downward trajectory in prices during the late 1640s and
early 1650s, house prices remained at high levels, and increased towards the peak of
the boom in 1664, coinciding with the height of the Dutch Golden Age (De Vries and
Van der Woude, 1997). Until 1682, following significant political turbulence in the Re-
public, both nominal and real house prices declined by more than 50%. The decline
was particularly sharp following the Dutch ’year of disaster’ 1672: between 1672-1674
house prices decline by 8% per year in nominal terms and even 11% in real terms.
After more than 30 years of stable house prices, a second major boom-bust cycle
started in 1714. Prices reached their peak in 1739 and reverted to their initial values
by 1750. Although less significant, turnover appears to have experienced a similar
cycle. The last major boom-bust cycle started in 1760, with the bust being particularly
significant. After the Batavian Revolution in 1795, which made the Republic almost
entirely dependent on France, prices declined in the following five years on average
by 11% per year in nominal terms and 13% in real terms. By 1810, nominal house
prices had declined by more than 70% relative to 1786, and real prices even by 75%.
Interestingly, this was also the only period where turnover moved opposite to house
prices. Relatively cheaper properties mostly drove these increases in turnover. It is
thus very well possible that these were distress sales, where low-income households
sold their assets to obtain liquidity for basic needs. However, over the entire sample,
the contemporaneous correlation between house prices and turnover is positive and
significant (r = 0.114).
Estimating Turnover
The construction of a turnover index requires estimating the number of homes trans-
acted annually and the total number of homes in the city. To start with the first, I iden-
tify for each transaction the number of homes that are involved. Most transactions are
for one home, but partial sales or multiple sales frequently occur as well. For trans-
actions that combine residential and non-residential sales, only the residential part
is counted. Subsequently, I adjust for periods with missing data. Since the registers
were chronological, data is either complete or entirely missing. If a missing register
does not cover an entire year, and more than three months of data is still available for
that year, I estimate annual turnover by dividing the total number of transactions in
these months by the share of transactions that, on average, occur in these months. I
made no estimates of turnover for the ordinaris kwijtscheldingen prior to 1582 due to
a lack of data. Data from orphan sales are excluded, as it does not represent the buying
and selling behavior from property owners, but rather the management of the orphan
chamber.
In the last step, I scale each of the series by the size of the market. Such a step
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is necessary, as the city of Amsterdam expanded significantly in size during the 16th
and 17th century. Tax registers reveal that from the 1680s, the size of the city and the
number of homes stayed constant. In this period, there are in total around 25,000
properties in the city, of which about 90% was residential real estate.24 It is more dif-
ficult to obtain estimates on the number of homes before 1680 when Amsterdam ex-
panded significantly in size and had vast suburbs, which were rarely included in the
tax records. Therefore, I rely on existing estimates of the Amsterdam population from
Nusteling (1985) and Van Leeuwen and Oeppen (1993), and scale these based on es-
timates of the number of people per home. For 1680, I assume the number of people
per home was equal to the number obtained from the tax records of 1733 (9.4 peo-
ple per home). Before 1632, I assume 8.42 people per home based on the number of
homes reported in Lourens and Lucassen (1997). Between 1632 and 1680, the number
of people per home is interpolated linearly.
5.B.2 Housing Supply
Any discussion of the historical housing market in Amsterdam cannot bypass the dras-
tic evolution of the city and its economy during the 16th and 17th century. In the
1570s, Amsterdam was a small city with an estimated population of only 25,000 peo-
ple (Nusteling, 1985). After joining the Dutch Revolt against the Spanish in 1578, and
aided by a large inflow of refugees from the Spanish Southern Netherlands, the city
started growing substantially both economically and demographically. It was in this
period that Amsterdam developed into the mercantile capital of the world: the Golden
Age. From the 1580s until the 1660s, Amsterdam’s population increased to over 200,000,
approximately a quarter of the total population of Holland. The city its government
started a coordinated expansion of the city, which has been described extensively in
Abrahamse (2010). This four-stage expansion took place between 1585 and the late
17th century, and expanded the size and housing supply of the city substantially.
The extensions of the city left a crucial mark on the developments in Amsterdam’s
real estate market. In the first place, the growth of the city significantly increased hous-
ing demand and supply, leading to increased activity in the real estate market. Second,
during the extensions, real estate investment boomed. Figure 5.14 presents statistics
on the annual transaction value in the Amsterdam housing market, in total and per
capita terms.25
Per capita housing investments peaked in the late 1580s and early 1590s, when the
first and second extension of the city took place, and during the 1610s when the third
major extension took place. Developments in total transaction value and transaction
value per capita were virtually the same since the 1660s, as the population of Amster-
dam did not change much after 1660. As a result of the stagnation, the city was unable
to sell all plots of land made available during the fourth extension of the city, which
took place in the second half of the 17th century. The city took its loss and converted
24Source: ACA 5044, inv. nrs. 402-405
25Population estimates are from Nusteling (1985) before 1680, and from Van Leeuwen and Oeppen
(1993) for 1680-1810
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Figure 5.14: Transaction Value Amsterdam Real Estate, 1585-1810
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Notes: Figure 5.14 reports the annual total value of all real estate transactions. Prior to 1665, when the
city grew substantially, I also report per capita investment. The series only include years in which data is
complete or available for at least 6 months (with transactions adjusted for missing months). When data
is missing, I used interpolation (dashed).
part of these plots into gardens. These were only converted into residential areas when
the population started expanding again in the late 19th century (Abrahamse, 2010).
These patterns are also visible when looking at actual construction and popula-
tion data. Figure 5.15 plots the level of population in Amsterdam, and the rental value
of annually completed construction. Due to the existence of property taxes, new con-
struction was valued when it was completed, and records of these taxations have sur-
vived in the Amsterdam City Archives for most years after 1650. I have aggregated
all of these to measure the total rental value of new construction relative to the total
rental value of the housing stock. After the 1670s, new construction in Amsterdam was
negligible.
5.B.3 Real Estate Taxation
The system of real estate registration helped both to identify and define property own-
ership, and allowed for the taxation of real estate, which was among the most impor-
tant forms of taxation in the Dutch Republic. There were various taxes on real estate,
which existed until the French changed the system of real estate registration and taxa-
tion at the beginning of the 19th century.26 The first tax was the ordinaris verponding,
which was a tax on the rental revenue that could be generated from a property, inde-
26Note that beyond specific real estate taxes, the Dutch government also frequently levied wealth taxes,
which included real estate (see e.g. Liesker and Fritschy, 2004)
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Figure 5.15: Population and Construction in Amsterdam
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Notes: These series report developments in construction and population for Amsterdam. Gross con-
struction corresponds to the total rental value of newly completed or renovated buildings relative to the
total rental value of all buildings in the city. For the 18th century, I also report net construction, which
measures the net total change in rental value in Amsterdam.
pendent of tenure status or actual rental prices. Before 1733, this tax was 12.5% on the
calculated annual rental value. From 1734 until 1805, the tax was reduced to 8.33%.27
The aldermen organized the registration of these taxes, and most of these registers
have survived in the archives.28 The second tax was the extraordinaris verponding.
This was a tax on the total value of the property and was in most cases 1% or 0.5%
of the total value. This tax was levied about once a year on all homes in the city, but
its frequency varied depending on the financing needs of Holland. The tax became
permanent at end of the 17th century, and continued to be levied until the early 19th
century.29 The valuations of each property were written down in the tax registers, but
rarely updated: in the period of study only in 1632 and 1732 completely new valuations
occurred. In other years, only homes that were newly constructed had to be revalued,
as well as properties that were split.
The taxation of property in Amsterdam differed from the practices in most mod-
ern economies. In most countries, the tax system favors homeownership, because im-
puted rents are not taxed or because mortgage interest can be deducted from taxable
income. Although fiscal frictions between housing and rental markets were absent in
Amsterdam, there was one aspect of taxation similar to some modern markets: the
27Effectively, this did not reduce taxes, since rent prices had increased substantially since 1632 when
the last assessment of rental values was made
28Source: ACA 5044, inv. nrs. 228-454
29Source: ACA 5045, inv. nr. 1-323
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presence of transaction taxes. In Holland, such transaction taxes existed at least since
the late 16th century. Regular sales were taxed with a 2.5% transaction tax on total
value, and notary records reveal that this transaction tax was typically shared by buy-
ers and sellers.30 For execution sales, the transaction tax was 1.25% because the seller
could not contribute to the tax for logical reasons. In 1645, Amsterdam added a city
transaction tax, amounting to 1.25% on regular sales and 0.625% for execution sales.
This tax was only levied on homes sold within the walls of Amsterdam. In 1687, all
transaction taxes were increased by 10%, so that the total transaction tax on regular
sales was 4.125% and execution sales 2.0625%.
5.B.4 Credit, Mortgages and The Housing Market
In Amsterdam, as in many other pre-modern economies, private credit was supplied
via peer-to-peer loans (Hoffman, 2000; Gelderblom et al., 2017). These loans could
be registered with the aldermen, with notaries or arranged without the interference
of aldermen or notaries. Registration of loans with the aldermen established a senior
claim on the borrower’s collateral and was in Amsterdam the most common form of
private loans.31 Importantly, it was mandatory to register mortgages (kustingsbrieven)
with the aldermen (see Cau et al., 1658; Rooseboom, 1656; Van Wassenaer, 1737) By
law, mortgages were the most senior form of debt and exempt from transaction taxes
because the property purchase itself was already taxed.
There were two ways to obtain a mortgage: using a private annuity (losrente) or
a private obligation (schepenkennis). Losrenten were private annuities similar to con-
sols: the debtor paid a fixed annual interest rate to the creditor, and always had the
option to redeem the debt by repaying the principal. Nearly all losrenten registered
with the aldermen were used to purchase real estate and had loan-to-value ratios of
up to 100% (average of 69%). Most schepenkennissen were provided as non-mortgage
loans, but in a small number of cases, they were also used for mortgage provision.
Schepenkennissen had a fixed maturity, often of a few years. In the case of mortgages,
they were most often used to set a payment schedule so that the buyer could pay the
purchase price in different installments (usually three installments six months apart).
In that case, they often did not specify an interest rate.
To estimate the size of the market for long-term mortgages (losrenten) relative to
the housing market, Figure 5.16 plots the annual number of newly issued private an-
nuities relative to the number of transactions in the housing market. The vast majority
of these annuities were used as mortgages to finance real estate purchases. During the
boom in the 17th century, almost 20% of real estate purchases were financed using
such a long-term mortgage. However, the market for these long-term mortgages dis-
appeared towards the end of the 17th century. This implies that the long-term mort-
gage market cannot be a causal driver of the booms and busts in the housing market
in the 18th century.
30Source: ACA 30452, inv. no. 504
31This excludes the market for beleningen, which were particular repo-type loans collateralized on fi-
nancial securities.
5.C. ADDITIONAL ROBUSTNESS CHECKS 185
Figure 5.16: Real Estate Transactions and Private Annuities
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Real estate transactions
Losrenten contracts (annuities)
Notes: These series report developments in the number of new long-term mortgages relative to the total
number of real estate transactions To avoid underestimation of the number of real estate transactions,
the series only contains years in which all transactions have survived. Mortgage counts are based on
mandatory annual registrations of private annuities (ACA 5044).
It is possible that schepenkennissen were relatively more frequently used as mort-
gages in the 18th century compared to the 17th century, as their average maturity in-
creased over time (Gelderblom et al., 2017). However, it is unlikely that the disappear-
ance of the market for long-term mortgages was fully compensated by an increase
in the number of mortgages issued schepenkennissen. Data from Gelderblom et al.
(2017) show that much fewer loans were registered with the aldermen in Amsterdam
during the 18th century. Although these data do not cover mortgage loans registered
as schepenkennis, it seems reasonable to assume that the trend in the number of long-
term mortgages and the number of non-mortgage loans also extended to short-term
mortgages.
5.C Additional Robustness Checks
The empirical analysis in section 5.4.2 assumes that shocks to the supply of bonds
directly increased house prices, as these shocks influenced the demand for real estate
of investors. These shocks thus increased both prices and the number of transactions
of wealthy bondholders exposed to the shock (see Table 5.5).
This approach neglects potentially richer dynamics among changes in housing
sales and house prices. Recently, various papers have modeled the dynamic relation-
ships between prices and volume to understand the build-up of speculative booms
and busts (e.g Piazzesi and Schneider, 2009; Glaeser and Nathanson, 2017; DeFusco
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et al., 2017). One important implication of these studies is that a positive shock to
house prices (or optimism about house prices) might endogenously attract more buy-
ers to the housing market. Such speculative behavior could manifest itself in a positive
feedback loop between prices and turnover, which is often observed empirically in the
form of momentum effects and predictability of prices with turnover. These specula-
tive mechanisms might have also been present in historical Amsterdam, and could be
another potential reason why house prices changed more than would be predicted on
the basis of standard housing fundamentals (Figure 5.4). In line with this, Figure 5.13
displays a positive correlation between prices and turnover in this period.
Empirically, such mechanisms could manifest itself through lead-lag relationships
between house prices and turnover (Ling et al., 2015; Dröes et al., 2017; DeFusco et al.,
2017). In line with existing empirical studies, I therefore estimate a more flexible ver-
sion of Equation 5.5 that endogenizes log changes in house prices and turnover (TO)
in a VAR model, with periods of war directly used as an exogenous variable. I also
estimate a second model with a more extensive set of control variables xt .[
∆l og (HPI )t
∆log (T O)t
]
=
[
β′1
β′2
][
∆log (HPI )t−1
∆log (T O)t−1
]
+
[
γ′1
γ′2
][
xt
]+[ε1,t
ε2,t
]
(5.7)
I estimate Equation 5.7 both using one-year changes and two-year changes be-
tween 1688 and 1780, as empirical literature finds that dynamic relationships among
these variables are stronger at the two-year level (DeFusco et al., 2017). Table 5.7 re-
ports the results using one-year changes in prices and turnover, and Table 5.8 using
two-year changes.
In line with current literature, changes in house prices are better predicted by
lagged changes in turnover and prices at the two-year level than at the one-year level.
While there is significant evidence for a momentum effect at the two-year level, there
is only feeble evidence that turnover predicts prices. Taken together, this suggests that
the exuberant changes in house prices during the boom and bust were not purely the
result of speculation. More importantly, endogenizing prices and turnover does not
change the main finding of the paper: outbreaks of war, through their effect on in-
vestor demand, had substantial impacts on house prices. This effect is significant in
all models, and also holds after including control variables. While periods of war also
correlated negatively with changes in the level of turnover, this effect is barely signifi-
cant.
It is important to note that the small number of observations at the two-year level
makes it hard to identify the precise economic and statistical significance of momen-
tum and price-turnover effects.32 However, the long length of the boom makes it un-
like that the boom was purely speculative. House prices increased from 1713 until
1740, which is much longer than what is typically assumed in a speculative boom.
Such a long boom would be more consistent with heightened investor demand for
housing, because interest rates were persistently low in this period, and declined only
gradually.
32These effects are larger and more significant when studying the entire sample period
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Table 5.7: Results VAR model, One-Year Changes
Dependent variable:
No controls With controls
∆pt ∆tot ∆pt ∆tot
∆pt−1 0.020 0.349 −0.055 0.368
(0.103) (0.355) (0.099) (0.371)
∆tot−1 0.026 −0.240∗∗ 0.004 −0.233∗∗
(0.031) (0.108) (0.030) (0.114)
W art −0.035∗∗∗ −0.035 −0.037∗∗∗ −0.013
(0.010) (0.033) (0.010) (0.037)
For ei g nW ar Lendi ng t −0.024∗∗ 0.001 −0.018∗ −0.005
(0.010) (0.034) (0.010) (0.036)
∆rt 0.742∗∗∗ 0.373
(0.199) (0.748)
log (IntPayment st ) 0.040∗ 0.070
(0.021) (0.080)
Constant 0.025∗∗∗ 0.016 −0.611∗ −1.119
(0.006) (0.021) (0.340) (1.277)
Economic Controls No No Yes Yes
Tax Controls No No Yes Yes
Observations 92 92 92 92
R2 0.238 0.081 0.434 0.183
Adjusted R2 0.203 0.038 0.332 0.034
Residual Std. Error 0.040 0.138 0.037 0.138
F Statistic 6.788 1.908 4.224 1.231
Notes: Table 5.7 presents empirical estimates for Equation 5.7, with dummies for periods of war and for-
eign war lending included as exogenous variables in the first VAR (Columns 1-2), and the full set of con-
trols used in the second VAR (Columns 3-4). All changes are one-year changes. Changes in the log level of
turnover are based only on regular sales; the construction of this measure is discussed in Appendix 5.B.
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01.
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Table 5.8: Results VAR model, Two-Year Changes
Dependent variable:
No controls With controls
∆2pt ∆2tot ∆2pt ∆2tot
∆2pt−1 0.239∗ −0.258 0.281∗∗ −0.350
(0.133) (0.390) (0.136) (0.414)
∆2tot−1 0.090∗ −0.162 0.047 −0.147
(0.053) (0.154) (0.057) (0.173)
W art −0.049∗∗ −0.107∗ −0.053∗∗ −0.046
(0.019) (0.055) (0.021) (0.063)
For ei g nW ar Lendi ng t −0.037∗ −0.037 −0.014 −0.049
(0.020) (0.058) (0.021) (0.063)
∆rt 1.163∗∗∗ 1.278
(0.323) (0.983)
l og (IntPayment st ) 0.024 0.085
(0.045) (0.138)
Constant 0.036∗∗∗ 0.063∗ −0.357 −1.318
(0.012) (0.036) (0.727) (2.214)
Economic Controls No No Yes Yes
Tax Controls No No Yes Yes
Observations 46 46 46 46
R2 0.438 0.111 0.650 0.402
Adjusted R2 0.383 0.024 0.492 0.131
Residual Std. Error 0.056 0.163 0.050 0.153
F Statistic 7.989 1.276 4.118 1.486
Notes: Table 5.7 presents empirical estimates for Equation 5.7, with dummies for periods of war and for-
eign war lending included as exogenous variables in the first VAR (Columns 1-2), and the full set of con-
trols used in the second VAR (Columns 3-4). All changes are two-year changes. Changes in the log level of
turnover are based only on regular sales; the construction of this measure is discussed in Appendix 5.B.
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01.
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5.D Overview Data and Data Sources
This appendix provides a list of all used data sources in this paper. Note that sources
from the Amsterdam City Archives are abbreviated as ’ACA’.
5.D.1 Primary Data
Real estate transactions, Amsterdam: ACA 5061, inv. nrs. 2163-2182; ACA 5062 inv.
nrs., 1-200; ACA 5066, inv. nrs. 1-58; ACA 5067, inv. nrs. 1-47; ACA 5073, inv. nrs. 910-
931. See main text and Appendix 5.A for further detail.
Onwillige decreten: Dutch National Archives, Archief van het Hof van Holland (entry
no. 3.03.01.01). Data on foreclosure sales in Amsterdam executed via the Court of Hol-
land. Only 59 of such transactions happened in Amsterdam, and I therefore do not use
them for further analysis.
Real estate transactions, Den Bosch: Wetzer (2018). Transcribed registrations of real
estate transactions from the "Bossche Protocol". Transaction data is available from
the period from 1660-1665 and from 1692-1838. The structure of the data is similar to
the database from Amsterdam.
Estate tax records: ACA 5046, inv. nrs. 1-71. See main text and Appendix 5.A for fur-
ther detail.
Marriage and burial records: ACA 5005, inv. nrs. 401-1276. Registrations of marriages
and burials for the city of Amsterdam between the early 1550s and 1810. Digitized data
kindly provided by the Amsterdam City Archives.
Construction: ACA 5046, inv. nrs. 226, 228, 223, 235-239, 246-253. ACA 5045, 171.
These registers contain the appraised rental value of all new or ameliorated buildings
in Amsterdam. I collected data on each of these between 1632-1739 and 1763-1782.
To convert this into a construction measure, I expressed the total level of construction
as a percentage of the total rental value of the housing stock. I obtained data on the
latter from property tax registers (ACA 5046, no 229 and ACA 5044, 246-294).
Long-term mortgage loans: ACA 5065, 24-34. To compute the annual number of long-
term mortgage contracts, I used mandatory registrations of long-term private mort-
gages (losrenten, with kusting). I counted each contract in these registers between
1634-1800. These mortgages were annuities that required the debtor to pay an annual
interest until he redeemed the loan and repaid the capital sum. Because these loans
had no maturity, some lasted for centuries. Although most of these loans were directly
used to purchase real estate, a small number of them were used for other purposes.
Short-term non-mortgage loans: ACA 5047, 1-105. I use data on transaction taxes
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for new non-mortgage loans registered with the aldermen, listed in books registering
each tax payment. For each of the 105 books, I counted per page the number of new
loans and their total value. Although registration of these loans was not mandatory, it
was often required by the lender, as it established a senior claim on the posted collat-
eral. See Gelderblom et al. (2017) for more detail on these loans.
Net rental yields: ACA 5048, 86-88, 154-156 and 214-230. To compute net rental yields,
I obtained data on 785 actual gross yields from auctions of properties that listed both
the rental price and the sales price (between 1737-1739, 1778-1779, and 1799-1803).
To transform these into net rental yields, I subtracted the level of annual taxes and as-
sumed maintenance costs to be 30% of the gross rent. To construct an annual index of
yields, I used the existing index of rent prices and house prices, which I benchmarked
using the net rental yield in 1799-1803 (similar to Jordà et al. (2019a)). To verify the
accuracy of this procedure, I compared the yields in 1737-1739 and 1779-1780 that
were implied by the benchmarked indices to those based on actual data. The absolute
difference in the average actual yield and the yield implied by the index was less than
0.5% in both cases.
5.D.2 Secondary Data
Property taxes: I compute the level of property taxes as a percentage of the rent or
rental value of each property. I started from the 1733 revaluation of property taxes
(ACA 5045, 203-268), which lists for each property in Amsterdam the standard annual
property tax paid after the revaluation (8.33% of rental value) and before the revalua-
tion (7.6% of rental value). This tax had to be paid between once and three times per
year. To compute the level of annual property taxes, I use data from Fritschy (2017)
that details how often property taxes were levied each year.
Fiscal data: Fritschy (2017). I use the following series from her database, which cov-
ers the period from 1600-1794: the annual level of public debt, the annual level and
annual percentage of bond tax, the annual level of consumption tax, annual extraor-
dinary wealth taxes, and annual interest payments to holders of Holland bonds. All
these series are for Holland only.
Bond yields: Gelderblom and Jonker (2011). These are transaction prices of Holland
annuities (losrenten) from the secondary market in Gouda, a city nearby Amsterdam.
Before 1670, bond yields are assumed to equal the annual interest rate, due to the
absence of prices from the secondary market. This series ranges from 1600 to 1794.
Between 1795 and 1804, I use data on the yields of Holland bills from the June price
list of the Maandelykse Nederlandsche Mercurius, correcting for the yield difference
between annuity yields and yields on Holland bills. This difference averaged 0.3% and
was fairly stable. To compute the difference, I used a small sample of transactions
prices from Holland bills sold in Amsterdam during the 18th century (from ACA 5068,
1-266).
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GDP: Van Zanden and Van Leeuwen (2012). The annual value of the Gross Domestic
Product of Holland between 1500 and 1807.
Wages: Van Zanden (2018). Day wages of construction workers in Amsterdam.
CPI and Construction Cost: Van Zanden (2018). Standard consumer price index, with
a separate construction cost component.
Population: Van Leeuwen and Oeppen (1993). Population estimate for Amsterdam at
5-year intervals, between 1680-1993. Before 1680, I used data from Nusteling (1985). I
interpolated data linearly.
Rent prices: Eichholtz et al. (2020b). Residential repeat-rent index for Amsterdam.
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5.E Supplementary Tables and Figures
Table 5.9: Impact of Bond Supply on Yields and Risk Premia, No Controls
Dependent variable:
∆(rt −pt ) ∆(rt −pt − it )
IV OLS IV OLS
∆log (Debtt ) 1.413∗∗∗ 0.670∗∗∗ 0.738∗∗ 0.444∗
(0.377) (0.234) (0.368) (0.239)
For ei g nW ar Lendi ng t 0.030∗∗∗ 0.026∗∗∗ 0.020∗∗ 0.018∗
(0.010) (0.009) (0.010) (0.009)
Constant −0.022∗∗∗ −0.015∗∗∗ −0.014∗∗ −0.012∗∗
(0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005)
Observations 93 93 93 93
R2 0.037 0.134 0.048 0.064
Adjusted R2 0.016 0.114 0.027 0.043
Residual Std. Error 0.040 0.038 0.039 0.039
F Statistic 6.948 3.060
Notes: Table 5.3 reports regression results similar to Table 5.4, excluding control variables. The dependent
variable in Columns 1 and 2 is the log change in the rental yield. In Columns 2 and 3 it is the log change
in the housing risk premium. Column 1 and Column 3 are based on an IV regression where changes in
public debt are instrumented with a dummy variable for periods the Dutch Republic was engaged in war.
Column 2 and 4 reports results for the same regression when estimated using OLS. Standard errors are
OLS errors as standard tests detected no heteroskedasticity or autocorrelation in the residuals. ∗p<0.1;
∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01.
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5.F List of Archival References
Amsterdam City Archives, Archief van de Thesaurieren Extraordinaris (entry no. 5044).
Amsterdam City Archives, Archief van de Honderdste en Tweehonderdste Penningkamer
of Commissarissen tot de Ontvangst van de Honderdste en Andere Penningen (entry
no. 5045).
Amsterdam City Archives, Archief van de Secretaris: stukken betreffende de ontvangst
van de twintigste penning op de Collaterale Successie (entry no. 5046).
Amsterdam City Archives, Archief van de Secretaris: stukken betreffende het toezicht
op de ontvangst van de veertigste, tachtigste, twintigste penning en de hele en halve
veertigste penning (entry no. 5047).
Amsterdam City Archives, Archieven van de Schout en Schepenen, van de Schepenen
en van de Subalterne Rechtbanken (entry no. 5061).
Amsterdam City Archives, Archief van de Schepenen: kwijtscheldingsregisters (entry
no. 5062).
Amsterdam City Archives, Archief van de Schepenen: register van rentebrieven en van
transporten van los- en lijfrenten (entry no. 5065).
Amsterdam City Archives, Archief van de Schepenen: register van willige decreten van
het Hof van Holland (entry no. 5066).
Amsterdam City Archives, Archief van de Schepenen: register van afschrijvingen bij de
willige decreten (entry no. 5067).
Amsterdam City Archives, Archief van de Burgemeesters: willige verkopingen (veilin-
gen van huizen, erven en obligaties) (entry no. 5068).
Amsterdam City Archives, Archief van de Weeskamer en Commissie van Liquidatie der
Zaken van de Voormalige Weeksamer (entry no. 5073).
Dutch National Archives, Archief van het Hof van Holland (entry no. 3.03.01.01).
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Chapter 6
Demography and the Housing
Market*
Population aging is one of the most important trends that is currently affecting global
society. The share of the global population above age 65 rose from about 5% to 8%
between 1950 and 2015 and is projected to double to 16% by 2050 (United Nations,
2017). These trends do not affect all countries equally. In most western economies the
large baby boom generation has started to retire, while in developing countries the
number of young adults is still increasing. These changes in demographic structure
could have profound implications for housing markets, and the main aim of this paper
is to empirically estimate how changes in demographic structure affect the housing
market and real estate investment.
A large number of financial studies has investigated how changes in demographic
structure affect asset prices and portfolio choice (e.g Abel, 2001, 2003; Geanakoplos
et al., 2004; DellaVigna and Pollet, 2007; Collin-Dufresne et al., 2017; Leombroni et al.,
2020). The main finding in this literature is that the demand for risky assets decreases
over the life-cycle so that comparatively large cohorts of young (old) people will in-
crease (decrease) asset prices. However, it remains extremely difficult to estimate and
predict the impact of these changes empirically. Demographic changes tend to be very
gradual, and due to changes in the economy, birth cohorts do not only differ by age,
but also by the economic trajectories they have experienced.
Most financial literature has not studied the role of housing, and focused on the
impact of demographic changes on bond and equity investment, even though hous-
ing is typically the largest asset in household portfolios. Estimating the effect of demo-
graphic changes on house prices is even more complicated, because housing serves a
dual role as a consumption asset and an investment asset. Existing housing market
literature studying the impact of demographic changes on house prices, typically as-
sumes that consumption demand for housing differs over the life-cycle (e.g Mankiw
and Weil, 1989; Takáts, 2012; Eichholtz and Lindenthal, 2014; Hiller and Lerbs, 2016;
Green and Lee, 2016), and does not distinguish between age-dependent changes in
*This chapter is co-authored with Marc Francke (University of Amsterdam).
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investment and consumption demand.
In this paper, we make two key contributions. First, we exploit long-term de-
mographic and housing data spanning four centuries, to show that large birth co-
horts consistently predict increasing house prices 25 to 30 years later, when entering
the housing market, and declining prices about 60 to 65 years later, when approach-
ing the end of their lifetime. By linking individual demographic data to investment
portfolios and housing transactions, we show that these aggregate patterns in house
prices match micro-level evidence on housing transactions and investment portfolios:
The fraction of wealth in real estate and the number of real estate purchases increase
strongly at early ages, but declines and reverses at older ages. For bond investment,
we document the opposite. Second, we separate pure housing demand effects from
investment demand effects by considering the impacts on rents prices, house prices,
and rent-price ratios. We show that the predictability of housing costs with demo-
graphic data appears both in house prices and rental prices, but that the effect is much
stronger when looking at house prices. This suggests demographic housing consump-
tion demand effects are modest relative to age-dependent investment demand effects.
The long-term approach we take in this paper has three main advantages over the
existing literature. First, the time span of our data is sufficiently long to study the
actual predictability of demographic rates for housing costs over very long horizons.
We study the period from the 16th century to 1913, covering many different genera-
tions over centuries with relatively limited economic growth. This long sample period
makes it possible to separate cohort effects from economic effects. This is difficult us-
ing modern data with a more limited time span, because 20th-century birth cohorts
differ both by age and by the economic trajectories they experienced. Second, changes
in demographic rates were much more frequent in the high-birth and high-death rate
periods that we study, implying our data cover multiple baby booms and busts. Recent
literature has focused on the post-war baby boom only, because birth rates dropped
gradually for the remainder of the 20th and 21st centuries. Third, government inter-
vention in the housing market was limited in the time period that we study (16th – 19th
century). Our analysis focuses on Amsterdam, both due to excellent data availability,
and the fact that its housing and capital markets developed early on, and functioned
similarly to modern markets. We also study rental markets in Paris. In the 20th cen-
tury, large swings in demographic rates around the World Wars happened at the same
time that governments in most western economies started introducing strict rent con-
trols, which significantly impacted house and rent prices. It is therefore difficult, if not
impossible, to identify demographic demand effects using more recent data.
The effect of population aging has been studied in urban economics, real estate,
and in the broader literature on asset pricing. The general asset price literature hy-
pothesizes that the aging of the ‘baby boom’ generation led to rising asset prices in the
1990s as ‘baby boomers’ began to save for retirement and that asset prices would fall
when this generation retires, and when they would sell part of their assets.
Various theoretical studies using overlapping generation models (among others
Abel, 2001, 2003; Geanakoplos et al., 2004; Leombroni et al., 2020) show that the demo-
graphic structure might exert a strong influence on aggregate asset prices. Geanakop-
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los et al. (2004) predict from a theoretical model – calibrated on stylized facts in the US
during the postwar period – that (1) the price-dividend ratio is proportional to the ratio
of middle-aged to young adults (MY), (2) real rates of return on equity and bonds are
increasing in the change of the MY ratio, and (3) the equity premium covaries with the
reciprocal of the MY ratio. Collin-Dufresne et al. (2017) take into account that younger
people update beliefs in response to aggregate shocks more than older people.2
Poterba (2001, 2004) documents that there is limited robust evidence for the ‘asset
market meltdown view’: the view that asset prices would fall substantially when the
baby boom generation retires. Poterba (2004) concludes that ‘the correlation between
asset returns on stocks, bonds, or bills, and the age structure of the US population
over the last seventy years, is weak.’ The positive correlation between the share of the
population in the prime working years and the price-dividend ratio is the most robust
finding.3
The housing market literature on demographic demand effects starts with the sem-
inal work of Mankiw and Weil (1989), who examine the impact of demographic changes
on house prices in the United States, primarily using contemporaneous correlations
between demographic demand and house prices. Based on cross-sectional census
data, they show that housing demand is negligible in childhood, increases sharply
from age twenty to thirty, and flattens out afterward. They attributed much of the
house price rises in the 1970s and 1980s to the ‘baby boom’ generation entering the
housing market and predicted that prices would fall in the 1990s due to the much
lower housing demand from the ‘baby bust’ generation. Unsurprisingly, their find-
ings generated significant attention in media outlets and were followed by a significant
academic debate. While their critics generally accept the notion that housing demand
is age-dependent, they generally disagree that this would lead to price predictability
(see Woodward, 1991; Hamilton, 1991; Holland, 1991; Engelhardt and Poterba, 1991).
In later studies, Pitkin and Myers (1994) and Green and Hendershott (1996) also show
that the cross-sectional Mankiw and Weil demand estimates crucially depend on how
age effects are separated from cohort effects. After properly accounting for cohort ef-
fects, the effects of the age-structure on the population are much smaller.4
2They incorporate generational learning bias in an ‘overlapping dynasties model.’ The model gen-
erates persistent periods of significant over- and underpricing, related to small, persistent mistakes in
cash flow expectations on the part of the agents in the economy. Moreover, the price-dividend ratio is
empirically more sensitive to macroeconomic shocks when the fraction of young in the population is
higher.
3Goyal (2004) finds that demographic structure in stock market regressions adds explanatory power.
DellaVigna and Pollet (2007) find that for age-sensitive industries, demographic demand growth fore-
casts significantly predict future stock returns in these sectors while finding no effects for other indus-
tries.
4With debates about population aging gaining prominence again, recent studies have re-examined
the impact of the demographic structure on prices. Eichholtz and Lindenthal (2014) and Green and Lee
(2016) make further refinements to estimate the housing demand function by measuring willingness to
pay for various housing characteristics across various age groups and cohorts. Takáts (2012) documents
that the old-age dependency ratio correlates negatively with house price growth in developed countries.
Hiller and Lerbs (2016) find a similar result for German cities, but also note significant heterogeneity
across market segments, with population aging even positively associated with real rent growth.
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As housing is both a consumption and investment good, we analyze the impact of
demographics on rents, prices, and rent-price ratios. Rents move only due to changes
in demand for housing services, while rent-price ratios move to changes in investment
demand. Housing prices contain both components. Specifically, we test for a positive
(negative) relation between current rents and lagged fertility for cohorts correspond-
ing to young adults (seniors). Likewise, we test for a negative (positive) relation be-
tween current rent-price ratios and lagged fertility for cohorts corresponding to young
adults (seniors). Our central identifying assumption is that historical fertility predicts
current housing and asset demand, but is unrelated to other economic variables that
could be correlated with current housing and asset demand, after adjusting for basic
economic fundamentals such as consumer prices and wages. One implication of the
age-dependency of housing demand is that contemporaneous fertility should have a
negligible impact on housing costs.5
We find that changes in the demographic structure have small effects on rents. For
Amsterdam, a one percentage point increase in fertility about 25 years ago increases
current rents by 1-1.5%. We find slightly larger effects for Paris of about 2%. These
effects disappear for younger and older cohorts, and turn negative for fertility lags
corresponding to cohorts in their late fifties or sixties, although these effects are small
(around -1%) and only weakly statistically significant. However, we find statistically
significant impacts of changes in the demographic structure on house prices and rent-
price ratios in Amsterdam. A one percentage point increase in fertility about 25 years
ago increases current house prices by 5.4% and reduces rent-price ratios by about 5%.
We find opposite effects for cohorts born around 60 years ago: increases in fertility 60
years ago increase current rent-price ratios and decrease house prices by about 4%.
There are no statistically significant effects for other cohorts.
To interpret these results, and identify how they can inform us about the impact
of changes in demographic structures on modern markets, we extensively discuss our
findings and the differences between the modern context and the historical context
we study in this paper. First, we study the role of changing demographic structures
over time. To compare our estimates to modern times, we should account for the fact
that levels of fertility and mortality have changed drastically since the mid-19th cen-
tury. In the 1850s, only 48% of Amsterdam babies would survive until age 25, and this
percentage was likely similar before 1850 (Van Leeuwen and Oeppen, 1993), as well
as in other cities (e.g. for London: Clark and Cummins, 2009). Correspondingly, we
should roughly double our estimates if we extrapolate them to a fertility regime with
negligible child mortality, as in most modern developed countries.
To show that our results are driven both by changes in consumption and invest-
ment demand for housing, and likely still extend to today, we exploit several micro-
5This theoretical prediction does not imply that housing costs are unrelated to fertility. Building on the
notion that children are a normal good (Becker, 1960), Lovenheim and Mumford (2013) show that house
price booms increase fertility among home-owners, while they document no effect for renters. For first-
time homebuyers or young households, Dettling and Kearney (2014) and Laeven and Popov (2017) find
that the effect of a housing boom is negative, as it makes purchasing a house more expensive and thus
reduces housing consumption and fertility.
6.1. DATA 199
level datasets on housing consumption and investment in Amsterdam.
First, we link property rental values in the 1832 housing census to their inhabitants
based on the 1851 personal census. We show that housing demand increased rapidly
in early adulthood, and decreased at older ages. This shows that the age structure
of housing demand in the historical demographic regime did not vary substantially
from the structure documented today (Mankiw and Weil, 1989; Green and Lee, 2016),
although declines in housing demand at older ages appear smaller today.
Second, in order to estimate the age composition of buyers and sellers in the hous-
ing market, we link data from marriage certificates to housing transactions. We show
that the years after marriage, which happened on average at age 28, were the most
common years to purchase real estate. On the other hand, housing sales peak at about
35 years after marriage, around the age of 65.
Finally, we link marriage certificates to asset portfolios at death for individuals that
died in Amsterdam between 1688 and 1780. Given the limited knowledge about health
and disease, death typically came suddenly during the time period we study. Compar-
ing individuals that died at different ages, approximated by the number of years since
marriage, we show that individuals that died shortly after marriage possessed a rela-
tively larger fraction of their wealth in real estate compared to individuals that were
old. In line with models that compare investments in equity and bonds, we document
the opposite relationship for bonds, with older individuals possessing a larger fraction
of their wealth in bonds.
In summary, our long-term historical evidence shows that demographic structure
is a crucial component of the demand for housing and other assets. Changes in de-
mographic structure exert large and predictive impacts on house prices, and smaller
impacts on rental prices. The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 6.1
briefly introduces the various data sources and the compilation of the aggregate series,
and their limitations. It also gives a descriptive overview of the demographic history
of Amsterdam and Paris. Section 6.2 presents the estimation results from the effect
of lagged fertility on current rent prices, house prices, and rent-price ratios. In Sec-
tion 6.3 we discuss these results and provide empirical results from housing market
activity and portfolios in line with our major findings, and analyze how our historical
results relate to the modern context. Section 6.4 concludes.
6.1 Data
6.1.1 Demographic Data
To construct annual time-series of demographic rates for Amsterdam and Paris we
combine archival sources and published studies. Beyond constructing series of his-
torical fertility, the key variable of interest in this paper, we also make use of data on
mortality and marriages. We will use annual time series of death rates, migration rates
and marriage rates as controls in our main analysis. For Amsterdam, we also use the
marriage data to link the age of individuals, approximated by the number of years
since marriage, to their portfolio composition and housing market activity.
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For Amsterdam, we use archival civil registers on all individual births, marriages,
and deaths in Amsterdam before 1810. These have been digitized by the Amster-
dam City Archives (ACA), and are available from 1554 (deaths) and 1565 (births, mar-
riages).6 After 1810 we make use of aggregated numbers of births, deaths, and mar-
riages from the Gemeente Amsterdam (1923) and the yearbooks of the Amsterdam
Statistical Office (Gemeente Amsterdam, 2019). These same sources also supply pop-
ulation and migration estimates after 1850. For the period before 1850, we use popu-
lation numbers from Nusteling (1985) and Van Leeuwen and Oeppen (1993) that are
available at five-year intervals. To transform these to annual numbers, we use actual
fertility and mortality data, while interpolating the implied migration estimates from
the population series.
The archival civil registers are not complete: In a small number of cases, records
from a church or cemetery are missing for some years. More importantly, there might
be an under-registration of births in the early period: After the Reformation of Ams-
terdam in 1578, Catholic baptisms were likely under-registered for extended periods.
Additionally, registration of Jewish births, which we retrieved from Hart (1976), only
survived from the late 18th century onwards.7
To compute crude Amsterdam birth and death rates in this period, we use an an-
nual weighted-average of the normalized number of births and deaths per church or
cemetery. In any year, we only include churches or cemeteries for which records are
complete, and normalize these based on the 25-year moving average of the number of
births or deaths in that particular church or cemetery. For births, we normalize for the
period 1565–1780, while for deaths we do so for the period 1554–1685. To transform
this to a crude birth and death rate, we assume that average fertility between 1565 and
1780 was the same as between 1780 and 1810. For mortality, we use the average rate in
the period 1685–1810. For other periods, records are sufficiently complete such that
we can use annual counts scaled by population numbers.
For the normalized series, there is no need to scale using population estimates. As
long as there are no significant non-linear population changes, the normalization is
an accurate estimate of actual birth and death rates. Amsterdam population grew sig-
nificantly in the late 16th and early 17th century, but there is significant uncertainty
regarding the level of population in this period, as also acknowledged in Nusteling
(1985). For this reason, we also normalize marriage rates between 1565 and 1585: scal-
ing by the contemporaneous population estimates leads to extreme values.
To approximate actual migration numbers at an annual level before 1850, which
we will use as a control variable, we construct estimates on the migration of wealth-
ier citizens by looking at citizenship purchases (poorterschap) between 1564 and 1733,
which were not necessary to live in Amsterdam, but provided certain privileges.8 For
6Source: ACA inv. nr. 5001 and inv. nr. 5009.
7For a more detailed discussion of these issues, see Nusteling (1985).
8Source: ACA 5014, Archief van Burgemeesters: stadsrekeningen. Privileges included access to the
municipal orphanage, membership of guilds, and the possibility to be considered for a position in the
Amsterdam government. It was either acquired at birth, through marriage with a ‘poorter’, or could be
purchased for 50 guilders. Based on population estimates, around 10% of migrants bought ‘poorter-
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the period 1733–1830, we use estimates of attestations from the Dutch Reformed Church,
the largest congregation in Amsterdam, that are published in Hart (1976). Such an at-
testation was requested when a member of the church moved from or to Amsterdam.
The Dutch Reformed Church was the largest congregation in Amsterdam, covering
about half of the population. From 1850, actual estimates of migration are available
from the yearbooks of the Amsterdam Statistical Office. Since the various migration
estimates have different scales, we normalize each component of the entire series us-
ing z−scores.
For Parisian demographic data, we rely on a multitude of publications on the an-
nual number of births, deaths and marriages Biraben and Blanchet (1999) and Charlot
and Dupâquier (1967) together with the Annuaire Statistique de la Ville de Paris, avail-
able from 1880 to 1967 (Mairie de Paris, 1967b). For the remainder, we use data pub-
lished by INSEE, the French Statistical Office. We transform these to crude birth, mar-
riage and death rates, based on population numbers of Biraben and Blanchet (1999)
for the pre-revolution period, and data from INSEE and the Parisian Annuaires from
the Revolution onwards. For Paris, we have no information on migration.
Figure 6.1 plots the resulting series of fertility for both cities, both at an annual
level (Figure 6.1a) and for five-year periods (Figure 6.1b). Most large shocks in fer-
tility and mortality can be related to major historical events. For example, in Paris
fertility dropped and mortality increased during and after the Siege of Paris (1590). In
Amsterdam, most mortality shocks before 1700 are related to outbreaks of the plague
(Noordegraaf and Valk, 1996). The post-World War II baby boom is clearly visible as
well.
Beyond these short-term events, the long-term evolution of the series is in line
with most of the existing literature. Until the mid-19th century, both fertility and mor-
tality were at high levels and varied significantly from year to year. Relative to today,
populations were relatively young with most of the urban population under age 30
and the fraction of older populations declining by age, given the much lower life ex-
pectancy. In the 19th century, both fertility and mortality started declining substan-
tially. The decline in fertility occurred much earlier in Paris, where fertility started to
decline around 1825, while in Amsterdam, this happened only 60 years later. Fertility
increased again during the baby boom after World War II. In Paris, both also soar after
World War I, which had much less of an impact on The Netherlands. The historical
evidence suggests that such baby booms are not unique historically, and particularly
when looking at five-year intervals it becomes clear that periods of relatively high and
low birth rates frequently followed each other.
6.1.2 Housing Market Data
For house prices, we combine several datasets of individual Amsterdam transaction
prices. For the period between the 1600s and 1810, we make use the of database of Ko-
revaar (2020), which covers all housing transactions in Amsterdam between 1700 and
1810, and the majority of housing transactions in the 17th century. Korevaar (2020)
schap’, which probably belonged to the upper class of society (Kuijpers et al., 2002).
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Figure 6.1: Fertility Rates
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(b) 5-Year Birth Rates
Notes: These figures report the estimate birth rates per 1000 inhabitants for both Paris and Amsterdam.
Birth rates are high and volatile until the late 19th century, when they gradually start declining. Birth
rates increase again after World War I (in Paris) and after World War II (both cities).
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estimates a repeat-sales index for Amsterdam in the period 1625–1810, with 57,113
repeat-sales identified from a dataset containing all transactions in Amsterdam in this
period. We combine the repeat-sales pairs in his paper with 5,269 repeat-sales prices
of properties along the Herengracht, Amsterdam’s most expensive canal, from Eich-
holtz (1997). This dataset extends from the 17th century until 1976. For the period
1840–1979, we have additional transaction data from property auctions from Eich-
holtz et al. (2020c). Note that rates of home-ownership in Amsterdam were low and
varied over time, ranging from 30% in the 16th century to just a few percent for most
of the 20th century. As a result, most properties were likely purchased to rent out either
entirely or partially.
We combine the observations from all data sources to estimate a repeat-sales in-
dex using the methodology of Francke (2010), spanning the period 1625–1979. This
method avoids excessive noise in periods with a low number of observations (between
1810 and 1840, and between 1625 and 1737), and is consistent with the rent indices
that are based on the same method.9
For our indices of rent prices, wages, and consumer prices, we make use of existing
indices reported in Eichholtz et al. (2020b), which cover the period from 1500-present
for Paris and from 1550-present for Amsterdam. Last, we combine various series of
bond yields to construct a series of interest rates for Amsterdam spanning from 1586
to the present. Until 1795 we use data from Gelderblom and Jonker (2011) on the
yields on Holland bonds, the most important public debt instrument in the Dutch
Republic. Between 1795-1807, we use data on bond prices (and the implied yields)
from the Maandelykse Nederlandsche Mercurius, which published price lists of bonds
from the 1790s onwards. After 1814 we use the long-term (10-year) Dutch bond-yield.
To interpolate between 1807-1814, we use observations from Wilson (1941).
Descriptive statistics on each of the variables that we presented in this section and
that will be used in the analysis in the next section, are reported in Table 6.1. The
statistics on rent prices, house prices, wages, and consumer prices all refer to annual
log-differences. Note that inflation was very limited before 1913, in particular from
the early 17th century onward. Mortality, nuptiality, fertility, and implied migration
reflect percentage shares of the total population. For reference, we have also included
statistics on annual population changes in the table, but we should note that these are
based on interpolated estimates from various studies, such that their annual standard
deviation likely underestimates the true standard deviation of population growth.
6.2 Analysis: Demographic Structure and Housing Costs
In this section, we estimate the effect of the demographic structure on rent and house
prices. Estimating this effect is challenging for two reasons. First, the demographic
structure is endogenous. Migration is an essential determinant of urban populations,
in particular historically, and most of these migrants are young adults. These migra-
tion flows are dependent on the economic opportunities within a city, which them-
9For more information on the data and the index construction, we refer to the individual papers.
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Table 6.1: Descriptive Statistics, Annual.
Statistic Symbol N Mean St. Dev. Min Max
Amsterdam, 1550-1913
Rents ∆r 363 0.007 0.040 −0.191 0.278
House Prices ∆h 288 0.002 0.055 −0.231 0.191
Wages ∆w 363 0.006 0.014 −0.063 0.072
Prices ∆p 363 0.004 0.076 −0.258 0.337
Mortality M 360 0.035 0.012 0.011 0.123
Nuptiality N 349 0.010 0.002 0.006 0.020
Fertility F 349 0.033 0.004 0.019 0.045
Migration (Impl.) Mi 364 0.009 0.017 −0.016 0.110
Migration (Norm.) Mi N 350 −0.024 0.962 −2.540 4.829
Population (Estim.) Pop 363 0.008 0.021 −0.168 0.105
Bond Yield ∆i 317 −0.003 0.084 −0.405 0.463
Paris, 1500-1913
Rents ∆r 413 0.010 0.062 −0.475 0.434
Wages ∆w 413 0.009 0.054 −0.223 0.223
Prices ∆p 413 0.008 0.068 −0.264 0.411
Mortality M 369 0.033 0.011 0.012 0.153
Nuptiality N 394 0.008 0.002 0.001 0.017
Fertility F 388 0.033 0.005 0.012 0.045
Population (Estim.) Pop 413 0.006 0.025 −0.260 0.174
Notes: This table reports descriptive statistics our series of demographic rates, house prices, rental prices
and control variables for both Amsterdam and Paris. All series are continuous and end in 1913, but differ
by starting year given differences in data availability. Note that the difference in mean rent price growth
and house price growth is primarily driven by significant increases in rental prices between 1550 and
1625, which are not covered by the house price series.
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selves also might impact housing costs. Second, changes in demographic structure
are slow, implying that annual changes are unlikely to pick up sufficient variation in
house prices, in particular when using aggregated series.
We deal with these issues in two ways. First, our main regressions estimate the
effect of lagged fertility on prices and rents. This has two important benefits: us-
ing lagged fertility circumvents the endogeneity of the urban population structure
and allows us to examine predictability of housing rents and prices. Existing liter-
ature has examined the contemporaneous relation between demographic structure
and changes in asset prices and risk premia, assuming the demographic structure is
predictable. However, this predictability has not yet been tested. Second, we study
developments in five-year fertility in our main specifications to filter out noise. This
draws a good balance between picking up actual changes in demographic structure
and statistical power.10
To estimate the impact of the demographic structure on prices and rents, we esti-
mate the following model:
∆5 yt =α+x ′tβ+εt , (6.1)
where y is a vector of (i) rent prices, (ii) house prices, or (iii) rent-price ratios. The vec-
tor xt contains the variables of interest: (i) The total five-year lagged fertility (
∑t
j=t−4 F j−l ag ),
and (ii) the total five-year contemporaneous fertility (
∑t
j=t−4 F j ). We will use various
lag lengths, ranging from 10 to 70. We do not include shorter-lags, because we already
control for contemporaneous fertility, and do not extend beyond 70 given that very
few people reached such a high age. We include demographic and economic control
variables in xt : Five-year total nuptiality (N ), mortality (M), migration (Mi ), and five-
year changes in wages (w) and consumer prices (p). For house prices, we add five-year
changes in bond yields (i ). Correspondingly:
x ′t = (
t∑
j=t−4
F j−l ag ,
t∑
j=t−4
F j ,
t∑
j=t−4
N j ,
t∑
j=t−4
M j ,
t∑
j=t−4
Mi j ,∆5wt ,∆5pt ,∆5it , ).
Note that we use changes rater than levels for all non-demographic variables, because
we could not consequently reject the presence of a unit root.11 This also avoids sensi-
tivity of our rent-price ratio to any measurement error, which might accumulate over
time when using levels (Eichholtz et al., 2020c).
To account for serial correlation introduced by overlapping observations, we com-
pute Newey-West standard errors using a lag length of five (as we take five-year differ-
ences). We will use these in all other estimation results we present in this section.12
10We will consider alternative period lengths in robustness checks.
11We tested for the null of a unit root using ADF-tests, KPSS-tests and DF-GLS tests. In most cases all
tests give the same results; we differenced variables in case one of the tests indicates the presence of a
unit root. All variables are stationary in first differences.
12As a robustness check, Figures 6.9 and 6.10 in Section 6.B report coefficients and 95% confidence in-
tervals based on the average coefficient and standard error from five non-overlapping regressions, where
we shifted the start year by one year for each regression. This gives similar results.
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6.2.1 Housing Demand: Rent Prices
Figure 6.2 presents estimated lagged fertility coefficients and corresponding 95% con-
fidence intervals for different lag lengths, both for Amsterdam and Parisian rents. Note
that by definition, the lags on the x−axis correspond to the youngest age group in that
particular cohort, so the 23th lag corresponds to the birth cohort that is currently 23-
27 years old. Table 6.2 presents full estimation results for this particular fertility lag:
a one percentage point increase in fertility 23-27 years ago increases rent prices by
about 1.25% in Amsterdam and 2.2% in Paris.
Figure 6.2 shows that both Paris and Amsterdam display similar trends for older
birth cohorts, although we measure the effects for Paris less precisely. The economic
and statistical significance is zero for fertility lags corresponding to children or younger
teenagers, but gradually increases and starts becoming significant as fertility lags start
to include cohorts currently in their twenties. A one percentage point increase in the
size of birth cohorts 20-30 years ago increases rent prices by about 1-2.5 percent. The
effect disappears again for birth cohorts in their thirties. Although the economic effect
turns negative for older cohorts, that are closer to retirement or their end of life, this
effect is insignificant for most lags.
The pattern in Figure 6.2 is closely in line with existing estimates of demographic
housing demand (e.g. Mankiw and Weil, 1989; Green and Lee, 2016). We only doc-
ument significant increases in rental prices for cohorts whose housing demand rises
rapidly: cohorts currently in their late teens or twenties. This finding suggests that the
housing supply does not fully anticipate the growth in demographic housing demand.
Nevertheless, the increase in rental prices is relatively mild: a one standard deviation
increase in five-year fertility would increase rental prices by 2-5%. This effect would
be about twice as large if we could account for child mortality.
Although they are not of primary interest, the results in Table 6.2 suggest that other
demographic variables correlate significantly with housing costs as well. In general, all
coefficients have their expected signs, but their significance varies across cities. Mor-
tality and fertility seem particularly significant in Paris, while nuptiality and migration
are important in Amsterdam. Note again that we cannot interpret these coefficients
causally, given that demographic rates and rental prices might both be related to city-
specific conditions for which we cannot entirely control.
6.2.2 Asset Demand: House Prices and Rent-Price Ratios
Figure 6.3 reports the effect of lagged fertility on changes in current house prices and
rent-price ratios. In Table 6.3, we report the full estimation output for one of these
regressions, corresponding to the birth cohort 23-27 years ago: A one percentage point
increase in fertility 23-27 years ago increases house prices by 5% and reduces rent-
price ratios by nearly the same amount.
The effects of lagged fertility on changes in house prices and rent-price ratios are
the exact opposite of each other, which confirms that demographic structure has a sig-
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Figure 6.2: Lagged Fertility and Rent Prices.
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Notes: These figures report the effect of lagged five-year fertility on 5-year changes in nominal rents in
the pre-1914 period. Each point corresponds to a different regression, with the fertility lag and starting
year changing over regressions. The fertility lag is reported on the x-axis. For example, a fertility lag of
20 corresponds to the birth cohort currently aged 20-24. Fertility data for Paris start in 1526 and for Am-
sterdam in 1565. All regressions control for contemporaneous demographic rates, wages and consumer
prices (see Table 6.2). Dashed lines reflect 95% confidence intervals, based on Newey-West standard
errors using a lag-length of five years.
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Table 6.2: Results for Paris and Amsterdam, 5-Year Rent Changes.
Dependent variable:
∆5rt
Amsterdam Paris
Fertility: Ft−23 1.246∗∗ 2.225∗∗
(0.582) (1.106)
Fertility: Ft 0.373 2.578∗∗
(0.503) (1.075)
Nuptiality: Nt 2.743∗ 4.226
(1.397) (3.228)
Mortality: Mt −0.441∗ −2.305∗∗
(0.245) (0.983)
Migration (Impl.): Mit 0.234∗
(0.141)
Migration (Norm.):Mi Nt 0.003∗∗
(0.002)
Wages: ∆5wt 0.288 0.277∗∗
(0.192) (0.109)
CPI: ∆5pt −0.017 −0.053
(0.044) (0.095)
Constant −0.328∗∗ −0.550∗∗
(0.164) (0.226)
Observations 322 359
R2 0.305 0.292
Adjusted R2 0.287 0.280
Residual Std. Error 0.062 0.146
F Statistic 17.191 24.195
Notes: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01. These regressions estimated the impact of demographic factors
on five-year changes in rent prices. They cover the time period from 1592–1913 (Amsterdam) and from
1555–1913 (Paris). Fertility observations start and end 23 years earlier. Standard errors are Newey-West
errors with a lag length of five years.
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Figure 6.3: Lagged Fertility and Changes in House Prices and Yields
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(b) Rent-Price Ratios, Amsterdam
Notes: These figures report the effect of lagged five-year fertility on 5-year changes in log house prices
and rent-price ratios in the pre-1914 period. Each point corresponds to a different regression, with the
fertility lag and starting year changing across regressions. The fertility lag is reported on the x-axis. For
example, a fertility lag of 20 corresponds to the birth cohort currently aged 20-24. Fertility data for Paris
start in 1526 and for Amsterdam in 1565. All regressions control for current demographic rates, wages
and consumer prices (see Table 6.2). Dashed lines reflect 95% confidence intervals based on Newey-West
standard errors with a lag-length of five years.
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nificant impact on house prices, while the effect on housing rents is mild.13 The effect
is significant for cohorts between age 20 and 35, and appears to peak for birth cohorts
in their late twenties, when effects exceed five percent. The effect becomes insignifi-
cant in the thirties and changes sign in the late forties. For fertility lags corresponding
to cohorts near or in their sixties, we find both statistically and economically signifi-
cant reductions in prices of about five percent per percentage point increase in lagged
fertility. Rent-price ratios show the exact opposite effect.
These effects are very substantial. An increase in five-year fertility of one standard
deviation (1.6%) would increase house prices 25 years later by over 8%. This effect
would be significantly higher after accounting for child mortality. For reference, the
US share of the population in their twenties increased from 12% to 18% between 1960
and 1980. This share declined again to 13.5% in 2000. France and The Netherlands
experienced similar trends (United Nations, 2017).
Except for normalized migration, and to a lesser extent nuptiality, we find little
correlation between house prices and other demographic variables, in line with the
findings for rental prices. The fact that normalized migration correlates with changes
in house prices, while implied migration correlates with changes in rental prices, is not
surprising: normalized migration likely measures migration of wealthier inhabitants
of Amsterdam, who are more likely to be able to buy houses. As expected, bond yields
are negatively related to house prices and positively to rental-price ratios.
6.2.3 Robustness Checks
We consider various other specifications to assess the robustness of our findings. First,
we estimate Eq. (6.1) using both three-year and ten-year changes, to assess the extent
to which our findings are robust to using different time horizons. Second, we investi-
gate whether our findings also hold when only considering growth periods, estimating
Eq. (6.1) on the subset of periods where the population was growing. The effects of de-
mographic housing demand on prices might be different when cities grow compared
to when they decline because housing supply can expand when cities are growing (see
Glaeser and Gyourko, 2005). When cities are growing, it is also more likely that birth
cohorts remain in the city compared to when it declines: when cities decline, newborn
children are more likely to die or migrate in the future.
For space considerations, we only report the full coefficient plots in Figures 6.11–
6.14 in Appendix 6.B, and briefly summarize the main results here. For changes in
rental prices, we find for all our specifications that the economic effects are in line
with the estimates reported in Figure 6.2. In some specifications, we find that the
effects become more or less significant. For example, fertility lags corresponding to
birth cohorts in their twenties do not significantly predict Parisian rent prices con-
ditional on urban growth, and nor do Amsterdam rent prices when using ten-year
13Note that the difference between the coefficients on lagged fertility for changes rent-price ratios and
house prices suggests the effect is even milder than in Table 6.2. This is because the estimation in Ta-
ble 6.2 uses a more extended sample, that includes the period with the most considerable demographic
fluctuations (16th - early 17th century).
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Table 6.3: Results for Amsterdam: Rental Yields and House Price Changes.
Dependent variable:
∆5hpit ∆5(rt −hpit )
(1) (2)
Fertility: Ft−23 5.434∗∗∗ −5.024∗∗∗
(1.142) (1.013)
Fertility: Ft 1.378 −1.340∗
(0.933) (0.789)
Nuptiality: Nt 6.510∗∗ −4.333∗
(2.698) (2.485)
Mortality: Mt −0.463 0.063
(0.428) (0.407)
Migration (Impl.): Mit −0.262 0.463
(0.483) (0.386)
Migration (Norm.):Mi Nt 0.013∗∗∗ −0.009∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.003)
Wages: ∆5wt 0.829∗ −0.791∗
(0.466) (0.377)
CPI: ∆5pt −0.143 0.175∗∗
(0.112) (0.083)
Interest rate: ∆5it −0.387∗∗∗ 0.289∗∗∗
(0.089) (0.071)
Constant −1.395∗∗∗ 1.292∗∗∗
(0.320) (0.202)
Observations 285 285
R2 0.428 0.363
Adjusted R2 0.409 0.342
Residual Std. Error 0.132 0.116
F Statistic 22.818 17.375
Notes: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01. These regressions estimated the impact of demographic factors on
five-year changes in house prices (Column 1) and rental yields (Column 2), estimated for the time period
from 1629–1913. Fertility observations start and end 23 years earlier. Standard errors are Newey-West
errors with a lag length of five years.
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changes. On the other hand, we find in some specifications that fertility significantly
negatively predicts future rent prices for fertility lags corresponding to older birth co-
horts. This effect is particularly pronounced when we look at periods of urban growth
(Figures 6.15-6.16), and it also appears slightly earlier for Paris than for Amsterdam. As
a result, the effect of lagged fertility on changes in rent-price ratios is also somewhat
smaller for these older cohorts. For changes in house prices, as well as rent-price ra-
tios, results are consistent across all other specifications: We find that lagged fertility
significantly increases house prices and decreases rent-price ratios for birth cohorts
in their twenties, and does precisely the opposite for birth cohorts currently in their
sixties.
Summarizing, these findings suggest that current fertility has a mild positive effect
on rental prices 20–30 years from now, and a weaker and generally insignificant effect
on rent prices about 60 years from now. We also find such effects on house prices,
but they are much larger and more significant. Correspondingly, effects on changes in
rent-price ratios go precisely in the opposite direction. Thus, most of the effect of de-
mographics on house prices is due to increased demographic demand for housing as
an investment asset, with much smaller effects coming from changes in demographic
demand for housing consumption.
6.3 Discussion
Our analysis in the previous section indicates that changes in demographic structure
have large and predictable impacts on house prices, but smaller impacts on rental
prices. Large cohorts of young adults will increase house prices significantly, while
large cohorts of older people will reduce house prices and demand for housing invest-
ment. In this section, we aim to discuss these findings and their implications in more
detail and examine how our historical numbers translate to the current context.
In our analysis, we have examined the predictability of future rent and house prices
with current levels of fertility. To interpret our coefficients for this historical period
compared to today, it is crucial to examine differences in life expectancy across time
periods. With st ( j ) denoting the survival probability of newborn babies at time t until
age j , our estimates underestimate the effect of the remaining cohort alive at age j by
a factor ( 1 - st ( j ) ). Because survival probabilities have changed fundamentally over
time, a child born today is much more likely to reach older ages than in our sample
period.
Figure 6.4 plots the age structure, based on data from the 1851 Amsterdam house-
hold census provided by Fryske Akademy (2018). Because fertility and mortality rates
did not start to decline until the end of the 19th century, this plot likely presents a fairly
representative picture of the average age structure of the population: Most of the pop-
ulation was very young, and it was rare for people to reach old ages. Of course, due
to fluctuations in birth rates, death rates and migration the demographic structure
was subject to changes over time. Except for high levels of child mortality, the demo-
graphic structure in historical cities looked much more similar to those in developing
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countries today, who are still experiencing their demographic transition.
Figure 6.4: Age Structure Population, Amsterdam, 1851.
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Notes: This figure plots the distribution of the Amsterdam population across genders and age groups in
1851. Because infant mortality was significant, there is a large drop-off between age 0 and age 1. About
50% of newborn children would reach age 15.
Van Leeuwen and Oeppen (1993) use this data in demographic models and es-
timate that approximately half of the population reached age 18. This number is in
line with other estimates for London in the 17th century (Clark and Cummins, 2009).
The second feature of Figure 6.4 is that very few people reached old ages. Van Leeuwen
and Oeppen (1993) estimate that only 20% of the population would reach age 60, while
nowadays about 95% of the newborn is expected to reach that age.
Because individuals can only rent or buy real estate when they are old enough
to leave their parental house, it is evident that we should double our estimates for
all birth cohorts currently above age 15–19. If we use mortality figures for older in-
dividuals, to translate our estimates to the modern context, we should multiply our
estimates on the impact of current fertility on prices 20–30 years later by a factor of
2 to 2.5, and the impact on prices 60 years later by a factor almost five. However, we
should also take into consideration the age-structure of housing consumption and in-
vestment demand today and in the past. Only when they are similar, these theoretical
factors would be correct. We study the dependence of housing demand on the age
structure of the population in more detail in the next subsection.
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6.3.1 Housing Demand across Age Groups
To study differences in housing demand across age groups today and in the past, we
start from a very simple model, where aggregated housing demand for a household
simply equates the summed housing demand of each of its members, with housing
demand entirely dependent on age:
D =
N∑
n=1
D(agen) (6.2)
As the rent paid by a household is the result of its total demand for housing ser-
vices, one can directly estimate Eq. (6.2) by regressing the paid rental prices on dummy
variables reflecting the age composition of each household. This is the approach ap-
plied by Mankiw and Weil (1989), who use US census data to estimate Eq. (6.2), and
identify that housing demand increases substantially between age 20 and 30, and re-
duces at older ages.
To grasp how housing demand correlated with age in the time period that we study,
we link the 1832 cadastral rent census of Amsterdam to the household census of 1851,
using data from Fryske Akademy (2018). This provides information on all tenants
of each property in Amsterdam, including information on their age, and the rent or
rental value of these properties in 1832. To the best of our knowledge, this is the only
source available to estimate urban housing demand so far back in history. Because
the population and economy of Amsterdam changed little between 1832 and 1851,
the cross-section of rental prices in 1832 provides a fairly representative picture of the
cross-section of rental prices in 1851, the year for which we know the characteristics of
all tenants in these properties. To reduce measurement error, we exclude parcels that
were split between 1832 and 1860 and properties with no assessed value in 1832. In
total, our data cover 17,339 properties containing a total of 167,003 inhabitants, about
75% of the total number of inhabitants in 1851. Note that most properties housed
multiple families.
Next, we regress log house rental value in 1832 on inhabitant age dummy variables,
in line with the analysis from Mankiw and Weil (1989). The basic idea behind this
analysis is that differences in rental values of properties proxy for differences in the
bundle of housing services provided by these properties. Based on this assumption,
we expect that age groups with higher levels of housing demand on average live in
more expensive housing. Figure 6.5 plots the coefficients of a regression of the log
rental value of each house on inhabitant age dummy variables, in line with the analysis
in Mankiw and Weil (1989). For reference, we have plotted a loess curve through the
estimated population coefficients. Standard errors around the coefficients are around
5% until age 30 and gradually increase to over 10% at age 70.
Figure 6.5 shows that housing demand is negligible in childhood, and starts in-
creasing in the late teens, with a particularly large jump at age 18. Note that it was
common for teens to move out of their parental houses at young ages and start work-
ing, which explains that housing demand already starts increasing at approximately
age 15. Housing demand keeps increasing until the thirties, and then gradually starts
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Figure 6.5: Log Housing Demand by Age, Amsterdam, 1851.
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Notes: This figure plots the annual coefficients of a regression of property log rental value (in guilders) on
age-dummy variables for each inhabitant, which decomposes property rent by the age of its inhabitants.
Summary statistics are provided in Table 6.7. Standard errors are around 5% up to age 30, and gradually
increase to over 10% at age 70. We exclude ages after age 70 due to a low number of observations. For
reference, we plot a loess curve through the points (quadratic, span = 0.3).
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leveling off at older ages. Note that the trend in Figure 6.5 is very much in line with
the results in Figure 6.2a. Exactly for the ages at which housing demand is supposed
to increase (decrease), we report positive (negative) predictability of rent prices with
current fertility.
The pattern in Figure 6.5 is also comparable to the one documented in Mankiw
and Weil (1989). Recent studies have pointed out that housing demand drops only
marginally after accounting for differences in the economic opportunities across co-
horts (Green and Hendershott, 1996; Eichholtz and Lindenthal, 2014; Green and Lee,
2016). Green and Lee (2016) show that demand for housing services only declines by
about 10% between age 65 and 90. In our estimates, the drop in housing demand
towards older ages is much larger, with total housing demand dropping by approx-
imately 40 percent between age 40 and 70. The fact that this drop in total housing
demand is about four times larger as in modern context, largely compensates for the
fact that only one fifth of the number of newborn babies would reach age 60 compared
to today.
One advantage of our historical setting is that for most periods economic growth
was limited, implying cohort variation in incomes was likely less substantial than in
the 20th century. This is not to say that incomes did not differ across cohorts histor-
ically. For example, Amsterdam experienced a very deep and long economic crisis in
the late 18th century and early 19th century, which might have still hurt the 1851 in-
comes of the older population that experienced the crisis. Although the census does
not report on income, it does report on the profession of each individual. Supplemen-
tary Figure 6.8 reports the estimation output of a model, where we include profession
and marital status fixed effects for the main tenant, often the household head. This
likely correlates closely to household income. This results in a similar pattern as in
Figure 6.5, except that the decline in housing demand between age 40 and 50 becomes
steeper.
In summary, to translate our historical estimates on the impact of current fertil-
ity on rental prices twenty to thirty years later to modern contexts, we should roughly
double our estimates. This implies that a one percentage point increase in five-year
birth rates increase rental prices about 25-years later by approximately 2.5 to 4.5 per-
cent, following our estimates in Figure 6.2 and Table 6.2. For older ages, the large
decrease in housing demand at older ages relative to modern times offsets the com-
paratively low fraction of newborns that reach old ages in our historical sample. Trans-
lating the evidence in Figure 6.2 to today thus suggests that the aggregate impact of a
large cohort of senior people on total housing demand and rent prices is limited.
6.3.2 Housing Investments across Age Groups
The census measures demand for housing consumption. Because wealthier house-
holds can decide whether to rent or buy property, and have the option to allocate their
wealth to other investments such as bonds or equities, the age structure of housing
demand is not necessarily the same as the age structure of demand for housing invest-
ments. The fact that house prices and rent-price ratios move much more in response
6.3. DISCUSSION 217
to lagged fertility than rental prices, suggests the latter channel is comparatively more
important.
Again, there are many potential reasons why the age structure of housing invest-
ment today might differ from the past. Most notably, the increasing availability of
mortgages has made property ownership available to a much larger group of people
than before. Second, the much lower levels of income and wealth implied that most
people historically died without any property, both in Paris and Amsterdam (Hart,
1976; Piketty et al., 2006). However, about two-thirds of people in 17th-18th century
Amsterdam that died with any wealth owned real property, with government bonds
the second most popular investment, present in about a quarter of estates (Korevaar,
2020).
The key metric to assess whether demographic demand is shifting housing invest-
ment and house prices, is the age of buyers and sellers in the market. Understandably,
it is hard to reconstitute these numbers going back hundreds of years. However, us-
ing data and matching procedures described in Korevaar (2020), we can link data on
buyers and sellers to their marriage records for all housing transactions in Amsterdam
in the period 1700–1760. Due to limitations in the registration of names in the birth
records, it was not possible to link housing transactions to birth records and link hous-
ing transactions to the actual ages of buyers and sellers.
We only match individuals that have a unique name. This implies that their name,
or a very close approximation of it, only occurs once in the marriage registers of Ams-
terdam (1650–1810).14 In total, our matched database contains information on 5,694
individuals transacting property.
Although the marriage records do not provide information on age, most individu-
als in Amsterdam married in their mid- to late-twenties, following the European Mar-
riage Pattern (van Zanden et al., 2019).15 For the subset of buyers and sellers with
unique names, Figure 6.6 provides the estimated distribution of housing purchases
and sales grouped by years since marriage.
Figure 6.6 shows that very few individuals transacted property long before they
married or more than sixty years after they married, suggesting the matching proce-
dure resulted in very few mismatches. The distribution for property sales is wider,
given that a large fraction of sales happened after death by the heirs of the original
owners. More importantly, there are clear differences between the ages at which indi-
viduals buy real estate, and at which they sell real estate. After marriage net demand
for additional housing investments rises quickly. In the first few years after marriage,
the number of purchases rises more rapidly than the number of sales. Between 10
and 20 years after marriage, the number of property purchases stays relatively con-
stant, while the number of sales increases. Over 20 years after marriage the number of
14Matches are computed for each individual in the transaction or estate tax records by computing the
minimum Jaro-Winkler distance to the closest person in the marriage register. This Jaro-Winkler distance
should be less than 0.1, and the name should (in expectation) be unique. See (Korevaar, 2020) for the
exact computation of uniqueness scores.
15The archival marriage records do provide information about ages, but this information has not been
digitized.
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Figure 6.6: Housing Transactions by Age, Amsterdam, 1700-1760.
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Notes: This figure plots the distribution of buyer and seller ages by the number of years that has passed
since marriage. The plot is based on 5694 observations, including 2826 buyers and 2868 sellers. Bins are
based per two years, and the density reflects the fraction of total persons (combining buyers and sellers)
in that age bin. The tail observations might reflect a small number of mismatches. The plot is truncated
at 50 years before marriage, excluding 31 observations.
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purchases starts dropping quickly to almost zero until 60 years after marriage, when
nearly every individual has died. This is the prime time for housing sales: about 25
years after marriage the number of sales exceeds the number of purchases, and the
sale distribution peaks approximately 30–35 years after marriage, around age 60. Af-
terward, the number of sales gradually decreases towards zero.
Taking the difference between the number of buyers and sellers per age group as a
measure of average net investment demand for housing by age group, it appears that
sellers at older ages form a comparatively large fraction of the number of sellers in the
market. This contrasts with the relatively limited fraction of older individuals in the
population. There are two reasons for this pattern. First, and most importantly, due
to high mortality rates about half of the properties in the market were sold by heirs of
the owner, rather than the owner itself. If it is profitable to rent out the property, or
occupy it themselves, heirs might not sell the property immediately after the death of
the original owner and hold on to it for longer periods of time. Second, individuals
that had sufficient wealth to own real estate might have lived longer than the rest of
the general population.
In short, our evidence suggests that demand for Amsterdam real estate invest-
ments rises rapidly between age 25 and 35, stabilizes at middle ages and starts decline
rapidly from the late forties, with a peak in sales volume around age 60 to 65. This
matches the evidence on house prices in Figure 6.3, and is also in line with modern
life-cycle portfolio theory. Generally, individuals also buy and sell larger houses at
older ages, with average house value increasing by 0.35% per year for each year since
marriage (see Appendix Table 6.8).
The transaction activity of individuals at different ages informs about when in-
dividuals buy and sell homes, but not about the relative importance of property in
their portfolio over time. To track how housing investment varied over the life-cycle,
we match names of individuals in the estate tax records of Amsterdam (1688–1780) to
marriage records, using the same matching method. The estate tax records provide
detailed data on portfolio composition and wealth at death for a third of of the popu-
lation that died with any wealth. Details on this data and the data collection procedure
can be found in Korevaar (2020). In total we have 855 matched portfolios. The original
database of portfolio records is much larger, but very few of the individuals could be
matched accurately to their marriage records. Conditional on owning any wealth, real
estate was the largest item in the typical household portfolio, with a mean portfolio
share around 60 percent.
To estimate how total real estate investment varied over the life-cycle, we regress
the fraction of total wealth in real estate on the numbers of years since marriage, both
linearly and including a quadratic term. Based on the fraction of observations that
dies before marrying (wrong matches), the data suggest over 60% of observations are
matched correctly, implying our estimated coefficients will be slightly biased towards
zero.
One concern is that the the real estate investments of individuals dying at a certain
age might not be representative for the people alive at that age, even in an era where
death typically came suddenly. For example, women often became older than men
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and wealthy people might have lived longer. To address these issues, we also estimate
a model where we control for gender and total wealth. We additionally include year-
of-death fixed effects. Table 6.4 reports the results.
Table 6.4: Real Estate Wealth by Age, Amsterdam, 1688–1780.
Dependent variable:
% Real Estate Wealth log (Real Estate Wealth +1)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Years since Marriage −0.239∗∗∗ 0.561∗ 0.710∗∗ 0.017∗∗ 0.072∗∗∗ 0.070∗∗∗
(0.088) (0.292) (0.293) (0.007) (0.025) (0.026)
Years since Marriage2 −0.012∗∗∗ −0.013∗∗∗ −0.001∗∗ −0.001∗∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.0004) (0.0004)
log Total Wealth −7.418∗∗∗
(0.910)
Gender 4.946 0.360
(3.014) (0.264)
Constant 66.446∗∗∗ 56.839∗∗∗ 144.230∗∗∗ 5.663∗∗∗ 5.004∗∗∗ 6.462∗
(2.982) (4.476) (41.909) (0.252) (0.379) (3.630)
Year FE No No Yes No No Yes
Observations 855 855 855 855 855 855
R2 0.009 0.018 0.188 0.006 0.012 0.117
Adjusted R2 0.008 0.016 0.095 0.005 0.010 0.019
Residual Std. Error 42.968 42.787 41.022 3.630 3.621 3.605
F Statistic 7.456 7.873 2.035 5.288 5.362 1.189
Notes: This table reports the results of a regression of the fraction of wealth in real estate (Columns 1–3)
and log Total Real Estate Wealth (Columns 4–6) on the years since marriage, either linearly (Columns 1
and 4), including a quadratic term (Columns 2 and 5), and adding controls (Columns 3 and 6). ∗p<0.1;
∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Comparing Columns 1 and 4 shows that whereas total real estate wealth increased
over the lifetime (by 1.7 percent per year after marriage), the fraction of wealth in-
vested in real estate decreased over the lifetime (by 0.25 percent per year after mar-
riage). Both effects are non-linear: The fraction or total amount of wealth in real es-
tate increases in the first years after marriage, but declines afterward. The estimated
tipping point is around 25 years after marriage for the fraction of wealth in real estate,
and around 35 years for total real estate wealth. This implies individuals on average
started divesting from real estate around age 60 to 65. These numbers are comparable
with the estimates in Figure 6.6. These numbers do not change when controlling for
total wealth or gender. Importantly, these patterns are comparable to what is observed
in modern markets (e.g. Poterba and Samwick, 2001).
In summary, our evidence on housing transactions and investment suggests that
our historical estimates on the impact of demographic changes on house prices likely
6.4. CONCLUSION 221
are much more comparable to their modern equivalents than those for rental prices, at
least after accounting for child mortality. This suggests that reductions in demand for
housing investment at old ages may have a substantial impact on prices when cohorts
are large.
6.3.3 Demographic Demand for Bond Investment
In most of this paper, we have focused on the relation between changes in the de-
mographic structure and the housing market. However, the large differences in the
fraction of real estate in household portfolios across age groups suggest there might
be differences for other asset classes too. Most notably, life-cycle models predict the
fraction of wealth in safe investments, most notably bonds, to increase in age. To more
specifically examine the relationship between bond investments and age in our data,
we replicate the analysis in Table 6.4 with data on government bonds, the second-
largest asset class. Table 6.5 reports the results.
In line with life-cycle portfolio theory, the findings for bonds are exactly oppo-
site to those for real estate, with both the share and absolute levels of wealth invested
in government bonds increasing over the life-cycle. The increase is particularly large
at older ages, and the effect is robust for controlling for total wealth and differences
across genders.
Establishing the impact of these changes on government bond yields is more dif-
ficult, because the bond yield series is based on comparatively few transactions from
different sources, and the expected price impact less clear-cut. For young cohorts, we
would only expect negative price impacts if young cohorts sell government bonds to
buy real estate, but young individuals generally owned very few bonds. For older co-
horts, transactions from heirs selling their inherited bonds might offset the positive
impact from older people still alive transitioning to bonds. Because we do not have
transactions data on government bonds, we cannot identify to what extent this was
the case.16
6.4 Conclusion
The main conclusion of this paper is that changes in demographic structure have sig-
nificant and predictive effects on housing costs, but that these effects vary across rent
and house prices. We find that current increases in fertility rates lead to mild increases
in rental prices 20–30 years later, but have large impacts on house prices and rent-
price ratios. We document the opposite effects for fertility on housing costs 60–65
years later, when house prices reduce, and rent-price ratios increase.
The strong impact on house prices suggests that wealthier households purchase
property in young adulthood both to satisfy their demand for housing consumption
and their demand for saving. They sell their property at older ages when they stop
16In Appendix 6.A we test for predictability of bond yields. Compared to the effect on rent-price ratios,
we find opposite coefficients of lagged fertility on bond yields for young cohorts, but similar effects for
older cohorts. Unsurprisingly, none of these effects is significant though.
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Table 6.5: Bond Investment by Age, Amsterdam, 1688-1780.
Dependent variable:
% Bonds log (Bond Wealth + 1)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Years since Marriage 0.187∗∗ −0.547∗∗ −0.630∗∗ 0.044∗∗∗ −0.018 −0.022
(0.080) (0.269) (0.275) (0.009) (0.030) (0.031)
Years since Marriage2 0.011∗∗∗ 0.012∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗ 0.001∗∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.0004) (0.0004)
log Total Wealth 3.853∗∗∗
(0.857)
Gender −6.977∗∗ −0.928∗∗∗
(2.837) (0.317)
Constant 25.950∗∗∗ 34.766∗∗∗ −15.630 2.887∗∗∗ 3.635∗∗∗ 0.987
(2.740) (4.113) (39.451) (0.300) (0.452) (4.368)
Year FE No No Yes No No Yes
Observations 855 855 855 855 855 855
R2 0.006 0.016 0.146 0.028 0.034 0.122
Adjusted R2 0.005 0.013 0.049 0.027 0.031 0.023
Residual Std. Error 39.489 39.323 38.616 4.331 4.321 4.339
F Statistic 5.387 6.817 1.502 24.671 14.839 1.236
Notes: This table reports the results of a regression of the fraction of wealth in government bonds
(Columns 1–3) and log total government bond wealth (Columns 4–6) on the years since marriage, either
linearly (Columns 1 and 4), including a quadratic term (Columns 2 and 5), and adding controls (Columns
3 and 6). The effects are exactly opposite of those in 6.4, with both total bond investment and the fraction
of wealth in bonds increasing in age, with the increase particularly rapid at older ages. ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05;
∗∗∗p<0.01
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working or approach the final stages of their life. The limited effect on rental prices
indicates that increases in housing supply absorb most of the increases in housing
demand, or that this effect is comparatively small.
Our study is the first to document that changes in demographic structure have
significant impacts on changes in rent-price ratios and corresponding housing risk
premia. Existing literature has found limited support for this hypothesis in other mar-
kets. We think that the significant impact of demographic structure on house prices
originates from the fact that real estate is the leading investment asset for ordinary
households, both historically and nowadays, as owner-occupiers typically invest the
majority of their wealth in their property. Holdings of stocks and bonds tend to be
much more concentrated.
This implies that in countries with rapidly aging populations, reduced investment
demand for housing will likely result in lower house price growth, when baby boomers
retire or gradually pass away. In cities that are still growing, the influx of migrants
or the arrival of new-born life will either immediately or in the future lead to rising
housing costs. However, if supply can adjust gradually, the effects on rent prices will
be mild.
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6.A Demographic Demand and Bond Yields
The differences in the demand for bond investments across age groups documented
in the main body of the paper suggest that changes in demographic structure poten-
tially might also influence bond yields. To test this hypothesis, we estimate Eq. (6.1)
with changes in log bond yields as the dependent variable. If changes in total asset
demand drive the effects we find, instead of the specific demand for housing invest-
ments, we should expect changes in bond yields to respond similarly to changes in de-
mographics. In Figure 6.7 we report the effect of five-year lagged fertility on changes
in bond yields, and compare these to changes in rent-price ratios, both estimated for
the 1625–1913 period. In the rent-price regressions, we do not control for changes in
interest rates.
Figure 6.7: The Effect of Lagged Fertility on Bond Yields.
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Notes: These figures report the effect of lagged five-year fertility on 5-year changes in (log) bond yield and
rent-price ratios. All regressions control for current demographic rates, wages and consumer prices. For
further interpretation, see Figure 6.3.
In general, we find no significant effects of lagged fertility on changes in bond
yields, although we estimate the coefficients less precisely than we do for changes
in rent-price ratios. Most importantly, the large reductions we find in rent-price ra-
tios for fertility lags between 20 and 30, do not appear in bond yields. For older ages,
both bond yields and rent-price ratios show similar trends, with higher bond yields for
cohorts around age 60, but these effects are insignificant for the bond yield.
Table 6.6 reports modified regression results for Eq. (6.1), with changes in rent-
price ratios (Columns 1-2) and bond yields (Columns 3-4) as dependent variables, and
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fertility 60-64 years ago as an additional independent variable. As expected, fertility
23-27 years ago negatively predicts changes in rent-price ratios, while fertility 60-64
years ago positively predicts yields. Most importantly, these effects do not change
when we do not control for changes in interest rates (Column 2). Correspondingly,
Columns 3 and 4 confirm that lagged fertility does not significantly predict changes in
bond yields. The coefficients on lagged fertility are also much smaller in size compared
to Columns 1 and 2, suggesting a lack of statistical power does not merely drive their
insignificance. In short, these findings suggest that changes in demographic demand
primarily influence housing risk premia.
Table 6.6: Results for Lagged Fertility and Bond Yields.
Dependent variable:
∆5(rt −hpit ) ∆5it
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Fertility: Ft−23 −4.941∗∗∗ −4.720∗∗∗ 0.932 1.266
(0.954) (1.073) (1.599) (1.529)
Fertility: Ft−60 3.981∗∗∗ 4.441∗∗∗ 1.857 1.697
(0.694) (0.880) (1.368) (1.161)
Bond yield: ∆5it 0.242∗∗∗
(0.060)
Constant Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes No
Observations 284 284 285 285
R2 0.502 0.421 0.072 0.027
Adjusted R2 0.483 0.402 0.042 0.020
Residual Std. Error 0.103 0.110 0.170 0.172
F Statistic 27.469 22.176 2.372 3.851
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Notes: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01. These regressions estimated the impact of lagged fertility on five-
year changes in rental yields (Column 1–2) and bond yields (Columns 3–4), estimated for the time period
from 1627–1913. Fertility observations start and end 60 years earlier. Between parentheses, Newey-West
standard errors using a lag-length of five years, are provided.
We see two potential reasons for this finding. First, the lack of any effect for young
cohorts could simply result from the fact that young adults increasingly start buying
real estate, but are not yet active in other asset markets because they have accumu-
lated few wealth to begin with. As a result, bond yields only could only change by
limited amounts. Second, the fact that bond yields do not decrease for birth cohorts
corresponding to seniors, could result from the fact that bond sales from old individ-
uals that have recently died outweigh the increased demand from old individuals that
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are still alive, and increase their bond exposure.
It is practically impossible to establish the magnitude of these channels, because
there is barely any data available on the number of transactions in the bond market.
As a result, it is also not possible to link transactions to the ages of buyers and sellers.
The relatively limited data that is available on the bond market also implies we should
be careful in interpreting the estimated effects.
Finally, the series of bond yields is based on a comparatively small set of total
transactions (Gelderblom and Jonker, 2011) and combined with several other sources,
and because the market for bonds operated very differently than the market for real
estate, it is possible this yield series is not entirely representative. We thus should be
careful in drawing strong conclusions about the impact of demographic changes on
bond prices.
6.B Supplementary Tables and Figures
Table 6.7: Statistics Rental Value Regressions.
Dependent variable:
log Rental Value
Constant No Yes
Age FE Yes Yes
Profession FE No Yes
Marital Status FE No Yes
Observations 17,339 12,738
R2 0.674 0.487
Adjusted R2 0.672 0.463
Residual Std. Error 2.948 0.642
F Statistic 360.163 19.824
Notes: This table contains the summary statistics from the rental value regressions. The dependent vari-
able in these regressions is the log rental value of a property in 1832, with as independent variables age-
dummies corresponding to the inhabitants of each property in 1851. The regression in Column 1 does
not use a constant, the regression in Column 2 does use a constant and additionally controls for the
profession of the main tenant of each property and his or her marital status
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Table 6.8: Transaction Prices by Age.
Dependent variable:
log Purchase Price log Sales Price
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Years since Marriage 0.003∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001)
Constant 7.950∗∗∗ 7.511∗∗∗ 7.859∗∗∗ 7.125∗∗∗
(0.028) (0.172) (0.033) (0.179)
Year FE No Yes No Yes
Observations 2,799 2,799 2,848 2,848
R2 0.003 0.073 0.007 0.061
Adjusted R2 0.003 0.052 0.007 0.040
Residual Std. Error 1.065 1.039 1.076 1.057
F Statistic 9.324 3.529 20.064 2.960
Notes: This table reports the output of a regression of log transactions prices on the number of years
that has passed since marriage, for the subset of unique buyers (Columns 1–2) and sellers (Columns 3–4)
used in Figure 6.6. Average housing values increase by about 0.35% per year since marriage. This effect
is robust to including time fixed effects (Column 2 and 4). ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Figure 6.8: Log Housing Demand by Age (1851, Amsterdam), with controls
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Notes: This figure plots the annual coefficients of a regression of property log rental value on age-
dummies for each inhabitant, controlling for the profession and marital status of the main tenant. Sum-
mary statistics are in Table 6.7. The coefficients are substantially lower than those in 6.5 due to the pres-
ence of a constant. The age-demand pattern is similar though. Standard errors are between 1-2% up to
age 50, and increase to 4% between age 50 and 70. We exclude ages after age 70 due to a low number of
observations. For reference, we plot a loess curve through the points (quadratic, span = 0.3)
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Figure 6.9: Lagged Fertility and Rent Prices (Non-Overlapping).
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Figure 6.10: Lagged Fertility, Rental Yields and House Prices (Non-Overlapping).
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Notes: These figures are constructed similar to Figure 6.2 and 6.3, except that the estimates are obtained
using regressions that do not contain overlapping observations. The coefficients and confidence inter-
vals in the figure are based on the average of five non-overlapping regressions, with the starting year
shifted by one year for each regression
230 CHAPTER 6. DEMOGRAPHY AND THE HOUSING MARKET
Figure 6.11: Lagged Fertility and Rent Prices (3-Year Changes).
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Figure 6.12: Lagged Fertility, Rental Yields and House Prices (3-Year Changes).
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Notes: These figures are constructed similar to Figure 6.2 and 6.3, but use 3-year changes instead of 5-year
changes. The lag length in the Newey-West procedure is increased to 10 years
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Figure 6.13: Lagged Fertility and Rent Prices (10-Year Changes).
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Figure 6.14: Lagged Fertility, Rental Yields and House Prices (10-Year Changes).
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Notes: These figures are constructed similar to Figure 6.2 and 6.3, but use 3-year changes instead of 5-year
changes. The lag length in the Newey-West procedure is increased to 10 years
232 CHAPTER 6. DEMOGRAPHY AND THE HOUSING MARKET
Figure 6.15: Lagged Fertility and Rent Prices (Growth Only).
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Figure 6.16: Lagged Fertility, Rental Yields and House Prices (Growth Only).
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Notes: These figures are constructed similar to Figure 6.2 and 6.3, but instead only use observations that
correspond to periods of positive population growth.
Chapter 7
Housing Markets in a Pandemic *
7.1 Introduction
The recent outbreak of COVID-19 has brought the globalized world to a standstill,
costing the lives of hundred-thousands of people and keeping millions in ‘lockdown’
in their homes. Although its economic effects are still unfolding, one of the many af-
fected sectors is the housing market. In some heavily-affected cities, early evidence
suggests that prices and demand have been falling rapidly, while other areas have not,
or not yet, experienced such effects. For example, prices have been falling rapidly in
Manhattan, while demand in sub-urban areas around New York has increased.2
However, there is still significant uncertainty surrounding the short-term impact
of COVID-19 on urban housing markets, and at this point in time it is not yet possible
to determine whether the pandemic will have any lasting impacts on future growth
trajectories of cities and their housing markets. In general, assessing the impact of
epidemics on housing markets, both over the short- and long-term, is challenging.
While epidemics typically arrive exogenously, they are also infrequent, such that data
availability is limited. Experts have argued that the current pandemic is the worst since
the Spanish Flu, which happened over a century ago (Ferguson et al., 2020). Because
major epidemics affect the lives of nearly everyone, it is also difficult to separate causal
effects from underlying time trends within a single epidemic.
The goal of this paper is to estimate the impact of pandemics on urban housing
markets over the short- and long-term. To do so, we exploit outbreaks of cholera in
Paris (1832 and 1849) and the plague in Amsterdam (ten outbreaks, 16th-17th cen-
turies). Each of these outbreaks resulted in high mortality and significant economic
disruption. Importantly, Amsterdam and Paris already had highly-developed housing
markets, and unique micro-level data survived in the archives of both cities, allowing
us to track mortality and the developments in the housing market following an epi-
demic. We focus on cholera and the plague, because the other two major pandemics
for which we have data, the smallpox epidemic in the 1870s and the Spanish Flu in
*This chapter is co-authored with Marc Francke (University of Amsterdam).
2‘New Yorkers Are Fleeing to the Suburbs: “The Demand Is Insane”’, New York Times, August 31, 2020.
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1918, were directly linked to wars that also affected the housing market. We show that
these epidemics depressed rent and sales prices in the short-term, with the effects
on sales prices being particularly large in the first six months of an epidemic, and in
heavily affected areas. However, both Amsterdam and Paris were very resilient to these
outbreaks, with population and house price growth quickly reverting to prior trends.
We start the paper by providing a descriptive overview of the outbreaks that af-
fected Amsterdam and Paris, and how they affected society. In both Paris and Amster-
dam, the outbreaks arrived in an era of rapid urban growth. Paris grew rapidly in the
19th century, and Amsterdam experienced its Golden Age when the outbreaks hit the
city. Similar to today, the epidemics had a large impact on daily life and the economy,
and hit poor areas with significant urban crowding more than wealthier areas. Very re-
cent evidence has also suggested this for the current pandemic (Borjas, 2020; Almagro
et al., 2020). One important difference is that these pandemics were much deadlier,
killing on average a few percent of the population. In Paris, the cholera pandemics did
follow shortly after the revolutions of 1830 and 1848, and in the paper we address how
we rule out that our effects are driven by revolutionary activity.
To start our empirical analysis, we use existing rent and house price indices to
evaluate how aggregate prices were affected by an epidemic. We find that after an
outbreak aggregate house prices fell each year by about six percent until one year after
the end of an epidemic. We find the same pattern for rent prices, but these declined
only by three percent per year. Confirming the exogenous arrival of pandemics, we do
not find any significant trends in house and rent price growth in the years prior to an
epidemic.
To provide a more detailed picture of the impact of the outbreak on different seg-
ments and parts of the housing market, the main specifications in this paper aim to
estimate the impact of the outbreaks over the very short-term and across neighbor-
hoods. For Amsterdam, our data cover multiple outbreaks and a sufficient number of
transactions to estimate short-term price effects. Controlling for annual price trends,
we find that properties sold within six months after the outbreak of an epidemic re-
alized about 13% lower prices. This effect is robust when adjusting for month fixed
effects, types of sale, and changes in the composition of properties changing hands.
Importantly, this effect is temporary: it is only present in the first six months of an
epidemic.
For Paris, our data only cover two outbreaks, but contrary to Amsterdam we do
possess much more information about the geographic dispersion of the epidemic. We
use this to study whether heavily affected neighborhoods experienced worse price de-
clines than other neighborhoods. We find that a doubling of cholera mortality reduced
neighborhood-level house price growth following the epidemic by about ten percent,
but that this decline did not persist over time. After the 1849 outbreak, which affected
neighborhood prices most heavily, prices in heavy-affected areas recovered to the lev-
els of less-affected areas in about five years. These effects hold when we control for
annual time trends in city-wide prices, and for differences in neighborhood poverty
and revolutionary activity.
Are these historical estimates still relevant today? On the one hand, these epi-
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demics might be the closest comparison to the current situation in major cities. The
pandemics we study resulted in a large number of deaths and caused major disrup-
tions to economic activity. They happened in growing cities with a substantial flow
of migrants and large buy-to-let property markets. On the other hand, today’s ur-
ban economies are different from historical Amsterdam and Paris, and the current
pandemic will almost certainly result in lower mortality rates than the pandemics we
study. Because each epidemic and its context are different, it is difficult to extrapolate
point estimates from previous outbreaks.
Accordingly, related literature on the impact of epidemics on house prices differs
in the estimated coefficients. For example, for the less severe SARS outbreak in Hong
Kong in 2003, Wong (2008) estimated a small house price decline of only 1.5 percent.
For the current pandemic, Ling et al. (2020) find that a one standard deviation increase
in daily local COVID-19 cases depressed REIT (real estate investment trust) returns by
0.24 percent the following day, but these effects can be mitigated if localities take non-
pharmaceutical interventions. REITs themselves lost significant value, with a price
drop of 49 percent in March 2020. Given that regular housing market data tends to be
less directly available, to the best of our knowledge there are not yet any studies that
look at the impact on house prices and activity in the residential housing market, as
we do in this paper.
Relative to these studies, the main contribution of our paper is that we cover mul-
tiple epidemics and also study the recovery of prices over longer periods of time and
across neighborhoods, and the potential long-term impacts of epidemics on these
cities and their housing markets. We find that despite sizeable effects on property
prices in the short-term, housing markets recovered quickly from the epidemics that
we study.
In the final part of the paper, we aim to provide potential explanations for the em-
pirical facts that we document in the main body of the paper. We highlight three im-
portant potential mechanisms in the response of urban housing markets to a major
pandemic, which likely hold more generally. First, the large short-term impact of epi-
demics on house prices relative to rent prices suggests the demand for housing in-
vestment falls more than the demand for housing services (measured by rent prices).
One channel through which this can happen is that epidemics temporarily increase
risk perception or risk aversion and corresponding risk premia, in line with literature
on other disasters.3 The fact that this increase is temporary could help to explain why
prices fall more than rents in the short-term. Uncertainty regarding future rent prices
could play a role as well.
Second, we find that house and rent price growth quickly returned to their initial
trends, implying Paris and Amsterdam were highly resilient to shocks caused by epi-
demics, despite being more affected than their national populations. One important
reason is that population losses due to epidemics were quickly compensated by in-
creasing migration. As a result, the demand for housing consumption was not strongly
3Existing literature has shown that exposure to major natural disasters (Cameron and Shah, 2015;
Goetzmann et al., 2016) or violence (Callen et al., 2014) can result in increased risk aversion or pessimism.
Epidemics might have similar consequences.
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affected by epidemics. This finding contributes to a literature documenting the re-
silience of large cities to major shocks. Existing work has focused on the physical de-
struction of cities due to bombing (Davis and Weinstein, 2002; Brakman et al., 2004;
Miguel and Roland, 2011), general warfare (Sanso-Navarro et al., 2015), or city fires
(Hornbeck and Keniston, 2017). Rather than destroying physical capital, pandemics
result in significant losses to human capital: the death of a substantial part of the pop-
ulation.
Finally, the recovery of Parisian house prices, even in heavily-affected neighbor-
hoods that experienced large price drops, highlights the role of urban policy when
cities are exposed to major shocks. In Paris, the outbreak of cholera proved to be a
catalyst for significant urban redevelopment, as the outbreak made the government
realize that the clogged and dense areas of Paris were detrimental to health. The gov-
ernment started significant urban renovations that improved local amenities, particu-
larly in heavily affected areas. We find these coincided with recovering property prices.
Hornbeck and Keniston (2017) suggest a similar mechanism. They find that the Great
Boston Fire of 1872, which burnt down many old low-quality buildings, paved the way
for a higher-quality housing stock, and accordingly increased land values. In related
work, Ambrus et al. (2020) exploit the London Broad Street cholera outbreak in 1854 to
show the epidemic created a pocket of poverty in the city, persistently lowering rents
in the areas affected by the outbreak. This outbreak was confined to a single neighbor-
hood, and it did not result in large changes in infrastructure or housing construction.
The different policy response to the London epidemic might explain why the findings
of Ambrus et al. (2020) differ from those in our study and in Hornbeck and Keniston
(2017).
Note that the focus of our paper is different from that of Ambrus et al. (2020). Am-
brus et al. (2020) exploit the cholera outbreak to estimate how local income shocks
affect neighborhood sorting and wealth over the longer-term, and achieve identifica-
tion from the fact that the epidemic was highly local. The contribution of our paper
is that we study the housing market impacts of epidemics that effect an entire city
and its economy, focusing specifically on the housing market. Inherent to a disastrous
pandemic is that everyone is exposed to the health and economic consequences of
the outbreak, although in varying amounts. This makes it difficult if not impossible to
observe a control group, but also implies that the outbreak will have larger and likely
differentiated impacts on the dynamics in housing markets relative to more concen-
trated outbreaks.
7.2 Historical Background
7.2.1 Plague in Amsterdam
In the 16th and 17th centuries, outbreaks of plague frequently ravaged large parts of
Europe (Alfani, 2013), and also hit Amsterdam. To obtain mortality data for Amster-
dam in this period, we use burial registers from parishes and cemeteries provided to
us by the Amsterdam city archives (from 1554). Because parish registers are missing
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in some periods, we construct relative estimates of mortality. We compute these by
dividing per parish or cemetery in each month and year the number of deaths relative
to the preceding and following five years. To aggregate data into a single statistic, we
take the average of all parishes and cemeteries, weighted by the number of deaths in
each parish or cemetery.
Data on plague outbreaks in Amsterdam comes from Noordegraaf and Valk (1996),
which lists each year for which historical sources mention a plague outbreak. They
do not provide information on the severity or timing of these. In this paper, we will
use two mortality measures. At the annual level, we define a year to be a plague year
if annual excess mortality is higher than 25% and Noordegraaf and Valk mention a
plague year. To be more precise about the start of plague outbreaks, we construct a
monthly measure. We define the start of a plague epidemic if, for the first time, excess
mortality in a given month exceeds 100%, and Noordegraaf and Valk mention a plague
outbreak in the same year. We count epidemics that last for more than a year only in
the month of the first outbreak.
Figure 7.1 plots the estimated evolution of annual mortality in Amsterdam be-
tween 1554 and 1700. Nearly all major spikes in annual mortality coincide with the
ten different periods we identified as major plague epidemics.4 The duration of a
plague outbreak varied between two months and two years, with an average of nine
months. Major plague epidemics were deadly; the largest epidemics wiped out over
ten percent of the total population. Potentially, this number is even higher due to the
under-registration of deaths during severe outbreaks (Noordegraaf and Valk, 1996).
These outbreaks often ravaged other parts of the Dutch Republic and Europe at the
same time, but it remains unclear why and how plague reached Amsterdam exactly in
these years. Because of the high levels of urbanization, trade activity and frequent
warfare, diseases could spread quickly in the Dutch Republic (Rommes, 2015). How-
ever, trade activity and war cannot explain the exact timing of these outbreaks, nor the
disappearance of plague after 1667, because they were near-permanent features of the
Dutch economy. However, while the Dutch Republic was engaged in war for the ma-
jority of time in this period, war activity did not happen within or close to Amsterdam
except in the 1570s. Most likely, the timing of the outbreaks was thus exogenous to the
state of the Amsterdam economy and housing market.
Although it is hard to compare mortality estimates over time and across space,
plague likely affected Amsterdam more heavily than other places in the Low Countries
(see Curtis, 2016). While people died of the plague across all classes, poor people seem
to have been more affected. For example, during plague months relative mortality on
the Karthuizerkerkhof, the cemetery in the poor Jordaan area, was about 50% higher
than on other cemeteries, although this effect varied substantially across epidemics.
Unfortunately, the data do not allow for a more detailed breakdown of mortality by
neighborhood, because the burial records do not report on addresses of the death.
The Amsterdam plague outbreaks resulted in widespread death and despair, and
4Based on our definition, epidemics started in 1557, 1573, 1601, 1617, 1624, 1635, 1652, 1655, 1663,
and 1666. The 1666 epidemic was the smallest of these.
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Figure 7.1: Mortality per 1000 Inhabitants.
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Notes: These figures plot the estimated total mortality per 1000 inhabitants in Amsterdam. The dashed
line represents the starting year of an identified plague epidemic. To convert these into approximate
death rates, we extrapolated based on mortality rates reported in Van Leeuwen and Oeppen (1993) for
the late 17th century.
also affected the economy. Mooij (2001) writes that during plague outbreaks “the
merchant city became a ghost city: trade and business activity came to a halt, mar-
ket squares were empty, and shops and workshops closed their doors." Sometimes
this was the result of direct government interventions. Noordegraaf and Valk (1996)
mention that the plague law of 1558 prohibited people from visiting markets, inns,
churches, and other places where many people gathered. These had real economic
consequences: Noordegraaf and Valk quote owners of inns who complained they lost
most of their income because travelers avoided Amsterdam due to the epidemic. How
large these impacts were is nonetheless hard to identify. With Amsterdam’s economy
build on trade, it seems unlikely interventions lasted very long. For example, De Vries
(1981) writes that, to his surprise, passenger volumes on barges in Holland were barely
affected in the years around epidemics.
7.2.2 Cholera in Paris
Cholera arrived in Paris for the first time in March 1832, and the outbreak came un-
expectedly. As late as 1831, when cholera started breaking out all across Europe, the
famous French doctor Baron de Larrey (1831) wrote that “the topographic situation of
France is so advantageous, that there is little reason to worry about the introduction of
cholera-morbus in this country.” However, within a month of the outbreak in March,
the ‘cholera-morbus’ killed over 11,500 people in the city. The total death count of
the epidemic amounted to more than 18,500 people or about 2.5 percent of the to-
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tal population. It took until March 1849 for the second epidemic to arrive. Although
the outbreak spread less quickly than the initial epidemic in 1832, by the end of the
epidemic in 1849 over 15,000 people had died, 1.5 percent of the total population.
Among the most vivid descriptions of the 1832 epidemic is that of German writer
Heinrich Heine (1872). He describes the epidemic left the city in a quiet state of de-
spair, with increased security measures and sanitary committees. But the epidemic
also raised tensions across social classes, and stories went around quickly that the
government had poisoned wells, fueling a rebellion in 1832 prominently described in
Victor Hugo’s Les Miserables. Tensions in Paris were already high before the outbreaks,
following one to two years after the revolutions of July 1830 and February 1848. Al-
though the outbreaks were exogenous to the state of the local Parisian economy, origi-
nating from abroad and affecting the entire French population, they thus did arrive in
already turbulent times.
The outbreaks did not affect everyone equally. Building on the figures reported
in the official government reports about the epidemics, Administration Générale de
l’Assistance Publique (1850) and De Châteauneuf (1834), Figure 7.2 reports the mor-
tality per neighborhood in Paris during both epidemics. Although cholera affected
people of all ages and classes, the first outbreak of cholera, visible in Panel 7.2a, pri-
marily affected the most central areas of the city, where up to six percent of the total
population died. In these areas, the working class lived in a maze of narrow streets
and over-populated, unhealthy homes (Le Mée, 1998). Even in better neighborhoods,
the most impoverished alleys and streets were most affected. This is also reflected in
housing values: our data show average house prices and rents were substantially lower
in heavy affected areas.
Figure 7.2: Cholera Mortality per 1000 Inhabitants.
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Notes: These figures plot the cholera mortality per 1000 inhabitants in Paris. In both epidemics, in each
neighbourhood 1 to 6 percent of population died. Boundaries are based on Vasserot quartiers. The
correlation in neighbourhood mortality between epidemics is 0.5.
The government recognized that there existed a close link between poor and dense
neighborhoods and cholera mortality, although, unaware of the exact cause of cholera,
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they primarily believed such poor neighborhoods favored the development of mias-
mas (De Châteauneuf, 1834). This link was confirmed during the 1849 outbreak. Mor-
tality levels were high in the working-class areas in the cities on the left bank but had
gone down in the historical city center (Panel 7.2b), where much of the slum housing
had been cleared (Le Mée, 1998).
7.2.3 Urban Growth and the Housing Market
One important element to understanding the impact of the epidemics on the Parisian
and Amsterdam property market is that both cities were growing substantially in the
decades around the epidemics.
From the late 16th century to the late 1660s, the period when most plague epi-
demics ravaged the city, Amsterdam’s population grew from about 30,000 people in
the 1580s to over 200,000 people by 1670, with no periods of population decline over 5-
year horizons (Nusteling, 1985). This implied that population levels recovered quickly
after outbreaks, although detailed data at the annual level is not available to track
exactly how quick this recovery was. Economic historians have named this Dutch
Golden Age the ’first round of modern economic growth’ (De Vries and Van der Woude,
1997). Similarly, the population of Paris increased from about 600,000 in 1810 to al-
most about 1.7 million by 1860 Mairie de Paris (1967a). Only between 1846 and 1851,
a period of crisis and cholera, population growth was halted temporarily. Crucial to
the sustained growth of both cities were high levels of immigration.
The growth of these cities is also visible in the developments in aggregate property
prices and rents. In Figure 7.3 we plot the evolution in rent prices and house prices
in this period, together with vertical dashed lines that mark the price level just before
the start of an outbreak. In both Paris and Amsterdam rent prices rise substantially
over the studied period. This is not only the case in nominal terms, which is depicted
in Figure 7.3, but also in real terms. In Amsterdam, rent prices and house prices do
fall substantially after the 1660s, following the end of the Golden Age and a decline
in population. The large increase in house prices relative to rent prices in the period
before 1670, and the contraction afterwards is primarily the rate of falling interest rates
in the Dutch Golden Age and increasing rates afterwards. In nearly all cases, epidemics
coincided in both cities with a subsequent fall in house prices, but this pattern seems
less consistent for rent prices.
Both Paris and Amsterdam already had highly-developed and active housing mar-
kets at this time. Most properties were buy-to-let properties owned by investors, with
only a minority of the population owning its own house.5 In both cities, properties
could be sold in private sales via search-and-matching, and in public auctions. These
auctions were a transparent way for investors to gauge the state of the housing mar-
ket, and they were used for a large fraction of housing sales. Some of these sales were
foreclosures, but most were regular sales.6
5In 1562 in Amsterdam 31% of properties were owner-occupied, and this reduced to 15% by 1805
(Korevaar, 2020). In Paris, home-ownership was only a few percent (Kesztenbaum and Rosenthal, 2017).
6In Paris, 36% of properties were sold in auctions, and in Amsterdam this fraction was likely even
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Figure 7.3: Housing Prices and Rents Around Epidemics.
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Notes: These figures plot the evolution of house prices and rents in both Paris and Amsterdam, with the
dashed line indicating the price level before an outbreak started. These indices are from Eichholtz et al.
(2020b) for Amsterdam and Paris housing rents, and for house prices from (Eichholtz et al., 2020c, Paris)
and (Francke and Korevaar, 2020, Amsterdam). The rent price indices cover 12 epidemics lasting together
17 years, and the house price indices cover eight epidemics lasting together ten years. The house price
indices cover a smaller period because insufficient data is available to estimate an index before 1620.
higher. For more detail, see Appendix 7.A.
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7.3 Analysis
Cholera and the plague caused significant mortality and economic disruption in Paris
and Amsterdam. In this section, we analyze how these factors influenced house prices
and rents. We refer the interested reader to 7.A for a broader discussion on the effects
of the epidemics on other parts of the housing market.
7.3.1 Data
To estimate changes in house values and volume, we gather data on sale and rent
prices from administrative records. For Amsterdam, we use mandatory governmen-
tal registrations of property purchases, provided by the Amsterdam city archives. This
data provides information on 158,757 house transactions, both regular sales and fore-
closure sales, between the late 16th century and 1811. Although registers are missing
for some years, in particular in the 16th and 17th centuries, the registers that have sur-
vived do contain the universe of housing transactions in the period they cover. Trans-
action prices on regular sales were only recorded from 1637, implying the number of
transaction prices is more limited before 1637. For our analysis, we use the repeat-
sales price pairs and aggregate index Korevaar (2020) identified.
For Paris, we use data from Eichholtz et al. (2020c) originating from the sommier
foncier, a government register containing information on the universe of sale prices
in Paris between 1809–1943.7 In total, we draw on a sample of 39,786 sales prices,
covering 17,300 properties. We match the addresses in the data to their respective
neighborhoods, in order to link housing transactions and rent prices to neighborhood
mortality measures published in the official government reports.
To track developments in aggregate housing prices and rents, we use the indices
of rent prices and house prices presented in Figure 7.3 for both cities (from Eich-
holtz et al., 2020b,c; Korevaar, 2020). These are repeat-sale or repeat-rent indices that
mostly build on the same sources that we use, and we refer to their papers for more
background on the transactions data. It is important to note that the rent price indices
only use data from new rental contracts, coming from institutional investors (Amster-
dam) or rentals for entire properties (Paris). They thus do reflect market conditions, at
least at the annual level. As potential control variables, we use information on wages
and consumer prices (Eichholtz et al., 2020a), and bond interest rates. For Amster-
dam, we use Holland annuity bond yields (Gelderblom and Jonker, 2011), and for Paris
French 5% annuity bond yields from Hautcoeur and Riva (2018).
7This database also contains information on rent prices, but these do not correspond to new leases
but actual rents. Given that rental contracts often lasted many years, current rents typically do not cor-
respond to market conditions, so we exclude rents from our analysis.
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7.3.2 Aggregate Impact on House Prices and Rents
To assess the impact of the epidemics on aggregate house prices and rents, we start by
estimating the following model:
δ j ,t =α j +Epidemic j ,tβ1 +Epidemic j ,t−1β2 +x ′j ,tγ+ε j ,t , (7.1)
where δ j ,t denotes the aggregate log house price return (∆p j ,t ) or log rent index return
(∆r j ,t ) in city j in year t . We will also consider a model where we look at the difference
between changes in rents and prices: the implied change in gross rental yields. In all
specifications we stack the Amsterdam and Paris data, assuming that the coefficients
β and γ do not differ between the cities. Only the constant α j varies over the cities.
Epidemic j ,t is an annual dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if there is a se-
vere epidemic of cholera or plague, and Epidemic j ,t−1 is a dummy if there was an epi-
demic in the previous year (but not in the current year). x j ,t is a vector of control
variables, including changes in consumer prices and wages and interest rates. We also
consider a model where we control for rent or house price growth in the three years
around an epidemic, to detect potentially unobserved time trends. For each city, we
only include data between ten years before the first epidemic (if available), and ten
years after the final epidemic. Table 7.1 reports the estimation results.
For house prices, we document a reduction in house prices of about 0.055 (in logs)
per year during an epidemic (first column). After an epidemic, prices fall by another
0.041. For rental prices, the effects are substantially smaller, with rent prices falling
by 0.030 during an epidemic and another 0.025 when an epidemic ends (second col-
umn). Given that the fall in house prices exceeds those in rent prices, we also find
increases in rental yields during and just after epidemics, although not consistently
significant (third column). These effects are robust to the inclusion of control vari-
ables (columns four to six). We also do not find any significant deviations in house or
rent price growth from their average level before an outbreak. About one to two years
after the end of an epidemic, price growth is not significantly different anymore from
its average trend. Note that we also do not find significant evidence for above-average
growth after a pandemic, which would suggest an even quicker rebound of prices. In
summary this suggests that, at least at annual level, epidemics provide a temporary
break in the growth rates of rental prices and sales prices.
If the specific year in which an outbreak arrives to a city is exogenous to its econ-
omy, as we have asserted here, the estimates in Table 7.1 identify the actual impact
of these epidemics on house prices and rents. However, there are several potential
limitations to these conclusions.
First, because the indices are in some years based on a small number of obser-
vations, measurement error could be affecting the statistical significance and magni-
tude of our results. Second, other economic trends coinciding with outbreaks could
explain part of the effect since the number of epidemics is still small in absolute terms.
For example, the Parisian outbreaks of cholera followed one to two years after the
revolutions of 1830 and 1848. Third, these analyses do not allow to distinguish be-
tween more and less severe epidemics, even though the epidemics varied significantly
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Table 7.1: House Prices and Rents in Epidemics.
Dependent variable:
∆pt ∆rt ∆rt −∆pt ∆pt ∆rt ∆rt −∆pt
Epidemict+3 −0.031 0.003 0.044
(0.028) (0.011) (0.033)
Epidemict+2 0.027 −0.004 −0.029
(0.020) (0.012) (0.022)
Epidemict+1 −0.008 −0.013 −0.011
(0.019) (0.013) (0.018)
Epidemict −0.055 −0.030 0.028 −0.068 −0.029 0.024
(0.025) (0.008) (0.028) (0.029) (0.011) (0.026)
Epidemict−1 −0.041 −0.025 0.031 −0.062 −0.031 0.031
(0.012) (0.011) (0.015) (0.015) (0.011) (0.016)
Epidemict−2 −0.046 −0.037 0.011
(0.025) (0.021) (0.020)
Epidemict−3 0.021 −0.012 −0.037
(0.026) (0.020) (0.031)
Controls No No No Yes Yes Yes
City FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 94 164 94 94 118 94
R2 0.076 0.034 0.024 0.238 0.173 0.086
Adjusted R2 0.056 0.022 0.002 0.146 0.096 −0.024
Residual Std. Error 0.064 0.055 0.070 0.061 0.053 0.071
F Statistic 3.737 2.808 1.098 2.594 2.237 0.783
Notes: Estimation results from Eq. (7.1). Standard Errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and autocor-
relation using Andrews standard errors with a quadratic spectral kernel.
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in their mortality. Finally, because many epidemics only lasted a few months, using
annual changes might already be too coarse to measure their short-term impacts.
We exploit the relative strengths of our data for Amsterdam and Paris to alleviate
these issues. First, we exploit differences in the exact timing of the arrival of the plague
in Amsterdam to estimate its short-term impact on prices. Our Amsterdam data cov-
ers a much larger number of epidemics, and we correspondingly have more transac-
tions happening around epidemics relative to Paris, for which such an analysis is not
possible.
Controlling for annual time trends and month fixed effects, we aim to identify
whether the arrival of plagues resulted in significant price distortion in the six months
following the start of the outbreak. This enables us to measure short-term price ef-
fects. Additionally, this alleviates concerns about potentially unobserved economic
time trends, as this methodology only requires the outbreak of plague to be exogenous
within a calendar year, rather than across years, as assumed in the previous analysis.
For Paris, mortality data is also available at neighborhood level. We exploit cross-
sectional differences in the severity of the cholera outbreak to study whether more or
less-affected neighborhoods experience different price trajectories after an outbreak,
controlling for city-wide trends. This also enables us to control for aggregate economic
changes in the city such as the 1830 and 1848 revolutions, that happened shortly be-
fore the outbreaks. By tracking price differences in these neighborhoods over time,
we also estimate whether price differences among differently affected neighborhoods
persist over time, and if these are confounded by existing pre-trends or other neigh-
borhood specific factors.
7.3.3 Repeat Sales Model
We estimate price trends and the impact of epidemics by a repeat sales model (Bailey
et al., 1963), given by
lnPi ,t − lnPi ,s =α+µt −µs + (xi ,t −xi ,s)′β+εi ,t −εi ,s . (7.2)
The left-hand-side is the difference in log prices of house i at the time of sale t and
purchase s, where s < t , t = 1, . . . ,T and T is the number of periods. The vector µ =
(µ0, . . . ,µT )′ represents the log price index, whereµ0 = 0. The termµt−µs is the change
in log price index between the time of purchase and sale. The vector (xi ,t−xi ,s) consists
of covariates, representing changes in characteristics between the date of purchase
and sale. The constant α is a holding period independent return (Goetzmann and
Spiegel, 1995). The error terms εi ,t are independently and normally distributed with
zero mean and variance σ2ε.
We apply three modifications on the repeat sales model (7.2). First, in order to
reduce the impact of noise on the index, due to low number of observations and/or
outliers, we use a stochastic log price index specification, replacing the time fixed ef-
fects, following Goetzmann (1992), Kuo (1999) and Francke (2010). The log price index
is specified as a random walk, given by µt ∼ N (µt−1,σ2µ).
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Second, we use a time-weighted repeat sales model to control for periodic (annual)
price changes as precisely as possible by taking into account the proportion of the pe-
riod during which the property was “held” (Geltner, 1997). For that reason we replace
the integer values s, t by continuous variables, where for example t = 1.25 indicates
that the property has been sold 1 year and 3 months after the start of the index. Define
fs = bsc+1− s, and ft = t −btc, denoting respectively the proportion was held in the
period of purchase and sale, where btc is the greatest integer less than or equal to t . We
subsequently replaceµt−µs in Eq. (7.2) by (1− ft )µbtc+ ftµbtc+1−( fsµbsc+(1− fs)µbsc+1).
Third, we add interaction effects from lower frequency (for example four year pe-
riods) time varying effects λ j and time-invariant covariates z j , where λ j is a (T ′+1)-
vector with the first element being equal to 0, so λ j0 = 0, and T ′ is the number of peri-
ods at the lower frequency. We use lower frequencies because we have an insufficient
number of observations to compute annual time fixed effects λ j precisely.
The modified repeat sales model can be expressed as
lnPi ,t − lnPi ,s = α+dµi ,s,t µ+
J∑
j=1
zi , j d
λ
i ,s,t λ
j + (xi ,t −xi ,s)′β+εi ,t −εi ,s ,
µτ ∼ N (µτ−1,σ2µ), µ0 = 0,τ= 0,1, . . . ,T, (7.3)
where dµi ,s,t is given by(
0 · · ·0︸ ︷︷ ︸
1,...,bsc−1
− fi ,s︸ ︷︷ ︸
bsc
−(1− fi ,s)︸ ︷︷ ︸
bsc+1
0 · · ·0︸ ︷︷ ︸
bsc+2,...,btc−1
1− fi ,t︸ ︷︷ ︸
btc
fi ,t︸︷︷︸
btc+1
0 · · ·0︸ ︷︷ ︸
btc+2,...,T
)
,
and dλi ,s,t is defined likewise at the lower frequency. The model has been estimated by
Stan, a flexible probabilistic programming language for Bayesian statistical modeling.
We use non-informative priors for (σ2ε,σ
2
µ,β,λ).
8
7.3.4 Short-Term Price Responses in Amsterdam
To estimate the short-term impact of the plague on house prices in Amsterdam we
estimate the modified repeat sales model (7.3). The covariates (xi ,t − xi ,s) contain
monthly dummy variables to deal with seasonal effects and dummy variables to con-
trol for potential price discounts due to distressed sales after a foreclosure or after the
death of the owner. Most importantly, the covariates include the variables of interest
related to the plague. The dummy variable Plague is equal to 1 when within the six
months prior to the transaction date, a plague epidemic has started. The 6 and 12
months lagged variables are denoted by Plague.L6M and Plague.L12M.
The repeat sales sample contains seven plague outbreaks in the periods: 1601Sep–
1602Dec, 1617Aug–1617Dec, 1624Jul–1624Dec, 1635Oct–1636Nov, 1652Aug–1652Nov,
8Alternatively, conditional on the variances (σ2ε,σ
2
µ) the time-weighted repeat sales model (7.2) can
be estimated by generalized least squares, providing estimates of (µ,β,λ). The variance parameters are
subsequently estimated by maximum likelihood (see for more details Francke, 2010). Results are similar.
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1655Aug–1655Dec, and 1663Oct–1664Nov. In total 191 repeat sales have a plague out-
break in the six months preceding the sale date.
Table 7.2 presents estimation results from the modified repeat sales model.9 We
find a negative short-term effect of the plague on house prices of 0.136 (in logs), see
the first column. If we do add lags of the plague variable (columns two and three), the
results for the Plague variable are similar. The coefficients for the first lag (Plague.L6M)
in the second and third column are small and statistically insignificant. The coefficient
for the second lag (Plague.L12M in the third column) is positive, 0.089, and statistically
significant10, suggesting prices partly recover after 12 to 18 months from the start of
the plague.
In columns four and five we test whether the effect is different for the bottom and
top third of properties, based on the average log transaction price per street. We esti-
mate the log average transaction price by taking the coefficients on street fixed effects
from a regression of the log transaction price on sale type, year fixed effects and street
fixed effects. In column four we have two variables (Plague Cheap and Plague Expen-
sive), where the plague variable is interacted with the bottom and top third transaction
average price. We do not find a significant difference between cheap, medium and ex-
pensive properties.
In column five we have one variable representing the price level (-1 for cheap prop-
erties, 1 for expensive properties, and 0 otherwise) with time-varying coefficients λ,
see Eq. (7.3). In column five we report the differences in the time-varying coefficients
around the plague epidemics. We use periods of two years as frequency for λ. We ex-
pect the differences in coefficients to be negative, but we do not find consistent sup-
portive evidence for these claims.11
The results in columns 4 and 5 do not provide significant evidence for large dif-
ferences in the price effects of a pandemic on cheap areas, which were likely more
affected by the plague outbreaks, relative to expensive areas. However, these results
might be driven by the fact that the coefficients are imprecisely estimated. Some
streets have only a few observations, resulting in noisy estimates of the price level,
and the rapid change of Amsterdam in the 17th century implied that neighborhood
status could also change quickly. We only have street names and no exact addresses,
so it is not possible to use another level of aggregation, like neighborhoods. The major
canals in Amsterdam, for which we have most transactions, are very long and there-
fore located in multiple neighborhoods. In the next section, we therefore conduct a
similar analysis for Paris, for which we have detailed data on epidemic intensity and
on the precise location of the properties in our sample of transactions, allowing for
more precise identification.
Finally, as a robustness check 7.B reports output based on a hedonic price model
9Our results on the effect of the plague variables are robust to various specifications: The exclusion
of the constant in the repeat sales model, the inclusion of property-specific random walks (Case and
Shiller, 1987, 1989), and the exclusion of the prior for the log price index, leading to the standard repeat
sales model with time fixed effects.
10The 95% credible interval is (0.001; 0.178).
11Similar results are found using four years periods (not reported).
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(Rosen, 1974), which is due to the limited number of hedonic variables variables less
precisely estimated, but has more price observations around plagues. The estimated
price drop in the first six months after the start of an epidemic is around 0.09 in logs.
7.3.5 Neighbourhood Price Responses in Paris
For Paris we estimate the modified repeat sales model (7.3), comparing developments
in house prices across neighborhoods more or less affected by cholera. We inter-
act time fixed effects with the cholera mortality in the neighborhood in which the
property is located (z and λ in Eq. (7.3)). For additional precision, the time dummy
variables cover periods starting from the 1st of April, because both cholera outbreaks
started around the end of March. We estimate these models separately using 1832
neighborhood mortality and 1849 neighborhood mortality (in logs). We do not in-
clude variables that indicate the six months after the start of the cholera outbreak (like
the Plague variable in Amsterdam), because Paris ‘only’ had two cholera outbreaks,
and therefore a very limited number of total transactions in the first few months after
outbreaks.12 To maximize the number of repeat-sales, we estimate the model on the
entire period before World War I.
Because the epidemics happened shortly after the revolutions of 1830 and 1848,
and affected poor neighborhoods more than wealthier neighborhoods, price effects
might not be driven by cholera mortality but by differential trajectories in neighbor-
hoods after the revolution, in particular between poor and wealthy neighborhoods.
To adjust for neighborhood poverty, we first estimate the average log transaction price
per neighborhood over the entire 1809–1848 period, before the major renovations of
Haussmann, controlling for aggregate price changes using annual time fixed effects.
Absent neighborhood level data on income, we assume that average housing values
are a close proxy for neighborhood status, following Ambrus et al. (2020) and Keszten-
baum and Rosenthal (2017).13 Similar to neighborhood mortality, we interact time
fixed effects with the log average transaction price for each neighborhood.
For the 1849 period, we can additionally test whether our results are driven by
revolutionary activity. During the main insurgences in February and June 1848, bar-
ricades were put up in the east of the city, where most worker neighborhoods were
located, and not in the conservative west of the city.14 In 1830, there was no such a spa-
tial division in revolutionary activity, with barricades all across the cities, and the main
skirmishes taking place among the main boulevards and along the embankments of
the Seine. To adjust for these, we construct a dummy taking the value of 1 if a property
is in the west of the city (no barricades), and 0 if it is in the east (with barricades)
Note that cholera mortality correlates significantly with both revolutionary activity
12We do have estimates of (lagged) Cholera variables (not reported). The corresponding coefficients
are negative (apart from the first lag), however statistically insignificant.
13The correlation between average prices estimated for the 1809-1831 period (4907 observations) and
the 1809–1848 period (9263 observations is 0.97. Given the higher precision of the 1809-1848 estimates,
we use these for both samples.
14For a map of barricades, see L’Histoire (2018).
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Table 7.2: Estimation Results Price Responses Amsterdam.
Dependent variable:
lnPi ,t − lnPi ,s
Plague -0.136 -0.137 -0.121 -0.150 -0.137
(0.045) (0.045) (0.046) (0.051) (0.043)
Plague.L6M 0.000 0.019
(0.036) (0.037)
Plague.L12M 0.089
(0.045)
Plague Cheap 0.006
(0.110)
Plague Expensive 0.099
(0.120)
Foreclosure Sale -0.021 -0.021 -0.021 -0.021 -0.009
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.012)
Widow -0.046 -0.045 -0.046 -0.045 -0.044
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Heirs -0.036 -0.036 -0.036 -0.036 -0.035
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006)
Constant 0.061 0.060 0.061 0.060 0.066
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
λ1620 −λ1618 -0.917
(0.427)
λ1626 −λ1624 -0.208
(0.372)
λ1638 −λ1636 0.022
(0.143)
λ1654 −λ1652 0.137
(0.077)
λ1656 −λ1654 -0.041
(0.075)
λ1666 −λ1664 -0.172
(0.102)
σε 0.380 0.380 0.380 0.380 0.371
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
σµ 0.071 0.071 0.071 0.071 0.070
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
PSIS-LOO value -31,381.5 -31,382.8 -31,382.3 -31,384.2 NA
Interaction effect No No No No Yes
Month FE Yes
Observations 39,281
Sample Period 1602 - 1811
Notes: This table reports the output of the modified repeat sales model (7.3). Standard
errors are reported between parentheses. In all specifications, we control for potential
price differences resulting from foreclosure sales and from transfers of properties by heirs
or widows, following the death of the owner. PSIS-LOO stands for Leave-one-out cross-
validation using Pareto-smoothed importance sampling (Vehtari et al., 2017).
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in 1848 (r = 0.36, where r denotes correlation) and neighborhood level average prices
(r = −0.49 for 1832, r = −0.63 for 1849). We control for these observations, and the
effect of cholera mortality per four-year time interval. Given the correlation across
these measures, and the limited amount of data, using shorter time intervals results in
imprecisely estimated coefficients.
Figure 7.4: Price-Variation in Neighbourhoods by Cholera Mortality.
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Notes: This figure plots the estimates of the mortality interaction coefficients in the period from 1820 to
1860, the λs in Eq. (7.3), based on the 1832 (1832 Mort., in red) and the 1849 cholera log mortality (1849
Mort., in blue and green). A coefficient of 0.1 implies that in the year of observation a neighbourhood
had ten percent higher prices compared to a neighbourhood with half its cholera mortality, relative to
the base year of 1820. Around the point estimate we plot +1/-1 standard error (thick bar), and a 95% con-
fidence interval based on these errors (thin bar). We use 4-year periods for the lower frequency process
λ. In the legenda ‘AvgVal’ and ‘West’ refer to additional interaction effects (z-variables in Eq. (7.3)), where
‘AvgVal’ is a proxy for neighborhood status, and ‘West’ is a dummy variable measuring revolutionary ac-
tivity. ‘Index’ is the annual log price index µ in Eq. (7.3).
Figure 7.4 plots the evolution of the mortality coefficients, where 1820 is the base
year, so λMortality1820 = 0. We show results for three different model specifications, where
the differences concern the interaction effects z . The first specification (red in Fig-
ure 7.4) has as interaction effects: (i) log mortality in 1832 and (ii) the average neigh-
borhood log transaction price, the second specification (in blue): (i) log mortality in
1849 and (ii) the average neighborhood log transaction price, and the third specifica-
tion (in green): (i) log mortality in 1849, (ii) the average neighborhood log transaction
price, and (iii) a dummy variable indicating revolutionary activity. More details on the
estimation results can be found in Table 7.3.
Mortality correlates across the two epidemics, so the λMortality coefficients in the
models using 1832 and 1849 mortality rates evolve similarly over time. Between 1820
and 1828, neighborhoods with a high cholera-mortality in 1832 experienced higher
levels of price growth relative to less-affected neighborhoods.
This is a period of rapid price and population growth in the city in general, which
might have led to particularly fast price growth in the central areas, which were also
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most affected by the outbreak in 1832. Prices remain relatively stable in the years lead-
ing to the epidemic. Between 1832 and 1836, high-mortality areas fall in prices relative
to low-mortality areas, with a relative price drop of 0.101 in logs, see the first column
in Table 7.3. The probability that the price change is positive is 0.046.15 Relative prices
in more- and less affected neighborhoods remain at similar levels until the late 1840s.
In summary, there is evidence that the outbreak of 1832 led to large price declines in
heavily-affected areas. Prices of more- and less affected neighborhoods experienced
different price developments in the years leading to the epidemics.
For 1849 mortality the evidence is more consistent and significant. After the out-
break of 1832, prices in more and less-affected neighborhoods in the 1849 epidemic
do not display any visible and significant time trend until the outbreak, both in the
model that only controls for aggregate time trends and differences across poor and
rich neighborhoods, and the model that additionally controls for east-west differences
during the 1848 Revolution. After 1848, we find sharp drops in property prices, with
prices in high-mortality areas falling by significantly more than prices in low-mortality
areas. The additional drop between 1848 and 1852 is 0.131 in logs (the probability
that the price change is positive is 0.019), and 0.152 in logs (the probability that the
price change is positive is 0.021) when controlling for differences in revolutionary ac-
tivity, see the second and third column in Table 7.3. However, prices also bounce back
quickly, with no significant differences anymore after 1860.16
7.4 Mechanisms and Implications
Our combined findings on Paris and Amsterdam point to three important effects. First,
house prices and rents both decline after epidemics, but this effect is more pronounced
for house prices. Second, house price declines are particularly significant in the first
six months after an outbreak (Amsterdam) and in heavily-affected areas (Paris). Third,
these large initial price declines are transitory: heavily affected areas recover in prices,
and aggregate house and rent price growth return to their initial growth paths within
a few years after an epidemic.
In this section, we discuss potential mechanisms driving these effects and the role
of policy responses in shaping the trajectories of house prices and rents after the epi-
demics.
7.4.1 Housing Demand & Urban Growth
Because cholera and plague killed a significant fraction of the population, total hous-
ing demand declined significantly during an outbreak. This reduction in housing de-
mand could be strengthened further if the epidemics also resulted in significant drops
in income, for which we only have anecdotal evidence. In line with this channel, we
find rent prices to decline. However, this response is small, with aggregate rent prices
15In this Bayesian setting we do not report p-values.
16This pattern also persists after 1860.
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Table 7.3: Estimation Results Price Responses Paris.
Dependent variable:
lnPi ,t − lnPi ,s
Auction sale 0.045 0.044 0.042
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Constant 0.118 0.119 0.116
(0.008) (0.009) (0.008)
λ
Mortality
1836 −λ
Mortality
1832 -0.101 -0.039 -0.062
(0.061) (0.066) (0.076)
λ
Mortality
1840 −λ
Mortality
1832 -0.101 -0.042 -0.049
(0.056) (0.058) (0.068)
λ
Mortality
1852 −λ
Mortality
1848 -0.088 -0.131 -0.152
(0.055) (0.064) (0.074)
σε 0.366 0.366 0.365
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
σµ 0.090 0.069 0.077
(0.011) (0.011) (0.012)
PSIS-LOO value -7296.9 -7305.5 -7285.9
Interaction effects (λ)
Mortality (in log) 1832 1849 1849
AvgVal Yes Yes Yes
West No No Yes
Observations 9,531
Sample Period 1809–1913
Notes: This table presents estimation results for three different specifications
of the modified repeat sales model given by Eq. (7.3), corresponding to the ones
plotted in Figure 7.2. The interaction effect ‘AvgVal’ is a proxy for neighbor-
hood status using average transaction price, and the interaction effect ‘West’ a
dummy variable measuring revolutionary activity based on the position of bar-
ricades. The coefficient on auction sales is positive and statistically significant
in all specifications. Auctions were widely used to efficiently sell proprieties.
PSIS-LOO stands for Leave-one-out cross-validation using Pareto-smoothed
importance sampling (Vehtari et al., 2017).
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only declining by about three percent per year until one to two years after the epi-
demic. Rent price growth returns to its previous level afterward (see Table 7.1 and
Figure 7.3).
An explanation for this finding is that the loss of population was quickly made up
by increasing migration in both cities. During the period when plagues frequently oc-
curred, Amsterdam experienced its famous Golden Age, with the population increas-
ing from about 30,000 in 1580 to over 200,000 inhabitants in the 1660s (Nusteling,
1985). In Paris, the population grew by almost 15% between 1831 and 1836, despite
a deadly cholera epidemic. Population growth halted around the epidemic in 1849,
but already recovered in the early 1850s.
One important implication of this finding is that large pandemics, and their corre-
sponding demographic shocks, do not seem to affect the long-term growth trajectories
of large cities. Of course, these effects might be different in less successful cities, or in
rural areas, for which do not have data (see Alfani and Percoco, 2019).
7.4.2 Potential Channels for Short Term Price Drops
The fact that epidemics altered the demand and supply for housing could explain the
trajectories of rent prices. However, a demand-and-supply based explanation cannot
explain why sale prices fall more than rents over the very short-term, and in heavier
affected areas. One potential channel is that investors became more pessimistic about
future housing demand and corresponding (growth of) rents and that this decreased
their valuation of properties. Note that if investors had perfect foresight on rents, or
extrapolated the experience of previous outbreaks, property prices would fall by less
than rent prices during an epidemic, because rent price drops were temporary. Such
changes in expectations can only explain the fall in house prices if investors became
very pessimistic and expected housing demand to continue falling after the epidemics.
Although we cannot test how likely this channel is, such pessimistic expectations were
unjustified ex-post and if investors considered previous outbreaks.
A second channel is that epidemics temporarily increased discount rates, by higher
interest rates and/or housing risk premia. Interest rate fluctuations can only explain
a minor part of this effect since the estimates in Table 7.1 hardly change when con-
trolling for aggregate interest rates. This also does not explain why prices fall more in
heavily-affected areas.17 It is more likely that an epidemic temporarily increased per-
ceived investment risk and risk aversion, and so risk premia. For example, changes
in wealth or expected income triggered by epidemics could increase risk aversion,
such as in the canonical model of Campbell and Cochrane (1999). The prospect of un-
certainty in future income can generate similar increases in risk aversion (e.g. Guiso
and Paiella, 2008). Second, theoretical and empirical work shows that when risks are
salient, and when events trigger negative emotions, risk aversion can temporarily in-
crease significantly (e.g. Loewenstein, 2000; Bordalo et al., 2012; Cohn et al., 2015;
17Bond interest data for Amsterdam is less precise than for Paris, but more granular archival data on
mortgage interest rates revealed these changed little during outbreaks (Amsterdam City Archives, Archive
5065).
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Guiso et al., 2018), and affect risk perception (Slovic et al., 2007). This mechanism
could explain why the fall in house prices is particularly large in the short-term and
in heavily-affected areas. Uncertainty resolves when the epidemic ends, while home-
owners in heavily-affected areas are more exposed to the outbreak, either directly or
through their tenants.
One concern is that properties might sell at lower property prices due to changes
in the composition of buyers, sellers, and properties for sale, instead of an increase in
aggregate risk premia. For example, properties might sell at discounted prices because
distressed sellers sell to the first available buyer, rather than waiting to realize the fun-
damental market price. This mechanism has been well-documented for foreclosure
sales (e.g. Campbell et al., 2011), but might also apply to regular fire sales. Table 7.2
shows that different types of properties did not realize different prices during plague
epidemics in Amsterdam, and that foreclosed properties did not realize lower prices
either.18 In 7.A.3 and 7.A.4, we show there is no difference in total foreclosure volume
and realized holding periods during an outbreak, implying evidence for fire sales is
limited.
7.4.3 Housing Supply & Urban Planning
In the short-term, epidemics coincided with falling construction activity, with esti-
mated completed construction going down on average by 40% (see 7.A.1). However,
epidemics had more significant consequences on housing supply over the long run.
The City of Paris is probably the most prominent example. After the 1832 outbreak, the
government quickly realized that the areas worst affected by cholera were those with
high population densities, narrow streets, and with poor inhabitants. When Count
de Rambuteau came to power in Paris in 1833, he proclaimed that his mission was to
provide “air, water and shadow" to all citizens in Paris, and started clearing unhealthy
housing in the worst-affected central areas of the city, as well as introducing public uri-
nals to improve sanitation (Park, 2018). The 1849 outbreak confirmed the validity of
this approach since the central areas that were most affected by Rambuteau’s renova-
tions, had much lower mortality than in 1832. This confirmation paved the way for the
renowned Haussmann renovations that started in the 1850s. These destroyed nearly
all of the unhealthy medieval Paris and gave the city the image it still has today, with
its wide boulevards and large apartment blocks. Although the movement to create a
more healthy Paris already started before the outbreak of cholera (Park, 2018), follow-
ing the huge increases in population density of the central parts of the city, cholera
turned out to be the catalyst that was needed to push through large scale renovations.
Plague also affected urban planning and housing supply in Amsterdam. Similar
to Paris, Amsterdam experienced enormous inflows of migrants, forcing the city to
expand significantly. Just prior to the outbreaks in the years 1617–1618 and 1663–
1664, the government had started selling plots of land for these expansions. Strikingly,
plots continued to be sold in the plague years, and the city even started selling these
18The likely cause for the absence of a foreclosure discount is that there was a large and liquid auction
market for real estate property in Amsterdam, where both regular and foreclosed properties were sold.
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plots with mortgages, such that investors did not have to pay the full price upfront
(Abrahamse et al., 2015). These mortgages were used widely, in particular around out-
breaks.19 We do not know if the government took these measures because of the pan-
demic, but they do display a strong commitment to keeping supply expansion going
even during epidemics. Beyond housing, the outbreaks of plague caused the city to
focus on improving the urban water infrastructure, which was thought to be related to
the spread of plague (Abrahamse, 2010).
Each of these developments might have contributed to the evolution of house
prices and rents we observe after epidemics. First, the regeneration of areas heavily af-
fected by cholera likely played an important role in the fact that house prices and rents
in these areas did not stay persistently lower relative to less affected areas in Paris, as
Ambrus et al. (2020) find for London. The introduction of wider streets, the clearance
of slum housing, and access to clean water could improve the valuations of both new
and existing properties.20 Second, the continued expansion of housing supply in both
cities after epidemics limited longer-term price growth and could reinforce migration
towards the city.
7.5 Conclusion
This paper studies the impact of pandemics, the plague in 17th-century Amsterdam
and cholera in 19th-century Paris, on house prices and rents, using micro-data. We
find that major epidemics cause economically and statistically significant, but short-
lived declines in house prices, and smaller declines in rent prices. Declines in prices
are most substantial just after the outbreak of an epidemic and in heavily-affected
areas.
Although various mechanisms could explain this finding, the most plausible ex-
planation for the large and temporary decline in property prices is that epidemics
temporarily increase housing risk premia, due to increased uncertainty and economic
disruption.
About one to two years after the end of an epidemic, price growth is not signifi-
cantly different anymore from its average trend. We attribute the absence of any long-
term effect on house prices and rents to the resilience of cities to major shocks. In
both Paris and Amsterdam, the outbreaks did not stop a massive flow of migrants from
coming to the city. In Paris, the epidemic even proved to be a catalyst for significant
urban change, and rent and house prices recovered even in the worst-affected areas.
19Amsterdam City Archives, Archive 5065: Register van Rentebrieven.
20In London the policy response was restricted to the shutdown of the affected pump.
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7.A Beyond Prices: Housing Markets in Epidemics
In this Appendix, we provide a descriptive overview of other developments in the Ams-
terdam and Paris housing market during epidemics. We will discuss changes in hous-
ing supply, mortgage supply, transaction volume & foreclosures, and time-between-
sales. For a more detailed description of the structure of the housing market in this
period, see Korevaar (2020) for Amsterdam and Eichholtz et al. (2020c) for Paris.
7.A.1 Housing Supply and Construction
Amsterdam
Abrahamse (2010) notes that the 1617-1618 epidemic temporarily halted the building
industry, with masons and carpenters complaining they experienced a very bad year.
From 1632, there are government statistics on the rental value of newly completed
buildings in the city, which were made for the purpose of property taxation.21 For
all four epidemics that hit the city after 1632, we find that the number of completed
properties falls in the year following the start of the outbreak, with an average fall in
completed construction of 38%, with the fall ranging from 27% to 48% across all four
epidemics. Because most outbreaks started in the fall, it is unlikely they still had a
large effect on completed construction in the year of the outbreak itself. However, we
should note that the levels of construction both before and after an epidemic varied
significantly: there was significant construction taking place around the 1635-1636
epidemic and even more so during the 1663-1664 epidemic, while construction was
already at very low rates around the epidemics in the 1650s.
Paris
In Paris, the outbreaks of cholera coincided with a slump in building activity as well.
Based on data from Daumard (1965), the total rental value of new construction fell by
about 70% in 1849, and the slump in building activity continued until 1852. After 1852,
construction quickly resumed due to the start of the Hausmann renovations of Paris.
It should be noted that construction was already falling significantly in 1848, due to
the economic crisis and revolution that Paris was experiencing at that time.
For 1832, we do not possess exact numbers on the rental value of new construc-
tion. The closest equivalent to a construction estimate is the number of bricks that
entered Paris in each year, because bricks are essential for housing construction. The
number of bricks fell by about 10% in 1832 (relative to a fall of about 33% in 1849), but
recovered quickly in the following year (Daumard, 1965). This is consistent with the
stronger population growth that happened in the early 1830s, at least when compar-
ing to the period around 1850. Again, we should note that the number of bricks that
entered the city was already falling sharply in 1831.
In short, our evidence for both Paris and Amsterdam suggests that housing con-
struction slowed down during an epidemic, consistent with the significant economic
21Source: Amsterdam City Archives, Archive 5044.
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and demographic turmoil brought by these epidemics. We want to stress that our ev-
idence on housing construction should be treated as suggestive evidence: we do not
have consistent data on housing construction available for all epidemics, leaving too
little power for any formal statistical test, and it is hard to control for pre-trends given
that the epidemics also coincided with other shocks in building activity, most notably
in Paris in 1849 and in Amsterdam around 1663.
7.A.2 Mortgage Originations
Amsterdam
In the 17th century, a significant fraction of properties was funded using a peer-to-
peer mortgage, typically supplied by the seller of the property. The closest analogy
to a modern mortgage was a losrente contract, which was an interest-only mortgage
without a maturity date and an LTV of up to 100%. The borrower could repay the
capital sum whenever he wanted. Between the 1630s and the 1660s, around 20% of
real estate transactions were financed using such a loan. The City of Amsterdam also
often provided such mortgages when it was selling plots of land. Beyond these long-
term loans, properties could also be financed using a schepenkennis, which was either
a loan without interest used to specify a payment schedule (typically for just a year), or
a short-term interest-bearing loan with a maturity of up to several years (Gelderblom
et al., 2017). We do not know exactly how many of these loans were used as mortgages.
We briefly highlight how long-term mortgage volume changed around the epi-
demics after 1630, using data on the number of losrenten from Korevaar (2020). During
the outbreaks in 1635–1636 and 1652, we document significant reductions in the num-
ber of mortgages, with the number of contracts dropping monotonically from 321 in
1634 to 134 in 1637, and from 100 contracts in 1651 to just 73 in 1653. There is no fall
in mortgage activity during the smaller outbreak in 1655, but it should be noted that
mortgage activity was already at very low levels before the outbreak, since there were
only 37 mortgages issued in 1654 and around 60 in 1655 and 1656. The outbreak of
1663–1664 is an outlier with respect to the number of mortgages, because mortgage
volume doubled in 1664, but fell in subsequent years. Most of the increase in con-
tracts was driven by mortgages on the sales of plots of land by the city. It is possible
they hoped to increase land revenue by providing credit, but we do not know whether
this decision was related to the outbreak. In 1617-1618, when the city issued a large
number of plots of land during a plague epidemic, the government also issued loans
to buyers of plots of land for a 50% LTV.
Paris
For Paris, we do not have detailed data on mortgage originations around outbreaks
of cholera. However, Paris already had a well-developed mortgage market in the 19th
century, with a centralized mortgage register (hypotheques), and a large and active
market for peer-to-peer loans (Hoffman, 2000). Comparatively, this market was also
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substantially larger than the peer-to-peer loan market in Amsterdam, at least during
the Ancien Regime (Hoffman, 2000; Gelderblom et al., 2017).
7.A.3 Transaction Volume & Foreclosures
Both Paris and Amsterdam had institutions in place that permitted creditors to auc-
tion properties in case the owner foreclosed on its loans or any other type of required
payment. These auctions were organized centrally and were also a common way to sell
non-foreclosed properties. In Amsterdam, the records do not allow us to distinguish
between regular private sales and auctions sales since only foreclosures were regis-
tered separately. However, the available auction lists suggest the number of transacted
properties was large relative to total volume. For example, in the year 1743, 548 prop-
erties were put up for sale, relative to 613 realized total transactions in the cities. Al-
though not every property put up for sale in an auction would eventually transact, this
suggests a large fraction of real estate transactions in Amsterdam happened through
auctions.
Amsterdam
For Amsterdam, we can reconstruct total volume in the housing market for a substan-
tial number of months, building on the turnover data presented in Korevaar (2020).
For four epidemics, we have precise monthly data on regular transaction volume, and
for five epidemics we have monthly data on foreclosure volume. This implies that,
contrary to our more scattered data on construction and mortgage volume, we have
enough observations to statistically test the impact of pandemics on volume.
To do so, we regress the monthly level of turnover on a set of annual time dum-
mies that indicate the number of years until or since the closest outbreak of a plague
epidemic, with the number of years ranging from -2 years (12-24 months before the
outbreak) to 3 years after the outbreak (24-36 months). We also control for seasonality
by including month fixed effects. To estimate the regression, we only incorporate data
that is between -24 months and 36 months from an epidemic. Because our volume
estimates are monthly, but our plague dummies annual, there is significant autocor-
relation (and heteroskedasticity) in the residuals of this regression. We adjust standard
errors for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation using Andrews (1991) HAC errors.
Table 7.4 reports the results of these regressions, both for regular sales and fore-
closure sales. We use transaction volume in the year before an epidemic as a baseline.
Transaction volume is expressed as a percentage of the total housing stock.
The estimates suggest that transaction volume declined significantly during an
outbreak, with monthly transaction volume going down by 0.05 percentage points.
On average, 0.2 percent of the housing stock traded hands in each month, implying
that transaction volume fell by about 25 percent during these epidemics.22
22As a robustness check, we also modeled monthly transaction volume in a local linear trend model,
that models log sales as a function of a linear trend, a seasonal component and the six-monthly plague
variables that we also used in our analysis on Amsterdam prices. This revealed that volume primarily
7.A. BEYOND PRICES: HOUSING MARKETS IN EPIDEMICS 259
Table 7.4: Monthly Transaction Volume around Epidemics.
Volume:
Regular Foreclosures
Epidemict−2 0.003 0.001
(0.023) (0.006)
Epidemict −0.049 −0.001
(0.023) (0.006)
Epidemict+1 −0.026 0.004
(0.025) (0.006)
Epidemict+2 0.019 0.012
(0.027) (0.006)
Month FE Yes Yes
Constant Yes Yes
Observations 258 260
R2 0.740 0.252
Adjusted R2 0.724 0.206
Residual Std. Error 0.083 0.028
F Statistic 46.034 5.488
Notes: HAC-consistent standard errors are reported between
parentheses.
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For foreclosure volume, we find no significant effects in the first two years after an
outbreak, but a significant increase in foreclosure volume 24 to 36 months later. This
increase (0.01 percentage point of the housing stock per month) is about 25 percent
relative to average monthly foreclosure volume. It should not be surprising that there
is a delay between foreclosure sales and the outbreak of an epidemic: lenders might
have waited for the epidemic to be over before starting a formal foreclosure procedure,
both to give debtors extra time to pay or to avoid selling in a distressed market.
Paris
Because our data are only for a sample of streets, we cannot reconstruct transaction
volume for Paris. However, the number of transactions in our sample provide, at least
over the short-term, an estimate of the changes in transaction activity in the city. Fig-
ure 7.5 plots the volume of annual auction sales and private sales for the streets cov-
ered by our data, from 1820 to 1860. In line with our observations on housing con-
struction, transaction volume already dropped substantially in the year before the
outbreak, following the economic crisis around the 1830 revolution and the 1848 rev-
olution. In 1849, transaction volume even increases relative to its previous levels, al-
though this is entirely driven by an increase in the number of auctions.
Figure 7.5: Transactions in Paris.
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Notes: These figures plot the annual number of transactions in our sample, separating auction sales and
private sales.
7.A.4 Time-Between-Sales
We want to check whether the time-between-sales changes during or just after an epi-
demic. When owners are forced to sell properties due to the effects of the outbreak of
an epidemic, the average time-between-sales might go down. For all repeat sale pairs
dropped between six and twelve months after an outbreak, and by approximately 29%
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the time-between-sales is calculated as the difference (in days) between the date of
selling and buying a property. We model the average time-between-sales per date of
the second sale pair (TBSt ) as
lnTBSt =µt +x ′tβ+εt , µt+1 =µt +κt +ζt , κt+1 = κt +ξt ,
where µt is the log time-between-sales trend, specified as a local linear trend model.23
The vector xt contains dummy variables for epidemics, specified similarly as in sub-
section 7.3.4 for the plague. Table 7.5 provides the estimation results for the coeffi-
cients of the epidemic dummy variables for Amsterdam and Paris. We do not find
statistical significant changes in the average time-between-sales during or just after
the outbreak of an epidemic. Note that the average number of second sales per month
is small, 6.2 and 9.7 for Amsterdam and Paris, respectively. So results may be sensitive
to outliers.
Table 7.5: Estimation Results for Time-between-Sales.
Dependent variable: lnTBSt
Amsterdam Paris
Epidemic 0.037 -0.072
(0.118) (0.130)
Epidemic.L6M -0.157 0.038
(0.119) (0.131)
Epidemic.L12M 0.108 0.109
(0.124) (0.130)
Observations 274 479
Sample Period 1645(1)-1669(12) 1820(1)-1859(12)
Notes: Standard errors are reported between parentheses.
7.B Results Using a Hedonic Price Model
In this section of the appendix, we estimate a hedonic price model that aims to control
for quality of the sold properties using actually observed quality characteristics. One
advantage of this model is that it does not require properties to be sold repeatedly.
Because our transaction data for the 17th century is incomplete, the number of repeat-
sales around some of the epidemics is small. Using a hedonic price model, we can
include over 1000 transaction prices within six months of an epidemic. A disadvantage
of this approach is that the data provide very little information on housing quality
beyond location, implying estimates contain significant noise.
23See Durbin and Koopman (2012) for more details on the local linear trend model. The model has
been estimated by the STAMP software for State Space Models.
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The hedonic price model is given by:
lnPi ,t =α+µt +x ′i ,tβ+εi ,t , (7.4)
where µt is the log price index, xi ,t is a vector of control variables, and εi ,t is the error
term with zero mean and variance σ2ε . Control variables are street fixed effects and
very crude descriptions of the property, like the presence of a building, a garden, a
shop, etcetera. In total, we have 25 property related dummy variables. We use identical
variables for the plague as in the repeat sales model.
Table 7.6: Estimation Results Price Responses Amsterdam, Hedonic Price Model
Dependent variable:
lnPi ,t
Plague -0.085 -0.088 -0.088
(0.044) (0.046) (0.051)
Plague.L6M -0.009 -0.0095
(0.046) (0.056)
Plague.L12M -0.001
(0.047)
Foreclosure Sale 0.024 0.024 0.024
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014)
Adj. R2 0.501 0.501 0.501
σε 0.827 0.827 0.827
Constant Yes
Year FE Yes
Month FE Yes
Hedonic Controls Yes
Observations 133,123
Sample Period 1600 - 1811
Notes: Standard errors are reported between parentheses.
The results of the hedonic price model are reported in Table 7.6. In general, the
plague variables in the hedonic price model are similar, but slightly smaller and less
significant compared to the ones in the repeat sales model. The estimated effect is
about minus 9% (significant at the 10 percent level). The weaker significant is unsur-
prising because the hedonic price model is less precisely estimated than the repeat-
sales model (i.e. the high σε relative to Table 7.2).
Chapter 8
Summary of Findings
Inspired by the challenges faced by modern housing markets, the chapters of this dis-
sertation exploit the long course of history to create a better understanding of the
dynamics in modern housing markets. The first set of studies does so by obtaining
and analyzing new data on the evolution of housing rents (Chapter 2), affordability
(Chapter 3), and housing returns (Chapter 4). The second set of studies uses specific
episodes in history to study phenomena that are hard to understand on the basis of
modern, shorter-term data (Chapters 5 to 7). In this section, I will briefly summarize
the results of each of these studies.
Chapters 2 and 3 combine the investor and tenant perspective on housing to study
one of the most significant challenges in urban housing markets: the development of
housing rents and their affordability in large cities around the world. Chapter 2 fo-
cuses on the evolution of housing rents as income to investors. Based on a dataset of
436,000 rent observations covering rents in seven cities; Amsterdam, Antwerp, Bruges,
Brussels, Ghent, London, and Paris, we present new indices of housing rents dating
back to 1500. Long-term growth in real rental prices has been limited but has differed
substantially across cities. While modern global cities like Paris and London experi-
enced substantial real rental price growth of 0.3% per year, cities such as Ghent and
Bruges, which lost their important status, did not experience long-term real rental
price growth for half a millennium. Focusing on returns of high-growth cities thus
provides biased estimates of future rental returns.
Chapter 3 analyzes these issues from the perspective of a tenant and studies the
long-term development of housing affordability, housing quality, and housing inequal-
ity. In the period before 1900, we show that markets were unregulated and that rent
prices and wages rose in tandem when cities grew, while housing quality and inequal-
ity increased. After 1900, housing affordability started improving substantially, and we
show that short-term improvements in this period were partially attributable to rent
controls. Most of the surge in housing expenditure that did occur over time is due to
increasing housing quality rather than rising rent. In the past decades, urban housing
has been more affordable than at any other time in history.
Chapter 4 retakes a pure investor perspective and provides the first evidence of the
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actual rate of return and risk to residential real estate, both at the aggregate level and
at the property level. It employs hand-collected archival data for Paris (1809–1942)
and Amsterdam (1900–1979), combining microdata on rents, transaction prices, and
assessed values for the same homes, as well as information about property-level taxes
and costs. In all, this amounted to over 170,000 observations of rents, prices, or taxes,
covering about 40,000 properties. Over the period of study, the real geometric to-
tal return to housing, net of costs and taxes, was 4.0 percent per year for Paris and
4.8 percent for Amsterdam. All real long-term total returns originate from net rental
yields. At the property-level, the yield at purchase is an essential determinant of the
total gross holding period return, even for longer holding periods. In the short-term,
idiosyncratic risk is the dominant component of total risk, but this reduces to about
50 percent for holding periods of up to 20 years.
Rather than focusing on risk and return only, Chapter 5 investigates the impact of
investor demand on house prices, specifically focusing on whether investors ‘reach for
yield’ when interest rates are low. This chapter exploits the setting of 17th-18th century
Amsterdam, using newly-collected archival data on 164,067 property transactions and
25,962 investment portfolios. In this period, Holland was often drawn into expensive
warfare abroad. Wars were uncorrelated to the Amsterdam economy, but exogenously
increased the supply of Holland bonds, which investors bought for a stable income.
These shocks caused large booms and busts in house prices, while bond yields only
changed by small amounts. Housing cycles were amplified because wealthy investors
reached for yield, actively purchasing higher-yielding assets in periods of peace when
interest rates declined. For the top 1% of society, a 1% reduction in bond yields in-
creased the share of wealth in real estate by 12%. This reach for yield reduced risk
premia and resulted in a persistent increase in housing wealth inequality.
Chapter 6 studies how population aging and urbanization affect housing markets.
This chapter exploits historical demographic shocks to identify the causal effect of ur-
ban demographic change on housing costs, building on half a millennium of data on
house prices, rents, and demographics from Paris and Amsterdam. We show that a
one percentage point increase in the current five-year birth rate increases house prices
about 25 years later by 5%, but reduces prices 60-65 years later by the same amount.
These changes are primarily driven by the age-dependent demand for housing as in-
vestment asset: we find large impacts of demographic structure on rental yields, but
smaller and less significant impacts on bond yields and rent prices.
Chapter 7 studies how housing markets respond to the outbreak of major epi-
demics. It answers this question by analyzing unique transaction and mortality data
around historical outbreaks of the plague in Amsterdam and cholera in Paris. We doc-
ument that these outbreaks had a significant negative impact on house prices, but a
smaller impact on rent prices. We find particularly large reductions in house prices
during the first six months of an epidemic, as well as in heavily-affected areas. How-
ever, these price shocks were only transitory, and both cities quickly reverted to their
initial price paths. Our findings suggest that urban housing markets are very resilient
to major shocks originating from pandemics, even if they result in a substantial num-
ber of deaths.
Chapter 9
Research Impact
The title and very first page of this dissertation reads "Financial Lessons from the Long
History of Housing Markets." To close the circle, this final chapter aims to conclude
with the lessons that can be drawn from the past and their relevance for modern so-
ciety. Housing is important for many different actors in society. For households, a
house is a place to live and an investment for the future. For investors, real estate is
the largest investable asset class, whose risks and returns are not yet fully understood.
For policymakers, housing is important both because the status of the housing mar-
ket is closely linked to the state of the macro-economy, and because housing markets
are a significant contributor to economic opportunity and inequality. My dissertation
contains important lessons for each of these groups.
9.1 Lessons for Households
With housing rents and prices rising substantially in cities, many households feel that
urban housing affordability is quickly deteriorating. To some extent, the findings of
Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 confirm this sentiment. In the 21st century, housing afford-
ability has stagnated or worsened in nearly all of the cities studied in these chapters,
as rent prices continued to increase while real wage growth stagnated. However, over
the long-term, urban households are still in a very favorable position. On average, real
rent prices today are comparable to their levels in 1900, but given the enormous im-
provements in wages and the reduction in income inequality, households today can
afford to buy or rent much larger and better quality housing than at any time in his-
tory. This holds even in cities like Paris or London, which are often considered to be
extremely expensive. So one important lesson for households is that their housing ex-
penses have primarily increased because of rising housing quality, and not because of
rising rent prices.
Yet at the same time, we cannot neglect that improvements in urban affordabil-
ity and housing quality appear to have halted in recent years, in particular due to
the growing popularity of cities. This is not inconsistent with the historical record, as
Chapter 2 shows that urban population growth coincided with significant increases in
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rental costs over time. Historically, cities responded to increasing populations and ris-
ing housing costs with significant urban expansions. This allowed both to house more
inhabitants and to limit increases in housing rents. Limited rental price growth could
further support future population growth. As a result, real housing rents have there-
fore only increased in limited amounts over the long run, even in cities that grew enor-
mously (Chapter 2). Nowadays, the use of strict planning regulations has often ham-
pered housing expansion and driven up housing costs (Glaeser and Gyourko, 2018).
If supply adjusts, rent price increases will level off or even reverse. Thus, household
support for housing supply expansion is crucial.
There might be other reasons why households could see their cost of housing
change over time. Chapter 6 shows that changes in demographic structure have ro-
bust and predictive impacts on the cost of housing, with the impact being particularly
large on house prices. Throughout the long course of history, cities with compara-
tively large cohorts of young people have consistently experienced large house price
increases, whereas large cohorts of older people resulted in price declines. This sug-
gests that population aging might reduce house price growth in the coming decades.
Finally, Chapter 7 addresses a question that is currently very high on the household
agenda: how will the coronavirus impact the housing market? Our findings suggest
that epidemics exert little influence on the development of housing rents, but do result
in significant but short-lived declines in house price growth.
9.2 Lessons for Policymakers
These lessons for households are also relevant for policymakers, who can exert much
more control over the supply of housing. To a large extent, the findings of this thesis
support the long-familiar adage in housing economics that housing supply matters.
The lesson is simple: policymakers should make sure we build enough homes, and
the current COVID-19 crisis is not making that any less relevant (Chapter 7). But there
are other valuable and more novel lessons to be learned. First of all, Chapter 3 shows
that unregulated urban growth results in increased housing inequality. When cities
grow, rental prices of cheaper housing appreciate at faster rates than those of more ex-
pensive housing. Beyond this inequality in prices, inequality in housing consumption
increases as well. Thus, if markets are unregulated, urban growth will likely result in
increasing inequality. Existing research has shown such inequalities might have im-
portant consequences for social mobility (Chetty and Hendren, 2018a,b).
A second issue that is currently very high on the policy agenda is the regulation
of investors in the housing market. Investors are increasingly buying real estate, but
the causes and consequences of this behavior have not yet been documented. One
channel that is often highlighted in these debates, but not yet identified, is the role of
reach for yield motives among investors. Chapter 5 shows that in periods with exoge-
nously low interest rates, wealthy investors increasingly reach for yield in real estate,
and likely also in other assets. There are three policy-relevant lessons to be drawn
from this finding. First, reach for yield behavior is not restricted to institutions but
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also prevalent among individual investors investing for themselves. Reach for yield
behavior becomes increasingly prominent among investors for whom capital is an
important source of total income, in particular if this income is strongly exposed to
fluctuations in yields. This suggests that reaching for yield results from individual
preferences, rather than from misalignment between the incentives in the financial
industry and the preferences of the investors whose money they manage. It also im-
plies that limiting competitive pressures in industry may not eradicate search for yield
behavior. Second, my findings indicate that reach for yield behavior might amplify
boom-bust cycles in house prices. Since housing market volatility might have signif-
icant implications for the aggregate economy, as highlighted during the recent crisis,
monetary policymakers might need to consider reach for yield motives in setting inter-
est rates. Third, because reaching for yield drives up house prices, and is particularly
prominent among wealthy investors, it increases housing wealth inequality. During a
reach-for-yield boom, investors increasingly purchase the property from less wealthy
investors. These changes in the distribution of housing wealth might have important
consequences for future wealth inequality and dynamics within cities.
A final policy-relevant lesson is that housing booms and busts are of all times. For
as long as we have written history, crisis and boom periods have occurred, and it would
be hard to believe that we can entirely prevent a future crisis from happening. After
the recent financial crisis, policymakers have put significant emphasis on restricting
the expansion of mortgage credit, which played an important role in the spread of the
2007-2008 financial crisis. Chapter 5 shows that such measures are not a sufficient
condition to prevent future crises from happening: 17th-18th century Amsterdam ex-
perienced several major housing crises, despite having a negligible market for private
credit. The important lesson here is that a credit boom is not a necessary condition
for a housing boom (and bust).
9.3 Lessons for Investors
This thesis contains important lessons for investors, particularly for investors that
have long-term horizons, such as pension funds and sovereign wealth funds, but also
for individuals that try to support their income with housing market investments.
One lesson important for each of these groups is the realization that all real hous-
ing returns over the long term accumulate from rental cash flows rather than capital
gains (Chapters 2 and 4).Even in nominal terms, capital gains only form a small frac-
tion of total returns. Of course, capital gains move substantially over the short-term
due to changes in interest rates and expectations of future rental growth, but over the
long-term, these changes are of minor relevance.
The importance of rental cash flows for housing returns also implies that it is of
crucial importance that investors make sensible assessments of their growth over the
long-term. Most evidence on long-term rental- or house price growth typically comes
from cities that have been very successful in the past. However, Chapter 2 shows that
looking at such cities only will induce a ’survivorship bias’ in return estimates since
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cities do not keep growing forever, and some even reduce in importance over time.
This is particularly important for the future as urbanization is expected to slow down.
The evidence in Chapter 2 shows that cities without substantial growth have not expe-
rienced any long-term real rental growth. This might be a more realistic prediction for
the future.
The importance of rents might be even higher for long-term investors that hold
concentrated real estate portfolios. The typical investor in the housing market owns
only one or just a few properties, implying significant exposure to idiosyncratic risks.
Chapter 4 shows that idiosyncratic risk is the main component of total risk for holding
periods of up to twenty years, while reducing gradually in importance over time. At
the same time, the rental yield at the time of purchase is an essential predictor of the
total return over the holding period. Thus, property investors should look carefully
at their yields at purchase, and compare them to the yields in the market, in order to
avoid losing significant amounts of money.
Finally, Chapter 6 documents there are substantial predictive components in hous-
ing markets due to changes in the demographic structure of populations. Investors
could benefit from these predictive changes by purchasing rental properties before a
large cohort of young adults enters the market. This could earn these investors both
higher rents and significant short-term capital gains.
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